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This dissertation examines the use of four of ubiquitous polarities in the political-administrative
discourse of the Qing dynasty as represented in the Imperial Statecraft Compendium (Huangchao jing-
shi wenbian皇朝經世⽂編, hereafter HCJSWB), printed in 1827, and its sequels. The compendia
appeared between 1827 and 1903 and include writings on theoretical and practical aspects of government
and administration from all reigns of the Qing dynasty. The polarities that this dissertation focuses on,
ren-fa, ming-shi, gong-si and li-yi, have been a part of the political-administrative discourse since at
least the Warring States period (475–221 BC) and still play a role in the political discourse of the People’s
Republic of China. The authors of the writings included in the statecraft compendia employed the po-
larities to structure their arguments by addressing aspects of administrative problems that are in tension
and must be brought into balance. The polarities served to formulate questions such as the following.
What is the optimal balance between local discretion and central regulation within the bureaucracy, and
how can it be established? How to ensure that oﬃcials fulﬁll their duties? Can civil servants be moti-
vated with the prospect of private beneﬁt while still ensuring that they decide in the public interest in
their day-to-day administration? How to extract enough revenue to maintain the functional capacities
of the state without burdening the people excessively? These questions are questions that have no uni-
versally valid answers, but must be answered in the context of concrete circumstances.
The statecraft authors employ the dynamic frame of reference that the polarities present to formulate
their context-dependent answers to expedient problems, rather than formulating general principles of
government. They use the polarities and the idioms and loci classici which they ﬁgure in as a common
point of departure with their audience. The polarities and idioms are used rhetorically in William D.
Grampp’s sense, who writes that to “interpret the ideas of the past according to the problems of the
present is not history – it is rhetoric or argumentation.”1 The polarities and the concerns they are used
to express are part of a “language of eﬃcacy”. This language of eﬃcacy is concerned with external eﬃ-
cacy in terms of the state achieving its goals and the bureaucracy performing its primary tasks of taxa-
tion, adjudication, border defense and infrastructural maintenance, and with internal eﬃcacy in per-
forming internal tasks such as the making and communicating of laws, recruitment, managing and con-
trolling of the members of the bureaucracy. The goal of this dissertation is to learn more about the po-
litical language of a period in intellectual history that is comparatively under-researched as compared to
the ones that precede and follow it but has exerted a formative inﬂuence on later periods, and to show
how shared concerns about internal aspects of the Chinese bureaucracy manifested in shared vocabu-
1Grampp (1965), p. 100.
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lary. Most importantly, this dissertations aims to show shifts in usage by proceeding from what did not
change (the terms of the language) to what did change (the meaning or usage of the terms). The terms
representing the four polarities and a number of prominent idioms in which they appeared retained
their popularity in political discourse as China ushered into the twentieth century. The meaning of the
terms and the ideas expressed with the terms and idioms continued to change with their appropriation
to new contexts, ﬁlled with new terms adapted from abroad, as it had done in previous periods.
The Qing statecraft compendia were a series of voluminous administrative anthologies published
between 1827 and 1903. The series started with the HCJSWB published in 1827 by the ﬁnancial com-
missioner of Jiangsu, He Changling賀⾧嶺 (1785–1848), and chieﬂy compiled by his private secretary
Wei Yuan魏源 (1794–1857). The compendia were compiled as anthologies, that is, they collect writings
that had originally appeared in other contexts, such as oﬃcial and local gazetteers, individual scholar-
oﬃcials’ collected works, administrative handbooks, and later increasingly the periodical press. Most
of the editors had close ties to reform-oriented high provincial oﬃcials (governors-general, governors,
ﬁnancial commissioners) and their views were representative the moderate views of the reform-minded
oﬃcialdom. Genres present in the compendia include memorials and other oﬃcial communication,
essays and treatises, examination essays, letters and paratexts. The HCJSWB includes writings from the
Shunzhi (1638–1661) until the early Daoguang reign (1820–1850). Five sequels appeared before 1898 and
included writings from the Daoguang reign until their time of publication, as well as a few writings
from earlier reigns. The sequels that appeared after 1898 concentrate mostly on writings of the Guangxu
reign. One important point mentioned in the preface of the HCJSWB that editors of subsequent com-
pendia subscribed to was the presentation of mundane and practical administrative writing together
with theoretical writings on scholarship and the essence of government. Another important point was
the juxtaposition of alternative, even opposing views in order to allow for synthesis and compromise
adapted to speciﬁc contexts.
The compendia were noticed and read by the great provincial oﬃcials associated with self-strengthening
such as Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang and Zhang Zhidong, as well as by the reformers Kang Youwei
and Liang Qichao. Maybe even more importantly, though, extant reading diaries and the reﬂection of
changes to the form and content of the civil service examinations in the content and print runs of the
compendia show that the compendia served scholars in their preparation for civil service examinations.
This means they were consulted and read by the broad mass of ordinary literati striving for public oﬃce.
By the early 19th century it had become characteristic of statecraft essay writing to employ “ancient-
style prose as a medium of political expression and New Text theory as a vision of institutional change”.1
Statecraft writing converged with periodical press journalism of both post-1895 reform press and ear-
lier established commercial press by the late 19th century. New concepts that entered the established
1Elman (1990), p. 308.
3discourse throughout these periods were merged into the “old rhetoric”.1 In order to establish a better
basis for understanding the process of how new concepts entered the discourse, this dissertation tracks
the use in argument of a number of terms that were part of the “old” statecraft rhetoric, the four polar-
ities ren-fa, ming-shi, gong-si and li-yi, over the course of the 19th century. The time frame covered
by the statecraft compendia represents the time before and during the large scale reception of political,
philosophical and economic theories and practices from Europe and the United States of America. The
in-depth study of this period is crucial for assessments of what intellectual transformations the inﬂux of
these theories and practices induced, and what role indigenous developments played, on the other hand.
The way this dissertation frames its research questions and how it approaches its sources is in-
ﬂuenced by John G. A. Pocock’s contributions within the Cambridge school of political thought and
intellectual history.2 Pocock posits that the study of the history of human thought is at the same time a
meaningful and possible endeavor. He argues that the study of human thought can offer valid descrip-
tions and explanations of human action. He further argues that it is possible to distinguish between
right and wrong interpretations of historical documents and to reconstruct the meanings of historical
utterances, and that it is legitimate to attempt to recover the author’s intentions (that is, their “projects”
or what they were “doing” with the texts). According to Pocock, historians uncover (or discover) lan-
guages in texts. These languages are the shared idioms, rhetoric, specialized vocabularies and grammars
that authors use to reach their “rhetorical goals”.3 Pocock’s attitude has been aptly phrased in Vanheste
(2007) as “certainty does not exist in intellectual history, but this does not imply that we should aban-
don aiming at convincing interpretations, based on the available evidence.”4 Vanheste also suggests
that the Cambridge school’s common denominator in terms of methodology is a “logic of question
and answer”, the assumption that “understanding any proposition requires us to identify the question
to which the proposition may be regarded as an answer”.5 While this seems very general, it can be taken
quite literally with the texts in the statecraft compendia. Many of the writings are written quite in a
straight-forward manner and propose solutions to problems. Related to this logic is the methodological
requirement to study “texts in context”. Texts must be situated in their linguistic, ideological, political,
etc. contexts in order to understand the issues, conventions and vocabulary of the period investigated
and thus avoid anachronistic interpretations. However, tehy should not be reduced to their social or
political context.6 Studying texts in context necessitates inquiries about the speciﬁc debate or issue that
1Janku (2003), p. 206.
2Pocock (1971); Pocock (2009)
3Pocock (2009)
4Vanheste (2007), p. 14.
5Vanheste (2007) quoting Quentin Skinner quoting Robin G. Collingwood. Vanheste (2007), p. 13.
6This requirement rejects the dichotomy between text and context in the process of interpreting historical documents
that the Cambridge school criticizes liberalist and Marxist modes of analysis established when dominant in the 1960s. Accord-
ing to the Cambridge school’s critique, liberalist analysis tends to overemphasize the text, which is impermissible because text
must be situated in its linguistic, ideological, political etc. context in order to understand the issues, conventions and vocab-
ulary of the period investigated and thus avoid anachronistic interpretations. Marxist analysis overemphasizes contextual
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a text is part of. It may otherwise be simply impossible to get what the author is talking about. It also
means to gather as many facts about the person of the author as one can in order to be able to put the
author’s “rhetoric” into perspective. This dissertation thus takes words as point of departure that tend
to reoccur and cooccur and have a central rhetorical function and lend a structure to the argument. It
analyzes their meaning and shifts in their meaning by observing how they are used and used in connec-
tion with each other, and by drawing conclusions as to what sort of problems they address, what con-
cerns they manifest and to which overarching questions they connect.
Reflecting on the difficulties confronting the student of Qing intellectual history, Metzger (1973)
notes to have “increasingly come to feel that if one asks about a particular Ch’ing political value, the
answer lies in dissecting an ambivalent attitude consisting of a variety of prominent, partly contradic-
tory statements made over the centuries and all eliciting widespread respect in the Ch’ing period. No
doubt this characteristic of ambivalence is typical of value systems in other societies as well.” Metzger
goes on to note that there were still quite many “famous ideas” that “were widely accepted as true, and
many phrases and ideas in Ch’ing documents were conventional and noncontroversial; the norms and
attitudes found in this conventional material almost by deﬁnition had general signiﬁcance”.1
To focus on language is to recognize that meaning can only be inferred from use and that terms
change their meaning through use in different contexts. The appropriation of linguistic idioms to new
contexts that they were not previously intended for plays an important role for political and social
change.2 Guy (2010) writes about the function of language in political change that “the process of politi-
cal change in early modern empires was often one of drawing new meanings out of old linguistic ﬁgures,
or developing new metaphorical comparisons”.3 Rowe (2002) observes that in late imperial China, id-
ioms that constituted “part of the common ground” of political-economic discourse “were available to
articulate members of the discourse community to draw on in ways that contested the very assumptions
they were conventionally resumed to convey”.4
This dissertation studies some of the many phrases and ideas that constitute the “conventional ma-
terial” in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the norms and attitudes or at least the shared
concerns that they manifest. That is, this dissertation sets out to proceed from the seizable and concrete,
language, which authors use to act and persuade, to meaning, that is, the concerns, norms, and attitudes
manifested through language, that are removed from our direct grasp by one layer of interpretation.
The terms constituting the four polarities discussed in this dissertation are of an abstract and ambivalent
nature. The “famous ideas” emerging from “conventional phrases” ﬁguring these polarities are there-
fore particularly open to reinterpretation. A focus on the four polarities provides ample opportunity
factors and tends to end up in social or political reductionism.
1Metzger (1973), p. 25.
2See, for example, the well-written synopsis of discourse theory in Cabrera et al. (2001).
3Guy (2010), p. 357. This does not exclusively apply to political change and not exclusively to early modern empires.
4Rowe (2002), pp. 289–290.
5to observe authors starting out from the same polarity or conventional phrase and arriving at opposite
conclusions.
An issue that puzzled me in my studies of Sinology was an apparent zero-sum logic displayed by
some participants in ideological debates across Chinese history. The pattern of attack employed by said
participants against their opponents in debate was to attack the other side’s approach as immoral and
bound to fail because it erroneously focused on a certain aspect X, and that this lead them to the neglect
another aspect Y. The attackers present their program as giving aspect Y its due weight. Examples of
such debates are the arguments of the opposition to Wang Anshi’s reforms represent the moral worth
of persons (ren) and the soundness of institutions (fa) as mutually exclusive; the debates on the reform
of the Chinese legal system in the ﬁrst years of the twentieth century, the so-called “Rites-versus-law
controversy” (li-fa zhi zheng禮法之爭), that represented Confucian moral norms and the (Western)
legal system as mutually exclusive; or, more recently, the arguments of the opponents of the “Charta
’08” represent ideas from the West and China as mutually exclusive.
Concretely, what perplexed me was that aspects X and Y were in all cases aspects that seemed com-
plimentary or even mutually dependent on each other, while the historical participants in the debates
seemed to view them as dichotomies, as two things that could not go together. What had puzzled me
about the debates Wang Anshi had with his political opponents was that his critics seemed to attack
Wang Anshi for ignoring the moral integrity of his oﬃcials because he wanted to design sound institu-
tions.1 What perplexed me about the debates on the reform of the Chinese legal code at the end of the
Qing was not that the conservative camp did not want to see women receiving equal status before the
law, nor that they would invoke ritual orthodoxy to back up their demands. It was that their rhetoric
seemed to imply that there existed a dichotomy between ritual propriety and (Western?) law. The only
explanation I had was that they were apparently failing to account for the fact that (Western or any
other) law can perfectly well enshrine the inequality of persons of different gender, race or religion,
has done so throughout history. They seemed to presume that (Western) law per deﬁnition implied
the equality of sexes. But this left me puzzled why none of the contemporary or later observers of the
debates had commented on this point that seemed so important for the understanding of the debate.
What perplexed me about the critics of the Charta ’08 was not that they regarded the Charta ’08 as unﬁt
for China, but that in the way this debate was conveyed to me by commentators at the time, the Chinese
critics seemed to imply that it was unﬁt for China because it was based on a Western model. I missed the
1Reading Rowe (2002) and Levine (2008), we get the expression that the debates seem to have been full of arguments
building on polarities. For example, Sima Guang’s oft-cited argument against Wang Anshi’s ﬁscal and economic policies was
that “the wealth produced by Heaven-and-earth is ﬁnite in amount; the more is held by the government, the less remains
to be held by the people”天地⽣財⽌有此數；不在官則在民. Sima’s zero-sum logic rejected Wang Anshi’s idea that
per-capita economic product could be increased, and that concentration of more economic resources in the hands of the state
did not necessarily conﬂict with popular welfare. “Sima’s complacent dictum on the ﬁnite nature of wealth became a nearly
unchallenged point of departure for later economic planners” advocating a “pullback from state activism in the economy”.
Rowe (2002), p. 286.
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logical link as to how this claim could stand because it is obviously not the case that all Western societies
form a collective opposite in how they function to the Chinese society.
The key to my understanding of these arguments and the logical link I was missing was provided by
Schwartz’ (1959) discussion of polarities in Confucian thought and Tillman’s (1982) development of the
concept and its operation in ideological debates discussed below. This resolved my perplexity: maybe
the discussants in the above-mentioned debates were simply taking for granted that the two poles were
compatible. Attacking their opponents of gravitating to one pole instead of the other was maybe simply
their way of saying that they were so obsessed with one aspect that they were forgetting about the other
aspect and that the two had to be balanced because they were both indispensable.
The four polarities discussed in this dissertation are pairs of concepts that refer to aspects of real-
ity that are intricately related and render each other intelligible. The polarities examined in this disser-
tation are frequently used like opposites, but they are actually correlatives. They differ from pairs of
concepts such as hot and cold, male and female which are not polarities by the deﬁnition of this disser-
tation. They are rather like the poles of a magnet, they are two aspects of one and the same thing, that
come into existence by looking at the thing from different angles. They are reciprocally related elements
that can be looked at separately but function together to perform a single function. Both aspects fulﬁll
indispensable functions, therefore, one is not “better” than the other. This dissertation looks both at
instances where the terms act as independent concepts, as well as instances where they are used in com-
pounds (such as ren fa任法, zhifa治法).1
Due to the abstract nature of the terms, authors may differ in their use of the polarities. The classical
pair of aspects captured by the ren-fa polarity is the role of human agency (ren) and standardized pro-
cedures (fa) for the eﬃcacy of institutions. Derived from this is the the polarity described by the need
for central standardization of policies (fa) and the need to adapt policies to local circumstances to make
them work (ren). Another derivative example of such conﬂicting aspects is the need to control oﬃcials
actions (fa) and the need to keep the workload connected to such control (book keeping, reporting etc.)
at a manageable level for all parties involved so as to allow oﬃcials to properly perform their primary
tasks (ren).
On the most basic level, the ming-shi polarity refers to the name of an object and its physical reality.
In the context of administration, ming may refer to an oﬃcial title and its connected responsibilities
and shi to the actual performance of the bearer of the title, that may or may involve fulﬁllment of the re-
sponsibilities. ming may also refer to a regulation or a whole framework of regulations and shi to their
eﬃcacy in the sense of whether they are implemented and complied with or not. Relatedly, ming can
be interpreted as the formal authority the central government and its commands and shi to informal
power devolved to the regional level.
1Note that fazhi法治 - renzhi⼈治 is not a common pair of concepts in the statecraft literature studied and is therefore
not discussed.
7gong and si refer to different spheres of the social. si refers to the personal or private sphere of the
individual or its immediate social environment, such as family and friends. gong is the public sphere
of the clan, community or state. This basic meaning is extended to refer to interests related to these
spheres, the private interests of the individual or his immediate circle and the public interests or “pub-
lic good” of the collective. In particular, the gong-si polarity is used to refer to the professional interest
of an oﬃcial to act to the beneﬁt of his jurisdiction and his private interests such as growing or keeping
together his material wealth or return his friends, proteges and relatives favors. Another derived mean-
ing is “partial” and “impartial”, in terms of a perspective that is informed by personal interests only and
an impartial perspective founded on an appreciation of the “public good” and a broad consultation of
sources of information.
In the context of the li-yi polarity, li refers to beneﬁt, advantage, or proﬁt. yi is “righteousness” and
functions as the touchstone deciding whether li refers to righteous beneﬁt or unrighteous proﬁt. Righ-
teous proﬁt is deﬁned as mutual beneﬁt of the involved parties or the collective beneﬁt of the people.
Beneﬁt on the cost of others, for example, embezzlement of public funds or abuse of oﬃcial power, is
generally associated with unrighteousness. Unrighteous are also tax laws that unduly burden the peo-
ple. Authors employ the li-yi polarity to formulate different answers to the questions as to how to
extract enough revenue to maintain the functional capacities of the state without burdening the peo-
ple excessively. Some authors restrict beneﬁt compatible with righteousness to measures that secure the
subsistence of the people such as the promotion of knowledge of agricultural techniques that maximize
yields and ritual propriety that promotes frugality and social peace. Other authors extend the scope of
righteous beneﬁt to include a much greater range of economic and ﬁscal measures that conform to their
criterion of beneﬁting the people.
“Polarity” became popular as an analytical term in post-war Anglo-Saxon philosophy. Sheldon
(1944) and Lloyd (1966) use polarity as an analytical term in their discussion of different European and
non-European systems of thought. Sheldon employs polarities as a structural device in his discussion
of different systems of thought and to formulate his own synthetic metaphysical system.1 According to
Sheldon, the awareness for polarities is part of a proper philosophical attitude that includes an accep-
tance of complementary truths obtained by contrasting perspectives. Norris (1956) attempts a philo-
sophical generalization of the concept of polarity under the title “Polarity, a Philosophy of tensions
among values” and viewed it as an attempt to come to terms with the diversity and multifariousness
in the world. Lloyd (1966) studies the role of polarities in Greek thought. Lloyd claims that the way in
which both polarity and analogy were used in Greek philosophical and cosmological thought changed
decisively with the evolution of logic, with Plato and Aristotle contributing decisive impulses. Before
Plato, most thinkers who based their arguments on opposites tended to see them as exhaustive and mu-
1Polarities discussed by Sheldon include idealism and materialism, ﬁxed structure and process, mind and body, one and
many, metaphysics and action.
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tually exclusive, or to regard one as positive and the other one as negative, which often lead to fallacies.
Plato solved the problem by postulating the law of contradiction that stated the conditions for mutual
exclusiveness. Aristotle formulated the full range of modes of opposition.
The ﬁrst Sinologist to employ the concept of polarity in the discussion of classical Chinese thought
was (to my knowledge) Benjamin Schwartz. Schwartz (1959) introduces the metaphor of polarity to
“deal with certain themes within Confucianism” that cannot be identiﬁed “as antithesis, contradiction,
and dichotomy because the alternatives in question were regarded by the Master and by most orthodox
Confucianists not as antithetical but as inseparably complementary”. Schwartz identiﬁes three polarities
in Confucian thought that are intimately related, but do not simply correlate with each other, namely
self-cultivation (xiuji修⼰ or xiushen修⾝) and harmonizing of the world (zhiguo ping tianxia治國平
天下), the inner (nei內) and the outer (wai外) and knowledge (zhi知) and action (xing⾏).1 As it be-
came obvious “over the course of centuries [...] that tensions existed between the poles in question; that
some men gravitated to or toward one pole rather than the other in spite of their nominal commitment
to both”, “[a]ntagonisms often developed when one thinker felt another one overemphasized one side
of the polarity and failed to perceive the fundamental relationship between the two poles or elements”.2
This approach is not unhelpful for making sense of historical debates in general, and the debates in the
statecraft compendia in particular. Most of the time, what discussants really accuse each other of is not
that the opponent gravitates to one pole where he should gravitate to the other, but that he neglects one
of the poles, where he should embrace both in a balanced way. The two concepts only seem to represent
dichotomies for the discussants on the surface of the discourse. A focus on polarities in discourse does
not deny that below the surface debates were often “enmeshed with economic and social interests”. But,
for the beneﬁt of analytic clarity, it allows to focus on the arguments and ideological aspects.3
The outlook of Chinese scholar-oﬃcials has repeatedly been described as a multi-dimensional spec-
trum in which certain polarities form the axes along which individuals positioned themselves. Metzger
(1973) observes the basic polarities Confucianism and Legalism, particularism and universalism, radi-
calism and realism.4 He points out that radicalist and realist tendencies regularly, though not always,
correlated with other attitudes, including large-scale reforms of the society-at-large vs. bureaucratically
internal reforms, notably the recruitment of better oﬃcials; top-down reform vs. reform on a local basis
or with regard to a single institution; fear and/or moral solidarity vs. remunerative, material incentives
as basic way of eliciting obedience from the people; monocausality vs. multicausality; discussion of ad-
ministrative problems in general principles vs. organizational details; “fundamentalist” stress on the
validity of the classics vs. appreciation of a larger variety of sources of validation, especially history.
1Schwartz (1959), pp. 52–62.
2Tillman (1982), p. 29, about Schwartz’ concept of polarity.
3Schwartz (1959), p. 52.
4Metzger (1973), pp. 65–79. Metzger writes that radicalism’s point of departure is “the euphoric idea that good gov-
ernment is easy if the ruler will adopt the right policies”, writings take the form of “prescription for easy and full political
success”. “Realism, on the other hand, focused on the diﬃculty of putting into effect even good policies.” Metzger (1973),
p. 75.
9Tillman (1982) draws on the concept of polarity in his study of the disputes between Chen Liang陳
亮 (1143–1195) and Zhu Xi朱熹 (1130–1200) during the Southern Song dynasty (1126–1271). Tillman
suggests to extend Schwartz’ list with the polarities of erudition vs. essentialism, virtue/integrity (de
德) and achievement/results (gong功), standard/absolute/permanent (jing經 a.k.a. the dao) vs. the
expedient/relative/temporary (quan權). Tillman aptly describes the rhetorical function of polarities.
“Virtually all Confucians were at least nominally committed to the premise that both sides
of these polarities were necessary and complementary; however, there were also tensions
between polarities. Antagonisms often developed when one thinker felt another overem-
phasized one side of the polarity and failed to perceive the fundamental relationship be-
tween the two poles or elements. Relative priorities assigned to elements of these polarities
provide a way to identify divergent nuances among thinkers.”1
Tillman observes that Chen and Zhu used “Confucian polarities”, notably the tension between the
morality of personal virtue and the morality of social results, and between integrity and utility, to de-
bate their “fundamental political orientations”.2 According to Tillman, Chen Liang and the gongli
xuepai功利學派 (school of utility) he is associated with tended towards visible social results, did not
completely neglect morality but advocated the cultivation and reinforcement of personal virtue through
rituals and social norms. Many prominent representatives of late Ming and Qing statecraft thought
1Tillman (1982), p. 24.
2Tillman (1982), pp. 24–29 and 134–152. The standpoint Chen Liang wanted to express, Tillman argues, was that an ethic
of maximizing political and social results was good in itself. Tillman notes that the reunion of polarized concepts was the
common feature of Chen Liang’s writings of his late teens until those written a few months before his death. Chen Liang
wrote about the simultaneous importance of the civilian and martial ways, the way of the ruler and the way of the teacher,
as well as the way of the king and the way of the hegemon. The fragmentation of the dao in post-classical times had lead
thinkers such as Mencius and Xunzi to focus solely on the king and reject the hegemon. The detrimental consequence of this
had been the formation into of two equally radical and equally inadequate camps: one championing moral basis of ruling,
and one championing rewards and punishments. Instead, Chen Liang argued, the king and hegemon, the personal virtue of
the ruler and the results he obtained should be uniﬁed, which meant concretely, for example that a ruler who fulﬁlled the ma-
terial of the people conformed with the ideal of the kingly way. For Chen Liang, integrity and utility, and the king and the
hegemon, were one concept, not two parallel concepts. Chen Liang fused the ideal of the king with the anti-ideal hegemon
by declaring that both scored equal by the standard of social end results obtained. Confucius had “washed clean” the image
of the kings of the Three Dynasties when editing the classics in order to create an “ideal type” of purity that he could defend
against the Daoists. Later generations had failed to understand Confucius intent. In reality, Confucius had espoused an
ethics of end results, as was evident, for example, from his evaluation of Guang Zhong. Zhu Xi rebuked this on the grounds
that Chen Liang was seeing things the wrong way round. Real and long-term beneﬁt was unattainable without true personal
virtue. Beneﬁts could never be the goal. Otherwise, success and failure would become the sole criteria of right and wrong,
regardless of the means employed. Instead, integrity should be one’s goal, and beneﬁts would always follow as result. Zhu Xi
passes over Chen Liang’s assumption that the historical kings of the Three Dynasties had not been as ideal as Confucius had
depicted them, and that Confucius had simply obliterated their personal weaknesses and failures in his pedagogical intent
to construct an ideal that later generations could follow. Even if ordinary people could not attain the perfection of the sage
kings, the high ideals and moral standards could never be abandoned in exchange for some second-rate ideals and relative
standards. He rejected Chen Liang’s uniﬁcation of king (kings of the Three Dynasties) and hegemon (great Han and Tang
emperors) as fallacy. While their results obtained by both (peace and unity) were equal on the surface, only the kings had
been driven by the right motivation and their minds had been truly humane. The hegemons had only achieved what looked
like the effects of humaneness and had faked being humane in their heart-minds (for example, Tang Taizong had pretended
readiness to listen to Confucian admonitions).
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such as Gu Yanwu, Yan Yuan and Gong Zizhen cited Chen Liang, which shows that his writing was not
regarded as esoteric or off the point.1 The debate between Wang Anshi王安⽯ (1021–1086) and his po-
litical opponents unfolding in the context of Wang’s disruptive reform projects in the Northern Song
(960–1126) predated the Southern Song exchange between Chen Liang and Zhu Xi. The debate featured
all four polarities discussed in this dissertation and is referenced several times in the following chapters.2
This dissertation argues that the selected concepts are part of and link to the central concerns
of a “language of eﬃcacy”. This language of eﬃcacy is concerned with eﬃcacy in terms of the state
achieving its goals and the bureaucracy performing its primary tasks of taxation, adjudication, border
defense, infrastructural maintenance etc. The eﬃcacy with which a bureaucracy performs primary tasks
and achieves its goals (external eﬃcacy) critically depends on the eﬃciency with which certain tasks of
internal organization, such as the making and communicating of laws, and the recruitment, manage-
ment and control of the members of the bureaucracy, are performed (internal eﬃciency). A crucial un-
derlying concern of the texts collected in the statecraft compendia is therefore the effective control of the
bureaucracy’s members. Note that moral aspects such as law abidance and non-corruption play a role
for both external eﬃcacy (“moral performance”) and internal eﬃciency.
Men (ren) and regulations (fa, or, depending on the context methods, standards or institutions)
form the building blocks of government and there the basic “building blocks of eﬃcacy”. ren most
often refers to members of the bureaucracy who are responsible for operating the bureaucracies insti-
tutions and complying to their internal rules and procedures. ren may also refer to the governed, that
is, the people as a whole or the inhabitants of a particular administrative subunit. On a more general
level, ren refers to human agency and fa to predetermined rules and frameworks. This dissertation
calls ming-shi and gong-si the “conditions of eﬃcacy” because in discussing the congruence between
name (ming) and actuality (shi) and the appropriate balance of public (gong) and private interest (si),
authors reason about the conditions of eﬃcacious government. Such conditions are, for example, the
correspondence of oﬃcial responsibilities and performance or between formal and informal systems in
the bureaucracy, and the proper balance of an orientation towards the public good and a motivation by
private interests. li and yi are called the “goals of eﬃcacy” because the congruence of beneﬁt (li) and
righteousness (yi) is often evoked in the discussion of the proper goals and ends of government. The
congruence of the two is reached when governance serves ﬁrst and foremost the people, not the state.
Metzger (1973) and Kiser and Tong (1992) provide useful theoretical frames for the relationship of
control, internal eﬃciency and external power. Metzger examines control, eﬃcacy and power from the
perspective of the bureaucracy, while Kiser and Tong take the perspective of the rulers. Metzger links
organizational control to the bureaucracy’s eﬃciency which he regards as determinant of the bureau-
1Tillman (1982), p. 9 and Feng (2002), p. 22.
2See Levine (2008). Further examples of Sinologist scholarship employing polarity as an analytical term are, for example,
Cheng (1991), pp. 185–217 and Huang (2001).
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cracy’s power. Kiser and Tong link the ruler’s control of oﬃcials to the level of oﬃcial corruption, a
major cause of ineﬃciency, which they regard in turn as determinant of the ruler’s power. Power here is,
in Kiser and Tong’s deﬁnition, the ability of the ruler to carry out chosen policies. Corruption is broadly
deﬁned as actions of state agents against the interests of the ruler. In Confucian statecraft ideology as it
is reﬂected in the writings collected in the statecraft compendia, both the ruler’s and the bureaucracy’s
goals are the material and spiritual well-being of the people. Eﬃciency and power is the means in this
ideological view of governance, while the goal is the happiness of the people and cosmic order. In Met-
zger’s and Kiser and Tong’s analytical perspective, power is the end, not the means. 1
Metzger (1973) underlines the signiﬁcance of internal aspects of the Qing bureaucracy by pointing
out that internal aspects affected the eﬃciency of the Qing bureaucracy and thereby its power. Accord-
ing to Metzger (1973), the eﬃciency with which the Qing bureaucracy performed its primary tasks “was
a major aspect of power: the more eﬃciently the bureaucracy performed its primary tasks, the greater
its power relative to its own society and foreign ones”.2 The primary tasks are any bureaucracy’s raison
d’être, they include taxation, adjudication, border defense, infrastructural maintenance etc. The eﬃ-
ciency with which the Qing bureaucracy performed its primary tasks depended considerably on how
successfully tasks related to the internal organization were performed. Those internal tasks include the
making and communicating of laws, and the recruitment, management and control of the members of
the bureaucracy. The proposition that internal conditions affected the eﬃciency and power of the bu-
reaucracy also “accords with the prominent outlook in imperial China whereby proper lizheng吏政
(management of governmental personnel) was regarded as the foundation of effective and good govern-
ment”.3 The writings collected in the statecraft compendia are representative of this outlook that linked
lizheng with the resulting bureaucratic discipline (lizhi吏治) which they in turn regard as crucial deter-
minant of order (zhi治). It also conforms with Wei Yuan’s comment in the preface that the success or
eﬃcacy of community granaries and the baojia-system of collective neighborhood organization depends
on the “management of government personnel”, and many other statements by authors in the statecraft
compendia.
Kiser and Tong (1992) approach the problem from the perspective of a principal-agent model, argu-
ing that the ability of rulers to control state oﬃcials is a primary determinant of the rulers’ power. They
proceed from the fact that rulers have to delegate a substantial part of their authority to state oﬃcials be-
cause they cannot rule a state alone. They propose to disaggregate the strength of rulers into autonomy
and power. Chinese rulers had more policy-making autonomy than their European counterparts, but
not necessarily more power. Autonomy refers to the ability of rulers to make decisions about state poli-
cies independently, whereas power refers to the ability to actually carry out the chosen policies. Kiser
and Tong argue that the ability to control state oﬃcials “provides the key to understanding the condi-
1This matches Dunstan’s (2006) the assessment of the Manchu emperors’ attitudes and Polachek’s (1992) assessment of
the interests of parts of the bureaucracy. Polachek (1992), p. 7.
2Metzger (1973), p. 2.
3Ibd.
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tions under which rulers will be able to translate their autonomy into power”.1 A ruler who cannot con-
trol the actions of his agents may end up with little power. Corruption, broadly deﬁned as state agents
acting against the interests of the rulers, decreases the power of the ruler.2 Because corruption can basi-
cally occur as soon as the agent’s interests diverge from the ruler’s interests, the ruler has to ﬁnd a way to
control (monitor and sanction) the oﬃcial to make his behavior conform to the ruler’s objectives, at a
cost as a low as possible. Kiser and Tong argue that rulers will invest in control if it provides a net beneﬁt
because the costs of control are lower than the costs incurred due to lack of control (corruption). With
effective control mechanisms, a small expenditure on control can purchase a large decrease in corrup-
tion, while ineffective control mechanisms manifest in high control and corruption costs.
Important types of control mechanisms mentioned by Kiser and Tong are related to recruitment,
task structure, monitoring, sanctioning, and training. Oﬃcials should be recruited oﬃcials on the ba-
sis of merit, not ascribed characteristics, and on the basis of dependence, because dependent oﬃcials
are easier to control. Location and content of oﬃcials’ tasks should be restructured to exclude oﬃcials
from districts in which they had landed property and relatives and have them rotate frequently. Clear as-
signment of cuties makes corruption easier to detect, while setting up bureaucratic rules limits oﬃcials’
discretion. The ruler can employ both positive and negative sanctions, to motivate and deter in order to
alter behavior to match the expectations. Training can foster the internalization of professional norms,
but it may also help fostering long-term relationships that facilitate collusion and raise costs of control.
Since all control strategies come with associated costs, whether a ruler uses them or not depends on the
relation of costs and beneﬁts entailed and also the resources available to the ruler.
The control of bureaucratic personnel was one of the tasks of internal organization of the bureau-
cracy, besides the making and communication of laws, and the recruitment and management of person-
nel. The eﬃcacy with which the bureaucracy carried out its primary tasks, that is, all economic, cultural
and coercive activities that represented the output of the bureaucracy, e.g. taxation and maintenance
of law and order, depended critically on how well tasks of internal organization were performed. In his
discussion of the imperial bureaucracy in the Qing dynasty, Metzger (1973) points out that “frank accep-
tance of the fact that men may be crass and self-centered and that it is only prudent in designing public
institutions to insist upon checks and balances and to provide objective rather than subjective restraints
on the uses of power” was the rule, rather than the exception. However, we also ﬁnd criticism of over-
regulation that promotes apathy among bureaucrats and wastes energies. An overarching question in
the statecraft compendia is what kinds of external control (externally imposed restrictions) of people
in positions of power are most eﬃcient in combination with what kinds of internal control (voluntary
compliance to rules and self-restriction)? Many authors emphasize that the standard for determining
the right balance should not be the capacities of the “saint” (shengren聖⼈) or the “worthy” (xian賢)
1Kiser & Tong (1992), p. 301.
2The three types of ﬁscal corruption in Kiser & Tong (1992), p. 303, can serve as illustrations of what kinds of deviant
behavior this can imply: undervaluation of taxpayers’ assets in exchange for bribes; stealing part of the gross tax revenue;
collection of tax rates above the oﬃcial tax rates, usually in the form of surcharges.
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oﬃcial, but what can be expected of the by practical and moral standards “averagely talented individ-
ual” (zhongcai中才 or中材).
The ﬁrst chapter of this dissertation introduces Wei Yuan’s career and thought, provides an analysis of
the preface and editorial principles, as well as the structure of the HCJSWB. The second and third chap-
ters present the use of the four polarities in the writings collected in the statecraft compendia published
before 1898. The second chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the polarity of ren and fa that represents
the basic building blocks of Qing dynasty discourse on governance and administrative eﬃcacy. The
chapter provides an overview of the use of the polarity in pre-Qing discourse and in the pre-1898 com-
pendia, and then discusses its function in debates on civil governance, taxation, public granaries and the
salt monopoly. The third chapter follows a similar structure in analyzing the ming-shi, gong-si and
li-yi polarities. The fourth chapter examines the use of the four polarities in the writings collected in
the statecraft compendia published after and including 1898, to show shifts and continuities in the use
of each of the polarities.
This dissertation takes Pocock’s notion of “languages” literal and looks at a subset of the shared vocab-
ulary which statecraft authors used to structure arguments (that is, the terms which they employed to
refer to different aspects of or perspectives on a problem) and with which they attempted to convince
their audience. The subset consists of four pairs of concepts ubiquitous in political-economic discourse
of late imperial China, the polarities ren-fa, ming-ming-shi, gong-si and li-yi. These polarities are
characterized by an inner logical tension. They at times seem like dichotomies at ﬁrst sight but are not,
most authors rather view them as complementary aspects that have to be brought into proper balance.
This dissertation takes the polarities as a lens or entry point into the political-administrative discourse of
the statecraft compendia. It examines how the polarities are used to structure the discussion of concrete
problems, tries to understand the more general concerns that authors articulate with these terms and
argues they are part of a language of eﬃcacy.
The statecraft compendia consulted as primary sources in this dissertation collect essays, oﬃcial com-
munication, letters, later increasingly newspaper articles on all topics related to government, with a fo-
cus on texts proposing practical pragmatic solutions. They form a coherent section of Qing political
discourse and circulated widely, as is evident from statistics of their appearance in historical book shop
lists, library holdings, and their mentioning in prefaces, letters, diaries. The statecraft compendia are
not collections of unorthodox pamphlets, their editors and authors are for the most part of the polit-
ical establishment, and therefore representative of the progressive mainstream currents. The Imperial
Statecraft Compendia, especially the original HCJSWB published in 1827 and the Huangchao jingshi
wen xubian皇朝經世⽂續編 (Sequel to the Imperial Statecraft Compendium) of 1888, remained in
print and circulated widely after 1900.1 Previous scholarship of the last ﬁfty years suggests that the state-
1See the material collected in Zhou (2005) that also qualiﬁes the view that the Shanghai book market consisted largely of
translations of Western books. For evidence of the progressive oﬃcial establishment consulting the statecraft compendia, see
Lin (1994); Gong (2004).
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craft movement is where to look for important missing links between the high Qing and last years of
the Qing and the early Republic, and regards the editor of the HCJSWB, Wei Yuan, one of its founding
ﬁgures.
Schell and Delury have described the HCJSWB as a “Legalist” whole assembled from Confucian
parts.1 A “Legalist” whole can only be created from Confucian parts if the individual parts already con-
tain a “legalist” spirit. Such a spirit pervades the practical oriented writing of the statecraft compendia
if we regard the Legalists with Graham (1989) as the ﬁrst thinkers to start not from how men ought to
be but how they are.2 But this does not imply a conception of man that sees man acting only out of fear
of harsh laws and desire for material rewards, while loyalty and benevolence do not exist. Polarities are
one way to express that “there is truth in both points of view” and to defend expedient solutions. Harsh
laws are not the solution of choice in the HCJSWB nor in its sequels because they are not regarded as
universally eﬃcacious: “laws (fa) that prohibit what men (ren) must do will not stand”強⼈之所不
能，法必不⽴；禁⼈之所必犯，法必不⾏.3 Wei Yuan’s focus on eﬃcacy has been noted by Liu
Guangjing.4. Wang Biao notes that Wei Yuan redeﬁned “the Way” (dao道) by declaring effectiveness
and utility (shiyong實⽤; youyong有⽤) to be the the dao’s basis for value judgments and key selec-
tion criterion instead of abstract values and behavioral standards (lixing daode性理道德).5 Guy (2010)
regards the focus on eﬃcacy as part of the new “political theology” introduced by the Yongzheng em-
peror. The dissertation shows the focus on eﬃcacy is a common characteristic of the writings included
in the HCJSWB and its sequels.
1Schell & Delury (2013), p. 20.





A “manifesto” and its subscribers
This chapter introduces Wei Yuan’s career and thought, provides an analysis of the preface and ed-
itorial principles, as well as the structure of the HCJSWB. Liu Guangjing (1984) calls the preface of the
HCJSWB written by the young Wei Yuan the “manifesto the the statecraft movement”.1 The preface
strongly aﬃrms the importance and value of the study of practical statecraft, that combines a familiarity
the lessons of the classics with the broad exposure to historical and contemporary cases of practical state-
craft. With the ﬁgure of polarity introduced in the form of four pairs of concepts, Wei Yuan underlines
that there are no eternally valid solutions in government, but that the best solution results from balanc-
ing extremes and viewpoints in light of changing circumstances. The call for practical statecraft was so
compelling and the HCJSWB so well-received that over a period of ﬁve decades, more than twenty se-
quels were published. The ﬁnal section of this chapter attempts a characterization of these sequels and
their editors.
1Liu (1984), p. 364.
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1.1 Intellectual context
The idea of “putting the world in order” (jingshi經世), also rendered less literally as “statecraft”, cor-
responds to “kingliness without” (waiwang外王) that complements “sageliness within” (neisheng內
聖) in Confucian ethics. “Sageliness within” refers to the goal of realizing the principles of good human
life, the dao道, within the individual, while “kingliness without” refers to the goal of realizing the dao
in the human world. The scheme of realizing the dao laid out in the Great Learning (Daxue⼤學), the
ﬁrst of the Four Books (Si Shu四書) of the Confucian canon, states that the individual has to start out
with moral self-cultivation but ﬁnally bring “order to the state” and “peace to the world”. Being so cen-
tral to the realization of the dao, the ideal of jingshi “was deeply rooted in the consciousness of many a
devout Confucian whose irresistible impulse to put the world in order often broke out in times of ad-
versity and chaos”, when, “almost as a rule, many Confucians would throw themselves into political
and social action, promoting reforms, voicing protests, or both”.1 In times of socio-economic and polit-
ical crisis, then, the urge to commit one’s energies to the solution of the pressing problems of the time
would blend with the prominent intellectual trends of the time.
1.1.1 Political crisis: The crises of the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns and the new men in the
provincial administration
While the term “putting the world in order” was not always central to the associated discourse, it was
made popular by the HCJSWB at the latest, which categorized the writings it included as either jingshi
theory or as practical examples of jingshi. He Changling’s and Wei Yuan’s lifetimes were indeed times
of adversity and chaos. The Qianlong emperor had abdicated in 1796, two years after Wei Yuan’s birth.
Problems had been accumulating over the second half of the Qianlong reign, demographic pressure and
economic recession caused or exacerbated by rising levels of oﬃcial corruption and ineﬃciency started
to discharge in popular uprisings in that very year. More than ten large scale uprisings between 1796
and 1838 affected nearly all provinces of the Chinese empire, and were followed by the confrontation
with British forces in the First Opium War (1839–1842), and, a decade later, the Taiping uprising (1850–
1864).2 The introduction of crops from the Americas and the relative peace during the long eighteenth
century had fostered an unprecedented population growth. The surplus workforce was successfully ab-
sorbed into the agricultural and growing commercial sector. By the end of the eighteenth century, how-
ever, the limits of growth had been reached, and the numbers of landless vagrant workers and migrants
to the frontier regions rose, creating new social conﬂicts and environmental problems.3
Another problem was the rampant level of corruption that had developed during the Qianlong reign
and drained oﬃcial funds and energies from public administration. The case with the most far-reaching
1Yu (2013), p. 122.
2Feng (2002), pp. 57–58.
3Mann Jones & Kuhn (1983), pp. 109–110, 154
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implications was the Heshen和珅 (1750–1799) corruption scandal. The aging and apparently demented
Qianlong emperor had appointed the young banner man to ten odd top positions in government and
military. Heshen had used his power until the death of the Qianlong emperor in 1799 to accumulate an
enormous wealth through the wide-spanning patronage network he built and through embezzlement.1
While Heshen cannot be blamed for all grievances and deﬁciencies of the later Qianlong reign, his ac-
tions certainly exacerbated oﬃcial corruption and were detrimental to bureaucratic morale. In 1799, the
reigning Jiaqing emperor sentenced Heshen and his closest associates to death.
The loss of the court’s authority incurred through the Heshen scandal resulted in more opportunities
for oﬃcials to discuss imperial politics and to put forward reform proposals. The years after the oust-
ing of Heshen saw a growing inﬂuence of Chinese literati in the Qing bureaucracy, with 1814 and 1820
marking critical junctures in the rise of Han Chinese appointed to provincial posts. There was an inﬂux
of men who had obtained their degrees after the Heshen era and who were increasingly drawn from the
Hanlin academy and the censorate. Notably, a great number of them had personal ties to the censor and
provincial oﬃcial Jiang Youxian蔣攸銛 (1766–1830) and were members of the Xuannan Poetry Club
in Beijing.2 Said trend of Han Chinese literati inﬂuence would culminate in the rise of Zeng Guofan
and his protégés during the Taiping rebellion and the subsequent Tongzhi restoration.3 The Yuelu and
Chengnan Academies in Hunan province, in contrast to many other institutions of higher learning at
the time, had been headed by men with considerable experience in administration in the late Qianlong
reign and beyond, which explains the great amount of Hunan literati among the ranks of these newly
appointed provincial oﬃcials.4
These new men who came to the provincial administration towards the end of the Jiaqing and during
the Daoguang reign were particularly interested in branches of learning dealing with administrative and
economic problems, which they called “knowledge of use in ordering the world” (jingshi zhiyong zhi
xue經世致⽤之學), and thus with them arose a “school of statecraft” (jingshi zhi xue經世之學).
In the period before the Opium war, the group consisted mainly of friends and patrons of Wei Yuan,
men such as Bao Shichen包世⾂ (1775–1855), Tao Zhu陶澍 (1779–1839), He Changling, Lin Zexu
林則徐 (1785–1850), Yao Ying姚瑩 (1785–1853) etc. They emphasized that the institutions of the sage
kings could not be reestablished in a one-to-one fashion in the present era, which required institutions
adapted to contemporary conditions. They saw local governmental and economic conditions as key
1Spence (2008), pp. 148–149.
2See Polachek (1992) on the connection of literary and aesthetic fellowship and literati political mobilization, and the
proliferation of poetry associations after the lenient treatment of Hong Liangji洪亮吉 (1749–1809) by the Jiaqing emperor
after his criticism of Heshen: “‘Poetry societies’ and other decorously-named literati groups (with protectors in high places)
had been visible in Beijing since about 1814. They were to play an increasingly open role in battles over policy and oﬃcial
appointments through the period of the Opium War.” Polachek (1992), pp. 39ff. Elman (1988), p. 75, calls the literati activism
of the early nineteenth century “the reemergence of Northern Song and late-Ming-style activism in the political arena”.
Elman writes it was preceded by the covert alignments of literati against the Heshen faction and the following qingyi清儀
(“pure remonstrance”) in the early nineteenth century.
3Mann Jones & Kuhn (1983), pp. 117–119.
4Mann Jones & Kuhn (1983), pp. 157–158.
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to stability and therefore aimed at eliminating corruption and ineﬃciency in the local administration
and at promoting local handicraft industries and agricultural methods. They also wanted to reform the
government’s key revenue-generating policies, canal river control (closely connected to the transport
of tribute grain) and salt administration as well as the currency system, by eradicating corruption and
streamlining operations, to achieve the two-fold goal of reducing the burden on the population while
securing a revenue stream for the state.1 In the Daoguang reign, while there were statesmen at the court
supportive of reform such as Yonghe英和 (1771–1840) and Qishan琦善 (1786–1854), the emperor
himself was less avid for reform.2 The efforts to reform the grain tribute transportation system are a case
in point.3
In the provinces, the “new men” were confronted with the residues of the Heshen era patronage net-
works which lead to conﬂicts about the paciﬁcation of the White Lotus rebellion and the corruption
in local government. Although the Jiaqing emperor had ousted and executed Heshen and his closest
aides shortly after the death of his father, he was not able to dismantle Heshen’s patronage networks in
the provinces and consistently ban their members from the bureaucracy. Patronage networks contin-
ued to sustain corruption among the oﬃcialdom and continued to be a destabilizing factor during the
Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns. The reason why the ﬁscal system had been able to sustain a high level of
corruption during the Qianlong reign was that inﬂation of grain prices had been suﬃcient to enable
the agricultural sector to support the rising demands of the bureaucracy. This changed when the steady
silver supply that had been one factor fueling the inﬂation in grain prices ceased, leading to falling grain
prices. The peasantry was increasingly unable to meet the tax and surtax demands, which caused grow-
ing tax arrears in the provinces.4
The HCJSWB was published in 1827 in the context of the grain transport reform debate and includes
oﬃcial and private writings from the reigns of all Qing emperors, that is, from the Shunzhi, Kangxi,
Yongzheng, Qianlong, Jiaqing periods down to the Daoguang reign. It combined writings of the early
Qing thinkers with the writings of the “administrative elite” of the mid Qing and the writings of con-
temporary administrators committed to statecraft into an unbroken line of statecraft thought and prac-
tice of the reigning dynasty. Although the preface does not say so, it is likely that the compendium was
published to rally support for the provincial reform projects of the statecraft elite.5 The authors of the
writings collated in the HCJSWB had not necessarily labeled their own writings as “statecraft” (jingshi)
themselves or made jingshi a key concept in their writings, be they of a theoretical or practical nature.
We can however distinguish several common arguments that these writings, as well as the editorial crite-
ria (li例) of the two compendia that ﬁgured as models of the HCJSWB, share with the HCJSWB, and
1Mitchell (1970), p. 54–55.
2Mann Jones & Kuhn (1983), p. 144.
3See Mann Jones & Kuhn (1983), pp. 119–128.
4Mann Jones & Kuhn (1983), pp. 129–130.
5The preface of the HCJSWB underlines the legitimacy of engaging with the technicalities of administration as necessary
and complements the cultivation of one’s moral intuition. The HCJSWB contains twenty-nine volumes on the key issues of
interest of the Jiangnan oﬃcial elite, transport of tribute grain, the salt monopoly and hydraulic engineering.
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which we could therefore see as the quintessence of what the HCJSWB editors regarded as core jingshi
principles. The ex-post declaration of jingshi thought continued throughout the nineteenth century,
as is evident, for example, from a comment in one of the prefaces to Rao Yucheng’s饒⽟成 (ﬂ. 1822–
18821) 1881 sequel to the HCJSWB regarding the compilation: “Rao Yucheng selected recent writings of
which he thought the content was relevant for statecraft (jingshi經世)”饒新泉通 [...]取近時⽂章
家擇其⾔之⾜以經世者⽤.2 The contribution of the statecraft movement of the nineteenth cen-
tury then, of which the HCJSWB was an important part, in comparison to previous statecraft efforts
“was mainly to lift practical concerns out of the mundane sphere of ordinary administration into that of
intellectually prominent writing, thereby increasing interest in reform”.3
1.1.2 Intellectual history
In face of the crises beginning in the later Wanli reign (1582–1620) of the Ming dynasty and the shock of
the Manchu conquest of China, many scholars of the seventeenth century criticized that contemporary
academia had lost its vision, its relevance, but also its grounding in the classics. Among them were Chen
Zilong陳⼦⿓ (1608–1647), Gu Yanwu顧炎武 (1613–1683), Huang Zongxi⿈宗羲 (1610–1695), Wang
Fuzhi王夫之 (1619–1692), Wan Sitong萬斯同 (1638–1702), Lu Shiyi陸世儀 (1611–1672) and Yan Yuan
顏元 (1635–1704). Writings by all of them are represented in the HCJSWB and its sequels. Although
they did not always explicitly tie their proposals to the term jingshi, nineteenth century intellectuals
regarded these thinkers as advocates of a statecraft ideal.4
All these thinkers underlined that self-cultivation (xiuji修⼰) was meaningless or even impossible
if the individual did not engage with his social and political environment with the aim to order and
improve it (jingshi). By conveying their message in the terms of the Great Learning and Confucius’
sageliness-within-kingliness-without polarity, they made it clear that this was a return to Confucian core
tenets.5 For men holding or seeking oﬃce (the majority of the educated elite) “ordering of the world”
included to administer taxation, adjudication, irrigation and the like. The early Qing thinkers therefore
advocated to include those topics into one’s daily studies. Study of the classics, histories, including in-
stitutional histories and the most recent history, should have the aim to digest the historical experience
into insights that could help to solve present problems and familiarize oneself with technical procedures
1Guo & Shi (1995), p. 949.
2HCJSWXJ/RAO, 0:1a.
3Metzger (1973), p. 27.
4When discussing the most important impulses for late Qing intellectual changes, Liang Qichao mentions “the so-called
‘statecraft learning’ of the enlightened period at the beginning of the Qing dynasty”清初啓蒙期所謂 ‘經世之學’. Liang
(1992), pp. 246–247. Wang Guowei says that the convictions and methods of the statecraft advocates of the Daoguang and
Xianfeng reign had much in common with “the old statecraft ideal from the beginning of the dynasty”國初諸⽼經世之
志. Wang (1983), pp. 26–27. Yan Yuan belonged to the second generation of early Qing thinkers and “he alone maybe said to
have formulated a powerful philosophy with jingshi at its center” and “transformed late-Ming quietism into a radical form
of activism” in which sages are “men of action”. Yu (2013), p. 122.
5Feng (2002), pp. 10–17, notes, though, that their theories represented a redeﬁnition of the conventional reading of the
polarity.
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and existing regulations. Ng and Wang (2005) note in this context that “history was increasingly seen as
a practical way to comprehend the world” in the seventeenth century. This “historic-mindedness” was
not just a search for lessons for the present in the past, but rather informed an awareness for “changing
particulars and the contingency of speciﬁc events and values”.1
Opponents of these suggestions objecting that incumbent and prospective oﬃcials should not lose
time with the vulgar details of administratitive procedures and strategies and rather concentrate on their
own character building could easily earn the charge of hypocrisy. Huang Zongxi called men hypocriti-
cal who shunned the study of ﬁscal administration on the grounds that it was “exploitation”聚斂 and
the commanding of troops on the grounds that it was a task for “vulgar types”粗材.2 Similarly, Gu
Yanwu found that it was hypocritical to claim to have attained perfect knowledge of human moral na-
ture through intuition alone or having studied historical institutions (百王之典), and without showing
the least concern for contemporary affairs. They had “replaced solid study with the aim of cultivating
oneself and ordering others by empty talk about illuminating the mind-heart and recognizing the moral
human nature”以明⼼⾒性之空⾔代修⼰治⼈之實學.3 The study of historical institutions was nec-
essary to learn about the dao that never appeared separate from its historical manifestations. Tang Zhen
唐甄 (1630–1704) contended that Confucius had conceived the “inner sage” and the “outer king” as a
personal unity, that self-cultivation was not exclusively a matter of the inner realm, and practical achieve-
ment not exclusively a matter of the outer realm.4 As soon as they were regarded as separate persons
between whom to make an exclusive choice, Tang argued, the king became secondary and the aspects he
personiﬁed were not pursued, while the sage became the primary ideal. The Way of Confucius became
fragmented, which effectively had a detrimental effect on people’s livelihood because the elite regarded
engagement with practical affairs as a preoccupation of the mean man.
The eighteenth century saw a continuous string of practically oriented compilations of administrative
writings by both private secretaries and oﬃcials.5 These compilations propagated the ideal of the oﬃ-
cial who combines deep knowledge both of the classics with practical administrative competence, who
is devoted to the “well-being and moral progress of the common people” and who can “control and
even manipulate the administrative machinery under his command”“ due to his profound knowledge
of the legal code and administrative procedures, who is a great judge and, if necessary, military comman-
1Ng & Wang (2005), pp. 223–238. Ng & Wang (2005) further note that “seventeenth-century thinkers did not abandon
altogether the ideal of antiquity as the norm, inspiration, and guide [...] their classicist regard for the ancient past was tem-
pered by their historical appreciation for the particularities of different dynasties or periods”. They did not think everything
was relative either, they still thought the classics were a repository of universal values revealed by the pattern of the rise and
fall of dynasties, for example the unswerving devotion to the people as constant ancient principle of governance, or that
government should make use of worthy men and promote education. Early Qing thinkers’ “appeal to the universal and
transhistorical was soberly counterbalanced by their earnest desire to implement timely measures relevant to current needs,
and these they identiﬁed through their deep knowledge of the contingent changes in history”.
2Huang (2005), vol. 10, pp. 421–422.
3Gu (1994), 7:6b.
4Tang (1984), 2:6b.
5Private secretaries (muyou幕友 or muliao幕僚) appeared in yamen on all levels of government in the early Qing and
their number grew considerably throughout the dynasty, while the number of oﬃcials remained largely constant.
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der, but also knows about agricultural techniques, hydraulic engineering.1 Will (2003) speaks of this
group of oﬃcials and private secretaries who were signiﬁcantly more committed to effective adminis-
tration than their average colleagues as “administrative elite”. The administrative “elite was composed
of activist administrators with a very high idea of their duty towards the people and of the diﬃculty of
their tasks”.2 Their “elitism” consisted in their being activist and idealist enough to stand out from the
cautiousness (conservatism), immobility and indifference of the majority of bureaucrats. Their role in
the “general economy” of the bureaucratic system was to respond to deﬁcits that the system encoun-
tered from time to time with the aim to “restore the effective control of the administration to those men
whom the dynasty had entrusted it”.3
This “administrative elite” of the eighteenth century pursued their project of technical excellence inde-
pendently from the scholarly trends of the time. In the ﬁeld of scholarship, the most inﬂuential method-
ological novelty was evidential scholarship (kaozheng考證 or kaojuxue考據學), while in terms of
commentaries used, many scholars went back in time, supplementing the orthodox Song dynasty com-
mentaries with the works of the commentators of the Eastern Han and Tang dynasty. Evidential scholar-
ship had developed out of Ming neo-Confucianism and had been ﬁrst applied to the Great Learning by
Chen Que陳確 (1604–1677).4 The idea was to solve controversies about the true message of the classics
within Song Learning by going “back to the roots” in the form of meticulous interpretations of the orig-
inal versions of the classical texts. According to Dai Zhen戴震 (1724–1777), free speculation could not
lead to the understanding of the moral principles of the ancient sages so that one needed to seek them
through philological studies of the ancient texts; philology would enable understanding, which in turn
enabled the grasping of the principles.5 Evidential scholarship developed into a scholarly attitude that
propagated careful textual studies with the help of auxiliary disciplines such as phonetics and etymology
in order to elucidate the authenticity and authentic meaning of classical texts. Qing evidential scholar-
ship perfected philological tools, especially etymology, phonology and paleography, and applied them
to the systematic study of historical and classical texts. In the course of the eighteenth century, eviden-
tial scholarship came to be closely associated with Han Learning (Hanxue漢學).6 The name indicates
its concentration on the interpretations of the great Han dynasty commentators such as Xu Shen許
慎 (58–147 AD), Ma Rong⾺融 (79–166 AD) and Zheng Xuan鄭⽞ (127–200 AD) as opposed to the
Song commentaries of Zhu Xi and Cheng Yi. The Song commentaries remained inﬂuential nevertheless
as there remained circles advocating “Song learning” and dedicated to their study, and also not least be-
1Will (2003), p. 14.
2Will & Li (1999), p. 3.
3Will (2003), p. 14.
4Yu (2013), p. 117. Makeham (2003), p. 278, notes that some tendencies in evidential research can even be traced to Song
dynasty scholarship.
5Yu (2013), p. 118.
6On the overlap and distinctness of Han learning and evidential scholarship, see Makeham (2003), pp. 277–278. Make-
ham suggests that Han learning in its narrow sense refers to the rejection of Song, Yuan and Ming commentaries in favor of
Han and Tang commentaries, while in its broader sense, it is synonymous with evidential scholarship with no strict restric-
tion to Han commentaries.
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cause Zhu Xi’s interpretation of the Four Books (si shu四書) remained the basis of the imperial civil
service examinations.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, evidential scholarship in combination with Han learning
was beginning to lose its leading status among literati. Critics observed that it had lost touch with prac-
tical concerns, including self-cultivation, as its rigorous philological studies had become an end in itself
instead of continuing to serve as a means to elucidate the meaning of classical texts and ﬁnd answers to
current socioeconomic problems. Scholars were wondering in view of the above mentioned crises and
booming output of Han learning works whether Han learning could actually achieve what had been
envisioned by its early advocates, namely that the close study of the classics and commentaries could
facilitate a return to the golden age of the Three Dynasties. Was the reason why the golden age seemed
more remote than ever that Han learning scholars were not giving enough attention to the applicabil-
ity and usefulness of their output, to its connection with governance, morality and manners, or was it
because the world of the present was too different from the world of the past so that the classics simply
could not be applied? There were also voices calling for a rehabilitation of Song learning, pointing out
its value outside of the civil service examinations, especially its insights about the pre-Qin Confucian
thinkers and their pronounced concern for the real world.1 The philological methods of evidential schol-
arship remained in use, however. Song learning began to regain its former popularity with prominent
advocates such as Zeng Guofan曾國藩 (1778–1861) and Woren沃仁 († 1871). Its broad perception
began to change from examination knowledge to a scholarly trend that could fuel socio-political change.
Note that the categories Han learning and Song learning, are rather confusing, not least because they
became common only from the eighteenth century onwards. Both concepts become elusive when one
tries to determine their exact differences because many accounts of the differences in primary and sec-
ondary sources tend to formulate one as counterconcept (Gegenbegriff) of the other which leads to dis-
torted formulations of the respective scholarly programs. Scholars such as Wei Yuan and Shao Yichen
邵懿⾠ (1810–1861) did not mind the distinction, and studied with teachers subscribing to Han learning
and teachers subscribing to Song learning. Maybe they acknowledged that everywhere “we ﬁnd gener-
ations which revolt against what they regard as the formalized, unauthentic perversions of the original
vision and which attempt to recapture that vision in its pristine freshness–only to be accused of one-
sidedness and distortion by their successors within the tradition”, and therefore simply chose to stick to
eclecticism and select the best of each scholarly trend.2 Nevertheless the opposition seems to have been
taken seriously enough by others in the nineteenth century that scholars started to advocate a reconcili-
ation of Han and Song learning, for example Zhu Qi朱琦 (1803–1861),3 a trend that is documented in
the HCJSWXJ/RAO.
Apart from the rising popularity of Song learning and a fusion of Song and Han learning, the nine-
1Wang (2003), pp. 3–5.
2Schwartz (1959), p. 50.
3Ouyang (2013), p. 539.
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teenth century saw the interlocking trend of a growing interest in New Text Scholarship (jinwen jingxue
今⽂經學) and “statecraft learning” (jingji zhi xue經濟之學 or jingshi zhi xue經世之學). What
was true for evidential scholarship and Song learning, namely that the former was a product of the lat-
ter, but at the same time its harshest critic, was also true of the New Text movement and Han Learning.1
The attention for New Text Studies meant a turn to a textual tradition within Han Learning that had
only survived as an undercurrent for a long time. Many intellectuals saw it as the best chance not to give
up on the classics although resenting their painstaking research, and to satisfy their interest in the prin-
ciples of good human life while still wishing to distance themselves from Song Confucianists. A central
text of this textual tradition was the Gongyang Commentary (Gongyangzhuan公⽺傳) of the Spring
and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu舂秋). The New Text tradition viewed Confucius as a “charismatic vi-
sionary and institutional reformer” who had composed the Spring and Autumn Annals “in prophetic
prevision of the rule by the Liu clan”, the ruling house of the Han dynasty.2 The vision of Confucius
as an “uncrowned king” (suwang素王) who had founded new institutions for the future implied a
“heightened outer-institutional interpretation of the Confucian idea of moral order”.3 In the beginning,
New Text Studies focussed on purely academic questions. It was through the work of Liu Fenglu劉逢
祿 (1776–1829), Gong Zizhen龔⾃珍 (1792–1841), Wei Yuan and later Kang Youwei康有爲 (1858–
1927) that New Text Studies came to be closely associated with political activism and that the schema of
the so-called Three Ages (san dai三代), the ostensible golden age of the Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties,
turned into an argument in favor of political reform.4
The New Text Studies rose in response to political corruption since the mid-Qing dynasty, attempt-
ing to “use the language of Confucian politics in order to create a legitimate framework for correcting
the wrongs of the contemporary world”.5 Succeeding adherents included Wei Yuan and Gong Zizhen,
as well as Shao Yichen, Dai Wang戴望 (1837–1873), Pi Xirui⽪錫瑞 (1850–1908), Liao Ping廖平
(1852-1932), and, as interests shifted more and more from interpretation of the classics to the reform of
the present, Kang Youwei. The pioneer of the New Text School, Zhuang Cunyu莊存與 (1719–1788)
believed that the Spring and Autumn Annals transmitted Confucius’ vision of politics and history.
Confucius had compiled the Spring and Autumn Annals with the “intention to pass judgement on
the violence, lawlessness and corruption of his age”.6 Zhuang Cunyu favored the Gongyang Commen-
tary, which he regarded as presenting historical interpretations, over the Zuo Commentary (Zuozhuan
左傳), which in his opinion presented a mere record of historical facts. Zhuang Cunyu regarded the
Spring and Autumn Annals as “a call to reform the present in the name of the past” (tuogu gaizhi托
古改制).7 By elucidating the “great meanings conveyed in esoteric/subtle words”微⾔⼤義 of the
1Mitchell (1970), p. 39, on the New Text movement’s assessment of Han learning.
2Cheng (1997), p. 65.
3Cheng (1997), p. 65.
4Lin (1994), p. 30.
5Zhao (2003), p. 40.
6Zhao (2003), p. 39.
7Cheng (1997), p. 65. Cheng also remarks that the literal translation of tuogu gaizhi is to look for political justiﬁcation in
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Gongyang version of the Spring and Autumn Annals with the help of annotations of Han New Text
scholars such as Dong Zhongshu董仲舒 (179–104 BC) and He Xiu何休 (129–182 AD), it would be
possible to disclose Confucius’ “statecraft intent”經世之旨 and use it to reform the present world.
The ﬁrst to carry on Zhuang’s project of reconstructing what he regarded as Confucius’ authentic teach-
ing, were members of his family, who employed methods of evidential scholarship and extended New
Text attention to other classics, raising doubts about the authenticity of several Old Text versions of the
classics. Among them was Zhuang Cunyu’s grandson Liu Fenglu劉逢祿 (1776–1829). Liu Fenglu be-
lieved that He Xiu’s commentary on the Gongyang Commentary “represented the only surviving link
between the New Text Confucianism of the Former Han dynasty and later New Text school”. Zhao
(2003) argues that Liu’s research on He Xiu also revealed close connections between Han Confucian
and Legalist notions of political reform, a link to be further developed by Liu’s students Wei Yuan and
Gong Zizhen and other Qing reformers.1
The revival of New Text Confucianism came to be closely associated with intensifying interest in prac-
tical statecraft. The protracted and devastating campaigns against the frequent insurgencies in different
corners of the empire had left the impression that the Manchu military lacked the prowess and the court
the ability to deal with the problems it faced.2 Statecraft advocats believed that classical studies alone
could not solve political and social problems. This perception resulted in a rising interest in historical
and geographical studies as a branch of learning better suited to dealing with political and economic
problems.3 While the statecraft advocates took an interest in institutional history, their reform propos-
als mainly touched upon administrative techniques, in areas such as taxation, river works and border
defense, not fundamental institutional changes. The group of statecraft advocates associated with Wei
Yuan is a manifestation of this trend. The statecraft advocates agreed with Zhang Xuecheng章學誠
(1738–1801) and saw bureaucratic corruption as the problem at the root of all others problems in the
economic and military area.4
There are two further currents in Qing dynasty intellectual history that deserve future exploration,
as they seem important to fully understand the intellectual context of the statecraft compendia. One is
a current that emphasized the social function of rites, the other one is an interest in Legalism and other
pre-Qin schools of thought. Both cannot be explored in depth within the scope of this dissertation.
Zhang Hao observes Mid-Qing statecraft thought’s tendency to emphasize the “real and actual”實際
and “real effects”實效was characterized by an “intensiﬁed manifestation of a kind of instrumental
rationality”⼀種功效理性的強化的表現. This also shows in one decisive issue that previous schol-
arship has found to distinguish Qing dynasty Confucianism from Gu Yanwu and Zhang Erqi張爾岐
the Classics, to sanctify practice in terms of precedent.
1Zhao (2003), p. 40.
2Mitchell (1970), p. 53.
3Feng (2002), pp. 248–311.
4Zhang Xuecheng had written that the three most important problems of the present, namely rebellion, treasury deﬁ-
ciencies and problems in the management of the civil service (corruption) were essentially one: the former two were caused
by the latter. Nivison (1966), p. 268.
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(1612–1678) to Zeng Guofan and Sun Yirang孫詒讓 (1848–1908) from the Confucianism of previous
dynasties, namely the preeminent importance attributed to rites (li禮) as compared to moral principle
(li理).1 The three books that received most attention among Qing commentators besides the Spring
and Autumn Annals were the three rites books, the Zhouli周禮 (Rites of Zhou), Yili儀禮 and the
Liji禮記 (Book of Rites).2 This is interpreted as a departure from a focus on metaphysical “principle”
(li理) in human interaction to visible and empirically traceable forms. According to Zhang Shou’an
(1994), this trend was set in motion by Ling Tingkan淩廷堪 (1757–1809), a scholar renowned for his
study of rites. Li comprises institutions (state and clan organization and norms), ceremonies (marriage,
assumption of oﬃce, funeral etc.) and moral values. In the course of the Qing dynasty, the focus shifted
from state institutions to the values and customs of local society and the realization of proper human
relationships. There is some amount of overlap between interest in statecraft and interest in the works of
Ling Tingkan. Ruan Yuan’s阮元 (1764–1849) Huang Qing jingjie皇清經解, an anthology of writings
in classical studies of the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns published in 1825 included both Ling Tingkan’s
Lijing shili禮經釋例 and two essays from his Fu li復禮 (Return to the Rites). Yang Guozhen, who
published a reprint of the QWZWC in 1826, published a reprint of two essays from the Fu li in the same
year. These two essays are positioned prominently in the rites section of the HCJSWB, which shows that
Wei Yuan and He Changling also appreciated Ling Tingkan’s contributions.3
Schell and Delury (2013) declare that from the “Confucian parts” that Wei Yuan combined into the
HCJSWB, all focusing on pragmatic solutions to China’s problems, “a very different whole emerged”
between the lines, that exuded Legalist philosophies of strengthening the army and enriching the state
(fuqian富強).4 Cheng (1997) similarly notes that the New Text School and statecraft reformism redis-
covered Former Han “Legalized Confucianism” or “Confucianized Legalism”.5 Elman (1990) similarly
notes that rediscovering the “Former Han synthesis of ritual and law”, New Text scholars, notably Liu
Fenglu, Wei Yuan and Gong Zizhen, began to develop the links between Legalism and Gongyang Con-
fucianism.6 Acknowledging that “Legalism” is a problematic heuristic device7, we can note that Wei
Yuan advocates a rehabilitation of wealth and power as state goals, which ﬁgure most prominently in
the Han Feizi and Shangjun shu, and proposes to adapt the valuable points in the teachings of the Yel-
low Emperor, Laozi, Shen Buhai and Han Fei (Huang-Lao Shen-Han⿈⽼申韓).8
We see a certain eclecticism here which was not restricted to Wei Yuan or his statecraft circle, but
1This view was ﬁrst put forward by Qian Mu錢穆 (1895–1990) and Sun Haibo孫海波 (1911-1972). Zhang (1994), p. 7.
2Zhang (1994), p. 3.
3Zhang (1994) says that Ling Tingkan caught her attention while she was researching the origins of Gong Zizhen’s
thought. Yang (2005).
4Schell & Delury (2013), p. 20.
5Cheng (1997), pp. 67–68.
6Elman (1990), pp. 257–274.
7See, for example, in Goldin (2011).
8WYQJ, vol. XII, p. 45. Huang-Lao thought was the dominant school of thought during the Han Dynasty until Han
emperor Wudi who established Confucianism as state doctrine. Several thinkers associated with Legalism today, such as
Shen Dao, are also variously associated with Huang-Lao.
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which represents a general characteristic of Qing literati and scholar-oﬃcials.1 The Qing scholar-oﬃcial
elite looked back at the history of Chinese political thought that they could draw upon as an intellectual
resource in the question of “how to improve the state”. In this history, the “intellectual roots of dogma-
tism and certainty were not necessarily deeper than those of eclecticism and doubt” and “a prominent
feeling existed that many different Chou schools, including Legalism, had brought out some facet of the
truth, a point made explicit by the great Han historians Ssu-ma T’an and Pan Ku”.2
Elman (1990) and Cheng (1997) discover a connection between New Text scholarship and Legalism.
Elman (1990) argues that the New Text school rediscovered the “Former Han synthesis of rituals and
laws”.3 According to Cheng (1997), the most important rediscovery of Former Han New Text convic-
tions by the New Text revivalists apart from the image of Confucius as institutional reformer had been
exactly this “synthesis of law and ritual”.4 The Gongyang tradition had established a connection be-
tween the Spring an Autumn Annals and law (fa) in light of the assumption that the annals contained
a systematic terminological and stylistic framework for making legal judgments. But apart from the as-
sertion that New Text adherents brought an element of evident reformism into traditional statecraft
discourse and made “emphatically explicit the connection between Confucian ends and and governmen-
tal means”5 it is hard to ﬁnd a satisfying account in previous scholarship of the “synthesis of law and
ritual”, “Legalization of Confucianism” (or vice versa), or at least the linking up of Confucian classicism
and Legalist practice. Cheng (1997) mentions the “synthesis of law and ritual” included the idea that
the universalism of law with “its refusal to make exceptions” could be tempered by the particularism
of ritual “which insists on differential treatment according to personal status, relationship and social
circumstance”.6 This, however, sounds more like a description of the status quo of adjudicative prac-
tice in imperial China, not a new or rediscovered idea. What Cheng (1997) also associates with linking
Confucian classicism and Legalist practice was the recognition of successive New Text adherents that
“traditional stopgap measures could not solve such problems as population increase, bureaucratic cor-
ruption, and foreign incursions” and therefore turned to statecraft discourse that had been kept up by
oﬃce-holding lineages for centuries.
1.1.3 Statecraft Anthologies
In the seventeenth century, under the impression of the late Ming socio-economic down-turn and the
following shock of the Manchu conquest, several generations of thinkers felt the need to emphasize that
scholarship should never be disconnected from a deeply-felt concern for solving the current problems of
1 Metzger (1973), pp. 25–27. Metzger (1973) draws heavily on Tao Zhu’s memorials and the HCJSWB as a sourcebook,
but he emphasizes that the HCJSWB contains writings that are typical of the administrative writing of the age because it
includes the writings of a broad spectrum of authors, not just the writings of the members of the school of statecraft.
2Metzger (1973), pp. 64–65.
3Elman (1990), pp. 257–274.
4Cheng (1997), p. 67.
5Cheng (1997), p. 68.
6Ibd.
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the world and its people. An early product of this trend was the Huang Ming jingshi wenbian皇明經
世⽂編 (Imperial collection of statecraft essays of the Ming dynasty, hereafter HMJSWB) published in
1638 by Chen Zilong陳⼦⿓ (1608–1647), Xu Fuyuan徐孚遠 (1600–1665) and Song Zhengbi宋徵壁
(1602–1672). The paratexts of the HCJSWB do not mention the HMJSWB as a model for the HCJSWB,
but Yu Yue’s preface for the HCJSWXB/GE and Sheng Kang’s preface for the HCJSWXB/SHENG
both regard the Ming anthology as model for the HCJSWB. Yu Yue writes that He Changling “used
Chen Zilong’s Ming compendium as precedent when he compiled the Huangchao jingshi wenbian”
⾃賀耦耕先⽣⽤前明陳臥⼦之例輯皇朝經世⽂編.1 Similarly, Sheng Kang writes that He Changling
had followed Chen Zilong’s HMJSWB and at the same time taken Lu Yao’s Qiewenzhai wenchao as
model in compiling the HCJSWB.2 The considerable number of literati from the Jiangnan region that
contributed to the compendium shows the heightened interest in statecraft among late Ming literati.3
The compendium comprises more than 3000 memorials, documents and treatises by oﬃcials of the
Ming dynasty, and the topics covered range from economy, ﬁnance and infrastructure to rites and the
military. The prefaces of the compendium emphasize a number of characteristic principles.4 The focus
of the anthology is practical administration.5 The preference is for writings documenting recent mod-
els of administrative practice rather than writings putting forward (possibly ill-conceived) ideas of past
models.6 Relevance to present problems ﬁgures as the sole criterion for inclusion of writings, not the
reputation or controversial status of the author. Where there is more than one opinion about a particu-
lar issue, alternative opinions may be included.
The publication of the Qiewenzhai wenchao切問齋⽂鈔 (Writings collected by the Studio for Rel-
evant Questions, hereafter QWZWC) by the Qing oﬃcial Lu Yao陸耀 (1723–1785) in 1775 shows that
the interest for “asking relevant questions ” (qiewen切問) and to connect scholarship and practical ad-
ministration into a coherent intellectual pursuit had never ceased throughout the Qianlong reign. As
mentioned above, the eighteenth century “administrative elite” of oﬃcials and private secretaries had
propagated the ideal of the oﬃcial in their writings and handbooks, who combines deep knowledge of
the classics with practical administrative competence (“savoir-faire”) in all areas of local administration
from agriculture, irrigation and hydraulic engineering to legal adjudication, and, if necessary, military
leadership.7 One likely reason why Lu Yao did not call his compilation a statecraft (jingshi經世) com-
pendium was that he wanted to avoid a reference to the HMJSWB, which had been placed on the index
shortly after the publication of the QWZWC in 1777.8 Lu Yao had begun the collection of statecraft
1HCJSWXJ/RAO, 0:1a.
2HCJSWXB/SHENG, 0:1a.
3Huang (1985), pp. 48–49.
4The editor’s notes were not included in the copy that I was able to locate in the Beijing University Library, but they are
cited in Feng (2002), pp. 548–550.
5The thematic focus is on military matters, economy and ﬁnance, with writings on military matters accounting for nearly
half of the total number of writings. Feng (2002), p. 550.
6Chen (1638), 0:(Fu xu)2b
7Will (2003), pp. 13–14.
8Zhou & Guo (2003), pp. 228–229. A reprint from 1869 exists under the title Huangchao jingshi wenchao皇朝經世⽂
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writings as a secretary in the Grand Secretariat (neige內閣) and the Council of State (junjichu軍機處),
and had already compiled books and anthologies on various statecraft topics, including the cultivation
of sweet potatoes, before the QWZWC went into print. Wei Yuan writes in the editorial notes that he
followed Lu Yao’s example when including contemporary authors in his statecraft compendium.1
The editorial principles of the QWZWC overlap with the editorial principles of the HMJSWB, with
two additions, however. Lu Yao underlines that style is no criterion for inclusion in the anthology, and
that stylistically unpretentious but relevant writings are included, while stylistically complex writings
are excluded if they lack substance. Secondly, and more importantly, Lu Yao notes that writings are
grouped by topic, and writings on the same topic are ordered by decreasing “urgency” (read: decreas-
ing endorsement by the editor). This hints at the one signiﬁcant difference in the organization of the
QWZWC and the HMJSWB. While HMJSWB had grouped the writings by author, the QWZWC or-
ganizes the writings by administrative topic. According to the logic of the Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao
四庫全書總⽬提要 (Annotated catalog of the Complete Imperial Library), using the person of the
author as the primary, and time as the secondary ordering criterion is most suitable if the aim is to get
an overview about a particular person’s thought. Using the topic as the primary, and the “urgency”
of the particular piece of writings as the secondary ordering criterion is most suitable if the aim is to
get an overview about the thought of different authors on a particular issue.2 Note that the status of
the author and the time are explicitly neglected in this kind of organization. The decision to open the
compendium with a section on scholarship (xueshu學術) that introduces the intellectual-ideological
orientation was emulated by all other Qing statecraft compendia to come, with the ﬁrst section either
being called scholarship (xueshu學術) or general discussion (tonglun通論). The HCJSWB does not
only adopt the xueshu section but also the ﬁrst writing in it from the Qiewenzhai wenchao, an essay by
Zhang Erqi.3
Compendia bearing the word “statecraft” (jingshi經世 or jingji經濟) in their title appeared already
in the Song dynasty, among them the Huangji jingshi shu皇極經世書 compiled by Shao Yong邵
雍 (1011–1077), the Jingji wenheng經濟⽂衡 compiled by Wan Jiji⾺季機 (?–?), and the Diwang
jingshi tupu帝王經世圖譜 compiled by Tang Zhongyou唐仲友 (1136–1188). These works did not
contain writings associated with practical administration, but rather theories about the organic unity of
the cosmos, human society and individual self-cultivation. The Yuan dynasty saw an oﬃcially sponsored
Jingshi dadian經世⼤典 that featured decrees and proclamations of the Yuan emperors until Yuan
Wenzong and memorials of Yuan oﬃcials on military, ﬁscal, economic and ritual matters as well as river
conservation.4 In the Ming dynasty, there was a veritable boom of statecraft compendia, with more
鈔, however. Feng (2002), p. 552.
1Note, however, that the HMJSWB already included the writings of contemporaries, as is evident from the list of au-
thors. Chen (1638), 0:1a–89b.
2This remark is made in the context of a synopsis of a Song compendium. Feng (2002), p. 553.
3He & Wei (1827), 1:1a–2b.
4Gong (2004), pp. 14–15.
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than twenty works bearing statecraft in their title. The HMJSWB compiled six years before the end of
the Ming dynasty was one of the last and at the same time the most inﬂuential of them.
Also worth noting is the relationship of these voluminous compendia with the mostly smaller-format
genres of guanzhen官箴 and gongdu公牘. The guanzhen were handbooks compiled by and for mag-
istrates, clerks and private secretaries containing material on all tasks encountered at the district yamen,
including taxation, jurisprudence and forensics. The gongdu were anthologies of administrative docu-
ments published to provide examples and models for a similar readership.1 Administrative handbooks
included extant laws, precedents and commands, other bureaucratic papers, maps, lists and explanations
of procedure, as well as information about laws and cases of historical signiﬁcance and historical dis-
cussions. They thus comprised both material to provide information about the current administrative
order and material that was to put the current administrative order into perspective.2
1For an introduction to administrative handbooks, see Will & Li (1999) and Will (2003).
2Metzger (1973), p. 231.
1.2 Wei Yuan and his manifesto
1.2.1 Wei Yuan’s career
Wei Yuan’s career is typical of an age in which many young aspiring mens’ hopes for a regular oﬃcial
carrier were frustrated but who nevertheless could get involved in administration as private secretaries.
Apart from a short stint as district magistrate in Jiangsu in the late 1840s after ﬁnally winning his jinshi
degree in 1845, Wei Yuan would only work in the retinue of high provincial oﬃcials and generals his
whole life. However, Wei Yuan was not only theoretically interested, he also commented on the major
problems of his time, notably the problems in the key administrative and revenue-generating areas of
the tribute grain transport, the salt monopoly and river conservancy, and on the defense of inland and
sea borders. He was also actively involved in contemporary efforts to solve these problems.
Born in Hunan in 1794 into a locally moderately inﬂuential family, Wei Yuan was interested in Wang
Yangming’s teachings and history in his teens. He passed his “Senior Licentiate” (bagong) in 1813 and
spent most of the next ten years in Beijing to study with prominent instructors such as Song Learning
advocat Yao Xueshuang姚學塽 (1766-1827), Han Learning advocat Hu Chenggong胡承珙 (1775–
1832), and New Text Studies advocat Liu Fenglu劉逢祿 (1766–1829).1 His network in Beijing included
fellow students such as Gong Zizhen龔⾃珍 (1792–1831), Dong Guifu董桂敷 (jinshi 1805), Chen
Hang陳沆 (1785–1826), Yao Ying姚瑩 (1785–1853) and capital oﬃcials such as Yang Fang楊芳 (1770–
1846). Wei Yuan also established and maintained the acquaintance of provincial oﬃcials many of whom
would later employ him as private secretary in their retinues, such as the fellow-Hunanese Tao Zhu,
Governor-General of Liang-Jiang, He Changling, Financial Commissioner of Jiangsu, and Lin Zexu,
the later governor-general of Huguang. Wei Yuan’s grandfather had sponsored poor but promising
students, among them the young Tao Zhu.2 Both Tao Zhu and He Changling became sponsors of Wei
Yuan’s career. He Changling invited him to serve as his private secretary in 1819 and helped him to pre-
pare for the metropolitan examination. In 1822, Wei won his juren degree. He became a private tutor at
the household of Yang Fang, with whom he would often discuss questions of military strategy. At the
same time, Wei Yuan became increasingly interested in contemporary affairs in general, which he would
often discuss with peers such as Gong Zizhen and Yao Ying.
Responding to a request of He Changling to submit comments to a proposal to temporarily shift the
transportation route and modalities of tribute grain in 1824, Wei Yuan became involved in the drafting
of proposals to shift the transport of tribute grain to sea transport put forward by He Changling, Tao
Zhu, Yinghe and and Qishan during this time. He Changling invited Wei Yuan in 1825 to edit a collec-
tion of writings on statecraft for him, the HCJSWB. Many of the writings on grain transport were in-
cluded in the grain transport chapters of the HCJSWB. Wei Yuan probably was not a statecraft expert at
the time he accepted He Changling’s offer to edit the HCJSWB. He had discussed contemporary affairs
1Wei (1976), p. 848.
2Gong (2004), p. 98.
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with his friends in Beijing, but his scholarly output had mostly consisted of poetry and classical studies.
His writings on practical affairs included in the HCJSWB, on the sea transport of tribute grain and on
military action against the Miao tribes in the South, all dated from the years 1824–1826 and were mostly
written in the context of his editing work of the HCJSWB and two local gazetteers. However, Wei Yuan
practically became a statecraft expert through his exposure to the vast amount of material he had to go
through during the compilation of the HCJSWB.1 It is likely that He Changling had already collected
much of the material which he then handed over to Wei Yuan who edited it and maybe also added the
writings of some of his fellow junior statecraft advocates such Gong Zizhen, Yao Ying and Bao Shichen.2
After failing the metropolitan examination in 1826, Wei Yuan served subsequently in the retinues of
He Changling and Tao Zhu in the years 1826–1829. Wei Yuan purchased a post as secretary in the Grand
Secretariat (neige內閣) in 1829, after failing the metropolitan examination again. Wei Yuan was invited
by his friend Gong Zizhen to join meetings of the Xuannan poetry club (as usual for these kinds of lit-
erary associations, the members were as interested in politics as they were in poetry3 The club’s senior
members included Lin Zexu, with whom Wei Yuan discussed poetry and contemporary affairs. After
joining a short military expedition to Kashgar led by Yang Fang in 1830–1831, Wei Yuan acted as advisor
to Tao Zhu in Nanjing in the reform of the Huaibei salt administration together with Bao Shichen in
the early 1830s.
Wei Yuan purchased a garden in Yangzhou in 1837 and spent most of his time there writing treatises
and compiling books on the key administrative problems of the time, concentrating on the topics of
grain transport and river conservancy, the salt monopoly, and military defense. Wei Yuan made a living
from salt business.4 Wei Yuan ﬁnished his Shi guwei詩古微 in 1840 in which he furnished his own in-
terpretation of the Book of Songs and attempted to reconstruct the classic in its original form, arguing
that the standard Mao commentary was based on a forgery. Wei Yuan did not get actively involved in
prohibition of opium and the confrontation with Great Britain that developed into the First Opium
War (1839–1842). He seems, however, to have corresponded with Lin Zexu on the matter, and in 1840
he traveled to Ningbo to interview a British Captain held prisoner there and published a short account
about the information he gathered. In 1842, Wei Yuan published his major treatise on Yellow River con-
servancy, criticizing the government’s strategies. Corruption in the responsible government agencies
was so rampant that only a fraction of the funds allocated for engineering projects were actually used for
their intended purpose, so that silting-up became an ever more critical problem.5 Wei Yuan advocated
1Gong (2004), pp. 98–100; Wei (1976), p. 848.
2Mitchell (1970), pp. 59–60. Mitchell thinks that Wei Yuan must have played more than a minor role in the compilation
because so many accounts of his friends and later biographers associate Wei Yuan closely with the work. The famous histo-
rian He Qiutao even ascribed the format of the compilation and the editing completely to Wei Yuan. Wei Yuan certainly
had more time to spare for editing the HCJSWB than He Changling, who acted as Financial Commissioner of Jiangsu at the
time.
3On the political ambitions of the Xuannan Poetry Club, see Polachek (1992).
4Both Mitchell (1970), p. 29, and Liu (1984), p. 363, say so, without providing details of the kinds of business operations
Wei Yuan was involved in.
5Feng (2002), pp. 180–182.
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that an engineering effort was due to force the Yellow River into a new bed to prevent it from changing
its course naturally and inducing large scale disaster. The warning was repeated by others but ignored.
However, the Yellow River did indeed change its course after a major dike break at Kaifeng in 1855 and
ruined a large stretch of the Grand Canal.1
Still in 1842, the year of the conclusion of the treaty of Nanjing, Wei Yuan completed the Shengwuji
聖武記 and a ﬁrst draft of the Haiguo tuzhi海國圖志 (Illustrated Treatise on the Sea Kingdoms). Like
the HCJSWB, the Shengwuji combined oﬃcial documents and private sources about the military expe-
ditions of the Qing up until and including the First Opium War. Mann Jones and Kuhn (1983) remark
that Wei Yuan’s purpose in compiling the Shengwuji was not “purely descriptive”, but that he intended
to expose the potential reasons for the Qing defeat in the Opium War, using private sources as check
upon the accuracy of the oﬃcial documents. This is also the thrust of his preface and his own treatises
included in the compendium. Wei Yuan characterizes the tendency of oﬃcial accounts to understate or
even omit Qing defeats as irresponsible. At the same time, Wei Yuan calls for reforms with the aim of
improving the quality and discipline of the Qing military, for example specialized training, better pay,
ﬂexible regional recruitment quotas and more care in keeping military rosters correct and up-to-date
to prevent graft.2 In the Illustrated Treatise on the Sea Kingdoms, Wei Yuan presented a world geogra-
phy. Wei Yuan compiled the treatise after the Opium War, building primarily upon Chinese-language
sources such as Lin Zexu’s Sizhouzhi四洲志 (Geography of the Four Continents), Xu Jiyu’s徐繼畬
(1795–1873) Yinghuan zhilüe瀛寰志略 (Record of the Ocean Circuit) and the dynastic histories. The
treatise included information on geography, politics, trade, as well as Western expansion, with a focus
on China’s traditional strategic interest in Southeast Asia. In the preface, Wei Yuan emphasized the need
for China to retroﬁt her military with Western ships and arms.3 In 1845, Wei Yuan ﬁnally attained his jin-
shi degree and later served a few years and shortly before his retirement as magistrate in several districts
in Jiangsu province.
1.2.2 Wei Yuan’s thought
Mitchell (1970) notes that the tenor of Wei Yuan’s involvement and writing on administrative prob-
lems was eﬃcacy of operations, that manifested itself in the two-fold aim of reducing the burden on
the peasantry, while at the same time raising actual government revenue.4 Mitchell further notes that
Wei Yuan studied the classics in the light of their application to problems of statecraft, linking New Text
Confucianism to his statecraft concerns with an emphasis on utility (li利), which to him represented a
practical utilitarian standard of validity.
1Mitchell (1970), p. 80. For a detailed study of the ﬂoods and disaster control measures along the Yellow River in Shan-
dong province in the late Qing dynasty that starts with the harbingers of the dam break in 1855, see Amelung (2000).
2Mann Jones & Kuhn (1983), p. 150.
3See Leonard (1984), pp. 93–120, for an analysis of the structure, content and sources of the treatise.
4Mitchell (1970), p. 100.
1.2. WEI YUAN AND HIS MANIFESTO 33
“Only utility or proﬁtability [li利] could determine right and wrong. It was the link be-
tween Heaven and Man, the unity of which all true Confucians sought. He steadfastly
denied the orthodox assertion of pursuit of proﬁt in any form as a low passion devoid of
ethical value. This denial came from Wei’s insistence on a practical utilitarian standard for
knowledge with the criterion its effect in the socio-political world. A result of this view was
Wei’s insistence on Wealth [fu富] and Power [qiang強] as not only inevitable but also
desired and wholly valid ideals for ethical government.”1
Wei Yuan is particularly articulate about his view of li利 (eﬃcacy or utility), and its relation to yi義 in
his Essays on Scholarship and Government, where he explicitly declares li a worthy goal and theorizes
about the relationship with yi.2 This is not to say that oﬃcials long before Wei Yuan had not embraced
li as a standard of validity in practical argumentation, using it to emphasize the eﬃcacy/utility of their
proposed solutions. As I hope to show in the following chapters, this is a broader trend in the writings
collected in the statecraft compendia. Wei Yuan’s insistence that li is a criterion for determining right
and wrong, and wealth and power a valid and even desirable goal of good governance summarizes the
tenor of the statecraft writings of the late Ming to late Qing. Wei Yuan bemoaned that not only had
scholarship been divorced from government, but also that concerns connected to wealth and power
(provisions and weapons, shibing⾷兵) had been divorced from scholarship. While he praised the
peace of the ancient feudal period, he contended that wholesale restoration of its conditions was nei-
ther possible nor desirable. Statements such as “the more changing of antiquity was complete, the more
it beneﬁted the people”變古愈盡便民愈甚 and that just like shoes must not be alike to ﬁt the feet
“ruling is not necessarily always the same but is expected to beneﬁt the people”履不必同期於適⾜；
治不必同期於利民 show that the constant in Wei Yuan’s thought was indeed utility.3 And while
Wei Yuan was not outspoken about distributive justice, as was his friend Gong Zizhen4, and certainly
not egalitarian, he at least underlined that utility had to be assessed from the perspective of the people at
large.
Mitchell suggests that Wei Yuan’s criticism of existing Confucian texts and his “intermingling of ideas
and lapses in methodological consistency suggested doubt in the ultimacy of the Classics in any form”
evidenced in his exegesis of the classics.5 On this basis, and judging from the political expediency of
New Text and the language of the Book of Changes (Yijing易經) in framing domestic rebellion, of-
ﬁcial corruption and problems within the grain transport, the salt administration, and river control,
Mitchell concludes that Wei Yuan’s “framing of thought within the language of textual validity primar-
ily resulted from a lack of alternative in that age and country. Any reaction to the socio-political system
1Mitchell (1970), p. 42.
2See chapter 3.3.
3WYQJ, vol. XII, p. 49.
4HCJSWB, 7:22a–23b.
5See, for example, Wei Yuan’s critique of pure evidential scholarship’s contempt for practical affairs in WYQJ, vol. XII,
p. 23, also included in HCJSWXB/ SHENG, 5:3a–7b, or his critique of a similar attitude on the part of extremist Song learn-
ing advocates in WYQJ, vol. XII, p. 36, also included in HCJSWXB/SHENG, 5:1a.
34 CHAPTER 1. A “MANIFESTO” AND ITS SUBSCRIBERS
demanded a malleable but Confucian-sanctioned body of theory capable of effecting what was a utili-
tarian standard of value. Wei found such in chin-wen and I-ching theories reinforced by a Taoist-tinged
Confucian ethic.”1
Wei Yuan was an advocate of creating more legitimate avenues for urban-based established literati
awaiting oﬃcial appointment (not the mass of rural lower degree holders) to participate in the discus-
sion of and inﬂuence contemporary affairs.2 Wei Yuan’s key argument for broadening literati participa-
tion was not some (anachronistic) idea of innate rights or freedom of speech, but eﬃcacy and that it was
in line with the idea to combine different views to arrive at the best decision and to grasp political truth
in light of comparison and context. Born into a world in which the central state’s authority was con-
tested from without and within, Wei Yuan’s aim was to increase governmental effectiveness and restore
a dynamic and powerful central state that could deal effectively with domestic and foreign troubles.
Wei’s main idea in terms of how to enhance participation of “established literati” was (from the perspec-
tive of the ruler) to tolerate the presence of associations of literati and oﬃcials who took active interest
in and engaged in discussions about policy. Kuhn points out that the HCJSWB precisely intended to
engage scholars in the discussion of bureaucratic management, state revenue and border defense and
to “appeal for involvement of established literati in politics”. Kuhn contends that this broadened par-
ticipation of urban-based degree holders was also in the interest of the provincial oﬃcials who needed
to mobilize support for their reform programs. Kuhn (1995) notes that inspired by a New Text vision
of a heroic style of political leadership, “Wei had in mind, certainly not a revolution, but rather a more
dynamic and powerful central state, one that could deal effectively with its domestic and foreign trou-
bles”.3 Both Wei Yuan and his “old friend” Feng Guifen馮桂芬 (1809–1874) regarded increased literati
participation as “the source of heightened national energy needed to resist the West” and probably also
as “a fulcrum for dislodging the deeply-entrenched interests” in oﬃcialdom and gentry that prevented
reform and “impoverished taxpayers at the same time as it diverted revenue from the state”.4
1.2.3 The preface and the editorial principles of the HCJSWB (1826): Wei Yuan’s “statecraft
manifesto”
The following section presents Wei Yuan’s approach to statecraft as set forth in his preface to the HCJSWB
that he wrote in 1826. In the appropriate places the statements in the preface will be juxtaposed with
1Mitchell (1970), p. 50.
2This has been noted by Kuhn (1995), pp. 298–317, and Elman (1988), pp. 75–78. Elman regards the chapter on Teachers
and Friends (shiyou師友) placed in the section on the Essence of Government治體 dedicated to the description of the
groups involved in the imperial administration as a subtle allusion to the more prominent role Wei Yuan envisioned for
political clubs of the metropolitan elite (disguised as poetry clubs). Note in this context Wei Yuan’s repeated emphasis that
rulers should take decisions only after consulting information from various sources. Elman (1988) thinks that the point of
the chapter in the HCJSWB on shiyou師友 chapter was not to talk about personal relationships among teachers, students
and friends, but to covertly advocate literati associations.
3Kuhn (1995), pp. 311.
4Kuhn (1995), pp. 317–319.
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lengthier expositions in the Mogu默觚 (Essays on Scholarship and Government)1, a series of essays that
Wei Yuan completed in 1851.2 The ﬁrst printed edition of the Mogu only appeared twenty years after
Wei Yuan’s death, and it probably did not have a big impact during the late Qing, but it is an important
source for gaining a complete understanding Wei Yuan’s thought.3
In the preface to the HCJSWB, Wei Yuan establishes a number of epistemological principles that
form the foundation of his political thought and that he develops further in the more comprehensive
Essays on Scholarship and Government. For Wei Yuan, learning or scholarship is the systematic study
of the vast amounts of historical material in the classics and other historical sources aimed at obtaining
insights about the Way (dao道) of good government. The vast amount of events and statements that
one has to study necessitate that one develops a strategy for dealing with details without losing sight of
the essential and for dealing with contradictions and multiple perspectives without being confused. Wei
Yuan offers some suggestions in this respect by reminding the reader of the interdependent nature of a
number of conceptual polarities, and by stating that right and wrong (shi fei是⾮) are relative, and that
circumstantial truth can be approached through comparison.
Wei Yuan’s ﬁrst premise is that learning should always have a practical orientation: it provides guid-
ance for governance. The Way (dao道) can only be studied through its instantiation in the Vessel (qi
器). The essence of learning is therefore the systematic inquiry of metaphysical principles (the Way) and
their realization in history (the Vessel). Scholarship should be no “cerebral exercise, but a guide to ac-
tion”.4
The second premise is Wei Yuan’s skepticism about man’s ability to reach absolute political certainty,
a.k.a. the Way, because he thought that “in politics, truth (at least, the contingent truth of our mundane
affairs) assumes multiple appearances”.5 Wei Yuan justiﬁes his advocacy of fully legitimizing discussion
of contemporary affairs of the urbanized, established elite with the necessity of unrestricted competition
of views and opinions that results from his skepticism towards absolute truths. “There is no single doc-
trine which is absolutely correct, and no single person who is absolutely good. That is why, in the Ode
‘Deer Call,’ the deer cry out to each other when browsing for food, and in the Ode ‘Felling the trees’, the
tree fellers call out to each other”道固無盡減，⼈固無盡益也。是以《⿅鳴》得⾷⽽相呼，《伐⽊》
同聲⽽求友.6 Interesting in this context is how Wei Yuan’s rhetorical use of passages from several Odes
from the Book of Songs in the Essays on Scholarship and Government differs from the conventional in-
terpretations. Kuhn (1995) points out that conventional interpretations of the poem placed the focus on
1WYQJ, vol. XII, vol. 12, pp. 1–80; the HCJSWXB/SHENG, 5:1a–7b and 8:1a–25b, includes an abridged version of the se-
ries of essays.
2For an entertaining biographical account that combines information and anecdotal material from primary and sec-
ondary sources, see Mitchell (1970).
3Liu (1984), p. 360.
4Kuhn (1995), p. 305. Also compare Zhang Erqi’s張爾歧 (1612-1678) assertion in the opening piece of both the HCJSWB
and the Qiewenzhai wenchao: “If one studies the words of the sages, but one’s actions do not attain theirs, then it is as if one
has not studied”學聖⽽⾏不⾄，猶之未學也. HCJSWB, 1:1a–2b.
5Kuhn (1995), p. 307.
6WYQJ, vol. XII, p. 35, translated in Kuhn (1995), p. 307.
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the harmonious relationship between a ruler and his ministers. Wei Yuan focuses instead on what the
poem says about the communication among the deer. Kuhn (1995), pp. 303–307 and 310. As Wei Yuan
presumes that “political truth emerges through the clash of opinions”, the ruler’s decision making will
be rendered more effective and his policies more correct if he lets men present their different views and
choses the best one or a synthesis1: “When sagacious oﬃcials are at court, their views do not necessarily
coincide. But the Great Man uses two views to reach one. Invariably, their views shine in succession,
and the leader can choose one to implement. As the ‘Book of Songs’ says: ‘The turbid water of the River
Jing seem even murkier when one sees them ﬂowing alongside the limpid water of the River Wei. How-
ever, it ﬂows clear near the little islets [where the water current is slower].”’故君⼦之⽤世也，道不必
盡同﹔智⼠之同朝也，轍不必相合﹔然⼤⼈致⼀⽤兩，未嘗不代明⽽錯⾏也。《詩》⽈：「徑以
渭濁，提提其址」.2 Wei Yuan’s advocacy of increasing literati (urban elites’) participation as fulcrum
for dislodging deeply-entrenched interests is a consequence of the belief that the best approximation of
truth results most often from a combination of several different perspectives. Instead of turning to spec-
ulation in the face of one’s inability to reach absolute political truth, one should engage in learning, and
thereby grasp situational truth and ﬁnd a workable solution in the light of comparison and context.3
The third premise he establishes is the complementary, interdependent nature of a number of con-
ceptual polarities that one might conventionally regard as mutually exclusive. Wei Yuan established
this premise right in the beginning of his preface to HCJSWB where takes up four conceptual pairs
that seem ontologically separate and shows that they are actually complementary and interdependent,
or even inseparable: “deeds” (shi事) and the “mind” (xin⼼), “models” (fa法) and “men” (ren⼈),
present (jin今) and past (gu古), and “external world” (wu物) and “self” (wo我). These conceptual
pairs represent basic categories of administrative discourse and a principle idea behind the HCJSWB.
The discussion of the four polarities serves the concrete purpose to justify the statecraft circle’s reform
projects and the format of the HCJSWB against common objections, most notably that it is more im-
portant to practice one’s moral intuition in reclusion than to engage in administration, that moral in-
tegrity of bureaucratic personnel is the key to good governance, that concrete administrative procedures
and institutional arrangements are perfectly exchangeable, or that one should not base decisions on
other people’s opinions, but only on one’s own opinion, government must not change ancient models.
Wei Yuan counters these arguments by contending that the extensive study and controversial discus-
sion of practical and technical (not just moral) aspects of governance is a legitimate and worthy occupa-
tion for urban-based degree-holders. He concedes that deeds and models, as well as present and external
1Kuhn (1995), p. 310.
2WYQJ, vol. XII, p. 50, translated in Kuhn (1995), p. 310. Again, Kuhn (1995) notes Wei Yuan’s departure from the con-
ventional reading of the ode that was conventionally explained as critique of the king’s judging an old wife by comparison
to a younger, prettier one. Wei lends the poem a more general signiﬁcance by presenting it as an illustration of a general
skepticism about man’s “ability to reach absolute truth” and the insight that “we can grasp political truth only in the light of
comparison and context”.
3This is evidenced in a passage discussed below in which Wei Yuan writes of the sage rulers’ broad consultation of reports
from across their realm.
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world logically derive from from the mind, from men, from the past and the self. But he takes recourse
to analogies to visualize the interdependent nature of the polarities and argues that it is nevertheless le-
gitimate to discuss the derivative concepts, that is, deeds, models, present and external world, in their
own right. The polarities manifest the “traditional organistic view of upper and lower partners differen-
tiated by function rather than value”.1 I suggest that polarity and analogy are not just rhetorical ﬁgures
to Wei Yuan and that he also formulates a more general epistemological strategy with the discussion.
This strategy is to overcome confusion by recognizing the complementary nature of ostensibly irrec-
oncilable dichotomies and by admitting that, most of the time, certainty emerges in speciﬁc contexts
through comparison, instead of deriving from some absolute norms or frame of reference. Analogy and
polarity are two fundamental intellectual ﬁgures with which Wei Yuan understands the world and his
age. This is evident from the fact that the four polarities from the preface to the HCJSWB ﬁgure promi-
nently in the Essays on Scholarship and Government. After the twenty-ﬁve years that had passed since
the publication of the HCJSWB, Wei Yuan still seemed to feel that he had to clear up misunderstand-
ings regarding several polar concepts in order to counter fundamental opposition against administrative
reform. Wei Yuan takes them up one after the other in an exposition of his political thought that is less
abstract than the one in the preface.
Through the ﬁrst polarity, Wei Yuan makes the point that engagement with practical affairs (shi事)
is as important as cultivating the innate knowledge of one’s mind (xin⼼). When he writes that practi-
cal affairs are a result of or, literally, are rooted in the heart-mind, Wei Yuan probably has two things in
mind. A person’s mental disposition determines how a person acts. How a person relates to and judges
external or past affairs also depends on this person’s mental disposition. The two analogies Wei Yuan
draws may admittedly not appear particularly straightforwardly to the modern reader. In the ﬁrst anal-
ogy, Wei Yuan appears to relate the human mind to a seal that, once inscribed with a certain script type,
cannot render its text in any other script type but the chosen one. With this, Wei Yuan probably relates
to the fact that human perception is limited by the time and space one lives in, and that, once adopted,
there are certain deeply entrenched biases or early acquired habits of perception that it is nearly impossi-
ble for the human mind to overcome.
Practical affairs2 are necessarily based on the heart-mind. If we create a myriad imprints
with one seal, they all come out perfectly identical. If the seal is inscribed in ordinary script,
can one use it to print ornate script with it? If the seal is inscribed in ornate script, can one
print ordinary seal script with it?
事必本夫⼼。璽⼀也。⽂⾒於朱者。千萬如⼀。有璽籀篆⽽朱⿃跡者乎。有朱
籀篆⽽璽⿃跡者乎。
The second analogy seems to speak more directly to those Confucian adherents who shun involvement
1Mitchell (1970), p. 62.
2Depending on the context, shi事 can also be translated as actions, deeds, events, matters or facts.
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in mundane affairs and regard a style of self-cultivation that is detached from the outside world as the
ideal way to attain real knowledge. Wei Yuan admits that every scale needs measuring marks to be of any
use. Those measuring marks conform to human-made standards (measuring units) and the quantities
they measure are in a way products of the human mind. However, if the scale indicates a certain weight,
this is still the result of the presence of an actual physical object and not just subjective mental ﬁction.
Thus, what Wei Yuan argues is that engagement with practical affairs is just as important to gain knowl-
edge as self-cultivation. By implication, an assessment of the success of a person’s self-cultivation is only
possible by observing the actions of that person.
Although a scale without measuring marks is useless, the actual weight of an object is what
produces the measured weight on the scale, not the other way round. Anyone who wants
to properly speak about the mind has to verify it by observing practical affairs.
然無星之秤不可以程物，輕重⽣權衡，⾮權衡⽣輕重。善⾔⼼者必有驗于事矣。
With the second polarity, Wei Yuan argues that models (fa法 or, depending on the context: institu-
tions, laws, methods, models or systems) are just as crucial as human agency (ren⼈), and should there-
fore receive proper attention. In the statecraft context, Wei Yuan had laws, institutions and administra-
tive regulations in mind when speaking of standards. Wei Yuan admits that standards, be they of a tech-
nical, administrative, legal or any other nature, have to be implemented by humans to take any effect
at all. The best carriage will not move its load for one inch without the agency of a human driver. Stan-
dards are nevertheless indispensable, as even the most decent craftsmen has to observe external standards
such as track widths and employ blueprints to build a properly functioning carriage. By way of analogy,
Wei Yuan warns of taking the conventional emphasis on the role of men (ren⼈) in government to its
extreme, a position which denies the possibility that any one set of regulations can be superior to any
other set of regulations. Laws, institutions, or regulations have to be implemented and complied with
by humans to take effect, but good laws make a difference and should always be preferred over bad laws.
Standards necessarily depend on human agency. A cart with ﬁve-inch hubs can transport
its load a thousand miles, but without a driver, it will not even move an inch. However,
even the famous craftsmen Lu Ban and Wang Er with their sharp eyes and great imagina-
tion were not capable of building a fully functioning carriage behind closed doors. Anyone




With the third polarity, Wei Yuan makes the point that while past events and wisdom are of immense
value, the present circumstances and innovations are just as essential. The cultural heroes of the past
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have made inventions and founded institutions that advanced Chinese civilization. However, not every-
thing from the past is equally relevant to the present. There is still the need for later born innovators to
improve on past inventions and to adapt past institutions to the changed circumstances of the present.
Wei Yuan extends on the past-present polarity in an essay in the Essays on Scholarship and Govern-
ment on the question in what way the Three Ages (Xia, Shang and Western Zhou Dynasties) and their
allegedly ideal institutions can be a model for the present, and in what way they cannot. In the essay,
Wei Yuan lists the innovations in several ﬁelds that have improved life since the Three Ages as evidence
that the present does not need to stick to the institutions of the past to the letter. Wei Yuan further-
more provides a theoretical argument for the necessity of change that draws upon the idea that while
the Way is unchanging, the qi氣 (“air” or “vital energy”) is constantly active and transforming the ma-
terial and living forms in the world. This results in ever changing “circumstances”, “power structures”
or “power constellations” (shi勢), which, in turn, necessitates innovations also in the institutional and
civilizational areas. Also, the “passing on” or “transmitting” (chuan傳) of a thing is always also “trans-
forming” the original thing, like a piece of ﬁrewood sustains but at the same time transforms the ﬁre
that was used to ignite it, and like a descendant continues his ancestors’ line and legacy, but transforms
it at the same time. This factor of change has to be kept in mind when observing the past and present in
order to prevent faulty scholarly judgments and wrong governmental decisions, Wei Yuan says: “Using
the past to regulate the present means failing to do justice to the present. Using the present to assess the
past means failing to do justice to the past. If one fails to do justice to the present, one will be unable to
govern (zhi治). If one fails to do justice to the past, one will be unable to pursue learning (xue學).”執
古以繩今，是為誣今；執今以律古，是為誣古；誣今不可以為治，誣古不可以為學.1
The present necessarily depends on the past. The sixty-year-cycle devised by the Great
Nao can be used for thousands of years without alteration. But last year’s calendar can-
not be used for this year, the inventions of out great-great-grandfathers and out great-
grandfathers are not as convenient to use as the ones of our grandfathers and fathers. The
more recent the times, the more similar the circumstances. The sages adapt their attitudes
and statesmanship to the times and circumstances. Anyone who wants to talk about the




By putting forward the fourth polarity, Wei Yuan advocates that one’s own perspective on things is
just as important as alternative perspectives, and that one should therefore still broaden one’s horizon
by learning from the opinions of others and by engaging in controversial discussions. Wei Yuan speaks
1WYQJ, vol. XII, pp. 48–49.
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favorably of controversial discussions because he seems to think that they take major critical points of
each opinion into consideration and therefore lead to simple and viable solutions.
Things in the outside world (wu物) necessarily depend on the observation of oneself
(wo我). But if two things rub against each other, something more reﬁned results. If two
minds confront each other’s opinions, doubts arise. If these doubts are critically debated, a
simple and viable solution results. The ‘Book of Songs’ says: ‘Wisely arranged are the great
plans; Sages devised them. What other men have in their minds, I can measure by reﬂec-
tion’.1 It further says: ‘everywhere I seek information and advice’, ‘everywhere I seek infor-
mation and counsel’.2 This is how the people of antiquity relied on their own mind by not
daring to rely upon their own mind alone. They were eager to inquire what others had in
their minds, and thus broaden their own minds in an incremental process of repeated dis-
cussion and continued exchange of ideas. Anyone who wants to speak about oneself has to





The exposition is followed by a deﬁnition of two key terms in Wei Yuan’s statecraft thought, order or
government (zhi治) and learning (xue學). Wei Yuan starts out on a cosmological note and anchors his
deﬁnitions in the universe of the Book of Changes (Book of Changes易經). The beginning and end
of the ﬁfth verse of the Appended Remarks (Xici shang繫辭上) act like a bracket around Wei Yuan’s
explanations of zhi, so that the passage resembles a variation turned upside-down of the ﬁfth verse. The
ﬁfth verse starts with a description of the Way (dao道) and ends in a description of affairs (shi事) and,
lastly, spirits (shen神). The verse presents the Way as the perpetual succession of yin and yang, the ac-
tive principle and the passive principle: “The alternating dominance of the passive and the active prin-
ciple is called the Way.”⼀陰⼀陽之謂道. Affairs are what can the diviner can gain certainty about
when observing the changes, the verse tells us, while spirits are what is unfathomable in the movements
of yin and yang: “What can be understood by observing the changes is called affairs, what is unfath-
omable in the succession of the passive and active principle is called spirits.”通變之謂事陰陽不測




3Legge (1899), pp. 355–357.
4Wei’s representation of the socio-political hierarchy is comparable to the one in Han Yu’s韓愈 Yuan dao原道. Han &
Wei (1200), p. 390.
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The kings and lords establish and adapt it, the high oﬃcials receive and spread it, the many lower oﬃ-
cials, functionaries, peasants, craftsmen, merchants and soldiers perform their special tasks to implement
and execute it in the whole realm.1 Here we have the “hierarchical human organization patterned on the
larger universal order” of the New Text School (jinwen今⽂) with its “political schema stressing ruler-
ship and structured subordination”.2 In line with the tenets of the New Text school, this socio-political
hierarchy represents a functional differentiation that aims for stability, rather than stressing a ranking
of roles in which a person’s status (wei位) automatically corresponds to this person’s intrinsic value or
moral capacity (de德).3 This functional hierarchy is what constitutes proper government or order (zhi
治), which Wei Yuan deﬁnes as “men standing on top of other men”⼈積⼈.4
Wei Yuan’s statements on the nature of the Way bear clear conceptual resemblance to the correspond-
ing verse in the Book of Changes. The Book of Changes states that the Way is the effect of the alterna-
tion of the passive and active principle, while Wei Yuan speaks of the alternation of decline and blossom,
decay and renewal. However, Wei Yuan markedly departs from the Book of Changes by not simply
speaking of “the Way” (dao道), but of “the Way and the Vessel” (dao yu qi道與器). The twelfth verse
of the Xici shang deﬁnes the Way and the Vessel in relation to material form xing形. The Way is what
is antecedent to material form (xing er shang形⽽上), abstract principles of things and affairs, while
the Vessel is what is subsequent to material form (xing er xia形⽽下), concrete realizations of things
and affairs. Later in the Essays on Scholarship and Government, Wei Yuan deﬁnes government or order
(zhi治) as “all affairs related to the forms the Way takes”, and further splits these “forms the Way takes”
up into vessel (qi器), (de)termination (duan斷), and resources (zi資). He links vessel to rites and mu-
sic, (de)termination to military and punishments, and resources to economy and ﬁnance. While “rites
and music” can refer to the institutional framework in general, not just narrowly to ritual and musical
institutions, it seems as if Wei Yuan excludes both military, penal, and economic and ﬁnancial matters
from the Vessel. However, I would argue that this reading cannot be transferred to the preface, as both
Wei Yuan and the HCJSWB is very much concerned with military, penal, economic and ﬁnancial affairs,
so that qi should be regarded as a designation for “all forms the Way takes” here.5 “Wei’s scheme was a
complex fusion of a constant, the Tao; a ceaselessly changing element, events; and a recycling element
[an ethical norm], comprehension of the constant manifested in dealing with the ceaseless changes.”6
Be that as it may, Way and Vessel are the only abstract concepts in the preface that Wei Yuan deﬁnes
1Wei Yuan never substantiates whether this “it” (zhi之) refers to zhi治 or dao道 and qi器, or both.
2Mitchell (1970), pp. 30–31.
3Mitchell (1970), p. 42. This does not mean a departure from the ideal that all people should come equipped with the
moral capacities that their roles require.
4The ﬁrst ren⼈ could also be read as singular “man standing on top of other men” or “a man accumulating other
men”, referring to the emperor. There is a similar passage in the third of Wei Yuan’s Essays on Scholarship and Government,
where Wei Yuan explains the Son of Heaven as “the product of the multitude of men”天⼦者眾⼈所積⽽成, essentially
equating the Son of Heaven with a “network effect”. However, as the present sentence is preceded by a description of the
multi-layered of all social roles, the chosen reading is preferred here.
5?, vol. XII, p. 23.
6Mitchell (1970). p. 49.
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not separately, but together as a pair. This might indicate his conviction that the Way could not exist
independently of the Vessel, and vice versa. The question is if Wei Yuan himself thought he had a deﬁ-
nite answer to the question of what (norms etc.) belonged to the unchanging category, and what to the
changing category. He has some statements on orthodox norms (some of them on disconcerting topics
such as “On the practice of feeding one’s relatives with one’s own ﬂesh”刲股對1) but his insistence on
broad study in order to get a feeling for historical contingency seems at odds with moral dogmatism.
That which permeates everywhere is called spirits. That which takes speciﬁc form is called
affairs. Those who establish and adapt2 are called kings and lords. Those who receive and
spread are called high oﬃcials at the court and all over the country. Those who make the
plans for implementation, dedicate their talents, perform all sorts of specialised tasks, tire-
lessly, and bring it to the whole realm are called secretaries, clerks, peasants, craftsmen,
merchants and soldiers. Men standing on top of other men is called government3. The re-
placement of one rule by the next forms the present and past. What goes through decline




Wei Yuan speaks of the Vessel and the Way as something that the human mind can grasp or at least gain
approximate grasp of, men can learn about the abstract principles through their concrete realizations,
making sense of the workings of the universe by observing its changes and distinguishing the constants
and variables. In the Essays on Scholarship and Government, Wei Yuan writes that the Way does not
change, and contrasts this with the “structures of power” or “constellations of power” (shi勢), which
are permanently changing.4 An unchanging Way does not contradict how Wei Yuan presents the rela-
tionship between the Way and the Vessel here, though. Wei Yuan presents the Way as something that
is so intricately interwoven with the Vessel that human intellect cannot properly separate the two from
each other and perceive the true essence of the Way without observing the Vessel.
According to Wei Yuan, learning or scholarship (xue學) fulﬁlls the practical purpose of guiding gov-
ernment (zhi治) through the study of the Vessel and the Way. Learning is simply the systematic study
of Way and Vessel. The purpose of learning is to ﬁrst bring order into one’s own thoughts, and from
there into one’s immediate social environment, the state and the world. Learning enables people to ﬁrst
order to their own mind and life and then to order the realm.
1HCJSWB, 60:35a–b
2The yin因 could mean here either that established institutions are followed, or that they are adapted to the changing
times, therefore, adapt was chosen as translation, which in a way strikes the best balance between both meanings.
3The term zhi治 can not only mean government or rule, but also what government and rule intended to establish and
maintain, i.e. order
4WYQJ, vol. XII, p. 48.
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When lords, high oﬃcials and commoners search for the causes of the ups and downs of
the Way and Vessel in order to bring order to themselves and the external world and in
order to know what path to take and how to make sense of indeterminacy and change, this
is called learning. Learning enables the teacher, the oﬃcial, the scholar and the common
man to investigate all matters concerning mind, person, family, country and realm, and to




Ordering the realm is by no means a trivial task. The actions of the ruler have a profound impact on a
great number of people. Rewards and punishments engender satisfaction or aversion, providing for ed-
ucation and nourishment engender feelings of happiness and joy, while the use of troops and enacting
punishments engender anger and sorrow. The ruler therefore has to use the means at his disposal wisely
and extrapolate beforehand what their effects will be. What is more, the ruler will often face situations
where he needs to strike a compromise between the need for institutional continuity and institutional
innovation, where it is not clear how to put decisions into practice once reached, or where the sheer
complexity and uncertainty of the circumstances seems to make a principled decision impossible. This is
where learning becomes indispensable. Learning, Wei Yuan promises, provides the student with orien-
tation and guidance in a complex and ever changing world. It will render the student to perceive both
the forest and the tree at the same time, to discern what remains constant and what is subject to change.
Learning makes men see behind the complex surface of things and perceive something of their real na-
ture, the basic principles of the cosmos, the Way.
Rewards and punishments will stir fondness and aversion, education and nourishment
will inspire happiness and joy, military action and penal law will provoke anger and lamen-
tation.1 If one is perceptive both when it comes to the constant frame of reference and the
ﬂuctuating details, and receptive to the subtle and profound, then the need for institu-
tional continuity will integrate nicely with the need for institutional innovation, and the
results from consultations and debates will be easy to implement and put into practice. It
will become apparent how to trace the most profuse and complex intricacies back to the
principled nature of things which determines their dynamics.
絻鉞其好惡，教養其喜樂，兵刑其怒哀。亹亹乎經曲，淼淼乎精微，則遵襲循
守與創制同，諏詢謀議與施措同。膠葛紛紜，⾄纖⾄悉，與性命流⾏品物同。
1To account for the parallelism of the phrases in this sentence, all objects are rendered as the mental states or emotional
expressions of the people (like and dislike, happiness and joy, angriness and lamentation). The ﬁrst phrase could also be trans-
lated as “using rewards and punishments to inﬂuence what the people like and dislike”, but while the second phrases could
still be forced into a similar schema, it is impossible to ﬁnd a corresponding parallel translation for the third phrase (it would
make no sense to recommend a ruler to use troops and penal law to inﬂuence what the people are angry and lament about).
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It remains for Wei Yuan to specify what learning actually is. For Wei Yuan, learning is broad exposure
to practical affairs and other people’s “words”, ideally practiced by the sage kings of antiquity. The sage
kings of antiquity built their rule on the careful evaluation of all information they could gather about
their realm. Their scribes, Wei Yuan contends, recorded not only everything the ruler did and said, but
everything relevant that was done and said in the whole realm. By studying the records and using them
as basis of consultation with their ministers, the sage kings succeeded in not being confused by the sur-
face complexity of things and by apparent contradictions. The mentioning of the left and right scribes
strikes a parallel with Chen Zilong’s preface to the HMJSWB.1 Gu Tang辜漟 (ﬂ. 1873) picks up the idea
that breadth of information is conducive to a clear perspective and writes in the preface to the reprint
of the 1873 HCJSWB: “the material included in this compendium is recent and ample, beneﬁts and de-
ﬁciencies are as easy to distinguish as white and black, the prescribed methods are systematic, so that it
avoids the reproach of wanting to treat contemporary maladies with ancient recipes”是編也。取材
近。選⾔富。利病若⽩⿊分。調劑各有法。古⽅今病之誚庶乎免矣.2 The idea is also manifest
in of the the editorial principles declared in the editorial notes, the broad selection of different or even
contradictory approaches to a similar problem. In several cases, Wei Yuan comments on the contradic-
tions between or within the writings and suggests a synthesis. See, for example, Wei Yuan’s comments
on essays by Jiang Shiquan and Li Fu discussed on p. 81 and p. 143 that both employ the ren-fa polarity
to discuss contradictions.
In antiquity, the left scribe3 recorded all the entangled events, while the right scribe recorded
all the profuse words. Events cannot be altered once they have happened, the merits and
drawbacks of words are clear once they have been uttered, the path taken is ﬁxed, all inde-
terminants are fully known. The former kings used these records for consultation, to keep
themselves informed about the people’s situation, to aggregate collective worries, to exam-
ine signs and to study ultimate reasons. They did not think that the study of things that
had not yet taken shape was obscure, they did not regard the broad investigation of the ba-
sic principles of human affairs as inessential, they were not perplexed by the antinomy of
light and dark (contradictions on the surface?), they did not regard overlapping rules and




Having set the task of emulating this model, the preface concludes with a brief note on authors and the
1See Chen (1638), 0:(Chen xu)1a.
2He & Wei (1887), 0:2b.
3The antique shi史were in a sense proto-court historians, so shi could also be rendered as historiographer.
4The yuan元 here replaces the taboo character xuan⽞ (which became taboo because it appeared in the Kangxi em-
peror’s birth name, Aisin Gioro Hiowan Yei (Xuanye)愛新覺羅⽞燁).
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arrangements of contents, a topic that Wei Yuan expands on in the following editorial principles.
For this reason, I collected the words of famous oﬃcials, eminent scholars, brilliant literati
and outstanding commoners, all of them signiﬁcant works, into one hundred-twenty vol-
umes, divided into eight overarching sections and sixty-three chapters. Six of the chap-
ters are about learning, ﬁve about government, eight about state servants, twelve about
households, nine about rites, twelve of them about military, three about punishments,
nine about public works. This compilation was introduced by Wei Moshen (Yuan), proof-
read by Cao Sheng, and completed in the sixth year of the reign of Daoguang (1826), in the





The editorial principles of the HCJSWB clearly reﬂect the principles of the HMJSWB and the QWZWC.
The HCJSWB conﬁrm the focus on practical administration, relevance as overarching criterion, entail-
ing the preference for recent models over past models if they are more relevant to the present as well as
no regard for the status of the author, and the inclusion of alternative and possibly controversial opin-
ions.
The ﬁrst editorial principle, entitled “Selection criteria” (Shenqu審取), presents the relevance of writ-
ings for the present as the primary criterion for inclusion in the compendium, and explains the eight
overarching thematic sections of the HCJSWB. Relevance means that writings that make points too
lofty, too commonplace, or too anachronistic were not included. The eight overarching sections are a
section on “Learning” or “Scholarship” (xueshu學術), a section on the “Essence of Government” (zhiti
治體) the six sections on the government of the Six Boards of the Qing government, namely “Appoint-
ments” lizheng吏政, “Household” huzhehg⼾政, “Rites” lizheng禮政, “Punishments” xingzheng
刑政, and “Public Works” gongzheng⼯政. Wei Yuan points out that the ﬁrst section, “Learning”,
contains writings which provide the guiding principles (gangling綱領) for statecraft (jingshi經世).
The second section on the “Essence of Government” is meant to set forth the theoretical framework
(gangwei綱維) for the following six section concerned with the administrative tasks of the Six Boards.
In the second editorial principle, entitled “Breadth of selection” (guangcun廣存), Wei Yuan explains
the strategy of including several alternative solutions to an administrative problem. Different condi-
tions may warrant different solutions, or the optimal solution to a controversially debated issue may lie
somewhere in between two antithetical positions, or in a combination of both. The HCJSWB indeed
includes writings that represent contradictory viewpoints on the same issues. This principle did not nec-
essarily extend, however, to administrative issues on which the editors had a clear position, such as the
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transport of tribute grain.1 In the three chapters dedicated to the topic, the opponents of the proposal
to switch to sea transport are not represented with writings. Wei Yuan furthermore notes that writings
were not excluded just because they were written in an unconventional or pretentious style, as long as
they contained valid points for the present. Furthermore, writings were included with no regard for the
status and prominence of their author.
With the third editorial principle, entitled “Arrangement of content”, Wei Yuan points out the lim-
its of a linear structure of sections and chapters. Wei states out that there are many issues which touch
upon the responsibilities of more than one government agency and which cannot be unambiguously
associated with one chapter or even one section, such as tribute grain transport or river conservancy, gra-
naries or bureaucratic discipline. Wei therefore encourages the reader to scan more than one section and
chapter in such cases. Wei furthermore states that the ordering of the writings within the chapters does
not imply a ranking, a clear departure from the QWZWC which arranged the writings within each topic
according to the preference.
The fourth editorial principle, entitled “Compilation and editing” (Tiaoli條理) contains some re-
marks on the sources and editing of the writings. Wei underlines that the criterion that the writing in-
cluded has to be relevant implies that writings by contemporary authors can be included, as “writings
which are relevant for the times in which they are written should not be published only after their au-
thors are dead”殆以切時之⾔無須⾝後始出. Wei defends the modiﬁcations made to writings
containing formulaic language and redundancies in order to render the writings more to the point. As
previous scholarship suggests, these modiﬁcations were sometimes quite considerable.2
1.2.4 Format, structure and sources of the HCJSWB
The HCJSWB contains 2236 private and oﬃcial writings by 702 authors from the reigns of all Qing
emperors until the early Daoguang reign. Wei Yuan adopted Lu Yao’s arrangement by topic instead of
author, reinforcing the idea that the primary aim of statecraft learning was to study particular problems,
and that the study of thought and achievements of individuals was of secondary importance. While
twelve sections had been enough to keep the slightly more than 400 writings included in the QWZWC
organized, Wei Yuan had to expand the original structure. He introduced a two-tier structure with eight
sections and 60 chapters spread across 120 volumes (some of the chapters ﬁlling two to ﬁve volumes).
This two-tier structure was kept by the sequels until the late 1890s, when most sequels started to drop
the overarching sections.
The ﬁrst two sections of the HCJSWB present the ideological basis of scholarship (xueshu學術) and
1HCJSWB, 46–48
2See Song (2012) for a detailed analysis of the modiﬁcations of a sample of writings included in the HCJSWB. Yang (1990)
reports instances in the HCJSWB where formulaic language at the beginning and end of writings was removed. Dunstan
(2006) also suggests that editors of the HCJSWB abridged and changed many writings, as the versions in the HCJSWB often
do not match other extant versions.

















Figure 1.1: Number of writings in each of the eight section of the HCJSWB
the essence of government (zhiti治體).1 The remaining six sections are each named after one of the Six
Boards of the Qing government and contain writings on the administration of personnel (lizheng吏
政), households or ﬁnance (huzheng⼾政), rites (lizheng禮政), the military (bingzheng兵政), public
works (gongzheng⼯政) and punishments (xingzheng刑政). In these sections, theoretical writings,
including presentations of canonical and historical authority, precede practical writings presenting cur-
rent weaknesses and corruption and suggesting ideal systems. As can be seen from ﬁgure 1.1, the two
initial theoretical sections on scholarship and government taken together are about as strong as one of
the practical sections. The six practical sections contain on average 300–400 writings. The household
section stands out with a total of 517 writings. That is partly explicable by the focus of the HCJSWB on
state budget and the people’s livelihood (guoji minsheng國計民⽣). However, the imbalance between
the households sections and the personnel sections is also partly attributable to the signiﬁcant topical
overlap of this section with the households section, a fact that Wei Yuan comments on in the editorial
notes.2
The personnel section starts with two general introductory characters reﬂecting upon the role of the
oﬃcial and the bureaucracy as a whole. The introductory chapters are followed by one chapter on ap-
pointments, one on the organization and structure of the bureaucracy and one on the evaluation of
oﬃcials. The remaining chapters of the section are dedicated to each of the roles in the bureaucratic hi-
erarchy. There is one chapter on high oﬃcials (the “oﬃcials who administer other oﬃcials”治官之官,
1For an analysis of the scholarship section of HCJSWB, see Elman (1988). For an analysis of the scholarship and essence
of government sections, see Huang (1985).
2HCJSWB, 0:2.2a–b
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that is, all oﬃcials above the district magistrate), three chapters on district magistrates (the “oﬃcials who
administer the people”治民之官), one chapter on clerks and runners and ﬁnally one chapter on private
secretaries.
In the household section, three chapters introduce the raison-d’être of the Board of Revenue, namely
the collection and management of ﬁscal revenues (licai理財) and at the same time the securing of the
people’s livelihood and their moral health (yang min養民). The remaining chapters of the section can
be roughly categorized under these two (admittedly intertwined) aspects. On the ﬁscal side, there are
ﬁve chapters on taxation, three on the grain tribute, two on the salt gabelle and one on the monopoly
on alcohol. On the economic side, there are three chapters on agriculture, two on granaries and ﬁve
on disaster relief, one chapter on military colonies and land reclamation and one on the livelihood of
banner troops. The last two chapters are dedicated to monetary policy.
The voluminous rites section contains one general introductory chapter, two chapters on the court
ceremonies, one chapter on schools, two chapters on the topic of ancestor worship, one chapter on
family relationships, one chapter on wedding ceremonies and two on funeral rites, two chapters on the
clothing system (dress code depending on social situation and status), two chapters on rituals and places
of worship, and two chapters on habits and customs.
Ten of the twenty chapters in the military section are dedicated to border defense, two on the de-
fense of the Northern and North-Western border regions, one on defense of mountain borders, three
on naval defense and four on military action against tribes in the South. This shows the renewed inter-
ests into such topics that had been banned from discourse until the late Qianlong reign. Particularly
noteworthy is the considerable interest in naval defense at this point in time already. Apart from that,
the section has chapters on military strategy, military training, physical geography, military colonies and
cavalry.
The relatively short section on punishments contains one general introductory chapter, two chapters
on the penal code, and two chapters on the investigation of criminal cases.
The public works section is completely dominated by hydraulic engineering. There is one chapter
on civil engineering concerned with the river shipment of wood for construction and the maintenance
of roads and bridges. The remaining twenty-six are all concerned with hydraulic engineering, that is,
river conservancy and irrigation schemes. There are eight chapters on Yellow River conservancy, three
on maintenance of the Grand Canal, fourteen on river conservancy apart from the Yellow River as well
as irrigation, and one on coastal embankments. The focus on river conservancy clearly illustrates the
fact that “China’s system of water transport, including the Yangzi River, functioned not only as a vital
commercial artery but an integral component of the state’s ﬁscal infrastructure”.1 This and the distribu-
tion of chapters in the households section reﬂects the focus of the statecraft group in the Lower Yangtze
valley (He Changling, Tao Zhu, Lin Zexu, Yao Ying etc.) on irrigation and agricultural methods on the
1Halsey (2013), p. 398.
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local level, and canal and river control, salt administration and currency reforms on the national level.1
Most writings in the HCJSWB stem from printed collections, both collected works of individual au-
thors (zhuanji專集) and anthologies of the writings of multiple authors (heji合集 and difangzhi地
⽅志 (mostly provincial gazeteers通志, but also some prefecture府志 and district gazetteers州志/縣
志). The editorial criteria (wuli五例) state the greater reliability of printed materials as compared to
handwritten copies in circulation (chuanchao傳抄), and further that handwritten copies had only been
taken into consideration if no printed edition had been available. The HCJSWB includes the writings of
54 contemporaries of which 14 had already published collections of their writings. The writings of the
remaining authors were possibly obtained as handwritten copies (some of them handwritten copies con-
sulted in archives or obtained from the authors themselves). The list of authors lists 398 authors whose
writings were taken from collections of their personal writings and another 243 authors whose writings
were taken from anthologies of memorials, compilations of administrative writings, local gazetteers,
and obtained as handwritten copies.2 In the process of compilation, some of the writings were modi-
ﬁed, a fact which Wei Yuan mentions in the editorial criteria. These modiﬁcations included changes of
title, merging of multiple writings into one, insertion of comments at the end of the writings, reword-
ing of passages, deletion or summarization of passages, and the insertion of punctuation marks. These
modiﬁcations were undertaken in order to render the writings more to the point and easier to read for
contemporary readers.3
Top authors in the HCJSWB













1Mitchell (1970), p. 55.
2For an analysis of the genres of the writings included in the scholarship and government sections, see Huang (1985),
p. 22.
3For a discussion of the modiﬁcations undertaken on a representative selection of writings from the HCJSWB, see Song
(2012), pp. 12–32.






























Table 1.1: Authors represented with 10+ writings in the
HCJSWB. The asterisk (*) marks authors still alive at the time pf
publication.
The HCJSWB includes writings by authors of a wide variety of outlooks. Metzger (1973) notes that
the advantage of the term statecraft (jingshi經世) was that, having its locus classicus in the Zhuangzi,
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it was vague and uncontroversial, and could embrace a broad spectrum of opinions. Among the promi-
nently represented authors are both outspoken advocates of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism as well as
prominent ﬁgures of the school of evidential scholarship. The Han learning advocate Li Ciming李慈銘
(1830–1895) criticized the inclusion of a number of writings outrightly polemizing against Han learning.
He acknowledges that the inclusion was due to the editors’ legitimate wish to reestablish Song learning
among scholars and oﬃcials.1 Both hailing from Hunan, He Changling and Wei Yuan ensured a solid
representation of Song learning including, for example, Cheng-Zhu advocates such as Fang Bao and Lu
Shiyi (1611-1672), and one of the most important Lu-Wang advocates of the Qing dynasty, Li Fu (1673–
1750).2 Evidential scholarship is represented, for example, with writings by Qian Daxin錢⼤昕 (1728–
1804) and Ruan Yuan. Gu Yanwu’s writings run through the sections as a common thread, albeit with-
out including the Junxianlun郡縣論 (Discussion of bureaucratic territorial administration) which the
editors of the HCJSWB probably regarded as too anachronistic and impractical because it advocated the
refeudalization of local government. Tang Zhen was among the Ming-Qing thinkers later highlighted
by Cai Yuanpei and Zhou Zuoren for being part of a trend of naturalized ethics and utilitarian morality
倫理的⾃然化，道義的事功化.3 Also prominently represented are the authors of handbooks on
practical administration such as Huang Liuhong, Wang Huizu and Chen Hongmou, and the historian
Zhao Yi. The HCJSWB includes writings by Wei Yuan’s peers from the statecraft circle immediately rel-
evant to reform projects which they were involved in. The best represented contemporary authors are
Wei Yuan and Gong Zizhen, but the compendium also includes writings by Bao Shichen (6), Tao Zhu
(8), He Changling (2) and Yao Ying (7). Much like the HCJSWB does not stand for one particular intel-
lectual aﬃliation, it does not stand for one particular approach to administration, but instead presents a
range of options for dealing with speciﬁc issues.
Many or most of the writings included in the HCJSWB were not explicitly labeled as “statecraft”
(jingshi經世) but had been written as oﬃcial communication or for other practical purposes such as
in the context of a handbook for prospective or newly appointed oﬃcials. The editors did not regard
contradictions between different practical approaches or different theoretical texts as inevitable and even
desirable as the point was precisely the idea to work through a lot of material and develop the ability to
make sense of controversial opinions and a feeling for circumstantial truths.4
1Li (1965), pp. 620–621.
2Wang (2006), p. 432.
3Wang (2003), p. 133–137.
4A similar assessment can be found in Metzger (1973), p. 27, who writes that the statecraft movement “hardly introduced
a practical concern with administration into the Ch’ing political scene. After all, many of the pieces in Huang-ch’ao ching-shi
wen-pien are seventeenth- and eighteenth-century memorials, and their practical tone is the same which one can ﬁnd in many
governmental documents. [...] The contribution of the nineteenth-century ching-shi movement was mainly to lift practi-
cal concerns out of the mundane sphere of ordinary administration into that of intellectually prominent writing, thereby
increasing interest in reform.” (my emphasis)
1.3 The manifesto’s subscribers
The defeat in the First Opium War (1838–1840) was another signal of the dynasty’s waning powers.
British forces had improved their discipline, professionalized training, and built up an effective com-
mand and supply system and coordination of army and naval forces during recent continental wars.
They faced a Chinese army in which confusion of command and supply as well as inept communication
and indecisiveness exacerbated problems resulting from inferior weaponry and style of combat. The un-
equal treaties signed in the Xianfeng reign lead to a loss of customs and territorial sovereignty and also
to a further loss of the dynasty’s authority. As the court could not solve the causes of unrest, namely
a shortage of arable land and oﬃcial corruption, incidents continued to occur and culminated in the
outbreak of the Taiping uprising during the Xianfeng reign (1851-1862).1 Inner court power struggles
during the early years of the reigns of the Tongzhi (1861-1875) and Guangxu emperors (1875-1908), both
enthroned in child age, incurred further damage of the dynasty’s image.2
The Tongzhi and Guangxu reigns, however, were also the period of “self-strengthening”⾃強, an
oﬃcially sanctioned policy aimed at strengthening China’s position in the diplomatic and military
ﬁeld. The self-strengthening efforts were motivated both by the hope of building up strength to ward
off future foreign aggression and the prospect to quell domestic rebellions. The chief advocates of self-
strengthening at the court were Prince Gong (Aisin Gioro Yixin奕訢, 1833–1898) and Wenxiang⽂祥
(1818–1876), who had negotiated the peace treaty with the British and French after the Second Opium
War. In the provinces, the leaders of the suppression of the Taiping forces, Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang
and Zuo Zongtang, supported the court’s policy of adhering to the treaties, while at the same time
strengthening China’s military power by training troops and manufacturing ﬁrearms and gunboats. In
the 1860s, arsenal and shipyards, as well educational institutions for the training future diplomats, engi-
neers and navigators in mathematics, sciences and foreign languages were established. These early efforts
brought China closer to the appropriation of Western technologies. However, the success of most en-
terprises established in the context of self-strengthening was negatively affected by the high salaries paid
to Western staff and Chinese oﬃcials (whose numbers were bloated by sinecure posts established by in-
ﬂuential oﬃcials to accommodate protégés), as well as the high expenses for imported intermediates.
Many early ﬁrearms and ships made in China were more expensive but of lower quality than imported
counterparts. The training institutions suffered from the fact that the degrees they conferred were far
less prestigious than the degrees awarded in the civil service examinations. But they trained personnel
who would play important roles in later decades, for example Yan Fu, who, after graduating from the
academy attached to the Fuzhou Arsenal went on to study at the Royal Naval College in Greenwhich,
1Lin (1994), pp. 24–28.
2Lin (1994), p. 26. Core issues behind the power struggles were the regency of the empresses dowager during the Tongzhi
and Guangxu reigns, and the fact that the Guangxu emperor was from the same generation as the Tongzhi emperor. Lin
argues that stakeholders in the power struggles, as well as many members of the oﬃcial and literati elite regarded these issues
as going against the “fundamental rules of etiquette” (lifa禮法), and that this also inﬂuenced the image of the court in the
eyes of these groups, adding to the image loss resulting from problems of political performance.
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England. By the second half of the 1870s, the focus shifted from defense to industrialization, with the
aim of building up transportation and industrial capacities.1.
1.3.1 Reception of the HCJSWB
The editors of the HCJSWB wanted to turn the comprehensive study of administrative operations that
included observing historical and contemporary oﬃcial communication and other sources of adminis-
trative practice into an earnest intellectual endeavor by providing theoretical texts from which an ide-
ological foundation could emerge. Their important credos were that scholarship should not lose sight
of practical application and the betterment of the scholar’s social environment, that scholarship played
an important part in providing orientation and guidance for the administrator, and that recent institu-
tional and administrative models were just as relevant or even more relevant as the models of antiquity.
This manifesto created considerable resonance among oﬃcials and literati and enjoyed a growing read-
ership throughout the nineteenth century. The amount of popularity the HCJSWB had reached at the
end of the nineteenth century is manifest in Liang Qichao’s suggestions the use of its format as a plat-
form for popularizing the political ideas of his reform circle because of its high standing in the eyes of
the readership, resulting in the compilation of the Huangchao jingshiwen xinbian皇朝經世⽂新編
(New imperial collection of statecraft essays, hereafter HCJSWXINB/MAI) by Mai Zhonghua⿆仲華
(1876–1956), younger brother of a fellow student of Liang.2
Previous scholarship has already pointed to qualitative evidence of the HCJSWB’s reception among
a readership ranging from high oﬃcials such as Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang and Zhang Zhidong to
members of the provincial gentry such as Liu Dapeng劉⼤鵬 (1857–1942).3 Twenty-nine-year old Zeng
Guofan in Beijing mentioned in a letter and his diary to have just received a copy of the HCJSWB from
home.4 Zeng also took note in the same year of having read thirty pages of the chapter “On Learning”
(yuanxue原學), ﬁfty of the chapter “Confucian Practice” (ruxing儒⾏) and another ten pages on three
consecutive days.5 Ten years later, he noted in his diary that his most important two sources of practical
statecraft were the Da Qing huidian⼤清會典 (Statutes of the Great Qing) and the HCJSWB.6 The
margins of Zuo Zongtang’s (1812–1887) copy of the HCJSWB, which he had started reading at the age of
nineteen, were all covered with notes, showing that he was an attentive reader of the compendium.7
Zhang Zhidong’s inﬂuential bibliographical primer Answers to Bibliographical Questions (Shumu
1Kuo (1983)
2HCJSWXINB/MAI
3Liu’s interest in the HCJSWB is and the HCJSWXB/GE documented in Liu Dapeng’s diary, Liu (1990).
4Zeng (1989), p. 28; Zeng (1987), pp. 90. Cited in Gong (2004), pp. 167–168.
5Zeng (1987), pp. 93–94.
6Gong (2004), p. 168.
7Luo & Zhu (1983), p. 7. Zuo Zongtang recommended in 1880 that the Historiographic compilation bureau (guoshiguan
國 史 館) compile an oﬃcial biography of He Changling, and that he should should be added to the list of notable person-
alities venerated in the provincial shrine of Hunan for his merits connected with the initiation of and involvement in the
compilation of the HCJSWB. Zuo (1987), p. 603. Cited in Gong (2004), p. 167.
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dawen書⽬答問) ﬁrst published in 1875 included the HCJSWB.1
That the Shumu dawen rated the HCJSWB “highly relevant and useful”最切⽤ certainly helped in
establishing the HCJSWB as a must-read for scholars and as a popular reference book for the prepara-
tion of the civil service examinations.2 Evidence for this can be found in the diary of Yang Changji楊
昌濟 (1871–1920) which documents a regular reading schedule starting in 1899.3 Yang’s case shows that
there were exceptions to the rule that large compendia were not read in extenso as compared to shorter
manuals stated in Will (2003).4 Yang Changji established this schedule in preparation for the provincial
level civil service examinations which he never passed. After studying in Japan and Aberdeen, he taught
in several public schools in Hunan before becoming a professor of philosophy at Beijing University.5
The provincial degree holder Liu Dapeng劉⼤鵬 (1857–1942) mentions in his diary in 1896 that one of
his students had returned from the capital with copies of the HCJSWB and the Huangchao jingshiwen
xubian皇朝經世⽂續編 (Sequel to the imperial collection of statecraft essays, hereafter HCJSWXB/
GE) that he had ordered.6 Sun Baoxuan’s孫寶宣 reading diary mentions both the HCJSWB and the
HCJSWXB/SHENG.7 Liang Qichao writes that statecraft compendia were one source of the eclectic
thought of his teacher Kang Youwei. Liang mentions in several letters his plans to compile an “Impe-
rial statecraft compendium” as a platform for his reformist thought because the general reading public
associated great authority and a high standing to the name.8
1.3.2 The sequels to the HCJSWB
The numerous reprints (see table 1.2) and sequels (see table 1.3) initiated in the second half of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth century are in themselves an indication of the popularity and commercial suc-
cess of the HCJSWB. The prefaces and editorial notes of reprints and sequels of the HCJSWB provide
qualitative information about the reception of the HCJSWB.9 Gu Tang辜漟 (ﬂ. 1871–1873) notes in the
preface to the 1873 reprint of the HCJSWB that the compendium had “long been circulating all over the
country, but the pirated copies book shop were selling were quite faulty which bothered readers”久布
濩乎海內坊間鋟板競售差謬良多讀者病之.10 Li Yuandu李元度 (1821–1887) comments about
the HCJSWB’s reception in the preface to the Huangchao jingshiwen xuji皇朝經世⽂續集 (Sequel to
the imperial collection of statecraft essays, hereafter HCJSWXJ/RAO) compiled by Rao Yucheng in 1881
1Zhang (1935), p. 68. The HCJSWB is the last of several Qing anthologies of memorials (although a comment notes that
it contains other genres if writings as well) and is followed by local gazetteers.
2Gong (2004), pp. 168–169.
3Yang (1978), p. 16. Cited in Gong (2004), p. 169.
4Will (2003), p. 35.
5Wan (2006), p. 727.
6Liu (1990), p. 62. Liu Dapeng further took note of the writings in the HCJSWXB/GE he had read between 1896–1897.
7Sun (n.d.), pp. 50–51; 58; 264; 715; 724
8Gong (2004), p. 123.
9While we must of course acknowledge that the authors of these texts had an interest to exaggerate the popularity and
relevance of the HCJSWB in order to boost the relevance of their own compendium, we also have to remember that these
works would not have been published had the initiators not believed that they had a market.
10He & Wei (1887) 0:2.1a
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that it “circulated everywhere in the country and fulﬁlled its mission of ‘ordering the world’ (populariz-
ing statecraft) in its title”海內⾵⾏不愧經世之⽬.1 Similarly, Yu Yue俞樾 (1821–1906) comments
in the preface for the HCJSWXB/GE compiled by Ge Shijun in 1888 that the HCJSWB “has been cir-
culating all over the country for decades now, anyone with an interest in statecraft values it highly, and
almost every household owns a copy”皇朝經世⽂編數⼗年來⾵⾏海內凡講求經濟者無不奉
此書為幾於家有其書.2 Sheng Xuanhuai says in the preface to the Huangchao jingshiwen xubian皇
朝經世⽂續編 (Sequel to the imperial collection of statecraft essays, hereafter HCJSWXB/SHENG)
compiled in the name of his father Sheng Kang that his father had often encouraged him to take up the
HCJSWB to familiarize himself with administration.3





1873 Shuangfeng shuwo雙峰書屋 Fuzhou撫州
(Jiangxi)
1882 Shuangfeng shuwo雙峰書屋 Fuzhou撫州
(Jiangxi)
1883 Jiangyou cuijun shanfang江右翠筠⼭房 ? (Jiangxi)
*1883 Tongwen shuyuan同⽂書院 ?






1891 Shaozhou jinglun shuju邵州經綸書局 ?
*1891 Guangbaisongzhai廣百宋齋 Shanghai
1895 Jishan shuju積⼭書局 Shanghai






4Zhang (1935), p. 68.
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1899 Zhongxi shuju中西書局 Shanghai
1902 Huanwen shuju煥⽂書局 Shanghai
1902 Baoshan shuju寶善書局 Shanghai
*1902 Jiujingzhai久敬⿑ Shanghai
*1902 Shangwu yinshuju商務印書局 Shanghai
*1902 Ciyuange shuju詞源閣書局 Shanghai
*1903 Sibulou思補樓 Shanghai
Table 1.2: Reprints of the HCJSWB 1827–1903. The table shows
a gap of more than twenty years between the ﬁrst reprint in 1851
and the second reprint in 1873, followed by a gap of nine years
before the third reprint. According to Gu Tang, pirated copies
circulated during these gap period, however. He & Wei (1887),
0:2a. During the following twenty years, reprints were pro-
duced every one to two years on average. Source: Song (2012),
pp. 6–7, Janku (2003) and CALIS (2010). (*) indicates editions
that have only one or two entries in CALIS (2010). Absence of
the asterisk indicates that the information is conﬁrmed by more
than one source or multiple entries in CALIS (2010). There was
furthermore a reprint of selected writings from the section on
military policy皇朝經世⽂編兵政摘抄⼀卷附寨堡圖説
compiled by Tan Cui檀萃 in 1860.
Tang Shouqian’s comment on the reception of the HCJSWB in the preface to the Huangchao jingshi-
wen tongbian皇朝經世⽂統編 (Comprehensive collection of statecraft essays, hereafter HCJSWTB/
SHAO) in 1901 that after the publication of the HCJSWB “there was a temporary rise in paper prices
(indicating that everybody rushed to buy a copy) and it was treasured in every household and by every
man”⼀時紙貴。幾乎家荊璧⽽⼈隋珠矣.1 The editorial notes to the Huangchao jingshi wen-
bian wuji皇朝經世⽂編五集 (Fifth sequel to the imperial collection of statecraft essays, hereafter
HCJSWBWJ/QSZ) say that the HCJSWB and the sequels compiled by Rao Yucheng, Ge Shijun and
Sheng Kang “all circulated widely and anyone who took an interest in statecraft had one at his home”並
⾏於世凡講求經濟者莫不家置⼀編.2
What has to be noted is that none of the sequels came near the HCJSWB in terms of popularity,
though the HCJSWXB/GE did particularly well. Shanghai book shops still had the HCJSWB in stock
in the early 1900s, and it even remained the best-selling statecraft compendium, Ge Shijun’s sequel rank-
1HCJSWTB/SHAO 0:1.1a
2HCJSWBWJ/QSZ, 0:2.1a
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ing second in terms of circulation.1
Also telling of the success of the HCJSWB is a move by the missionaries Timothy Richard and Young
John Allen who petitioned the court to ban writings critical of the Christian church in both the Haiguo
tuzhi and the HCJSWB.2 The fact that the HCJSWB contains only a handful of writings on the foreign
faith underlines the inﬂuence that missionaries ascribed to these writings nevertheless.
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1Relatedly, Zhou (2005) points out that books on Western learning in general did not dominate the book market in the
early 1900s.
2Chen (1979), p. 77.
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1902 Zuixin jingshi wenbian
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1903 Huangchao xu’ai wen-
bian皇朝蓄艾⽂編





Table 1.3: Sequels of the HCJSWB 1851–1903. Source: Feng
(2002), pp. 560–561, Gong (2004), p. 177, and CALIS (2010).
We saw that the two statecraft compendia most frequently mentioned in oﬃcials’ and scholars’ di-
aries are the HCJSWB itself and Ge Shijun’s sequel. This corresponds with the reprints registered in
CALIS (2010). For Ge Shijun’s sequels, the database lists one reprint in 1891, one in 1896, three in 1898,
on in 1901 and two in 1902.1 Chen Zhongyi similarly notes in his editorial notes for the Huangchao jing-
shiwen sanbian皇朝經世⽂三編 (Third imperial collection of statecraft essays, hereafter HCJSWSANB/
CHEN) in 1897 that Ge Shijun’s sequel was circulating all over the country while Rao Yucheng’s sequel
had not circulated widely.2 The HCJSWSANB/CHEN would become the third sequel to see several
reprints. The sequel compiled by Chen Zhongyi was reprinted three times in 1898, once in 1901 and
three times in 1902.3 One common feature of the HCJSWXB/GE and the HCJSWSANB/CHEN is
that they have a preface written by Yu Yue. The Shiwu jingshi fenlei wenbian (1897) was reprinted in
1902 under the title Huangchao jingshi wenbian wuji皇朝經世⽂編五集 (Fifth imperial collection
of statecraft essays, the HCJSWBWJ/QSZ).4 Similarly, the HCJSWXINB/MAI of 1898 was reprinted
in 1902 in a version cleared of most of the writings of the exiled Hundred Days reformers Liang Qichao
1The reprints were published by the Guangbaosongzhai廣百宋齋 in Shanghai in 1891, the Baoshan shuju寶善書局 in
Shanghai in 1896 , the Wensheng shuju⽂盛書局 in Shanghai, the Shanghai shuju上海書局 and the Hongwenge宏⽂
閣 in Shanghai in 1898, the Jiujingzhai久敬齋 in Shanghai in 1901 and the Chongxin shuju崇新書局 in Shanghai and the
Tianzhang shuju天章書局 in 1902. CALIS (2010).
2HCJSWSANB/CHEN, 0:2.1a
3The reprints were published by the Baoshan shuju寶善書局 in Shanghai, the Zhejiang shuju浙江書局 and the Shang-
hai shuju上海書局 in 1898, the Shanghai shuju上海書局 in 1901, and the Shanghai shuju上海書局, Zhongxi shuju中西
書屋 in Chongqing (Sichuan) and the Longwen shuju⿓⽂書局 in 1902. CALIS (2010).
4The paratexts of both compendia are identical but re-dated to the year 1902 in the HCJSWBWJ/QSZ.
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and Kang Youwei, a few remaining with the indication that the author was unknown.
When trying to pinpoint the reasons for the increase in reprints and sequels and the changes in the
1880s and 1890s in content and form introduced in the sequels, it turns out that both advancements in
printing technology and changes to the content and form civil service examinations can provide an ex-
planation. The announcement of these changes or rumors circulating before the oﬃcial announcement
preceded changes in the compendia. The civil service examinations had a huge impact on the book mar-
ket, on the intellectual pursuits of the mainstream and therefore also on the intellectual transformation
in China at the turn of the last century. The inclusion of several chapters on Western mathematics in the
HCJSWXB/GE coincided with the introduction of an elective mathematics examination in the provin-
cial examination. In 1887, the government consented to introduce an elective mathematics examination
into the provincial examination process on the request of Chen Xiuying陳琇瑩 (1853–1889), censor
of the Jiangnan circuit.1 The boom of sequels in 1897/98 and 1901/1902 conincides with the court’s an-
nouncement to introduce an examination on statecraft (jingji teke經濟特科) into the civil service exam-
inations, which would test candidates’ knowledge on current domestic and foreign affairs, mathematics
and law, science and technology. After the Second Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), the Guangxu emperor
consented to a proposal submitted in 1897 by Yan Xiu嚴修, provincial education commissioner of
Guizhou, to introduce an examination on statecraft. In 1898, the court announced the abolition of the
eight-legged essay which canidates had to compose in answering questions on the Four Books and Five
Classics (si shu wu jing四書五經). Instead, the evaluation of the candidates would give full weight to
policy essays (celun策論) in which candidates had to apply their understanding of the classics and his-
tories to answer questions related to current affairs. This change was, however, never enacted, as it was
revoked by the Empress Dowager in her coup d’état in 1898, only to be reintroduced in 1901 against the
background of her “New Policies” (xinzheng新政). A novelty in the regulations of 1901 as compared to
1898 was that essay questions were required to test candidates of the provincial and metropolitan exam
(huishi會試) explicitly for their knowledge of Chinese and foreign politics and technology.2 The author
of the preface to the HCJSWBWJ/QSZ mentions the change of three rounds of the provincial exami-
nation into celun, examination questions that ask the candidate for comments on current affairs.3 Tang
Shouqian opens his preface to the HCJSWTB/SHAO with a reference to the edict in 1901 reestablishing
the statecraft special exam (jingji teke經濟特科) of 1898 and presents the HCJSWTB/SHAO as refer-
ence book for preparing the civil service examinations.4 A growing focus on Western institutions and on
the national level superseded the concern for detailed accounts of administration on the local level. In
1Fan (2016). Not many candidates made use of the option and successful candidates were few as well. One participant
in the mathematics examination won a juren degree in 1888, while none won a degree in the succeeding provincial exam-
inations, with the number of participants ever shrinking, also probably because the mathematics examination had to be
prepared on top of the usual curriculum.
2Yang (2013a), p. 27
3HCJSWBWJ/QSZ, 0:1.1a. The HCJSWBWJ/QSZ is a reprint of the Shiwu jingshi fenlei wenbian時務經世分類⽂編
of 1897. As the paratexts of both compendia are identical, this must refer to a policy in or around 1897.
4HCJSWTB/SHAO, 0:1a.
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1904, the court decided that the civil examination system in its old form would be phased out starting in
1905. In 1905, the system was abolished completely.1
Editors of the sequels
Some of the sequels indicate only one name as compiler, while others indicate a team with several roles.
These roles do not always reﬂect the actual role played in the compilation.2 Among the compilers are of-
ﬁcials such as He Changling, Zhang Pengfei, Rao Yucheng and Sheng Xuanhuai; private secretaries such
as Wei Yuan, Miao Quansun and Wang Xun; ordinari literati such as Ge Shijun and Chen Zhongyi and
Yu Baoxuan; and professional book publishers such as He Liangdong and probably most of the editors
publishing under a pseudonym.3 Note the tactic of several of the lesser known editors to at least have a
preface written by a prominent oﬃcial, for example Rao Yucheng by Li Yuandu, Ge Shijun and Chen
Zhongyi by Yu Yue, Gan Han by Duan Fang端⽅ (1861–1911), governor-general of Huguang. Commer-
cial incentives certainly played a role for most of the initiators to undertake the extensive compilation
effort that many of the sequels required. Gong (2004), p. 58, notes that Zhang Pengfei, founder of the
ﬁrst publishing house in the region of Ankang (Shaanxi) and therefore equipped with some commer-
cial background, would not have compiled his sequel had he not estimated that it would ﬁnd a market.
The close correlation between the publication of statecraft compendia and modiﬁcations to the format
of the civil service examinations from the late nineteenth century onwards (see table 1.3) also suggests
this. The huge supply of compendia on the market is likely to have met a demand similar in scale. Even
with the availability of more economic printing technologies at the end of the nineteenth century, the
editing of a publication of the size of a statecraft compendium with over a hundred volumes was time-
consuming and represented a substantial economic risk. Editors would only take it if they felt conﬁdent
that the compendium would sell.
Although sources of biographical information are not ample for many of the editors, there is still
reason to believe that at least some of them simultaneously had additional motives in compiling their
statecraft compendia.4 There are indications that the wish to propagate personal reform projects (for
example Sheng Xuanhuai and Mai Zhonghua with Liang Qichao in the background) and sympathy
with the idea of reference books for practical administration as well as with the ideas expressed in the
preface and editorial notes of the HCJSWB and the wish to present an updated sequel (Zhang Pengfei,
Ge Shijun) played a role. Most paratexts of the reprints and sequels connect with the basic tenets of the
HCJSWB’s paratexts such as the simultaneous need for ideological and intellectual guidance and for
models that show how to proceed from knowledge to practical realization.5
1Franke (1960), p. 59.
2See, for example, Gong (2004), pp. 54–55 and 104–122, for the case of the HCJSWXK/SHENG.
3Gong (2004), pp. 57–58.
4Biographical sources are essential to solidify hypotheses about the motives of the editors. Yang (1990) argues that Ge
Shijun had mainly commercial motives, while Lin (1994), pp. 35–37, presents additional biographical information on Ge
Shijun, his grandfather and father to argue that Ge had a genuine interest in statecraft studies.
5For example, Zhang Pengfei writes that He Changling’s idea in compiling the HCJSWB had been “that it was inap-
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The ﬁrst sequel to the HCJSWB was the Huangchao jingshi wenbian bu皇朝經世⽂編補 (Extended
imperial statecraft compendium, hereafter HCJSWBB/ZHANG) printed in 1951.1 The compendium is
a reprint of the HCJSWB extended by some 370 additional writings and with annotations added in the
margins of both the original and the additional writings. Zhang Pengfei張鵬⾶ (1783–1854), the edi-
tor, had been an academy teacher in Shaanxi before he entered the civil service holding the oﬃce of an
assistant department magistrate in Sichuan province. He also was a publisher. The Lailutang來⿅堂 he
founded and which published his HCJSWBB/ZHANG was the ﬁrst publishing house in his home re-
gion of Ankang in Shaanxi.2 The publication of the HCJSWBB/ZHANG shows, on the one hand, that
the HCJSWB was received not only in the metropolitan area but also in the North Western provinces,
and, on the other hand, that Zhang Pengfei estimated that it was well received enough that an amended
and updated reprint would ﬁnd a readership among the North Western based scholars and oﬃcials.
In the preface, Zhang Pengfei expresses his enthusiasm for the philosophy behind the HCJSWB and
explains his reasons for publishing an extended reprint. Zhang Pengfei credits the HCJSWB with the
intention to revert “the amorphous disease”無形之疾3 – corruption, incompetence and lethargy – af-
ﬂicting contemporary administration. Zhang Pengfei highlights the HCJSWB’s principle of emulating
recent models where the emulation of ancient models is impracticable or inappropriate, and its focus on
state ﬁnance and the people’s livelihood. He justiﬁes the reason for adding further writings with the fact
that the HCJSWB focused on topics relevant to the administration of the South-Eastern regions so that
adding writings on North-Western administration seemed a worthwhile complement to the original
compilation. At the end of the preface, Zhang Pengfei shares his vision that his own sequel might just
be the ﬁrst on a whole series of sequels that will present updated version of the HCJSWB in the future
and ﬁll in gaps that his own sequel has not yet ﬁlled: “be it a second, third, fourth of ﬁfth sequel, they
will all amend what my limited experience cannot amend“不憚⼆續、三續、四五續，以助⾒聞之
不逮4.
Zhang Pengfei was right, but he would have to wait some ﬁfty years for a ﬁfth sequel to appear. After
Zhang Pengfei’s sequel in 1851 there seem to have been no reprints or sequels of the HCJSWB until Rao
Yucheng published a reprint of the HCJSWB in its original form but as pocket edition (xiuzhenben袖
珍本) in 1873 (via further reprints in 1882 and 1883) and his sequel in 1881. The presses that had printed
propriate to take the remote past as model and that it was better to take recent times as orientation“其 意 蓋 謂 遠 法 古
無當不如近效今咸宜. HCJSWBB/ ZHANG, 0:2b. Gu Tang辜漟 (ﬂ. 1873) writes in the preface to the 1873 reprint of
the HCJSWB that “the material included in this compendium is recent and ample, beneﬁts and deﬁciencies are as easy to
distinguish as white and black, the prescribed methods are systematic, so that it avoids the reproach of wanting to treat con-
temporary maladies with ancient recipes”是編也。取材近。選⾔富。利病若⽩⿊分。調劑各有法。古⽅今病之誚
庶乎免矣. He & Wei (1887), 0:2b. Zuo Zongtang, who started to study the HCJSWB as a young man, also commended the
HCJSWB saying that it provided “both essence and application”體⽤具備. Gong (2004), p. 168.
1HCJSWBB/ZHANG
2Gong (2004), p. 58.
3HCJSWBB/ZHANG, 0:2b.
4HCJSWBB/ZHANG, 0:3b.
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the 1873 reprint and the 1881 sequel printed further reprints of the HCJSWB in 1882, 1883 and 18841, and
the printing and reprinting gained further speed after the Sino-French War of 1884/85.2
Rao Yucheng served in a minor oﬃcial position in Changsha. He was an avid collector of books, and
had, amongst others, compiled an anthology of Tang writings before initiating the 1873 pocket reprint
of the HCJSWB.3 He apparently was well-connected with the upper echelons of the bureaucracy as the
author of one of the prefaces to his sequel is Li Yuandu李元度 (1821–1887), a close friend of Zeng Guo-
fan. Rao Yucheng conceived his sequel much like Zhang Pengfei’s sequel as a supplement or update.
The sequel supplements writings on all Qing reigns which the original, for some reason or another, had
not included, but which Rao regarded as relevant. Furthermore, it provides updated contents in sec-
tions which Rao Yucheng found particularly important in relation to China’s economic and military
self-strengthening, namely naval defense and trade policy. While Rao did in fact include a considerable
number of new writings on naval defense, a topic which the HCJSWB had covered extensively in three
chapters, there are few writings that can be related to the topic of trade, and they are all found in the
chapters on naval defense. That Rao Yucheng was aware of Zhang Pengfei’s sequel is evident from the
fact that both he and Li Yuandu mention the sequel, and Rao Yucheng states to have selected the best
twenty-nine writings from Zhang Pengfei’s sequel for inclusion in his own sequel. Structurally, Rao
Yucheng’s eight sections and 120 chapter headings were identical with the ones of the HCJSWB. As Rao
Yucheng had already published a separate reprint of the HCJSWB, the sequel only contains 519 newly
added writings, which lead to a number of placeholder chapters (youmu wuwen有⽬無⽂). Gu Tang
also says that Rao Yucheng was so convinced of the HCJSWB as to initiate a reprint in pocket format so
that he could distribute it among his assistants.4 Before publishing the HCJSWXJ/RAO, Rao Yucheng
published several examination aids with successful essays and oﬃcial sample questions.5.
Rao Yucheng’s sequel itself does not seem to have circulated widely. However, it ﬁgured as the basis
of two further sequels. One of them, the sequel by a certain Guankui Jushi管窺居⼠, a “layman with a
narrow ﬁeld of vision“ or “narrow-minded layman“, probably was even less successful because it is hard
to ﬁnd in modern library catalogs. The sequel by the Guankui Jushi is basically a copy of Rao Yucheng’s
sequel extended with an additional 260 writings. The sequel also adopts Rao Yucheng’s editorial princi-
ples, while adding two points. The preface by the editor states that the sequel continues Zhang Pengfei’s
and Rao Yucheng’s line of sequels. The gist of the short preface is that statecraft writings can only confer
knowledge of statecraft and a range of possible alternatives, but that the ﬁnal step, the implementation
1Renmin University a copy of the 1882 reprint, Beijing University Library, Henan University Library, Shandong Univer-
sity Library and Wuhan University Library hold a copy of the 1883 reprint, Jinan University a copy of the 1884 reprint. See
rbsc.calis.edu.cn.
2Janku (2004), pp. 78–79.
3Zhou & Guo (2003) notes his highest position was that of a dianshi典史, a district jailor in Ming and Qing times
according to Hucker (1985), p. 506.
4He & Wei (1887), 0:2.1a
5For example, the Lidai zhuangyuan shikao, sanyuan dingjia celun, kaoguan shiti歷科狀元事考三元⿍甲策論考官
試題錄was printed by the Shuangfeng shuwu雙峰書屋 in 1876. The front page says it was compiled by Rao Yucheng and
carved in the government oﬃce in Xingsha鋟於星沙官廨
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through which the knowledge becomes effective, depends on the mental and physical efforts of the indi-
vidual administrator.
The other sequel based upon Rao Yucheng’s sequel, published by Ge Shijun (1845-1895) in Shanghai,
became the most widely read among all sequels, second in terms of its number of reprints only to the
HCJSWB itself. Ge Shijun’s family had managed a ﬂeet of river boats for several generations, but the
family business had declined during the time of Ge Shijun’s grandfather, probably due to the shifting of
transport business from the inland to the sea. Ge Shijun’s father had worked as a tutor and was of such
a high integrity as to refuse the repeated attempts of relatives to buy him an oﬃcial position. Stemming
from a family of Shanghainese entrepreneurs himself, Ge Shijun’s father repeatedly expressed his con-
tempt for merchant extravagance and arrogance and his appreciation of frugal peasant life in poems.1
The last sequel that can still be counted among the compendia of the self-strengthening period is the
HCJSWXB/SHENG. Although it went into print in 1897, compilation started much earlier. Ge Shi-
jun already mentions that the compendium was in the process of being compiled in the preface to his
1888 sequel.2 Sheng Kang (1814–1902) had started his career as a private secretary in the retinue of Hu
Linyi胡林翼 (1812–1861), and had afterwards been promoted to salt commissioner and later provin-
cial administration commissioner (provincial treasurer). Sheng Kang took an interest in contemporary
affairs early on his life, and was reputedly scandalized by the lifestyle of metropolitan literati and their
indifference towards statecraft (jingshi經世).3 However, while being actively involved in the adminis-
tration his whole life, Sheng Kang published little or nothing on the matter, and he was probably only
marginally involved in the actual compilation of the HCJSWXB/SHENG, only ﬁguring as nominal
compiler of the work. The project was initiated and supported by his son Sheng Xuanhuai (1844–1916).
Unlike his father, who had passed the jinshi exam at the age of twenty, the young Sheng Xuanhuai was
not successful in the civil service examinations. He did, however, start to build a superb career after join-
ing the staff of statesman-general Li Hongzhang as private secretary, holding successfully and sometimes
concurrently over a dozen key positions, ﬁrst in the regular bureaucracy and then in newly founded in-
stitutions and businesses.4 As Sheng Xuanhuai was kept busy building China’s modern transportation,
communication and ﬁnancial infrastructure, the actual compilation work was conducted by his private
secretary Wang Xun (1846–1915) and Miao Quansun (1844-1919), who are listed as proof-readers (jiaokan
校勘) in the imprint of the HCJSWXB/SHENG. Ge Shijun remarks in the editorial notes of his se-
quel that the Shengs were working on a sequel but had not published it yet.5 Chen Zhongyi states in the
1For a biographical vignette, see Lin (1994), pp. 33-37.
2Miao Quansun joined the editorial team in 1886. Gong (2004), p. 108. But Lin (1994), pp. 40–41, thinks that the project
was initiated a lot earlier than that, in 1867.
3Lin (1994), p. 38.
4Sheng Xunanhuai’s positions included director-generalships of the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company輪
船招商局, the Imperial Telegraph Administration電報局, the Huasheng Spinning and Weaving Company華盛棉紡
織廠, Hanyang ironworks漢冶萍鄉煤鐵廠礦, the Imperial Bank of China中國通商銀⾏, and in the imperial railway
administration.
5HCJSWXB/GE, 0:3.1a
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editorial notes for his sequel that the Shengs had interrupted their compilation work when Ge Shijun
published his sequel.1
Liang Qichao spoke of his plans to compile a large-scale essay collection featuring “Imperial statecraft
compendium” in its title in order to “take advantage of the great title and catch people’s attention”取
舊名取動⼈ already in 1895.2 He was positive that with a statecraft compendium he would reach more
readers, and groups of readers that he usually did not reach with his publications. The future editor-in-
chief of several newspapers further assessed in 1895 that it “even surpassed the newspaper in its power
to change people’s mindsets and behaviour”其於轉移⾵氣，視新聞紙之⼒量似尚過. Liang
saw the statecraft compendia as a “powerful tool to convert China’s old conservative minds”於變易
中國守舊之重⼼，頗有⼒量.3 Too busy with his other projects involving journalistic and editorial
work for reformist newspapers and reformist study societies, Liang Qichao handed the project of com-
piling a statecraft compendium over to Mai Zhonghua, the younger brother of his fellow student Mai
Menghua, and limited himself to composing a preface for the HCJSWXINB/MAI printed in 1898. It is
hard to obtain information about the editors of the other sequels of the Hundred Days Reform period
and the New Policies period that goes beyond their association with the respective compilations.
Structure of the sequels
The sequels of the self-strengthening period all keep the two-tier structure introduced by the HCJSWB
more or less intact. Zhang Pengfei’s and Rao Yucheng’s sequels adopt the original two-tier section-
chapter structure completely, resulting in a number of empty volumes kept for formal reasons (youmu
wuwen有⽬無⽂). Ge Shijun’s sequel introduces a separate ninth section with material on foreign
countries under the title yangwu洋務which all later compendia that adopt the original two-tier struc-
ture keep, except for the HCJSWXB/SHENG, for which plans to publish a separate ninth section
were never realized.4 The seven chapters of the yangwu section contain the writings of important ad-
vocates of self-strengthening measures in the high oﬃcialdom such as Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, Li
Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong, intellectual leaders of self-strengthening such as Feng Guifen, foreign
envoys such as Guo Songtao, Xue Fucheng, Yao Wendong and Li Fengbao, as well as ﬁfteen writings
indicating the US-American missionary W. A. P. Martin as translator.5 The section also contains a few
prize essays from the Shanghai Polytechnic Institute格致書院.6 Ge Shijun’s sequel also introduces a
few further modiﬁcations to the chapter structure. The most signiﬁcant change is the addition of three
1HCJSWXB/GE, 0:2.1a
2Ding (1983), p. 48.
3Ding (1983), pp. 48–49.
4The HCJSWSANB/CHEN has a yangwu section, the Huangchao jingshiwen sibian皇朝經世⽂四編 (Fourth imperial
collection of statecraft essays, hereafter HCJSWSIB/HE) has a “Foreign affairs” (waibu外部) section, and the Huangchao
jingji wenbian has a section “Western government” (xizheng西政). The HCJSWXB/SHENG forms an exception. Sheng
Kang mentions plans to publish a separate “Outer” section (waibian外編) with comprehensive information pertaining to
foreign affairs, but it was never realized. HCJSWXB/SHENG, 0:2.1b.
5All writings originate from the Xingyao zhizhang星軺指掌 (Guide diplomatique) translated and published by Martin.
6Feng (2002), p. 565.
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chapters on mathematics and astronomy to the scholarship section. The editorial notes motivate the
addition with the high relevance of mathematical methods for engineering and land surveying (zhiqi
cedi制器測地). Ge writes in the notes that the HCJSWB had motivated the omission of mathematics
from the otherwise broad range of topics covered with the reason that it was not immediately relevant
for solving contemporary problems, and too complex to do justice to it in a few chapters of a general
compendium.1 Ge insists that mathematics are not just the foundation for astronomy and music, both
important pillars of the government of the ancient sages, but also of engineering and land surveying
that important for contemporary government.2) The three chapters contain the writings of Chinese
mathematicians and astronomers from the Daoguang, Xianfeng, Tongzhi and early Guangxu reign,
as well as two translations of a mathematics and and astronomy primer.3 The only other change is the
addition of a separate chapter on the “border regions” (jiangyu疆域) in the household sections for writ-
ings concerning the far North-Western and Northern provinces as well as Taiwan.4 The HCJSWXB/
SHENG inserts a chapter on the “Teachings of the sages” (shengxue聖學) into the scholarship section
before the original ﬁrst chpater “On learning”, and performs a few further modiﬁcations to the chap-
ter structure to address important contemporary issues in their own dedicated chapters. The household
section is extended by chapters on two important components of economic and ﬁscal policy of the self-
strengthening period, the commercial tax (lijuan釐捐) and mining (kaikuang開礦), as well as a chapter
on the border regions (jianzhi建置). In the rites section, a chapter on the civil service examinations
(gongju貢舉) is separated out from the chapter on schools (xuexiao學校).5
Four sequels of the Hundred-Days-Reform period and the New-Policy-Period stick to the original
two-tier section-chapter structure, the HCJSWSANB/CHEN (1897), the Huangchao jingji wenbian
(1901), the Huangchao jingshiwen tongbian (1901) in 120 volumes and the HCJSWSIB/HE (1902). These
compendia do, however, perform signiﬁcant rearrangements in terms of the chapter structure, dispens-
ing with a number of original chapters in exchange for new chapters. Other sequels adopt the single-tier
structure which Mai Zhonghua introduces in the HCJSWXINB/MAI (1898, modiﬁed reprint 1902),
namely the Huangchao jingjiwen xinbian, the Huangchao jingshiwen xinbian xuji and the Huangchao
xu’ai wenbian. Other sequels follow their own individual chapter structure. For example, the Huangchao
jingshiwen xinzeng shiwu xubian contains forty volumes entitled shiwu時務 and numbered from one
to forty, and eight volumes entitled yangwu洋務, equally numbered from one to eight. The HCJSWTB/
SHAO (1901) in 107 volumes choses a two-tier section-chapter structure that only bears remote resem-
blance with the original two-tier structure of the HCJSWB. There is a clear shift in focus to “Western
1The editorial notes of the HCJSWB do not speak of mathematics (suanxue算 學）but of astronomy, calendar making
(xingli星歷) and ancient musical systems (lülü律呂).
2HCJSWXB/GE, 0:2.1a
3Feng (2002), p. 566.
4For a detailed comparison of the HCJSWB and the HCJSWXB/GE including changes to the number of volumes dedi-
cated to each chapter, see Gong (2004) pp. 29–32.
5For a detailed comparison of the HCJSWB and the HCJSWXB/SHENG including changes to the number of volumes
dedicated to each chapter, see Gong (2004) pp. 32–37.
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learning”, that is, accounts of the political institutions, history, industry and commerce, science and
technology of the Western nations. For example, the HCJSWSIB/HE adds chapters about international
law, treaties, parliaments and diplomacy in the rites section, that accommodated the extended portfolio
of the Board of Rites traditionally in charge of foreign affairs. Independent of the selection of the indi-
vidual chapter format, the sequels continuously introduce new topics, especially in ﬁelds of economics,
ﬁnance and military, and then increasingly in the ﬁelds of science, technology and politics.
Sources of the sequels
Collections of the writings of individual authors (zhuanji專集), as well as anthologies compiled from
the writings of several authors (heji, including other imperial statecraft compendia and local gazetteers
(fangzhi⽅志), remained an important source for the sequels.
Some cases of overlap between the compendia are insigniﬁcant or indicated as such. For example, the
HCJSWXJ/RAO includes 29 selected writings from the HCJSWBB/ZHANG, which is indicated in the
preface and the list of authors. But there are also several cases of considerable overlap between the com-
pendia. For exxample, 249 of the writings of the 1357 HCJSWXB/GE are adopted from the HCJSWXJ/
RAO1 Around 500 writings of the HCJSWXB/GKJS are adopted from the HCJSWXJ/RAO, which
is practically the whole compendium, as the HCJSWXJ/RAO only contains 519 writings in total and
some of them are simply merged together in the HCJSWXB/GKJS. Random inspections also reveal
that the HCJSWSIB/HE contains a signiﬁcant number of writings from the HCJSWXB/SHENG, es-
pecially in the case of chapters which discuss topics that were no longer up-to-date at the beginning of
the twentieth century. There is also a considerable overlap of 61 writings between the HCJSWSANB/
CHEN and the HCJSWXINB/MAI, notably writings by Liang Qichao, Kang Youwei, Wang Kang-
nian, Xue Fucheng and Han Wenju. However, this could still be due to the fact that both compendia
were compiled and published nearly at the same time. The greatest amount of overlap is found in the
HCJSWTONGB/SHAO, which is a digest of the compendia of all previous periods.
Gong (2004), p.74, points to several cases of writings by Guo Songtao and Zheng Guanying in the
HCJSWXB/RAO and the HCJSWSANB/CHEN in which the editors probably relied handwritten
copies in circulation (chuanchao傳抄) as source. The periodical press of Hongkong and Shanghai be-
came an increasingly important source of writings for the compendia.2 The HCJSWXB/GE was the ﬁrst
sequel to include a moderate number of newspaper writings (Ge Shijun also announced the compila-
tion with an advertisement in the Shenbao申報).3 After 1895 the number of newspapers and journals
in print rose and they became a major source of articles for the compendia. For example, more than
1It would be an interesting question to explore whether there is any principle as to which writings the HCJSWXB/GE
adopts from the HCJSWXJ/RAO. For example, the HCJSWXB/GE does not include the considerable number of writings
that advocate the reconciliation of Han and Song learning included in the HCJSWXJ/RAO, with the only exception of a
postface by Shao Yichen. However, a complete analysis would require a separate in depth case study and is outside the scope
of this dissertation.
2See Janku (2004) for an analysis of the convergence of the two genres of statecraft essay writing and journalistic writing.
3SB, 1888/06/1, no. 5429 and 1888/06/05, no. 5433.
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50% of the writings in the HCJSWXINB/MAI had appeared in newspaper and journals before.1 Chen
Zhongying included a considerable number of prize essays of the Shanghai Polytechnic Institute上海
格致書院.2
The time between the publication of Zhang Pengfei’s enlarged addition of the HCJSWB in 1851 and
the sequels of the 1880s saw the paciﬁcation of the Taiping uprising by the scholar-generals Zeng Guo-
fan, Zuo Zongtang and Li Hongzhang and the initiation of efforts to modernize China’s industry and
defenses by the same cast of men. The writings of personal circles around these scholar-generals domi-
nate the sequels of the 1880s, including the sequel by Sheng Kang, which was published in 1897 but had
been started much earlier than it went into print.3 Notable is also, for example the inclusion of Feng
Guifen’s writings in the HCJSWXB/GE and HCJSWXB/SHENG.
The sequels published during the Hundred Days Reform period were compiled under the impression
of China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) and all include the writings of Kang Youwei
and his disciples, most notably Liang Qichao. Both the HCJSWSANB/CHEN and the HCJSWXINB/
MAI include a great number of writings authored by Timothy Richard. Other notable observations
are the great number of 64 writings by Zheng Guanying included in the HCJSWSANB/CHEN and
the fact that Gong Zizhen is represented with 21 writings in the HCJSWXINB/MAI.4 During the New
Policies period, the writings of both appear anonymized in the HCJSWTB/SHAO, while the reprint
of the Hongkong Shiwu jingshi fenlei wenbian with the title HCJSWBWJ/QSZ keeps the real names
of the authors. This is in line with a general tendency to omit the names of the authors and the source
of the writings, information which the earlier compendia had provided in lengthy lists of authors.5 For
example the HCJSWXBXJ/GAN and the HCJSWSIB/HE, both published in 1902, only indicate the
authors of a about 15–20% of the writings.
1For a list of writings included in the HCJSWSANB/ CHEN and the HCJSWXINB/ MAI that can be traced back to the
periodical press, see Gong (2004), pp. 75–78.
2See Zhou & Guo (2003), p. 251, for a list of the prize essays included in the HCJSWSANB/CHEN.
3Lin (1994), pp. 59–66, shows how most of the authors whose writings were included in the sequels by Ge Shijun (and
therefore also the one by Rao Yucheng) and Sheng Kang were associated with at least one of Zeng Guofan’s personal net-
works. Janku (2003), p. 78, states that Ge Shijun’s sequel reﬂects the policy of the modernizers around Zeng Guofan and
Li Hongzhang. See Shen (1967) for an account of Zeng Guofan’s thought and activities. Mitchell (1970), p. 55, calls Zeng
Guofan the successor to the statecraft scholars of the generation of Wei Yuan, Tao Zhu and He Changling. See Shen (1967)
on Zeng Guofan’s statecraft ideas. Zeng Guofan collected materials on salt revenue, sea transport regulations, the monetary
system and river conservation while studying in Beijing in the 1840s. “It is the hypothesis of this essay that while adhering to
orthodox Sung Neo-Confucianism in his basic ideas on government, Tseng belonged to the School of Statecraft insofar as
he was, even in the early eighteen ﬁfties, seeking empirical solutions to the dynasty’s problems. Moreover, he did not shun
what may be described as Legalist methods in administration, to achieve essentially Mencian aims. After he became a military
leader against the Taipings in 1853, he was to go further in his empirical and utilitarian tendencies, without abandoning his
basic concerns.”
4The absolute number of writings is not a perfect indicator of the importance of an author for an editorial team not least
because it is inﬂuenced by more or less arbitrary decisions to merge or split individual pieces of writing.
5Miao Quansun had criticized Ge Shijun for the obliteration of such lists.
Conclusion
The statecraft compendia include a range of different oﬃcial and literary writing genres, most impor-
tantly oﬃcial memorials, private letters, treatises and essays, but also examination essays, statutes, and
pre- and postfaces, amongst others. They thus represent both the internal communication of bureau-
cracy and court and private writings. They include both theoretical reasoning about issues of govern-
ment and scholarship and practical and expedient arguments in connection with concrete administra-
tive issues. The editorial principle of presenting a range of alternative approaches and conﬂicting sugges-
tions also of lesser known ﬁgures implies that the texts included represent a broad range of authors and
standpoints. The statecraft compendia may still represent the selective choices of their editors. But they
allow for a more representative assessment of intellectual consensus than collections of the works of out-
standing individual authors. They contain the views of different political camps. Editors were in general
moderate reformers but faithful servants of the ruling dynasty. A picture of their views is representa-
tive of broader circles of the reform-minded oﬃcialdom. The statecraft compendia are thus a portion of
Qing dynasty political texts that were broadly received from the 1840s until the end of the dynasty.
In his study of the reception of international law in China, Zhang Qing calls the statecraft compen-
dia an “important channel of communication of Chinese and Western thought”.1 According to Zhang
Qing, the statecraft compendia had the most authoritative standing and were therefore probably the
most inﬂuential of all compilations introducing new knowledge, and therefore provide for the most
realistic impression of the intellectual world of the late Qing and degree of reception of certain no-
tions.2 Han Chenghua sees the statecraft compendia’s signiﬁcance in their intellectual dynamism.3. Liu
Guangjing and Chow Kai-wing claim that statecraft learning in general was the trailblazer of a broad
range of academic and political reform movements after the Opium Wars.4 Feng Tianyu and Huang
Changyi call the pursuit of “statecraft practical learning” (jingshi shixue經世實學) a bridge to turn-of-
the-century “new learning” (xinxue新學).5
While we certainly need to understand the periodical press as an important medium propelling con-
ceptual and terminological changes and proliferating new knowledge, its reach which did not extend
over a marginal intellectual elite should not be overestimated. It is as important to look at media which
the mass of ordinary literati consulted, for whom all kinds of reference books that could serve the prepa-
ration of the civil service examinations had an important status. The surge in new sequels and their fo-
cus in content suggests that the statecraft compendia played the role of such reference books. The state-
craft compendia were among the compendia that extended the reach of the periodical press by reprint-
ing articles from this ephemeral genre and introducing them to a broader readership.
1Zhang (2013), p. 235.
2Zhang (2013), pp. 235–236.
3Han (2011), p. 223.
4Liu & Chow (1986)
5Feng (2002), p. iii
69
2
Building blocks of eﬃcacy: ren⼈ and fa法
The polarity of ren and fa represents the basic building blocks of Qing dynasty discourse on gov-
ernance and administrative eﬃcacy. In the Confucian state as depicted by Wei Yuan and Gong Zizhen,
the emperor, being himself a “man (ren) standing on top of other men (ren)”, governs the country
with the assistance of a hierarchy of bureaucrats.1 To lend his government permanence, the ruler and
his assistants create models and standards (fa), the institutions and regulations. The effectiveness of in-
stitutions and regulations and the men in service of government are interdependent. In an ideally func-
tioning government, institutions and regulations are effective through the bureaucrats staﬃng them,
implementing them, and complying to them, while institutions and regulations add a eﬃciency and
routine to the bureaucrat’s actions. In reality, deviant bureaucrats may render institutions and regula-
tions ineffective, while inapt institutions and regulations could render bureaucrats commitments futile.
The polarity therefore comes with a considerable baggage of historical discussions on how to resolve
such issues and on the relative importance of both poles for good government.
ren and fa form a classic polarity in Chinese political thought, a pair of complementary, interdepen-
dent or even inseparably related concepts that are in tension, but can (or even have to) be reconciled. In
the political sphere, the polarity touches upon the question of how much good government depends
on features attributed to the institutions of a state (fa), and how much on features attributed to the
men who govern (ren) the state, i.e. rulers, their ministers and others. But even with this limitation of
observations to the political-administrative context, authors still differ in what exactly they attribute
to the ren-aspect, and what to the fa-aspect. Angus C. Graham writes that pre-Qin “Legalists” had “a
common ground in the conviction that good government depends, not as Confucians and Mohists sup-
1HCJSWB, 0:1b; HCJSWB, 1:33a–35a.
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posed on the moral worth of persons, but on the functioning of sound institutions”.1 This contrasting
of “moral worth of persons” and the “soundness of institutions” is just one example of how authors
use ren and fa as abstract categories to refer to different aspects of an administrative problem. Graham
places a generic Confucian and Mohist views on one end of the spectrum opened up by the polarity,
and Legalist views a.k.a. the views of “teachers of realistic statecraft” (fajia法家) on the other. And then
there are positions in between, as “Kuan-tzu gives both morality and law places in the organisation of a
state, in proportions not very different from the Confucian Hsün-tzu”.2
There are features that some author might attribute to ren, and another one to fa. For example,
Shen Dao慎到 (395–315 BC), variously associated with either Legalist or Huang-Lao thought, used
the term to refer to an “impersonal administrative technique of determining rewards and punishments
in accordance with a subjects true merit”, as opposed to criteria such as kinship, social status or the se-
niority principle, or simply the ruler’s personal preferences.3 There is ample mention of the meritocracy
principle in the statecraft compendia, but mostly not in connection with fa, and instead associated with
ren. There are actually more cases where fa refers to the seniority principle than cases where it refers to
the meritocracy principle. Another example is the aspect of monitoring and sanctioning oﬃcials and
enforcing the law. In the majority of texts in the pre-1898 statecraft compendia, this aspect is subsumed
under ren, not fa. In these texts, fa stands for the speciﬁc administrative programs or frameworks that
the texts discuss, such as policies for the administration of public granaries, the salt monopoly, or cur-
rency policies.
ren refers to the “men in charge” of making and changing the fa (li fa⽴法 and bian fa變法)
or adhering to and executing the fa (shou fa守法 and xingfa⾏法). Depending on the context and
scope of the respective fa discussed, ren therefore indicates certain groups of the staff of the imperial ad-
ministration, local elites, or the general populace. The subchapter headings of the lizheng吏政 (“man-
agement of government personnel” or “civil governance”) sections of the pre-1898 statecraft compen-
dia list the most important groups of people involved in the imperial administration: high oﬃcials in
central and provincial agencies (dali⼤吏), prefects and district magistrates on the sub-provincial level
(shouling守令), private secretaries (muyou幕友) and runners and clerks (xuli胥吏, hereafter often
referred to as “sub-oﬃcial functionaries”).
The aspects which authors refer to when they emphasize the importance of “men” or the human fac-
tor in governance ren includes not only the personal capabilities of a person, including the capacity
of internal control of a person.4 It also includes measures which foster this capacity of internal control
(education), and measures of external control of a person’s actions (monitoring and sanctioning). The
1Graham (1989), p. 268
2Graham (1989), p. 268.
3Goldin (2011), p. 91.
4This also applied to the empasis on ren in the context of expressions such as zhiren治 ⼈ (“men who order the state”)
or任⼈ ren ren (“putting men in charge” or “relying upon men”).
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concern to select morally upright and capable (xian賢) personnel does not preclude measures to mon-
itor and check the actions of this personnel once they are in oﬃce. The measures captured under the
aspect of ren thus include selection, monitoring and sanctions. Measures such as these were meant to
increase the accountability of ren for their responsibilities are mostly attributed to the ren aspect, not
the fa aspect, even if they rely on externally imposed rules backed by sanctions. A further important as-
pect covered by ren is ﬂexibility in the execution of central directives. Authors use ren to advocate an
evaluation of oﬃcials according to (realistic) end targets instead of their adherence to procedure.1
The basic meanings of the term fa are “method”, and “standard” or “model”. In this general sense,
fa refers to “ways of doing things” that can serve as precedents or models of action in approaching ad-
ministrative problems. In the administrative context, fa has a range of derived meanings apart from
these basic meanings, among them “government program” and “law” or “regulations”. Here, “govern-
ment program” refers to policies such as monetary policy (qianfa錢法) or the “Green Sprout Policy”
青苗法 of establishing government credit bureaus. “Law” and “regulations” refers to commands issued
in the form of rules by authorized administrative organs that are backed by sanctions. Authors often
use fa to refer to sets of rules that regulate the performance of primary administrative tasks such as tax
collection, ﬂood control and famine prevention. These rules were in general codiﬁed administrative
regulations that oﬃcials were expected to “guard” (shou fa守法) in carrying out their administrative
duties, facing sanctions if they failed to do so or violated the regulations (wei fa骫法 or違法). This
is “law” if we understand “law” as “rules backed by sanctions”. These rules often allocate powers and
duties, thereby circumscribing political actors’ legitimate scope of action, and are backed by sanctions
which makes them laws.
By 1740 at latest, Qing law related to governmental functions fell into three categories: penal laws
specifying criminal sanctions, laws on administrative punishment specifying noncriminal sanctions for
oﬃcials’ administrative mistakes, and administrative regulations specifying administrative or procedural
requirements (performance requirements).2 Administrative regulations were produced in qualiﬁed of-
ﬁces on the different administrative levels by sorting out executive decisions into four formal categories
of precedents and laws: cases used as precedents; cases used as administrative rules; the fully established
1See chapter 2.3 for examples.
2Metzger (1973), p. 214. Keliher (2016) asserts that the Qing dynasty had an administrative law in the broad understand-
ing of the word as “institutional organization of the state, and the rules and regulations for administrative procedure, includ-
ing the duties and responsibilities of administrative personnel” (p. 55). Keliher argues that “the intent behind the regulations
of the Huidian was to lay out enforceable procedural requirements that regulated administrative activity, as well as to set
binding rules about the organizational structure of the state and the relations among actors and internal agencies” (p. 57).
The narrow deﬁnition necessitates the protection of citizen’s private rights from abuses of state power. Note that regulations
used as the basis for adjudicating cases of land, debt, marriage and inheritance were dispersed in sub-statutes of the adminis-
trative regulations (huidian shili) and the penal code (lüli). See Bernhardt & Huang (1994), Huang (1996), Huang (2009),
who challenge the view that imperial China relegated civil cases to the status of trivial matters that should be mediated, not
tried at court. Bourgon (2002), on the other hand, argues that law and custom did not represent a civil law in any proper
sense.
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precedents and regulations of capital oﬃces; the empire’s supposedly most important and unchanging
laws, in general either inherited from the previous dynasty or consisting of the decrees of the dynastic
founder. Central executive decisions took the form of independently issued commands (zhishu制書)
and “appellate cases” (ling令), proposals submitted by nobles or qualiﬁed oﬃcials and approved by
the emperor.1 The term fa was used as a general term to refer to imperial laws and executive commands,
other general terms including chengfa成法 (“established laws”), gongling zhi shu功令之書 (“books
of law”), lüling律令 (“laws”), and jinling禁令 (“prohibitions and laws”).2
The cases used as precedents and cases used as rules could be published in a variety of formats. The
fully established precedents and regulations of capital oﬃces, the empire’s supposedly most important
and unchanging laws were published in the huidian會典 (“collected statutes”) and their appendixes,
the huidian zeli會典則例 or huidian shili會典實例 (“collected precedents” or “regulations”). The
huidian described the institutional apparatus and general operating rules (not, however, general princi-
ples of law), while the appendixes described the speciﬁc operating rules. The huidian zeli or huidian shili
were constantly revised by the competent government bodies, while the huidian only went through ﬁve
editions during the Qing dynasty.3 This division into “core law” and “living law” in the form of “prece-
dents” or “substatutes” can also be seen in another fundamental book of law, the penal code (lüli律例).
The penal code consisted of the “statutes” (lü律) promulgated by the ﬁrst Qing emperor closely copy-
ing the Ming code, and later subsequent additions in the form of “substatutes” (li例).4 Note that the
penal code was reproduced in most editions of huidian since the late Ming dynasty, and in the huidian
shili from the latter half of the Qing dynasty, under the section of the Board of Justice (xingbu刑部).5
These bodies of law were all backed by sanctions.6
1Metzger (1973), p. 176. See Metzger (1973), pp. 167–235, for more details on the formal structure of the law-making
process.
2Note that it is not really possible to draw a strict line between executive commands applying to a single occasion and
laws formulated as general rules, as there was no separation of executive and legislative powers and as commands could serve
as precedents and acquire the status of law. Metzger (1973) notes that this corresponds, however, to the “modern notion”
of law “as commands which are issued and enforced by some group such as a state and which apply to a general class of
occasions”, following e.g. Max Rheinstein.
3Will (2012), p. 128.
4Will (2012), p. 230.
5Metzger (1973), pp. 211–212.
6Most administrative zeli, in contrast to disciplinary zeli (chufen zeli處分則例) and penal law, did not specify sanctions
themselves. They were nevertheless backed by sanctions for violating speciﬁc or any command or law. The lüli and chufen
zeli were formulated negatively, pointing out punishments for transgressions (but in practice, they could be taken as posi-
tive formulations of how oﬃcials should proceed in order not to get into trouble). The articles of the huidian, on the other
hand, did not, in general, specify sanctions by themselves, but were backed by sanctions, either by other articles specifying
punishment for violation of a administrative regulation, or by general fall-back articles in the lüli and chufen zeli that deﬁned
punishment for “doing what ought not to be done”. Metzger (1973), p. 169. fa is one of the general terms for the above
mentioned precedents and regulations that cuts across substantive and formal categories.
2.1 Pre-Qing political career
One early inﬂuential Chinese thinker to comment on the relationship between the categories of ren
and fa with respect to good government was Xunzi (Xun Kuang荀況 or Xun Qing旬卿, ﬂ. approx.
325–238).1
“It is rulers who bring chaos upon a state, a state does not throw itself into chaos. It is ren
who can bring order to a state, fa cannot order a state by themselves. The fa of the mythi-
cal Yi are not forgotten, but his descendants do not rule anymore. The fa of the Great Yu
are still known, but the Xia dynasty does not reign anymore. fa cannot promulgate them-
selves, precedents cannot apply themselves. If men are there to implement them, they will
persist, if not, they vanish. fa are the basis of government. The ruler is the source of fa. If
a state has a good ruler, then even if the fa are sparse, they will cover all situations. If the
state does not have a good ruler, then even if the fa are all-encompassing, the proper order
of precedence is not observed, and it becomes impossible to adapt to new situations, and





In Xunzi’s eyes, both ren and fa are indispensable for good government. ren are the ruler and his
agents, while with fa, Xunzi refers to a state’s institutions and their codiﬁed form, regulations or statutes.
He speaks of records of the fa of mythical rulers and the fact that the fa do not promulgate themselves,
just like precedents (lei類) do not apply themselves. He sees evidence for this claim in the fact that there
are numerous cases of great ancient rulers whose institutions are still known, but whose descendants are
no longer in power. Knowledge about fa does not guarantee good and stable government. The quality
of government also depends on the person of the ruler and his agents (ren). ren do not only create and
reform fa, they also implement and enforce fa. Legal rules (fa) cannot cover every possibly conceiv-
able situation. ren have to do the work of matching the general fa to concrete cases, of making good
decisions in cases not covered by the fa, and of adapting the fa to changing circumstances.
Xunzi’s statements are in line with Mengzi’s take on the dialectical relationship between the attitudes
of the ruler and the availability of fa (standardized practices and techniques of government). With fa,
Mengzi refers to both the techniques invented by the cultural heroes and the institutions created by the
sage kings of antiquity. Mengzi says that a ruler “cannot govern with good intentions alone, but neither
1Pang (1997), p. 28. In the following, the mentioning of Xunzi, Mengzi, Shenzi and Guanzi stands synonymous for the
book Xunzi, the book Mengzi, the book Shenzi and the book Guanzi compiled by their adherents and attributable to them
with more (for example in the case of Xunzi) or less (for example in the case of Guanzi) certainty.
2Xun (1978), p. 40.
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can fa implement themselves”徒善不⾜以為政。徒法不能以⾃⾏.1 In order for their inten-
tions to be effective in the world, rulers need to rely on fa to systematically and consistently realize their
plans. They either devise the fa themselves and leave them as a legacy to their posterity, or emulate the
fa of their predecessors. Mengzi enumerates a number of great civilizational achievements that their
authors realized and perpetuated not through ad hoc actions but by devising and popularizing appro-
priate models (fa). Lilou, the man with the best eyes in the ancient world, and Master Gongshu, the
world’s most skilled craftsmen, could not draw circles and right angles without the help of compass and
set square. The famous musician Shi Kuang could not have ﬁxed the pentatonic scale without the basis
of the ancient six tone scale (liu lü六律). The Great Yu could not have paciﬁed the realm without insti-
tutionalizing his policies of humane government (renzheng仁政). Mengzi’s point is that individuals
can only put their capabilities to good use in the world and achieve their goals if they rely on techniques
and standards.
According to Xunzi and Mengzi, fa is indispensable for good government. Still, they emphasize the
primacy of ren in the relationship between ren and fa, and be it just because ren are in the pivotal
position to enforce, maintain and interpret the fa. A number of other thinkers later associated with
the schools of “Legalism” or Huang-Lao/Daoism grants greater relative importance to fa, among them
Guanzi (Guan Zhong管仲, ﬂ. 8th–7th c. BC), Shen Buhai申不害 (ﬂ. 4th c. BC) and Shen Dao慎
到 (ﬂ. 4th–3rd c. BC). Previous scholarship has argued that this group of thinkers used fa in the sense
of “law”, but also in the sense of “method”, where method is understood as basing administrative deci-
sions upon standardized and ﬁxed criteria.2
According to Guanzi and Shen Buhai, if the ruler makes his actions conform to fa, this mutes the
“human factor” in government (arbitrariness and partiality induced by his personal interests) through
uniﬁed standards (in the form of written rules), which in the end is conducive to a more stable grip on
power. The ruler should not arbitrarily change and override the fa, as this diminishes his power in the
long term. Guanzi draws an analogy between fa and the carpenter’s tool of compass and set square, a
common metaphor for norms and established practices, to illustrate that the ruler cannot govern with-
out fa.3 Even if a carpenter has the keenest eyes and steadiest hands, he had better use a compass to draw
circles and a set square to draw right angles. Just as a skilled man can create a compass and set square but
cannot draw a correct circle and right angle without the aid of these tools, a sage can devise fa but can-
not govern a state without the aid of fa.4 Guanzi analytically differentiates between fa, ling令 (“com-
1Zhu Xi’s commentary on this passage in the Sishu zhangju jizhu puts the dialectic character of Mengzi’s statement into
relief, not pointing to the relationship between ren and fa, however, but between xin⼼ (mind or attitudes of the ruler)
and the zheng政 (techniques of government). Zhu (1983), 4:1b. I am aware that Mengzi does not mention the term ren, so
I am in the same dilemma with Mengzi as Busse (1994) with Grabbe and the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in his conceptual
history of nationalism in the German language.
2Creel (1970), p. 94; Goldin (2011), p. 7–8.
3Xunzi employs the metaphor to emphasize the indispensability of “rites” (li禮) as a tool of the enlightened ruler. Xun
(1978), p. 299.
4Guan & Zhu (1619), p. 185.
76 CHAPTER 2. BUILDING BLOCKS OF EFFICACY: REN ⼈ AND FA 法
mands”) and shangfa賞罰 (“rewards and punishments”), when he states the conditions for the effec-
tiveness of the ruler’s commands. The ruler’s actions have to conform with his own commands. The
commands in turn have to conform to the fa, which here seems to mean the extant body of law (proba-
bly including previous commands). There have to be agencies that monitor the execution of the fa and
impose adequate and universal sanctions in the event of non-execution. This is also valid for fostering
the compliance with fa and li禮 (“rites and etiquette”) in general: It is helpful if the ruler makes no ex-
ception in the application of fa, neither for himself nor for anybody else. Shen Buhai focuses on fa as
a method for bestowing rewards on the grounds of a person’s achievements, and oﬃce on the grounds
of a candidate’s ability. He refers to the latter under the term xingming刑名, “comparing an oﬃcials
‘performance’ (xing) with the duties implied by his ‘title’ (ming), and then rewarding or punishing him
accordingly”.1 For further remarks on Shen Buhai’s theory of xingming, see chapter 3.1.1.
Shen Dao uses fa to refer to both laws in general and to standards of reward and punishment in par-
ticular. In the latter sense, fa is an “impersonal administrative technique of determining rewards and
punishments in accordance with a subject’s true merit”.2 Shen Dao compares it to the drawing of lots to
divide up land, horses or other material goods among a group of people. One main point of Shen Dao
is that even if a technique (fa) can never be completely fair in the sense of perfectly reﬂecting what some-
one truly merits because they always contain an element of randomness (just as in the case of drawing
lots), they are at least impersonal standards that unify people’s expectations. The technique is effective
because the ruler grants rewards and punishments based on an impersonal standard, not the his own
personal preferences. The recipients know beforehand what to expect, and will therefore not resent the
decision and will not argue for more generous rewards or more lenient treatment because they know
that the standards are ﬁxed. fa introduces a ﬁxed “common” or “impartial” (gong公) standard and
eliminates interference of the “personal” or “partial” (si私).
“With divination using yarrow stalks or tortoise shells, people establish common (gong)
insights. With scales, people establish common standards. With contracts, people establish
common trust. With measures of length, people establish common criteria. With a system
of laws (fa) and a ritual canon, people establish a common understanding of what is right.
With every common (gong) norm, people give up a partial (si) viewpoint.”
故蓍⿔。所以⽴公識也。權衡。所以⽴公正也。書契。所以⽴公信也。度量。所
以⽴公審也。法制禮籍。所以⽴公義也。凡⽴公。所以棄私也。3
Fifteen centuries later, Zhu Xi朱熹 (1130–1200) writes inﬂuential lines about ren and fa in the con-
text of the Southern Song dynastic red tape. Zhu Xi criticizes that the eagerness of law makers to pro-
mulgate regulations leads to paradox or irrational legislation. The bureaucratic overhead involved in
1Goldin (2011), p. 92.
2Goldin (2011), p. 92.
3Shen (2001), p. 34.
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the performance of most of their tasks makes many oﬃcials rather sit on their hands than take up ad-
ministrative work. He advocates to reform and simplify the extant fa because “government cannot do
without regulations”為政必有規矩 but “if the fa is deﬁcient, then even good magistrates can do noth-
ing about it”法弊，雖有良有司，亦無如之何.1 Zhu Xi emphasizes that before a reform of fa can
be effective, however, the right ren have to be educated and recruited for oﬃcial positions. The reason
is that fa cannot enforce itself, “fa needs ren to get implemented”固是法也待⼈⽽⾏.2 Moreover,
there is no fa that can be conceived without defects and loopholes for abuse that malevolent people can
exploit. The ren in charge of implementation therefore have to be responsible persons: “In general, any
fa that is promulgated has necessarily potential defects. There is no fa without defects, the important
thing is to put the right ren in charge.”⼤抵⽴法必有弊，未有無弊之法，其要只在得⼈.3
Among the thinkers formative for conceptions of ren and fa in the 19th century are Wang Fuzhi
王夫之 (1692–1692) and Huang Zongxi黄宗羲 (1610–1695). Both Wang and Huang agree with Zhu
Xi’s point that a country cannot be well governed and ren cannot put their capabilities to good use if
the fa is ill-conceived. Huang modiﬁes Xunzi’s dictum in order to accentuate this point. “Regarding
the theory that ‘it is ren who order the state not fa’ I would thing that after there are fa suitable for
ordering the state, there will be ren who order the state”即論者謂有治⼈無治法，吾以為有治
法⽽後有治⼈.4 Huang calls ill-conceived and unsuitable fa “unlawful law”⾮法之法. He points
to the law of successive imperial dynasties as an example of such “unlawful fa”⾮法之法. His main
point of critique is that as “the fa of one family”⼀家之法, it only takes into account the interests of
the ruling dynasty, not of the people at large.5 Wang Fuzhi touches upon ren and fa several times in his
commentary on the Zizhi tongjian資治通鑑. When lauding the institutional setup created by the ﬁrst
Sui emperor, he conﬁrms Xunzi, but at the same time insists that insuitable fa render good governance
impossible. “fa do not necessarily lead to order. ren (implement the fa to) bring about order. But if
the fa are not good, then even if the right ren are in charge, it will be impossible for them to guard the
fa and properly administer them. And it will be even more futile if the wrong ren are in charge.”法者
⾮必治，治者其⼈也。然法之不善，雖得其⼈⽽無適守，抑未由以得理，況未得其⼈邪.6
While none of the cited thinkers proposes to govern without either ren or fa, some put more em-
phasis on ren and some put more emphasis on fa. Those who put more emphasis on ren argue that
the agency of ren is crucial for the eﬃcacy of fa, both in the positive and in the negative sense. ren
in charge can sabotage the implementation of fa by simply neglecting it. ren in charge have to imple-
ment the fa and apply and adapt it to new situations. Those who put more emphasis on fa argue that
everything being equal (particularly the quality of ren), there are fa which are more conducive to good
1Zhu (n.d.), p. 1560; Zhu & Li (1713), p. 2794.
2Zhu & Li (1473), p. 2172.
3Zhu & Li (1473), p. 2162.
4Huang (n.d.), p. 7.
5Huang (n.d.), p. 6.
6Wang (n.d.), p. 481.
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government and those that are less conducive to good government.
ren and fa each can refer to several things. ren can refer to the virtues and capabilities of men in
charge (in power) or the lack thereof. It can also refer to measures of organizational control, i.e. of “man-
aging men” (yong ren⽤⼈), including the administration of sanctions to enforce compliance with
FA.1 Meanwhile, fa can refer to whole institutions or government programs, or to the operational rules
(regulations or statutes) that deﬁne them.
Many texts in the statecraft compendia discuss real administrative issues, and authors employ the
ren-fa polarity to negotiate these speciﬁc cases. They do not necessarily intend to make a point beyond
these cases and subscribe to either extreme of the spectrum spanned by complete arbitrary power to vir-
tuous ren and complete restriction of individuals by centrally determined fa (which is one possible in-
terpretation of ren and fa). While this dissertation sets out to ﬁnd out about shared concerns that man-
ifest themselves through the use of a common language, it is necessary to exercise caution in deducing a
political standpoint from the rhetorical use of language. The author of this dissertation is aware that it
is important to differentiate between assertions intended to state universal principles and comments on
particular historic situations. A survey of isolated quotes is not the ideal format to do so, which is why
this dissertation tries to contextualize statements when possible. The aim of this dissertation is not the
answer the “elusive question” of the relative importance that thinkers attributed to aspects of govern-
ment. It is rather to show the ﬂexibility of the polarity by examining which aspects of government were
associated with ren and fa, how authors used the ren-fa polarity to structure their arguments, and
how this involved the reinterpretation of historical statements involving ren and fa.
1This applies to instances where the concept ren is used and forms a polarity with fa. These can also be instances where
ren is used in a compound such as “men (ren) who order”治⼈.
2.2 Functions of ren and fa in Qing statecraft discourse
ren-fa is one of the four polarities that Wei Yuan presents in the opening of his preface to the HCJSWB.
Wei Yuan discusses the interdependent nature of the four pairs of concepts in question to justify the
study of practical and technical aspects of governance. To him, learning can never solely be a pursuit
of abstract principles, the Way, independently of its concrete realizations, the Vessel. The Way does not
exist independently of the Vessel, and the human mind cannot grasp the Way independently of the Ves-
sel. The quintessence of the preface is that commitment to self-cultivation is not enough, and that men
must also study past and present examples of practical statecraft.1 Wei Yuan states that although fa are
conceived of and implemented by ren, they fulﬁll such an indispensable function that it is legitimate
to discuss them in their own right. To illustrate the indispensability of well-designed fa in governance,
Wei Yuan recurs to an analogy similar to the ones in the Mencius and the Guanzi that links the tools and
standards of the craftsman with the regulations and institutions of the ruler and his ministers.
“fa necessarily depend on human agency (ren). A cart with ﬁve-inch hubs can transport
its load a thousand miles, but without a driver, it will not move single a meter. However,
even the famous craftsmen Lu Ban and Wang Er would not have been able to build prop-
erly functioning carriages behind closed doors by relying only on their sharp eye, steady
hand and artisan imagination. If we want to speak about human agency (ren) we also
have to talk about fa.”
法必本夫⼈。轉五⼨之轂。引重致千⾥。莫御之。跬步不前。然恃⽬巧。師意
匠。般爾不能閉造⽽出合。善⾔⼈者必有資於法矣。
Just like craftsmen need to work with standardized tools and blueprints, rulers and their ministers need
to work with regulations and institutions.
The ren-fa polarity appears a second time in the editorial principles to the HCJSWB. Here, Wei
Yuan quotes Xunzi’s statement that “it is ren who order a state, not fa”有治⼈無治法 in passing.
He explains that as it is men, not administrative methods which govern the state, some problems which
technically speaking are the responsibility of the Board of Revenue, for example the administration of
public granaries and the baojia-system, actually “arise from matters that are the responsibility of the
Board of Personnel”挈其原於吏. A closer look into the chapters on public granaries and the baojia-
system provides clues as to what Wei Yuan means by “matters that are the responsibility of the Board of
Personnel”. The most common abuse reported in the texts is that superiors neglect their duty of prop-
erly monitoring their subordinates, whose corruption and disregard of the administrative regulations
subsequently leads to the malfunctioning of the institutions. The responsibility of the Board of Person-
1See chapter 1.2.3 for a complete analysis of the passage.
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nel was “civil governance” or “management of governmental personnel” (lizheng吏政), which included
personnel management and maintenance of discipline in the bureaucratic apparatus.
Previous scholarship on the Qing bureaucracy has called these tasks “tasks of internal organization”.
The eﬃcacy with which the bureaucracy carried out its primary tasks (including all economic, cultural
and coercive activities that represented the output of the bureaucracy, for example taxation and mainte-
nance of law and order) depended critically on how well tasks of internal organization were performed.1
What Wei Yuan discusses under the aspect of fa are procedural rules regulating the performance of
primary tasks. The eﬃcacy with which primary tasks are performed depends on the ability and willing-
ness of the government personnel (ren) to implement and comply with the regulations (fa). What Wei
Yuan discusses under the aspect of ren is everything related to ensuring the proper implementation and
compliance with established fa. This correlates with internal tasks.
We can learn more about Wei Yuan’s interpretation of Xunzi’s statement from his comments on sev-
eral essays in the HCJSWB. In one case, Wei Yuan criticizes the way an author adapts Xunzi’s statement
on ren and fa to assess different models (fa) for the administration of public granaries. The competing
models in question are Wang Anshi’s Green Sprout Policy and Zhu Xi’s Community Granaries. The
author argues that both are equally valid blueprints for the administration of granaries. The difference
in the degree of success reported for both models results only from the fact that “it is ren who order the
state not fa”. Both schemes succeed if the right ren are put in charge of administration, and fail if the
wrong ren get in charge. Wei Yuan objects to this view. Wei argues that Xunzi’s point is that no fa is
absolutely fail-safe and virtually “implements itself”. But administrators still have to opt for the fa that
is most resilient against abuse and reduces the potential for negative side effects: “accepting that there is
no fa that administers itself, we have to ﬁnd a fa that can last long”⾄于無治法之中⽽必求可久
之法. So even if the right ren can be recruited for the job, the choice of fa still has to be carefully made,
and Zhu Xi’s fa is actually the better fa. Wei Yuan points out that this is exempliﬁed by the fact that
the author’s own outline of regulations for the administration of granaries silently adapts over several
points from Zhu Xi’s guidelines, deviating from Wang Anshi’s guidelines.2
In another case, Wei Yuan quotes Xunzi’s statement in a comment that suggests a way of synthesiz-
ing two contradictory statements on the role of oﬃcials in dyke construction and maintenance. The
HCJSWB includes a number of writings that argue that oﬃcials should oversee dyke construction and
maintenance in order to provide guidance and ensure the successful conclusion of the project. After
these writings, the HCJSWB includes one writing which argues the converse. The author advocates to
1Metzger (1973), pp. 5–6, divides the tasks of the Qing bureaucracy into tasks of top leadership, primary tasks and tasks
of internal organization. Tasks of top leadership, the “ultimate determination of policy and goals”, were performed by the
emperor and “a mixture of palace, noble and bureaucratic personnel” at the capital and high regional oﬃcials. Primary tasks
involved palace service and foreign affairs as well as the economic, cultural and coercive activities that represented the output
of the bureaucracy, for example taxation and maintenance of law and order. Tasks of internal organization, ﬁnally, were
personnel management, internal management of ﬁnances and maintenance of discipline.
2For further remarks on Wang Anshi’s and Zhu Xi’s granary models and for a discussion of the remainder of the essay,
see chapter 2.5.
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discontinue the deployment of oﬃcials because they are notoriously corrupt and render construction
and maintenance ineﬃcient. At the end of this last essay, Wei Yuan remarks:
“The preceding writings all contend that oﬃcials are indispensable for the administration
of dyke work. This writing now insists on the harm incurred by oﬃcial involvement in
dyke work. It is very true that ‘ren order the state not fa’. Therefore, those who honestly
care for the people regard monitoring of civil servants as their ﬁrst duty.”
前篇⽅⾔督圩不可無官。此篇復⼒⾔官督修圩之害。信⽲有治⼈無治法也。故
愛民者以察吏為第⼀義。1
What Wei Yuan derives from the Xunzi dictum and especially the concept of “men who order the state”
in this context is the importance of top-down bureaucratic supervision, enforcement of fa by ren
through the monitoring and sanctioning of other ren. Oﬃcials order the state by supervising their
subordinates in fulﬁlling their tasks and by being themselves supervised by their superiors in the fulﬁll-
ment of their own tasks. If superiors want to make sure that their subordinates work for the beneﬁt of
the people they cannot take their subordinates’ good will for granted. To express real care for the people
means to properly monitor whether the subordinates’ actions conform to the fa and work for the bene-
ﬁt of the local people. The bureaucratic personnel works to implement government programs, but only
if it can be ensured that they do what they are supposed to do and do not abuse their power. This func-
tional constellation of superiors giving directives to their subordinates and monitoring whether their
subordinate carry them out properly is replicated on the different levels of the hierarchy.2
Wei Yuan’s own administrative-political writings add the choice of appropriate fa and elaborating
the details of its implementation to the tasks of ren. The HCJSWB includes four of Wei’s writings on
the reform of the transport of tribute written between 1825–1826, in which he expounds the beneﬁts of
sea transport and responds to counterarguments.3 Wei Yuan argues that the right fa makes a big differ-
ence, but that the agency of choosing and implementing the fa lies with men (ren) in decision-making
positions. He presents sea transport as a fa that is superior to conventional inland shipment under the
present circumstances. Due to insuﬃcient maintenance, the inland water ways are not navigable, while
the sea route is both safe and fast due to ﬂourishing coastal and sea trade. By enlisting merchants for
the shipments, the government does not have to take care of building boats and recruiting personnel.
Shipping fees are considerably reduced, as the number of parties involved along the route is signiﬁcantly
lower for sea transport. Citing one of the chief proponents of sea transport, the Minister of Finance
Ying He英和 (1771–1840), Wei Yuan concedes that while sea transport is superior to inland transport
under the given circumstances, its success depends on the commitment of the men in charge (ren).
These aspects are the resettling of the militia who used to accompany and secure the inland transport,
1This is Wei Yuan’s comment on an essay by Jiang Shiquan on the administration of dyke construction and maintenace.
See HCJSWB, 38:36b.
2See chapter 1.2 for further comments on Wei Yuan’s ideas of the political cosmos.
3HCJSWB, 48:60a–62b; HCJSWB, 48:70a–75b; HCJSWB, 48:76a–81b; HCJSWB, 48:82a–b
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the monitoring of sub-oﬃcial functionaries guarding the tax granaries, and river works to maintain the
river navigable. At the end, however, the cost-beneﬁt calculation is clearly in favor of sea transport as
compared to inland transport. The most fundamental function of heroic administrators is to engage
in these kinds of cost-beneﬁt calculations: “to sensibly enact the necessary changes in accord with the
times when the abuse of regulations (fa) becomes increasingly frequent is the task of the men in charge
(ren)”法久弊⽣；因時制變，則神⽽宜之，存乎其⼈.
Wei Yuan’s comments on governance collected in the Treatise on Scholarship and Government (Mogu
默觚), published some twenty-ﬁve years after the HCJSWB, contain further remarks on ren and fa
that complement the earlier ones.1 The HCJSWXB/SHENG contains an abridged version of this series
of essays.2 In the treatise, Wei Yuan states that the capacity of fa to inﬂuence ren’s behavior is not un-
limited. The ﬁrst and fundamental condition for fa to be effective is that ren have to be actually capa-
ble of complying to the rules: “if it forces ren to act in ways they cannot act, the fa will not be effective;
if it prohibits things that ren are bound to commit, the fa will not be carried out”強⼈之所不能，法
必不⽴；禁⼈之所必犯，法必不⾏.3 Even a fa with realistic chances of success should not be pushed
through too quickly and with overly harsh sanctions, or else resistance is bound to form. Wei Yuan also
warns the ruler of changing personnel too quickly, and of being too uncritical of his own point of view.
These are shortcomings that Wei Yuan associates with the Huang-Lao thought and the thought of Shen
Buhai and Han Fei. Wei Yuan nevertheless recommends administrators to endorse Huang-Lao thought,
“adapting its strengths but not its weaknesses”兼⿈⽼申韓之所⾧⽽去其所短.4
Wei Yuan recurs to analogies to illustrate the interdependent nature of ren and fa. While he had
compared the ruler’s use of fa to govern the state with the carpenter’s use of tools and established prac-
tices to build handicraft products in the HCJSWB, Wei Yuan moves to the comparison of the ruler with
a doctor using methods of treatment to cure a patient, and the bowman’s use of the bow for hitting
targets in the Mogu.
“A doctor saves men’s lives with the help of methods of treatment. He can kill them with
the same methods. A ruler brings order to the realm with the help of fa. He can harm
to the realm with the help of the same fa. It is not diﬃcult to obtain knowledge about
methods of treatment. But a doctor who can make proper use of the methods of treatment
is diﬃcult to obtain. It is not diﬃcult to promulgate fa. But ren who make proper use of
fa are hard to obtain.”
醫之活⼈。⽅也。殺⼈。亦⽅也。⼈君治天下。法也。害天下。亦法也。不難於
得⽅。⽽難得⽤⽅之醫。不難於⽴法。⽽難得⾏法之⼈。
1Kuhn (1995), p. 303, translates the title as “Treatise on Scholarship and Politics”. The literal title could be something like
“Moshen’s writing tablet”, Moshen默深 being Wei Yuan’s courtesy name.
2HCJSWXB/SHENG, 5:1a–2b; HCJSWXB/SHENG, 5:3a–7b; HCJSWXB/SHENG, 8:1–25b
3HCJSWXB/SHENG, 8:6a.
4HCJSWXB/SHENG, 8:6a.
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“A bow is a tool for hitting a target. But it does not hit the target by itself (lit.: it is not
the reason why the target gets hit). Laws and commands are instruments of government.
But they do not govern by themselves (lit.: they are not the reason why the state is well
governed).”
⼸⽮。中之具也。⽽⾮所以中也。法令。治之具也。⽽⾮所以治也。1
With these two examples, Wei Yuan underlines the agency of ren in the implementation of fa. Wei
Yuan presents a number of historical examples as evidence of his claim that it is ren who decide about
the eﬃcacy of fa. At the same time, and most clearly in the case of the bowman, it is equally clear that
the agent cannot attain his goals without the help of the means, the bowman without the bow or, re-
spectively, the administrator without the fa.
Wei Yuan expresses a moderate stance on reform. He claims that his own reform proposals are sim-
ply small corrections that ensure that existing regulations (fa) can operate properly. Rulers should not
lightly initiate discussions on fundamental changes of the fa. Instead, they should remove “defects out-
side the fa”法外之弊 in order to render the fa effective again. By “defects outside the fa”, Wei Yuan
means defects that arise and abuses that are committed in the implementation of the fa, but that are
not inherent in the fa itself and thus cannot be prevented by changing the fa. Rulers should not give
precedence to the promulgation of new fa. Rather, they should promote the recruitment of ren who
make proper use of the fa. This will automatically lead to the “establishment of proper fa”⾃能⽴法.2
More explicitly than twenty-ﬁve years earlier in the preface to the HCJSWB, Wei Yuan declares that he
does not pursue a radical vision of changes to the fundamental institutions of the state, but incremental
reform of the existing framework. The question where to draw the line between incremental and radical
change remains of course a question of perspective. But Wei Yuan certainly viewed the reform efforts he
himself was involved in, for example, in the areas of the grain transport, salt monopoly and hydraulic en-
gineering, as examples of incremental change. Pieces that Wei Yuan cites as negative examples of radical
change include two of Gu Yanwu’s essays proposing a “refeudalization” of the imperial bureaucracy.3 In
his own contributions to the HCJSWB, Wei Yuan emphasizes that the best fa is the fa where success de-
pends least on the integrity and capability of the ren involved in the implementation. For example, it is
better if the fa does not give oﬃcials the opportunity to embezzle money, than to hope that exhorting
functionaries not to embezzle public funds will do the job. Still, fa depends on ren for promulgation
and enforcement. The state needs personnel that takes up responsibility, selects the appropriate fa and
sees to its enforcement. Here, it is sometimes necessary to differentiate (not excluding overlap though)
between the ren who make the fa and enforce them, and the ren who take part in implementing and
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That the ren-fa polarity and Xunzi’s dictum still received attention more than seventy years after
the ﬁrst edition of the HCJSWB can also be seen from the preface to the 1901 HCJJWB. The HCJJWB
presents “the fundamental institutions of past dynasties and current forms of government”列朝之
憲典近時之規模 to the concerned elite of the turn of the century for consultation. The editor of the
HCJJWB explains his motivation to compile the compendium with the need of ren for updated infor-
mation about fa. “fa with which the state can be governed well still need ren who can (implement
them to) govern the state well; ren who can govern the state well still need fa with which they can gov-
ern the state well”有治法不可無治⼈。有治⼈尤不可無治法.1
The authors of the writings collected in the statecraft compendia employ fa in the context of
the ren-fa polarity to refer to the procedural rules regulating primary administrative tasks such as the
land-tax, salt monopoly, tribute grain transport, currency policy or famine relief. An interesting phe-
nomenon is that many texts written to promote a certain kind of fa, such as Wei Yuan’s essays on the
sea transport of tribute grain, contain statements that emphasize the importance of ren, and make nega-
tive statements about fa, for example, that fa do not bring order by themselves, that too many fa result
in chaos, that there is no perfect fail-safe fa. These negative statements, however, rather than denying
the need for fa, emphasize that fa can only be effective if certain conditions are met. These conditions
are related to concerns of organizational control and based on a conception of ren as “mediocre talent”
(zhongcai中材).
Objections that regulations (fa) that are too “strict” or “complicated” (mi密 or fan繁) foster dys-
functional forces and diminish organizational control capacities and thereby eﬃciency, do not have to
be fed by a rejection of regulations in general. The opposite of complicated laws is not no laws at all, but
simpler (jian簡) laws2, that are neither excessive in number nor too minute in detail, and that ﬁx dead-
lines and goals which an average oﬃcial can realistically meet. An example of this viewpoint is “if the fa
are strict, then oﬃcials will not dare to engage in corrupt practices; if the fa are simple, then they sim-
ply have no way to engage in corrupt practices”法嚴⽽官不敢貪，亦法簡⽽官不能貪.3 We are
again presented with a question of the right balance here. What many authors criticize is promulgation
of restrictions without regard for the bigger picture. The critique is that lawmakers establish very spe-
ciﬁc regulations to prevent very speciﬁc deviances, although these illicit practices are already outlawed
by existing law, and the problem is not a lack of legislation (Regulierungsdeﬁzit) but a lack of enforce-
ment (Vollzugsdeﬁzit). The new regulations have the only add to the complexity and unwieldiness of
the whole system, and have negative side-effects for the people who actually abide by the law.
Chen Hongmou’s commentary on the prohibition on the sale of excess rice by boats transporting
1HCJJWB/QZQZZR, 0:5a.
2Liu (1959), p. 176.
3HCJSWB, 46:12a–14b. Oﬃcials are corrupt because the fa are inappropriate and has “loopholes” (likong利孔). Simple
fa are unambiguous and have no loopholes.
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tribute grain is representative of this kind of view.1 Originally, shippers of the tribute grain from the
lower Yangtze to the capital area had been allowed to sell excess rice to the people along the shipping
routes to supplement their income. A prohibition introduced in Chen Hongmou’s time prevented this
kind of sale on the grounds of suppressing pirate sale of tribute grain (daomai caomi盜賣漕⽶). Chen
Hongmou criticizes that the prohibition criminalizes a mostly harmless practice and does more harm
than good. He argues that the majority of sales of excess rice are non-pirate sales that beneﬁt the ship-
pers by supplementing their modest income and the people en route by diversifying their sources of
supply. Actual pirate sales are easy to detect and have been eﬃciently handled according to existing legis-
lation in the past. The prohibition only beneﬁts the functionaries posted along the shipping routes who
are provided with an excuse to conﬁscate all excess grain for their own use.2 Chen Hongmou says that
this is just one example of how “defects are generated by attempts to prevent defects”防弊⽣弊 and
that half of the problems related to the administration of tribute grain are this kind of self-generated
problems caused by “overregulation” (li zhi tai duo例之太多). Bi弊 can be translated as “defects” or
“abuse” depending on whether the author refers to problems caused by defects inherent in the legisla-
tion or problems resulting from the conscious abuse or circumvention of the legislation.3 Chen identi-
ﬁes a harmful mindset at the root of overly complex and unsystematic legislation: “As soon as an abu-
sive practice comes to the attention (of the law makers), they pass a new regulation to prohibit it. But
then the new fa produces other defects (opportunities for abuses). It prevents the abuse committed by
one or two men, but harms many others.”偶有未善，即設⼀例；究竟法⽴弊⽣，所除者⼀⼆⼈
之弊，⽽所苦者多矣.
Another example of rhetoric relativizing the omnipotence of fa, but nevertheless supporting an
agenda involving particular fa, are Wang Liu’s王鎏 (1786–1843) essays advocating the introduction
of paper money. Wang’s theoretical discussion of fa, ren, and the changing of fa provides the context
for bringing up the large scale introduction of paper money as a positive example of reform. The lesson
to be learned from unsuccessful government programs is not that reform is a bad idea, Wang Liu says.
Reform is a normal stage in the life cycle of government policies and a guarantor of long-term stability.
Any fa established has unforeseen side-effects in the form of defects/abuses. In order to get rid of these
defects/abuses, it becomes necessary to change the fa. Whether the reforms are effective depends on the
1HCJSWB, 46:43a–b
2This is at least my interpretation of Chen’s criticism that with the prohibition in place, “will future excess rice just be dis-
posed of? Certainly not, it will instead just contribute to the enrichment of military functionaries along the shipping route”
究竟旗丁所帶餘⽶，豈⽢置之無⽤；不過徒為⼀路弁兵所利⽿.
3Metzger (1972) explains bi in the context of ﬁscal regulations as complicated ﬁscal arrangements and dishonest prac-
tices “lumped together”. See also Lu Shanji⿅善繼 (1575-1636), who differentiates between “defects inside the fa” (fa-nei
zhi bi法內之弊 and “defects outside the fa” (fa-wai zhi bi法外之弊. Defects inside the fa “are not the fault of the re-
sponsible oﬃcial”⾮有司之過 because they are inherent in the regulations. Defects outside the fa are legal loopholes,
they “are the fault of the man in charge (ren), but that through which he commits the abuse are the regulations (fa)”
其弊在⼈⽽其所以弊在法. Lu (2002), 11:2. But see also Peng Yu彭釪 (?) who regards as defects outside the regulations
(fa) as a deviation from the regulations that can be prevented through strict law enforcement instead. HCJSWB, 50:76a–
77b.
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capabilities of the ren enacting the reforms to enforce and implement the reform in accordance with
the times and circumstances.
While Wang Liu concedes that there are no fail-safe fa and that everything depends on ren, he still
emphasizes the indispensability of fa for good governance. Wang employs the same allegory of a doctor
applying prescriptions as Wei Yuan later in the Mogu, to argue that abuse of fa is an act of ren and
should not be held against the fa.
“When the state establishes fa it is like when a medical doctor applies medicine. An an-
cient prescription can cure a disease if properly applied. If misused, it can kill people. If a
mediocre doctor misapplies an ancient prescription, people will blame it on the fact that
he has only crudely studied the subject. It would be foolish to discard the medical prescrip-




Wang Liu likens governance to a game of chess. Winners and losers start with exactly the same chess
pieces. Success or failure depends on how they employ their ﬁctive armies. The chess analogy is com-
monly used to emphasize that the distribution of talented men is roughly equal in the realm of any ruler
and success depends on the strategical use of the right people in the right places.2 Wang Liu, however, in-
tegrates fa into the winning strategy, saying that good governance critically depends on the availability
of fa.
“It has become a conventional wisdom nowadays to say that ‘it is ren who order the state,
not fa’. But even if ren capable of good governance have been recruited, there is still need
for fa that lead to good governance. Establishing good fa means to correct the defects of
deﬁcient fa. The winner of a game of chess plays with the same gaming pieces as the loser.”
世每⾔有治⼈。無治法。然既有治⼈。必有治法。⽽⽴法之善。不過即獘法⽽
更其獘。所謂勝者所⽤敗者之棋也。3
The ren-fa polarity in general, and the dictum that “it is men who order the state, not regulations”
in particular, manifests a concern for effective organizational control. Organizational control is a need
not only of private organizations such as companies, but also of public types of organizations such as
a state: “As a social unit devoted primarily to the achievement of speciﬁc goals, any organization such
as a state needs to control its members in such a way that they help to achieve its goals. To be effective,
such control tends to require sanctions of a certain type.”4 Because rulers cannot rule alone, they must
1HCJSWXB/SHENG, 20:62a–63b.
2Yin (2006), p. 93. Ouyang & Xu (n.d.), p. 194.
3HCJSWXB/SHENG, 60:21a–32b.
4Metzger (1973), p. 236.
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delegate authority to state oﬃcials. These oﬃcials perform tasks on their behalf and receive decision-
making power. In order to ensure that oﬃcials act in the interest of the ruler, it is necessary to exercise
control and contain corruption as “even rulers with high autonomy (the ability to make decisions about
state policies independently) may have little power (the ability to carry out the chosen policy) if they
cannot control the actions of their agents” and the “ability of rulers to control state oﬃcials provides the
key to understanding the conditions under which rulers will be able to translate their autonomy into
power.” Furthermore, oﬃcial’s “corruption can make even the most autonomous ruler powerless”.1 The
ability of rulers control, that is, to monitor and sanction the actions of state oﬃcials had an inﬂuence on
the type and level of oﬃcial corruption.
Effective organizational control involves monitoring of agents and in conjunction with the use of
positive and negative sanctions. The Qing system of sanctions included various informal and formal
rewards (e.g. administrative honors and promotions), as well as the main system of negative sanctions,
the regulations on administrative punishment (chufen zeli處分則例).2
It is noteworthy that authors often do not only attribute aspects of internal control to ren, but also
aspects of external control. In the context of statements involving ren and fa, authors tend to subsume
the concern of monitoring and sanctions under the aspect of ren, not fa. ren can be intrinsically moti-
vated to comply to fa (internal control) and extrinsically motivated (external control), through institu-
tional checks and surveillance. ren can be changed by strengthening measures of external control, that
is, monitoring and reporting, either top-down or mutual. ren can also be changed by strengthening
their internal control by means of top-down “education and transformation” (jiaohua教化).
Statecraft advocates like Wei Yuan see a close connection between the establishments of measures of
organizational control and virtues such as a caring attitude for the people. A deﬁning characteristic of
a good administrator, a zhiren治⼈, a man who orders or governs the state well, is that he commits
himself to the interests of the people, that he “cherishes the people” (ai min愛民).3 In the context of
dyke maintenance, Hu Zaike胡在恪 (jinshi 1655) holds that “the essence of the wisdom that ‘it is ren
who order the state not fa’ is that ren (administrators) should show love for the people in their hearts,
and be a model for the people in their actions”則所謂有治⼈無治法者。存乎其⼈之愛民以
⼼。先民以⾝.4 Similarly commenting on dyke construction, Wei Yuan sees nothing wrong with a
recurse to measures of external control to help subordinate oﬃcials foster their “love” for the people:
“It is without doubt ‘ren who order the state not fa’, which is why those who love the people should
1Kiser & Tong (1992), p. 301.
2This is the translation of chufen zeli given in Metzger (1973), who notes that these regulations formed the “main system
of negative sanctions used by the Ch’ing bureaucracy to control the performance of civil oﬃcials” and “dealt with punish-
ment of oﬃceholders for light offenses involving governmental affairs by means of impeachment and of economic status
deprivations. [...] it formed the major part of the total system of sanctions, which also included various informal elements
and formal rewards, such as administrative honors and promotions”. Metzger (1973), pp. 235ff.
3As this emotional commitment is likened to the parental love for a child (ai min ru zi愛民如⼦), “love” may indeed be
the adequate translation for ai here.
4HCJSWB, 117:15a.
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regard surveillance of their subordinates as their ﬁrst duty”信⽲有治⼈無治法也。故愛民者以察吏
為第⼀義.1
In his discussion of the Qing bureaucracy, Metzger (1973) points out that “frank acceptance of the
fact that men may be crass and self-centered and that it is only prudent in designing public institutions
to insist upon checks and balances and to provide objective rather than subjective restraints on the uses
of power” was the rule, rather than the exception in Chinese politics.2 Qing oﬃcials regarded sanctions
as an integral part of the government’s internal organization because they believed that most men were
of “mediocre quality” in terms of their moral, intellectual and professional capabilities.
The idea that most people are mediocre goes back at least to Xunzi and Han Fei. Han Fei believed
that only few men were good, and that the majority of men was mediocre. It was exactly this majority
of mediocre oﬃcials that could potentially be corrupted by power. The state had no choice but to staff
oﬃcial ranks with mediocre men, but they had to be controlled by means of rewards and punishments.3
For Han Fei, this did not only apply to oﬃcialdom, but also to rulers, whom Han Fei also judged to be
mainly of medium quality. While waiting for a ruler of the worthiness of a Yao and Shun, the mediocre
ruler should use his power (shi勢) and uphold the fa to bring about social peace. He can prepare the
grounds for the future order of a Yao and Shun this way and prevent chaos wrought if a tyrannical ruler
of the wickedness of a Jie and Zhou (the last kings of the Xia and Shang dynasty) takes power instead.4
A crucial characteristic that distinguishes the “men of average talent” from the charismatic ideal of the
“virtuous man” or “true gentleman” is that his moral capacities depend more strongly on outer circum-
stances than on his inner spiritual strength.5 These outer circumstances could be material conditions,
legal or administrative restrictions, but also intellectual currents. The theory of the mediocrity of the
majority served as rationale for imposing legal checks and for disciplining oﬃcials with rewards and pun-
ishments in Qing literature, and generally for all measures that promoted moral standards and integrity
among the oﬃcialdom, also including the provision of material incentives and the prevention of impov-
erishment of oﬃcials as basic anti-corruption measures. Overall, the widespread perception was that
what was true for all people was also true for oﬃcials. Rules could only stand if it was possible for the
majority of oﬃcials to comply with them and therefore “the drafting of fa should take the oﬃcial of
1HCJSWB, 38:36a–b
2Metzger (1973), p. 236, refuting Lucian W. Pye’s contrary representation as based on “basic misunderstandings”. How-
ever, Metzger also attests other scholars neglect of chufen law, which he sees reﬂected e.g. in the oversimpliﬁcation in Ch’ü
(1962) and Twitchett (1964) that Qing government did not make a distinction between punishment for an administrative
fault and for a criminal offense. According to Metzger, this lack of information about chufen law has led to basic misunder-
standings about the nature of the imperial bureaucracy.
3Metzger (1973), pp. 261.
4Yang (2013b), p. 59–61. fa is an impersonal administrative technique for select oﬃcials and evaluating their achievements
that avoids that the ruler employs in order to avoid to take his personal subjective judgment as a basis.
5Metzger (1973), pp. 261–62. Metzger also mentions Wang Anshi and Gu Yanwu with their ideas about the dependence
of the majority of mediocre oﬃcials on external incentives such as material conditions and legal restrictions. Metzger regards
the question of whether “the elite had an inner spiritual core of morality or were contemptibly controlled through outer
circumstances” a “central doubt in the Confucian value system”.
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mediocre talent as its point of departure”⽴法本為中材.1
Jiang Qiling’s蔣琦齡 (1818–1874) perspective on the role of ren and fa is quite representative of the
pre-1898 statecraft compendia’s tenor.2 Jiang states that in order to achieve good governance one must
neither neglect to make sure of the virtue and capability of the men in charge (ren), nor neglect to make
sure that the institutions (fa) are sound.
“Which standards and directives do not depend on men (ren) to comply with and imple-
ment them. One must not neglect the importance of good men (ren) because the regu-
lations (fa) seem sound enough. Neither must one neglect the importance of good regu-
lations (fa) because the men in charge (ren) seem virtuous enough. Only extraordinary




The common denominator with regard to the use of the ren-fa polarity in the statecraft compendia is
an awareness of the interdependent nature of ren and fa. Furthermore, the majority of texts manifest
a concern for eﬃcient organizational control through ren who ensure the proper use of fa by means
of external and internal control and through “simple” fa that facilitate compliance and enforcement
as much as possible. The role of ren is to make fa, to execute and comply with fa, and to ensure that
other comply with them as well, in order to make them effective (fa are effective through ren). fa are
adapted or created by ren in consulting historical evidence from the rulers of pre-Qin times (xianwang
先王) or the rulers of the imperial period (houwang後王) and adapting it to the circumstances. Some
fa are better than others in preventing ren from acting si instead of gong, doing things only in ming
instead of shi, or at least more robust against ren acting in such ways. The basic description of the task
of the administrator is to “prevent abuse and beneﬁt the people” (chubi limin除弊利民) and to imple-
ment policies by adapting them to the local circumstances (yindi zhiyi因地制宜). As will be shown in
the following section, recruitment and task structure, as well as control through monitoring and posi-
tive and negative sanctions were all regarded as important preconditions to ensure that administrators
live up to these expectations by the authors of the statecraft writings included in the pre-1898 compen-
dia.
“Men (ren) must be selected well, the regulations (fa) must be strict [...]. Throughout
history, it were men (ren) who ordered the state, not regulations (fa). There is nothing in
the word that cannot be accomplished [...] by carefully selecting the men (ren) to be put
1HCJSWXB/GE, 17:3a–b
2Pan Lei潘⽾ (1646–1708) may have written (much earlier than Jiang) that he thinks “that the making of regulations
(fa) is not diﬃcult, but their implementation is”⾂以為⽴法⾮難，⽤法為難, but this refers to the perspective of the
high oﬃcial or ruler globally overseeing the implementation of regulations. HCJSWB, 13:49a–54b.
3HCJSWXB/SHENG, 13:19a–45b.
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2.3 Civil governance (lizheng吏政)
This subchapter discusses the use of the ren-fa-polarity in the writings included in the sections on
the “administration of the personnel” (lizheng吏政) in the compendia, dedicated to the tasks of the
Board of Personnel (libu吏部). The tasks of the Board of Personnel included the appointment, eval-
uation, promotion, demotion, transfer and dismissal of oﬃcials. These tasks were also commonly asso-
ciated with the concept of “making use of personnel” (yong ren⽤⼈).1 Oﬃcials involved in the ap-
pointment of other oﬃcials had to select the right people for the job, the point being to properly match
“personnel with oﬃces in order to maximize performance and minimize the waste of talent and other re-
sources”.2 The “talents” (rencai⼈材) had to be trained, provided with incentives, monitored and have
their performance appraised, and ﬁnally be re-allocated to new postings based on performance. Per-
sonnel politics had to be coordinated with the government functions of administration of disciplinary
sanctions and of criminal justice. For example, personnel shifts often were simultaneously negative or
positive sanctions.3 The focus of the writings discussed in this subchapter focus on the sub-prefectural
context of the zhou and xian magistrate’s administration. fa refers to administrative regulations and
institutions in the writings discussed, but mostly more speciﬁcally to the regulations of law of adminis-
trative punishments.
That the lizheng and the resulting “bureaucratic discipline” or “bureaucratic governance” (lizhi吏
治) were the foundation of good – and effective – government was a prominent idea in imperial China.
Statements conﬁrming this view can be found all over the Qing statecraft compendia and other political
writings.4 These tasks were not solely the responsibilities of the Board of Personnel. Any superior was
responsible to morally guide, monitor and recommend his subordinates for promotion or demotion.5
The censorate was globally responsible for the disciplinary surveillance of the bureaucracy and the im-
peachment of wayward oﬃcials.6 But all the aspects at the same time where core competencies of the
Board of Personnel.7
1Smith (2015), p. 99
2Metzger (1973), p. 243.
3Metzger (1973), p. 239.
4See, for example, HCJSWB, 15:19a–20b, where Ortai鄂爾泰 (1677–1745) writes that “the government of the
empire relies on making use of personnel (yong ren) as its root, the remaining tasks are the branches and leafs”
治天下惟以⽤⼈為本其餘皆枝葉事⽿. Wei Yuan emphasizes that the eﬃcient administration of public granaries and the
baojia-system may be responsibility of the Board of Revenue, but in fact also depends on how well the Board of Personnel
fulﬁlls its responsibility of making sure that oﬃcials are selected and monitored properly, as “it is men (ren) who order
the state, not regulations (fa)”. See also HCJSWXB/GE, 14:5a–7b, where, responding to a an edict requesting the upper
echelons of the bureaucracy to outline current problems in “making use of personnel and the exercise of administration”
⽤⼈⾏政, Zeng Guofan underlines that “what must receive full attention today is making use of personnel (yong ren)”
今⽇所當講求者惟在⽤⼈⼀端⽿. According to Zeng Guofan, the “making use of personnel” includes providing moral
guidance, properly educating, selecting, appointing, promoting and demoting and effectively monitoring the bureaucratic
personnel.
5In the provinces, regular administrative superiors were expected to carry out the surveillance of their subordinates, while
circuit censors only “backstopped surveillance”. See Metzger (1973), pp. 270-271, for details and further evidence.
6Hucker (1985), p. 592.
7Hucker (1985), p. 306.
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Apart from the selection of the right men for the job, the concept of yong ren also includes tasks of
organizational control. Organizational control refers to measures ensuring that the members of the bu-
reaucracy worked towards the realization of the bureaucracy’s goals. The tasks subsumed under yong
ren include measures of external and internal control. The surveillance of oﬃcials’ performance and the
sanctioning of oﬃcials according to this very performance are measures of external control. But mea-
sures to foster internal control (voluntary compliance) are also a part of yong ren. Internal control was
regarded as being affected by oﬃcials’ shared cognitive and affective orientations, the so-called “political
culture” or “norms of the bureaucrats”仕⾵. This is in line with the view that the socio-cultural context
of shared values directly affects organizational eﬃciency (which in turn affects the power of the bureau-
cracy). This culture could be inﬂuenced by means of “teaching and transformation” (jiaohua教化),
implying that superiors inculcate proper values and a proper bureaucratic culture in their subordinates
in a top-down fashion by means of explicit instruction (jiao) and more subtle transformation (hua) by
setting a good example.
This accords with theories of organizational control. Effective organizational control, on the one
hand, requires sanctions. Sanctions have to meet certain normative and administrative conditions to
elicit effort from the organization’s members and be effective. First, the members must regard the sanc-
tions as legitimate. Second, the sanctions must be universalistically correlated with member’s perfor-
mance (success or failure in achieving the organization’s goals) instead of being particularistically tied
to a member’s status. In this context, responsibility is “rationalized” by limiting the responsibility of
an individual to events that are realistically within his practical control. Third, punishments for minor
administrative mistakes must be mild enough that oﬃcials are still willing to engage in administrative
tasks that involve the risk of committing these mistakes. Fourth, the “sanctions must be changeable and
ﬂexible so that they can be adjusted to elicit maximum response”, it must be possible to subject them
to critique. Fifth, the administration of sanctions must be organized as a centralized and differentiated
administrative unit “in order to achieve uniformity of application”.1 Whether these conditions were ful-
ﬁlled depended on the formally established policies and resulting formalized procedures (“the formal
structure as it existed on paper was in fact a major positive determinant of actual behavior”2). It also de-
pended on a number of situational, institutional, cultural, and technological factors conditioning these
policies and procedures. The low level of technology of communication produced a lack of fast and reli-
able information and a tendency on the part of rulers to prefer harsher sanctions. The institutionalized
right of the emperor to arbitrarily intervene in the adjudicative process could also reduce the universal-
ist tendency (though extreme arbitrariness was rare in practice). Control over the bureaucrats by the
rulers was limited by situational factors giving rise to “dilemmas of choice” that were a “major topic of
indigenous discussion”. One dilemma of choice existed between effective performance and control in
the narrower sense, as “tight controls often reduced discretion, which was needed for effectiveness”. An-
1Metzger (1973), pp. 236–237.
2Metzger (1973), p. 81.
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other dilemma involved the topic of solidarity. Control could conﬂict with feelings of solidarity, which
could reduce solidarity’s positive impact on effectiveness. On the other hand, policies that enhanced
solidarity could also have a detrimental effect on effectiveness. The policy of promotion on the basis of
seniority is an example.
There were cultural factors related to the bureaucrats’ basic orientations, and the technological fac-
tor of a relatively low level of the technology of communication. Qing bureaucrats’ basic orientations,
for example the spectrum between particularism and universalism that Qing bureaucrats’ orientations
formed, inﬂuenced the eﬃcacy of administrative systems such as the sanction system. A tendency to-
wards “particularistic ties of solidarity leading to corrupt practices, which interfered with the realization
of universalism” existed among Qing bureaucrats. On the other hand, bureaucrats also had a “strong
universalistic orientation, and their self-image involved notions of responsibility and attitudes toward
punishment which in their minds largely legitimated ch’u-fen law”, that speciﬁed administrative sanc-
tions.1 On the whole, these orientations were the result of sociocultural factors outside the rulers’ con-
trol. But at the same time, “rulers policy could also inﬂuence the inherent tendency in the bureaucrats’
orientation to swing between its particularistic and universalistic poles”.2
The ﬁrst ﬁve writings discussed in this section, by Li Fu, Wang Zhiyin, Zhou Hao, Chu Fangqing and
Pan Lei all touch upon the system of sanctions and the above mentioned criteria of effective sanctions.
The ﬁve writings propose modiﬁcations to aspects of the bureaucracy’s internal organization meant to
enhance organizational control and eﬃcacy, including recruitment, appointments, personnel and task
structure, and monitoring and sanctioning. While Wang’s and Zhou’s writing rhetorically emphasize
ren, Chu’s and Pan’s writings emphasize fa, and Li’s writings represents a middle ground. What sets
Chu’s and Pan’s memorial substantially apart from the other three is that they emphasize the need for
universal sanctions that do not discriminate between offenses committed by high oﬃcials and offenses
committed by low oﬃcials. Wang’s and Zhou’s memorials probably date from the Jiaqing reign (1796–
1820), while Chu’s examination essay and Pan’s memorial were written earlier, during the Kangxi reign
(1661–1722). Li’s memorial dates from 1735, the last year of the Yongzheng reign (1723–1735). The memo-
rial Li Fu is included in this section because it makes a point of explaining how to adapt all policies (fa)
of personnel administration, including appointments, administrative regulations and disciplinary sanc-
tions, to a realistic model of the average bureaucrat, the “mediocre man” (zhongren中⼈). In Wang’s
and Zhou’s writings, effective sanctions are an aspect attributed to the men in charge (ren). The writ-
ings by Chu and Pan emphasize the role of universal regulations or laws (fa) in their arguments about
effective sanctions. The sixth and seventh writing, by Yang Yuguo and Wang Xiaocheng, probably writ-
ten during the Jiaqing and Daoguang reign, employ ren and fa to discuss the “dilemma of choice” be-
tween central control through enforcement of uniﬁed regulations (fa) and the leeway granted to local
magistrates (ren) in adapting the regulations to the local context. The two writings suggest that an im-
1Metzger (1973), p. 240.
2Metzger (1973), p. 240.
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balance between the two leads to the ineﬃcacy of central policies. While Yang proposes a list of local
institutions (fa) that should be abolished in order to free magistrates energies and provide suboﬃcial
functionaries less opportunity to commit abuses, Wang just ends with an appeal to ensure the quality
of personnel (ren) recruited. The eighth writing by Guan Tong focuses on the role that prevalent bu-
reaucratic norms (bureaucratic culture) play in furthering or diminishing the eﬃcacy of organizational
control and of regulations in general. Guan wrote the essay in the late Jiaqing or early Daoguang reign
(1820–1850). He argues that the prevailing culture inﬂuences the “quality” of the bureaucratic personnel
(ren), which in turn affects compliance to institutions and regulations (fa).
Li Fu’s李紱 (1673–1750) approach to “making use of personnel” (yong ren), expounded in a memo-
rial written in 1735, is explicitly focused on making proper use of the potential of the mediocre oﬃcials
who represent the majority of the bureaucracy.1 Li uses the words cai材/才 (men’s qualities or talents)
and ren interchangeably, sometimes speaking of “mediocre talents” (zhongcai中材) and at other times
of “mediocre men” (zhongren中⼈). While the recruitment of as many exceptionally virtuous and
able (xian賢) candidates for the civil service as possible should remain the high goal of personnel poli-
tics, the supply of the such candidates is limited, Li argues. With the right personnel policies (yong ren
zhi fa⽤⼈之法), however, it is possible to tap the potential of mediocre candidates for government
and to extend the pool of talents eligible for government service. Li suggests changes to three person-
nel policies to accommodate mediocre oﬃcials: the promotion of mediocre oﬃcials in accordance with
formal criteria, especially seniority (zige資格) and performance, the relaxation of sanctions for minor
offenses, and the prolongation of terms-of-oﬃce. Li points out a that tapping the potential of mediocre
candidates is in general intimately related with the eﬃcacy of regulations (fa).
“The sages fostered the truly upright men to provide for the people. Truly upright men
cannot be recruited in great numbers, but it is possible to put even mediocre men to good
use. We should promote them according to their seniority, treat their minor mistakes with
leniency, and appoint oﬃcials who monitor (the other oﬃcials in their) fulﬁllment of of-
ﬁcial duties.2 Then the empire will have plenty of talent available for the civil service, all




While Li uses fa once in the above quote to refer to the administrative regulations and laws in general,
his use of the term fa in all other instances and in the remainder of the essay comes closest to the term
1HCJSWB, 15:23a–27b.
2專 官 司 以 盡 職 守 could also mean “and clearly deﬁne each oﬃcial’s responsibilities so as to enable oﬃcials to fulﬁll
their duties”.
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“policy” or “method”. Li describes the basic principles that appointments, monitoring and punishment
of civil servants should follow, and does not refer to particular regulations in each case.
Li opts to abolish the regulation (li例) that allows for the “hand-picking of candidates to be allocated
to posts”揀選分發 instead of assigning posts by lottery.1 Li questions the objectivity of the selection
criteria of the high oﬃcials qualiﬁed to suggest candidates. In the end, hand-picked candidates are not
better than batch-assigned candidates, as the vast majority of oﬃcials are “men of mediocre quality”
(zhongren中⼈). Their integrity and their commitment depends on the integrity and commitment of
their superiors. The hand-picking just introduces a considerable administrative overhead.
“Most men in the bureaucracy are of mediocre virtue and ability. They mostly replicate
the moral conduct of their superior. Not one in a hundred stays honest if their superior
is corrupt, or remains diligent if their superior is lazy. Similarly, not one in a hundred will




What Li demands is a focus on universalist instead of particularist standards in the recruitment of oﬃ-
cials.
Li criticizes that governors-general and governors to impeach local oﬃcials who show perfectly able
of “public-minded administration”秉公 for minor administrative lapses after a short time in a new of-
ﬁce. This goes against the principle of observing the difference between public (gong公) and private (si
私) offenses. “Private” offenses involving corruption and breaking of laws should be punished regard-
less of the extent of the damage incurred. “Public” offenses often result from circumstances beyond the
control or knowledge of the oﬃcial and should therefore not be punished with permanent dismissal re-
gardless of the extent of the damage incurred. Instead they should be recorded to be taken into account
later for the regular performance evaluation. Li cites a number of references supporting this demand,
among them a statement by Fan Zhongyan范仲淹 (989–1052) that “public offenses are impossible
to avoid, but if someone actually fears to commit public offenses, he will not dare to responsibility for
anything and undertake any affair anymore”公罪不可無。誠以畏避公罪。則無敢任事者.
This suggestion conforms with the second and third conditions for an effective system of sanctions, that
require a “rational” relationship between performance and sanction as well as moderate sanctions for
minor offenses in order to prevent oﬃcial lethargy.
Li demands to extend the terms-of-oﬃce of both local and court oﬃcials in order to give oﬃcials a
better chance to familiarize themselves with their tasks and better fulﬁll their duties. Longer terms-of-
1The appointment by lottery was introduced by the Yongzheng emperor, who was chronically suspicious that the par-
ticularistic ties among the literati class undermined the formal recruitment system. High oﬃcials in the ﬁeld (governors and
governors-general) could submit suggestions of worthy candidates to the emperor for appointment. Zelin (2002), pp. 194–
195.
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oﬃce would leave clerks and runners with less opportunity to deceive the magistrate with false informa-
tion. The majority “mediocre oﬃcials” gets a chance of promotion to the next higher rank every nine
years according to their performance record. Criminal or incompetent oﬃcials can be dismissed and out-
standing candidates promoted before the end of their turn of oﬃce. This represents a compromise with
regard to the “dilemma of choice” between seniority and competence as described by Metzger (1973).
Li connects the attainment of goals of good government (the people living in peace) with proper
“employment of personnel (ren)”. Proper employment of personnel relies on the right policies (fa)
of personnel management adapted to the special needs of “mediocre men (ren)”. Li demands a formal
universal appointment process that accounts for the fact that a particularist recommendation system
will not select the best candidates because the vast majority of candidates are mediocre anyway. The
distinction between public and private offenses must be strictly adhered to and minor lapses must be
treated with lenience in order to prevent mediocre oﬃcials from tending to over-cautiousness and inac-
tivity. Similarly, mediocre oﬃcials must be motivated by a realistic chance to advance in grade based on
their seniority and performance. Li furthermore posits a connection between proper management of
mediocre men (ren) and the eﬃcacy of administrative regulations (fa).
Wang Zhiyin’s汪志伊 (1743–1817) memorial on “Three matters of bureaucratic discipline”敬陳吏
治三事疏1 warns against the dangers of over-regulation and demands the abolishment of three regula-
tions that he regards as detrimental to administrative eﬃciency on the district level. Wang sees two main
reasons for ineﬃciency and corruption: irrationality in the system of administrative sanctions that pre-
vents oﬃcials from putting their talents to use, and a system of appointments that does not select the
best men. Wang’s criticism is that the strategy of the legislators to respond to abuses of the current reg-
ulations (fa) is to introduce more regulations (fa). This opens up further possibilities of abuse because
additional regulations may come with inherent defects, and the extant corpus of regulations unwieldy
and hard to oversee. In reality, the eﬃcacy of regulations (fa) depends on “appointing the right men
for the job” (ren ren任⼈) and properly “managing men” (yong ren). The “three matters” that Wang,
several times inspector-general of Fujian province and later governor-general of Zhejiang and Fujian
province during the Jiaqing reign (1796–1820), addresses concern tax collection deadlines, terms of of-
ﬁce and salary cuts imposed on Fujian magistrates. Wang advocates to revoke the recent tightening of
tax collection deadlines, to relax the three year limit on magistrates’ terms of oﬃce, and to reduce the
scope and duration of temporary cuts of magistrates’ income. Wang starts his critique with a theoretical
exposition on bureaucratic discipline.
“Since ancient times it has been men (ren) who have ordered the state, not regulations
(fa). If we create a regulation (fa) for every defect (possibility for abuse) that arises, the
laws will still never cover all contingencies. With every regulation (fa), new defects (pos-
sibilities for abuse) arise, we will never eliminate all of them. Also, the more complicated
1HCJSWB, 16:11a–15b; also included in HCJSWTB/SHAO, 27:32a–33b.
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the regulations (fa) get, the more they will get circumvented. This will lead to increasing
neglect for regulations (fa). Viewed in this light, we had rather pay more attention to the
management of administrative staff (ren), instead of focusing on the discussion of addi-




Wang calls the approach that he currently sees at work in Fujian and that he is critical of “focusing on
the discussion of additional regulations (fa)”詳於議法. What he means is that superiors solve prob-
lems of bureaucratic discipline by passing additional regulations that are intended to prevent abuse.
As Wang expounds in the remainder of his memorial, these kinds of regulations are mostly not partic-
ularly effective for these purposes. They even have their own drawbacks in that they create additional
problems and possibilities for abuse. Wang’s alternative to the particularistic approach of “creating an
additional regulation (fa) for every defect that arises” is the more general approach of “management
of government personnel” (yong ren). The core of his approach is to improve bureaucratic discipline
through reward and punishment of oﬃcial performance.1
“It is not easy to recruit the right men (ren), however. In general, we get many averagely
talented and few outstanding men. But the truly unworthy are also few in number. If we
single out the unworthy men and punish them severely, then the others will naturally pull
themselves together, and bureaucratic discipline will turn towards integrity. If we spot the
outstanding men and promote them generously, then this will motivate the other men,
and bureaucratic discipline will improve ever more. The averagely talented will be eager to





After this general introduction, Wang discusses the “three matters” of Fujianese bureaucratic discipline.
The matters at issue are the three-month deadline imposed on magistrates for collecting the army pro-
visions tax (liangmi糧⽶), the three-year term-of-oﬃce which magistrates have to fulﬁll before they
can be appointed to another post, and the increasing frequency with which superior oﬃces decide to
withhold magistrates’ incomes. In a further introductory remark, Wang foreshadows the main points of
his critique of each of the three regulations in the discussion that follows. Wang emphasizes that in all
1While Wang frames reward and punishment under the (yong) ren-aspect, this is actually quite close to one classical un-
derstanding (among others) of fa as an “impersonal administrative technique of determining rewards and punishments in
accordance with a subject’s true merit”. Goldin (2011), p. 92.
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three cases, (more or less) recently introduced regulations diminish the chance of objective assessments
of individual oﬃcials’ performance that is at the core of his favored strategy. Many of those who possess
enough will power and ambition are simply not eligible according to the formal criteria because they
have not completed their current term-of-oﬃce at the time the vacancy arises. The rest cannot put their
talent to full use because they are restricted by a short term-of-oﬃce or insuﬃcient budget.
“Oﬃcials are impaired by criteria of eligibility that hinder them from putting their own
will and ambition to good use. They are impaired by standards of evaluation that prevent
them from staying in oﬃce long enough to put their talent to full use. They are empover-
ished by reductions of their streams of income so that they cannot fulﬁll their duties and
foster their own integrity.”
特患執資格以限之。使不得伸其志以作其氣。復設科條以縛之。使不得久其任
以盡其材。且扣得項以窘之。使不得全其守以正其趨。為可惜也。
Subsequently, Wang discusses the three issues in Fujianese administration in detail. The main thrust
of his discussion is to illustrate how “creating an additional regulation for every defect that arises” does
an insuﬃcient job in solving the problems it is meant to solve, and how it at the same time create new
problems. For each issue discussed, he identiﬁes a regulation, decree or policy (fa) that he regards as the
core of the problem. He points out how the respective fa causes the problem as a side-effect, offering
evidence for his assesment that “with every fa created, another defect arises”. He also makes a point
of underlining that the respective fa does not only have negative side-effects contrary to the effects in-
tended by its makers, but even fails to fulﬁll its original purpose. Wang connects his demands for change
with a punishment-and-reward-based strategy of yong ren (“management of government personnel”).
The ﬁrst issue discussed is the tight three-month deadline for the collection of an army provisions tax
established during the Qianlong reign. Wang demands to go back to the one-year deadline previously in
force and to relax the sanctions for magistrates who fail to deliver the tax grain in time. Wang argues that
in Fujian, tax delinquency is a widespread phenomenon and tax collection a tedious business. Coastal
and mountainous areas dominate Fujian’s geography. The soil is much barrener and the people poorer
than in other provinces. If magistrates choose a slow, but persistent strategy in urging people to pay
their taxes, they have a chance to meet the quota. If they hasten things, desperate delinquents will en-
gage in open tax boycott.
In 1788, the deadline for the collection of the army provisions tax was tightened and reduced from
twelve to three months. The new regulation also requires stricter penalties for magistrates failing to meet
the deadlines. The initiator of the stricter regulation of army provisions tax collection motivated the
change with the vital role the tax plays in supplying the army. Wang Zhiyin points out that this is a poor
argument, as there is still the land-tax of which a certain ratio provides for the army. The regulations of
1788 sanctioned failure to meet the quota after three months with exclusion from career advancement
opportunities, and the second failure, after six months, with demotion and transfer to another post.
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This had unintended consequences for both the tax income and the eﬃciency of local administration.
At ﬁrst, oﬃcials avoided penalty by misappropriating public grain stocks for the payment of the tax.
This lead to deﬁcits in the granaries and was consequently prohibited. Since then, the frequency of mag-
istrate demotions has soared. The average tenure of magistrates has decreased to one or two years. Many
magistrates are transferred after the ﬁrst round of deadlines, after a just few months in oﬃce. There are
households who deliberately do not pay their taxes on time or refuse to pay their taxes at all, expecting
that the magistrate will be exchanged after a few months anyway and they have to fear no consequences.
Also, functionaries do not urge people to pay taxes and even take advantage of the situation and engage
in corrupt practices. Instead of increasing, the amount of army provisions tax collected decreased.
In summary, the new three-month regulation has had the exact opposite effects of what its initiator
intended, plus a number of undesirable side-effects. The original intention had been to motivate magis-
trates to hasten the collection of the army provisions tax due to its relevance for the yearly assessment of
their performance (kaocheng考成). In practice, the measure proved ineffective, as it even increased the
tax deﬁcit. The impeached oﬃcials were partly rehabilitated by appointing them to posts with the same
rank instead of demoting them to inferior posts. But the frequent personnel changes left the public af-
fairs of the affected localities in disorder. The only solution to beneﬁt both the military and bureaucratic
discipline, Wang argues, is reversion to the twelve-month deadline and full rehabilitation of all previ-
ously impeached oﬃcials.
The second regulation which Wang wants to see relaxed for Fujian is the regulations that prohibits “ir-
regular” (bu heli不合例) appointment of magistrates, i.e. reappointment to other posts before the end
of their regular term-of-oﬃce or appointment to higher-ranked posts of oﬃcials who do not have a per-
fect track record. It should become possible again to reappoint magistrates to other posts before the end
of their regular three-year term if there is an urgent vacancy and the person is specially qualiﬁed for this
post. This kind of extraordinary reappointments was legalized by an imperial edict in 1749. However,
the practice was outlawed again on the initiative of a censor in 1799. The rationale cited in the 1749 edict
had been to enable quick reaction to urgent local needs. (After all, the provincial authorities of governor
and governor-general only had the right to suggest appropriate candidates anyway, as the emperor had
the last word in the decision.) The rationale cited by the censor when opting to revoke the 1749 regula-
tion had been to prevent appointments based on personal relations. Wang calls this reasoning illogical:
While cronyism is despicable, whether persons are appointed based on their personal relations to su-
perior oﬃcials is completely independent from whether they have served their three-year term or not.
Instead of abolishing a regulation that serves legitimate local interests well, and thereby producing lo-
cal problems, the better strategy is to ﬁght oﬃcial cronyism and corruption in general, not just in this
particular instance.
The other reason why the current regulations for promotions have become impracticable is that they
require the candidate to have a record clear of any impeachment for failing to meet tax collection dead-
lines or failing to catch criminals in their jurisdiction. However, there are many places in Fujian where
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this is impossible to achieve even for a very committed magistrate. In poor regions it is never possible to
collect the full tax quota in time and the magistrate may also not be in a position to suppress all criminal
activity. Wang suggests to make oﬃcials who have less than ten impeachments in their track record eli-
gible for suggestion to the emperor as candidates for promotion. Even more lenient criteria have to be
devised for districts with a high crime rate. Otherwise, Wang says, he, the governor, and the governor-
general will run out of candidates. Already now they regularly have to drop candidates which they have
chosen for his integrity and ability because a check of his track records tells them that, following the cur-
rent criteria, they should actually rather demote him.
Wang’s third demand is that the scope and duration of cuts on magistrates’ income, especially the
practice of “joint compensation” (tanpei攤賠), have to drastically decrease. “Joint compensation”
refers to the practice of compensating deﬁcits in the provincial budget by collecting contributions from
all oﬃcials stationed in the province, although they were not responsible for the deﬁcit. Another fre-
quent compensation scenario was to have successors in oﬃce make up for the deﬁcits caused by their
predecessors. Wang cites the example of a case where the soaring costs of a military operation in Taiwan
were split among the local oﬃcials, ﬁrst through cuts on their income, then through an additional com-
pensation payment. In general with this strategy, the priority is placed upon fast compensation of the
loss, instead of clarifying the causes and identifying responsible oﬃcials. Frequent compensation pay-
ments deprive magistrates of the funds for their normal conduct of oﬃcial business, an effect they try
to offset by levying higher customary fees (lougui陋規). These fees are hard to control and often entail
corrupt practices on the part of the oﬃcials or the functionaries who collect the fees. In the case cited,
however, these decisions were revoked by an edict in 1796 that decided that it was not fair to have unin-
volved oﬃcials pay for the mistakes of others who remained unaffected. The right decision, says Wang:
it ensured that local oﬃcials have enough funds to conduct their business, and that the local people are
not negatively affected by spiraling customary fees.
All three regulations criticized contradict Wang’s views of proper personnel management. The ﬁrst
and second regulation prevent the “selection of candidates (ren) who match the job requirements
best”以官擇⼈. The third regulation punishes the wrong persons and makes oﬃcials liable for repay-
ment of costs that they bear no responsibility for. Besides contradicting his views of proper personnel
management, all three regulations also straightly fail to deliver the effects there were intended to. The
intention of the ﬁrst regulation, the shortening of the tax collection deadline for the army provisions
tax from twelve to three months, had been to accelerate the collection of the army provisions tax to en-
sure the fast provision of supplies for the army. However, due to the poverty of most Fujian localities,
magistrates were not able to meet the three-months deadline which lead to frequent dismissals. Local
administration suffered from frequent personnel changes. Anticipating the magistrate’s dismissal, the
motivation of taxpayers to pay their taxes and of the tax collecting functionaries to urge payments de-
creased. So in the end, the new deadline undermined the original goal of ensuring the fast delivery of
taxes in full quota to feed the army. The intention of the second regulation, that prevents appointment
2.3. CIVIL GOVERNANCE (LIZHENG 吏政) 101
of oﬃcials to higher-ranked posts before they have completed their current term-of-oﬃce, was to con-
tain cronyism. Wang, however, denies the existence of any logical connection between whether oﬃcials
engage in cronyism and whether the term-of-oﬃce completion regulation is strictly enforced. A more
consistent choice in his eyes is the prosecution of cronyism in the bureaucracy in general. Wang also
advocates relaxing the criteria for promotion and keep oﬃcials with a maximum record of ten impeach-
ments eligible for promotion. Otherwise, the province runs out of candidates to ﬁll vacancies because
in many localities in Fujian it is simply impossible to keep one’s track record clear of failed tax collection
deadlines and uncaught criminals. The third regulation for “joint compensation” of deﬁcits had been
intended to quickly eliminate budget deﬁcits on the local or provincial level. However, the repayments
unduly reduce magistrate’s income which they try to make up by demanding “customary fees” from the
local population. This fosters the proliferation of corrupt practices among oﬃcials and functionaries,
and leads to impoverishment of the people.
Wang’s emphasis on “properly employing bureaucratic personnel (ren)” instead of “establishing a
new regulation (fa) for every defect that arises consists of his three suggestions. Wang criticizes a mind-
set that regards prohibitions and coercion as universal means of securing bureaucratic discipline. His
point is not, however, that personnel management can do without rules and prohibitions altogether,
but that the particular three regulations criticized ignore the real conditions facing the magistrates that
make it nearly impossible for the magistrates to comply, and are therefore ineffective. Wang’s ﬁrst sug-
gestion is in line with the second criterion of Metzger’s (1973) system of sanctions for eﬃcient organi-
zational control cited above, that demands a rational relationship between sanctions and performance
so that oﬃcials are only penalized for events that are realistically within their practical control. The sec-
ond suggestions touches upon the “dilemma of choice” between seniority vs. competence in Metzger
(1973). The third suggestion calls for suﬃcient positive sanctions to contain corruption, demanding that
magistrates be equipped with an adequate budget so as to be able to conduct their oﬃcial business in a
ﬂexible and eﬃcient manner. We can regard this as the precondition for any rational evaluation of oﬃ-
cial performance.
During his time as district magistrate in Zhejiang province, Zhou Hao周鎬 (1754–1823) writes a
response to a request of the acting governor-general inviting suggestions on “what would beneﬁt and
what is negatively affecting the local situation” (difang libi地⽅利弊) from the local magistrates.1 Zhou
presents a list of six suggestions. He introduces his suggestions with a theoretical perspective on adminis-
tration that uses the categories of beneﬁts (li利) and “defects”, (bi弊), and men (ren) and regulations
(fa). A simple beneﬁts-and-defects perspective on legislation can be misleading and counterproductive,
Zhou says.
“Your eminence wishes to know what could beneﬁt and what is harming my district. Ben-
eﬁt and harm are intricately related. For every beneﬁt there is a harmful side-effect (bi). It
1HCJSWB, 16:16a–20b.
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starts with a new regulation (fa) that is established in order to bring beneﬁt, an the nega-
tive side-effect (bi) lurks within the regulation. Next, there will be a reform of the regula-
tion (fa) to prevent the side-effect. This produces side-effects (bi) outside the regulation





Zhou calls this style of government “reliance upon regulations (fa)”任法. The better approach, that
breaks out of the cycle of establishing ever more complex regulations, Zhou says, is “reliance upon the
men in charge (ren)”任⼈. The current problem is not that there are no adequate or not enough regu-
lations in place. It can therefore not be solved by focusing on the regulations which is what Zhou calls
the strategy of “relying on regulations (fa)” prescribes. It has to be approached from the perspective of
“relying on the men in charge (ren)”. The problem that prevents full reliance upon the men in charge
is twofold. On the one hand, in many districts, “no qualiﬁed men can be recruited for the position of
the magistrate”州縣之未得其⼈. On the other hand, even where qualiﬁed men can be recruited, they
are unable to govern their district well, for two reasons. Overly complicated regulations (fa tai mi法
太密) unduly restrict the magistrates in the performance of their oﬃcial tasks. And there is no “trust”
(xin信) in the fairness and appropriate of the system of positive and negative sanctions (quan cheng勸
懲), which renders the system ineffective. Zhou’s six suggestions can therefore be read as instructions on
how to put the right men in charge and enable them to properly perform their duties, so as to be able to
“rely on the men in charge (ren)”.
Zhou’s ﬁrst suggestion is to abolish the criterion of seniority in the selection of candidates for post-
ings. This suggestion connects to the second “dilemma of choice” between solidarity and control men-
tioned in Metzger (1973) and cited above. Under the current system of appointments, the only criterion
observed is the date a candidate has ﬁrst taken up oﬃce within the province, and the time the vacancy
arises. The talents and capabilities of the candidates are not taken into account. This easily leads to a mis-
matches between posts and candidates. Less talented candidates may get assigned to “busy vacancies”
(fanque繁缺), although they are not prepared to simultaneously handle the many diﬃcult tasks arising
in a busy area.1 Talented candidates, on the other hand, who could have put their abilities to good use
in managing such busy posts, get assigned to easy vacancies (jian簡缺) instead. The rationale behind
the strictly formal appointment rules is to prevent the governor and governor-general from recommend-
ing their personally favored candidates into good positions. Zhou argues that such favoritism is a sure
sign that the governor or governor-general is “not impartial and not right”不公不正, which is a much
1Magistrates’ administrative burdens varied from place to place. The terms “busy” (fa繁) and “easy” (jian簡) were the
most general categories for the classiﬁcation of the importance, on the one hand, and the and work load and diﬃculty of the
oﬃcial business in an administrative district, on the other hand. For details and subcategories, see Ch’ü (1962), p. 15.
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more general problem. Dishonest high oﬃcials can commit abuses in many ways that do not depend on
whether they can appoint their personal agents magistrates.
Zhou’s second suggestion is relax the sanctions for failures on the part of magistrate to detect and in-
vestigate internal abuses should be relaxed. What Zhou suggests here amounts to the second condition
of sanctions for effective organizational control mentioned in Metzger (1973) and cited above, the crite-
rion that sanction have to correlate with a member’s performance in a rational way. At the same time,
it involves the third condition of rendering sanctions for minor lapses mild enough that oﬃcials still
risk committing them instead of shunning to become active in relation to part of their duties. It is the
duty of the magistrate to detect cases of seal forgery and embezzlement of public funds committed by
his staff. If the magistrate fails to investigate and punish the culprits within two months he is regarded as
jointly liable and punished with demotion by two ranks and transfer. A magistrate who has not investi-
gated case after two months has to face the same sentence as one who has not engaged in investigation at
all and who is sentenced as conﬁdant. Magistrates who detect a case of fraud only after two months have
passed therefore try to cover it up instead of engaging in a proper investigation. In order to prevent this,
sanctions should differentiate between magistrates who do not engage in investigation at all and those
who engage in belated investigation, especially in investigation of cases that date from the term-of-oﬃce
of their predecessor in oﬃce.
Zhou’s third suggestion is to reduce the paperwork magistrates have to complete in a timely fashion
to report to their superiors. Right now, magistrates have to adhere to strict procedures and deadlines
and have to report every step to their superiors. Zhou demands that magistrates be granted more leeway
in the conduct of administrative tasks and that evaluations of their performance be based on their out-
put, not their adherence to formal protocol. This way, magistrates can account for special circumstances
relevant in their district more ﬂexibly. The superiors supervise the process but assess performance based
on the end results. This still allows for detection and demotion of the “incompetent and unqualiﬁed”
昏庸不職者, Zhou claims. This suggestion involves the ﬁrst “dilemma of choice” between tight control
vs. discretion of oﬃce holders as described in Metzger (1973) and cited above.
Zhou’s fourth suggestion is to reduce the magistrate’s ﬁnancial stress by banning the practice of so-
called “donations”捐款 to the personnel of superordinate yamen. These so-called “donations”捐款
have to be paid on the occasion of regular transaction between the yamen and on the occasion of spe-
cial projects. With the magistrates already on a tight budget, with expenses for supporting private sec-
retaries, servants and extended family, envoys, entertainment of superiors, and gifts to friends and col-
leagues, they usually cannot pay the fees from their regular budget. Instead, they either exact this money
from the people or misappropriate local public funds, which both leads to a growth of the local budget
deﬁcit in the ends.
“Don’t they know that what they call ‘letting the magistrates donate’ means that the mag-
istrates will either steal from the state (portions of the regular budget earmarked for other
purposes) or impoverish the people, which both comes down to increasing deﬁcits in the
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local budget.”
⽈捐之州縣。豈知州縣且上侵其國。下病其民。⽽併歸於積⽋也哉。
Zhou suggests to eliminate the current deﬁcits in local treasuries sonce and for all through a one-time
payment, and then consistently prohibit all informal payments from the magistrates to superior yamen.
This will restore the ﬁnancial power of the magistrates and put an end to local budget deﬁcits.
Zhou’s ﬁfth suggestion is that provincial authorities should inquire what reputation a magistrate
enjoys among the local populace. The reputation among the people is an indicator of how “committed
he is to the people’s needs”專⼼為民. This is substantially different from how well the oﬃcial “serves
his superior”奉上: “There are magistrates who fully commit to serving the people’s interests and for
whom fulﬁlling their superiors’ wishes is of secondary importance. There are also those who work on
fulﬁlling their superiors’ wishes and do not care about the people.”有專⼼為民疏於奉上者。亦有⼯
於奉上⽽無意為民者. It is important that superiors differentiate between the two and make sure that
magistrates pay heed to the people’s needs. “If the magistrate acts according to the wishes of one person,
and does not inquire about the preferences of the people, then his title (ming) and his performance
(shi) are in mismatch and the distinction between good and bad is in disorder.”若以⼀⼈之意向為
憑，⽽不察萬民之好惡，則名實紊⽽是⾮亂矣.
Zhou’s six suggestion is to restore “trust”信 in the appropriateness of rewards and punishments
(shang fa賞罰), i.e. positive and negative sanctions. This suggestions connects to the ﬁfth condition of
an effective system of sanctions, as Zhou emphasizes the universality of application of sanctions. Zhou
calls the system of sanctions the central instrument with which the emperor “governs the bureaucracy
and exhorts the empire”策馭羣才⽽⾵⽰天下. It is important that this instrument is universally
employed. The situation that Zhou observes right now, however, is that assessments of magistrates’ in-
tegrity and capability are available, but they are not used as basis of rewards and punishments.
“The assessments of magistrates by censors about who is honest and who is corrupt, who
is talented and who is unworthy are usually all fair and impartial. But one never hears that
those who are assessed honest and talented are selected for advancement in rank. Neither




This sends out the wrong signals to the mass of “average talented” (zhongcai中材) oﬃcials, discour-
aging commitment and encouraging deviant acts instead. Consistent employment of sanctions, on the
other hand, motivates ambiguous “average talents” to commit their full energy to their tasks.
“If those who should be rewarded are not rewarded, this is called inhibiting the good. If
those who should get punished are not punished, this is called nurturing the bad. [...] If
2.3. CIVIL GOVERNANCE (LIZHENG 吏政) 105
the rewards and punishments are handled rigorously, the average talents in the realm get
encouraged to strive for achievements. But if rewards and punishments fall into disuse,
this pushes the average talents to give in to lethargy and lose every sense for progress.”
當賞不賞。是謂沮善。當罰不罰。是謂養姦。[...]故賞罰嚴者。⿎天下之中材⽽
進之功業之途。賞罰廢者。推天下之中材⽽納之暴棄之域。
Zhou legitimates his emphasis on rewards and punishments by calling it the implementation of Confu-
cius’ principle of “putting the upright in charge and putting aside the crooked, so that the crooked can
become upright”舉直錯諸枉，能使枉者直.1
In the introduction to his letter, Zhou had framed his six suggestions as “relying on ren”, not “rely-
ing on fa”. The suggestions concern the appointment, monitoring and sanctioning of magistrates and
task structure. Relaxing formal criteria of appointment, Zhou argues, enables governor-general and
governor to suggest the best candidates for the post. Rationalizing the sanctions for failures on the part
of the magistrates related to the investigation of crimes will render magistrates more motivated to in-
vestigate internal abuses instead of covering them up. With more discretion granted to magistrates in
the conduct of their administrative business, magistrates can react more ﬂexibly to local circumstances,
they do not lose time and energy on paper work, and assessment of the end result is a fairer way of judg-
ing oﬃcials’ performance than assessment of how rigidly they adhere to formal procedure. A suﬃcient
budget suﬃcient to cover all their regular expenses also enhances magistrates’ ﬂexibility, and helps mag-
istrates abstain from demanding customary fees that invite extortionate practices on the part of the
functionaries involved in their collection. Zhou suggests that investigation of the local reputation of
an oﬃcial should serve as an indicator of the performance of an oﬃcial. This suggestion is a logical con-
sequence of Zhou’s emphasis on the role of the men in charge (ren). It can be seen in connection with
the fact that criticism directed at Wang Anshi’s reforms frequently refers to Wang Anshi’s failure to ap-
point oﬃcials who empathized with the people which lead to the exploitation of the people by the new
oﬃcials. The magistrate’s ﬁrst duty is to serve the legitimate interests of the people, not the personal
interests of his superiors. Finally, Zhou regards the universal application of the system of sanctions as
an effective means to discourage deviant acts and particularistic (corrupt) orientation, and to promote
compliant behavior and a universalistic orientation.
These suggestions are associated with not “relying on fa” because they involve the abolition and mod-
iﬁcation of regulations (fa) that have proved ineffective. The picture that Zhou paints of the magistrate
who has to be “relied upon” is that of the “mediocre man” or “mediocre talent” whose moral capacities
depend on outer circumstances just as much as or more than on his inner spiritual strength. A suﬃcient
budget will prevent him from engaging in the levying of customary fees that always leads to illegitimate
surcharges that go into his own and his functionaries’ private pockets. He tends to be more commit-
ted to serving his superiors’ interests than the people’s, as the further is connected to immediate conse-
1He (n.d.), p. 14.
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quences, while the latter might not be. He needs to see rewards and punishments consistently enforced
to reassure them that it is worth to refrain from deviant acts and that integrity in the conduct of oﬃcial
business pays back.
There is a strong correlation between emphasis on ren and concerns of effective organizational con-
trol as described in Metzger (1973) and cited above. While Zhou’s fourth and ﬁfth suggestions present
the magistrate torn between serving the superior yamen’s and the people’s interests, the remaining four
suggestions correspond to above-mentioned ideal conditions and situational dilemmas related to Qing
organizational control. The ﬁrst suggestion involves the dilemma of choice of effectiveness through se-
niority vs. effectiveness through choice of candidates according to their qualiﬁcation for the post. The
second suggestion corresponds to the condition of rendering sanctions for minor lapses mild enough
that oﬃcials still risk committing them instead of shunning to become active in relation to part of their
duties; and condition involving “rationalized sanctions” making oﬃcials responsible only for events that
realistically lie within his practical control. The third suggestion involves the dilemma of choice between
effectiveness through tight control and effectiveness through tight controls reduce discretion of oﬃce
holders. The sixth suggestion touches both upon the condition that sanctions must be universalistically
correlated to members performance in achieving the organization’s goals. Although the overlap may
not be perfect, we see that Zhou’s concern with “relying upon ren” largely overlaps with concerns of
organizational control.
The HCJSWB contains the abridged versions of three examination essays by Chu Fangqing儲⽅慶
(1633–1683) originally composed on the occasion of the metropolitan examinations of the year 1667 un-
der the Kangxi emperor.1 The three essays respond to examination questions asking examinees to sketch
out policy suggestions for tackling three acute problems: the problem of appointing the right candi-
dates to vacant posts; the problem of effectively containing corruption among local magistrates; and the
problem of securing suﬃcient ﬁnancial resources for the state without jeopardizing the people’s subsis-
tence. Chu’s second essay, discussed in the following, responds to the second question of what measures
can effectively combat corruption of the lower levels of the bureaucracy. Chu Fangqing employs ren
and fa to demand the universal application of sanctions punishing corruption to all oﬃcials.
“The method (fa) to regain control is to identify and abolish all regulations (fa) that are
ineffective, and to establish regulations (fa) to discipline all oﬃcials.”
顧救之之法。必舉法之已⾏⽽不效者。⼀切屏去不⽤。更設法以馭群⾂.
Chu’s emphasis is on a universalist approach. Although the examination question asked how to con-
tain the corruption of local magistrates, Chu demands that governors-general and governors must be
checked as well. Particularist measures against corruption on the lower echelons of the bureaucracy are
1HCJSWB, 7:37a–44b. For unabridged versions, see, for example, Wu (1851), 39:67a–75b or Chu Fangqing’s collected
works, Chu (1876), 6:1a–15b.
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simply not effective, Chu insists, “getting rid of crime and violence while exempting notables and digni-
taries from the measures (fa) will not work.”惟⾏法不加于貴顯，⽽⾜以禁奸除暴，未之有也.
There is an overlap between Chu’s demands and the condition of universalist application of sanctions
for effective organizational control.
Chu supports his demands by indicating that power corrupts and that corrupt practices spread top-
down. Furthermore, it is a cardinal error to suppose that high oﬃcials tend not to engage in abusive
practices. On the contrary, more power and longer terms-of-oﬃce tend to corrupt people and, at the
same time, render them harder to monitor and control. The higher an oﬃcial the greater his jurisdiction
and the larger the number of people affected by his corrupt practices. Lower oﬃcials become corrupt in
the process of collecting surcharges from the people to meet the expenses they are expected to make to
entertain their superiors.
“[...] men (ren) must not be given great powers. No person should be entrusted with
power and a long term-of-oﬃce if no mechanisms exist to restrict him. With great power,
people easily lose their self-restraint, and with long terms-of-oﬃce people easily lose their
sense of what it right and proper (and establish particularistic ties). If there are no mecha-




The government should not just target corruption and extortion on the part of local magistrates and
their immediate superiors.1 The government should start to investigate and impeach governors-general
and governors for their illegitimate activities which are the source of corruption among the lower lev-
els. The fact that current anti-corruption measures have not discouraged magistrates from engaging in
extortion of surcharges, and the fact that the scale of corruption has increased on the contrary, shows
that the root of the problem lies elsewhere. The magistrates extort excessive fees from the population
because their superiors extort funds from the magistrates in turn. Neither the magistrates nor their su-
periors should take all the blame. The magistrates get corrupt because they respond to their superiors’
demands. Corruption of the magistrates superiors does not come out of nowhere, but is caused by de-
mands placed on them by oﬃcials still higher up in the adminstrative hierarchy. Corruption spreads
top-down and its scope is the greater the higher up it starts.
The anti-corruption regulations applied to magistrates should therefore be extended to high oﬃcials.
On the one hand, punishing a high oﬃcial has a larger deterrent effect because there is automatically
more publicity. On the other hand it meets the condition of universal application of sanctions regard-
less of the offenders status. This will increase the legitimacy of the system of administrative sanctions in
1There were in general three layers of oﬃcials in between the magistrates and the governor. See Ch’ü (1962), p. 5.
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the eyes of the lower oﬃcials. Failure to apply anti-corruption measures universally, on the contrary,
hampers the normative effects that the regulation (fa) exerts upon oﬃcials’ attitudes and behavior.
“If one man (ren) is exempted from punishment for his crime, but thousands of other
men (ren) are punished, then these hundreds of others will know that they are punished
for corruption. But in their minds they will ﬁnd it hard to completely accept it. Those who
escape punishment by law (fa) will indulge in corruption and know no limit. I have heard
that ‘enforcement of regulations (fa) should start with those closest to the ruler’.1 Getting
rid of crime and violence while exempting notables and dignitaries from the regulations





A universal system of sanctions is not the only building block of effective organizational control of
the bureaucracy for Chu. The goal should be to achieve a state where oﬃcials do not have to be sanc-
tioned for corruption because they simply do not engage in corruption in the ﬁrst place. One pivotal
step to achieve this is to carefully “select the men to be put in charge (ren)”擇⼈. The selection should
take into account the administrative challenges posed by geography and the character of the local peo-
ple. Prospective candidates should have no personal ties to other oﬃcials in the area. This ensures that
they can act independently (duxing jizhi獨⾏⼰志) and do not tolerate attempts to deceive the ruler
among their subordinates. It discourages the oﬃcials under his supervision from exploiting the people
in their jurisdictions. Any dishonest oﬃcials who still embezzle money and mistreat the people may be
safely brought to justice. It will accord with the broader oﬃcialdom’s sense of fairness and nobody will
doubt the sanction system’s appropriateness. A further step to discourage corruption is to shorten term-
of-oﬃce of governors-general and governors to one year. A longer term-of-oﬃce means more time for
illegitimate networks of interest and particularistic ties to form between high oﬃcials, low oﬃcials and
functionaries. Finally, low oﬃcials should be installed to monitor governors-general and governors to
further check their power, a strategy that Chu calls “those with the lowest status checking those with the
highest status”⾄輕馭⾄重.
Chu clearly regards both the universal application of sanctions (fa) and other strategies, including
the careful selection of men (ren) as well as the creation of mutual checks among the bureaucracy, as
indispensable for containing oﬃcial corruption.
We ﬁnd another example of an appeal to universalist sanctions that employs the ren-fa polarity in a
comment by Pan Lei潘⽾ (1646–1708) in response to an imperial edict eliciting suggestions on a ques-
1The statement that “the enforcement of laws should start with those closest to the ruler”法⾏⾃近 is from the Xin
Tangshu新唐書, Ouyang et al. (n.d.), p. 1964.
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tion similar to Chu’s examination question, but not restricted to magistrates: how to stop unlawful and
corrupt practices among the oﬃcialdom.1 Pan makes ﬁve suggestions: stricter application of rewards
and punishments, creation of more direct channels of communication with the emperor, more careful
recruitment of oﬃcials, rewards for honesty and integrity, and incentives to encourage people to attend
village schools. Pan’s program touches upon many aspects of the relationship between the court, oﬃ-
cials and the people, as well as the education, recruitment and management of oﬃcials. His argument
for the ﬁrst point of the program, stricter application of rewards and punishments, employs the cate-
gories of ren and fa in demanding universal application of sanctions. Current anti-corruption laws are
strict and comprehensive, Pang says, but there is a gap between legislation and implementation. Particu-
larist or lax application of administrative sanctions leads to grave problems.
“If a regulation (fa) is used here but not there, this paves the way for selective circumven-
tion of the law. If a command is executed in the beginning, but not later, then gradual
disintegration of the laws sets in. [...] In my opinion, passing regulations (fa) is not dif-
ﬁcult. Enforcing them is diﬃcult. If regulations (fa) are not enforced consistently, but
instead observed for some people and neglected for others (depending on the status of the
delinquent), then some men (ren) are immune to the law (fa). If regulations (fa) are not
enforced constantly, but instead sometimes observed and at other times neglected, then




Pan illustrates his concerns with a speciﬁc case and two loci classici demanding universal application of
sanctions. The ﬁrst is a point originally made in the Han Feizi.
“Not to forget to reward those in lowly positions stationed in distant localities, and not to
spare the notables close to the emperor from punishment.”3
賞不遺卑遠。罰不廢貴近。此其要術也。
Pan regards this as evidence that “the sage kings enforced laws (fa) fairly uniformly”聖王⽤法較若畫
⼀. The second is a quote by Zhuge Liang.
“To pass laws (fa) and not to enforce them consistently and constantly is the same as hav-
ing no laws (fa).”
夫⽴法⽽⾏之不斷。守之不堅。與無法同。
1HCJSWB, 13:49a–54b.
2Judging from the way Pan uses fa, it seems justiﬁed to translate fa as “law”. For example, Pan writes of the “offence”
罪狀 of “breaking the law for private advantage”枉法交私, “passing laws”⽴法, “circumventing the law”逃於法之外,
“complying to the law”守法, and “failing to implement the laws consistently (universally)”⾏法不斷.
3Cmp. Han Fei’s statement that “when punishing, high oﬃcials should not be spared, when rewarding, ordinary men
should not be forgotten”刑過不避⼤⾂，賞善不遺匹夫. Han & Wang (1896), p. 41.
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Authors often express the “dilemma of choice” between tight control and discretion through the
concern that regulations (fa) are too complicated (fan繁) or strict (mi密) to allow for eﬃcient adminis-
tration.1 What authors demand in the name of “simpliﬁcation” of the regulations is largely synonymous
with a reform that grants regional oﬃcials more discretion but renders control more eﬃcient in the end.
An illustrative example is the response of the assistent prefect Yang Yuguo楊于果 (1745–1822) to the
question of the governor-general of Huguang why institutions (fa) that worked ﬁne in the past such as
the baojia system of collective neighborhood organization and community granaries were largely failing
in more recent times.2 In the question, the governor-general imputes a connection of the failure with
“bureaucratic discipline”吏治. In his reply, Yang states that insuﬃcient bureaucratic discipline only
offers a partial explanation of the failures. The other part of the explanation are the institutional regu-
lations (fa) themselves. reform for the sake of “simpliﬁcation” is one three points Yang makes on the
reform of regulations (fa). Institutions may not only become ineffective because oﬃcials fail to enforce
them. Their regulations (fa) have to change from time to time and must be “simpliﬁed” to be effective.
“Since ancient times there has been no institution (fa) that has not become defective or
been abused. This is also due to changed circumstances. It is not just because the magis-
trates do not put enough effort into enforcing the institutions (fa).”
某竊以為從古無不敝之法。此亦時勢使然。⾮盡州縣奉⾏不⼒之故。
Yang supports this claim with evidence that Confucius did not prescribe any institutions (fa) for eter-
nal use. Yang differentiates between zheng政, which refers to governmental affairs or the temporary
measures employed to regulate these affairs, and fa, fundamental institutions that represent models
for emulation by future generations. Yang’s assessment is that Confucius actually only recommends a
handful of cultural institutions of antiquity for future use.
“The Analects often speak of governmental affairs (zheng), but never of institutions (fa).
When Confucius pondered about what of the institutional designs of antiquity could be
used eternally without defects arising, the result were the music of Shun and Yu, the calen-
dar of Xia dynasty, the chariot of Shang dynasty and the crown of Zhou dynasty. Institu-
tions (fa) indeed must change with the times, just like a worn-out robe must be mended,




Yang illustrates his claim through the discussion of the three institutions (fa) of baojia, ever-normal
granaries and the salt monopoly. All three systems have, on the whole, proved ineffective since the
1See Metzger (1973), pp. 238–239, on factors limiting and promoting centralization in the Qing bureaucracy.
2HCJSWB, 16:28a–30b.
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Qing dynasty, or even earlier.1 Yang contrasts the past with the present situation in order to show how
changed circumstances have resulted in the ineﬃcacy of the institutions, and to emphasize his point that
the institutions have to be adapted to the times.
In Zhou dynasty, the heads of the baojia units were selected for their high moral standing in the local
community. They assisted the magistrate in local government and were treated with the considerable
courtesy. The unit heads and the magistrate jointly worked for the education and welfare of the people.
Nowadays, however, the unit heads have descended to the role of tax collection agents and are held li-
able if people in their unit fail to pay their taxes.2 With their days spent running after delinquent tax
payers, they have no time assisting the magistrate in providing for the people’s spiritual and economic
wellbeing. The magistrate himself, overburdened with administrative paperwork and constricted by
deadlines, also has no spare time to invest into the people’s “education and nourishment”教養.3
“Regulations (fa) are instruments of government. They cannot function by themselves
but rely on men (ren) who execute them in order to function. The magistrates are oﬃ-
cials who execute regulations (fa). It is desirable that regulations (fa) are easy for them to
comply with and hard to deviate from. Nowadays, there a many complex regulations, re-
porting requirements and tax collection deadlines. Already small arrears can entail public
prosecution. This way, even a magistrate who wants to administer his district well cannot
put his intentions into practice. Soon he will acquire a careless attitude and only work to





When the ever-normal granary system was properly functioning, stocks were sold every year when
prices were high, and the granaries were restocked again when the grain price had fallen. Nowadays,
magistrates have to apply for permission from the superior yamen for every sale. This leads to such a de-
lay that the prices are down again when magistrates ﬁnally obtain their permission to sell. The personnel
commissioned to oversee the sale and restocking take advantage of their role and demand arbitrary sur-
charges. The embezzlement of the proceeds obtained from the grain sale is another a problem. Due to
these reasons, magistrates tend to refrain from selling granary stocks, so that the stocks slowly rot away
1See Ch’ü (1962), pp. 151–52, for an assessment of the overall effectiveness of the baojia system, and pp. 157–59, for the
granary systems. See Sokoloff (1980) for the salt gabelle.
2Li (2010), p. 115, notes that “[b]elow the country were rural households organized into decimal groupings called lijia for
household registration and tax collection and into another set of decimal groupings called baojia for neighborhood surveil-
lance. In the eighteenth century, the baojia further assumed the functions of tax collection after the state abandoned the lijia
system.”
3“Education and nourishment” involves moral education and guidance, but also all activities that foster local (self-
)subsistence, for example the promotion of local agriculture and commerce.
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or are eaten by mice. The original intention of the public granaries was to balance the market price in or-
der to protect the people from the effects of private hording. But with the current restrictions in place,
the system only beneﬁts unlawful and isolates the upright, Yang says. The unlawful circumvent or even
break the regulations, while the upright harm themselves while trying to save the failing system.
The history of the salt monopoly shows, Yang argues, that it is that relatively unintrusive systems
that involved moderate organizational effort were most successful. Complex systems (such as the salt
monopoly described in the Guanzi) can be operated in small states, but not in a large empire. What
Yang regards as too strict in the current salt system are the regulations combating smuggling. Magis-
trates are required to engage in an investigation of the origins of the smuggled salt came from if they
catch smugglers with more 300 catties of salt. If the investigation fails, the magistrates face disciplinary
action. These leads many magistrates who catch smugglers to report artiﬁcially low quantities or even to
ignore the case completely. The result is that a fa intended to prevent smuggling helps to promote it.
Yang concludes that the three cited cases are examples of a general negative trend of oﬃcial paraly-
sis and lethargy. The institutional (fa) changes he suggests to counteract this trend are the abolition of
government-run granaries and the salt monopoly, and the establishment of a retroﬁtted baojia system.
The changes will relieve the magistrate (ren) from superﬂuous administrative burdens and let him dedi-
cate all energy to his original principal task of “educating and nurturing”教養 the people living within
his jurisdiction, Yang says. Local self-subsistence will be the logical consequence of a more eﬃcient body
of regulations. The magistrate can handle most administrative duties himself and has to rely less on (po-
tentially unreliable) functionaries. With no functionaries preying upon their property, the people can
devote their full energy to agriculture and commerce with virtually no extra guidance from the mag-
istrate. The magistrate only has to provide disaster relief, adjudicate criminals and make prohibitions
public. Local customs will improve by themselves. The baojia system ﬁts in nicely in with this strategy.
All other institutions such as community granaries and the salt monopoly can be abolished.
Yang’s essay addresses the “dilemma of choice” between central regulation (fa) and local ﬂexibility
(ren). His radical solution is the abolition of a range of local institutions which cannot be operated
eﬃciently. Yang argues that this will result in an overall increase of administrative eﬃcacy because mag-
istrate’s energies are freed and they can commit to their other tasks, while suboﬃcial functionaries are
deprived of opportunities to engage in abusive practices.
Wang Xiaocheng王效成 (ﬂ. during Daoguang reign) similarly addresses the dilemma between con-
trol through enforcement of central regulations (fa) throughout the empire, and the discretion of the
men in charge (ren) to adapt them to the local circumstances. Wang discusses the problem with refer-
ence to the fall of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC). According to Wang, the Qin emperors’ fallacy was to
issue regulations (fa) centrally without paying enough attention to the ability and integrity of the oﬃ-
cials and sub-oﬃcial functionaries (ren) in charge of implementation, and as to whether or not the reg-
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ulations ﬁt the situation in the individual administrative regions.1 Wang calls this “governing through
regulations (fa)”以法治. But as regulations (fa) are only the tools of government (zhi zhi ju治之
具) and their successful application depends on the moral and technical competence of the oﬃcials in
charge (ren), the ruler should rather “govern through men (ren)”以⼈治. What Wang implies by
“governing through men” seems to be to appoint virtuous and capable and grant them ﬂexibility to
adopt regulations to the circumstances. According to Wang, the ruler and high oﬃcials should never ne-
glect appointing talented bureaucratic personnel (ren), even if they assume that the issued regulations
(fa) are good enough to prevent corruption. Centrally issued decrees and regulations (fa) must not rule
out granting local oﬃcials leeway to ﬂexibly adapt them to the local situation. “If one governs through
men (ren), the regulations (fa) will be effective if the right men (ren) are put in charge. If one governs
through regulations (fa), the men in charge (ren) lose all ﬂexibility and initiative, and the regulations
(fa) will subsequently become ineffective.”以⼈治者⼈得⽽法從，以法治者法⽣⽽⼈死，⽽法亦
困.
Guan Tong管同 (1780–1831) wants to rehabilitate the unfashionable concept of “education and
transformation”教化.2 His take on the question of the basis of good government is that effectiveness of
institutions cannot be taken for granted but relies on “men of talent”⼈才.
“All over the empire, there is clamor for change of the institutional (fa) setup. But if the
customs do not change, no men (ren) of talent are produced. Even if there is an institu-
tional (fa) setup, who is there to operate the institutions?
天下之⼠。囂囂然爭⾔改法度。夫⾵俗不變。則⼈才不出。雖有法度。誰與⾏
也。
The availability of such “men of talent” depends on the “customs” or “mores” of the time. According to
Guan, negative tendencies of the customs prevent men from developing their full potential and becom-
ing “men of talent”. These negative tendencies in the customs vary with the times, just as the customs
do. The central negative tendencies of the Qing dynasty are greed for proﬁt (changli嗜利) and servility
(haoyu好諛). Greed for proﬁt spreads top-down, from high ministers to commoners. It tears people
from their embeddedness in proper Confucian relationships. It makes them “bend the laws (fa) and
strive for personal gain”骫法營私 in times of peace, and turns them into criminals and rebels in times
of trouble. Servility is the tendency of those in subordinate positions to ﬂatter their superiors and is not
to be confused with loyalty. Subordinates “shower their superiors with ﬂatteries but do not feel real
loyalty towards them”有諂媚⽽無忠愛.
So Guan’s stance is that greed for proﬁt and sycophancy impede the eﬃcacy of institutions. Luck-
ily, the rulers have an inﬂuence on the customs: “The customs are made by those above”⾵俗者上
1HCJSWXB/SHENG, 9:11a–12b.
2HCJSWB, 7:45a–47b.
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之所為也. The rulers can affect positive changes if they revive the method of “education and transfor-
mation”教化. Guan says the fact that many contemporaries regard “education and transformation”
as an anachronistic, impractical concept is based on a basic misunderstanding. The practical aspect of
education and transformation is actually very up-to-date and effective, Guan asserts. Education, Guan
points out, means to instruct and transformation means to guide people with one’s own behavior. The
practical way “education and transformation” to inhibit proﬁt seeking and sycophancy, then, would
be to provide suﬃcient role models for the people to emulate. As moral inﬂuence spreads top-down in
Guan’s universe, these models should be people starting from the emperor down to common people.
They have to display disinterest in material wealth and ﬂattery by subordinates. The emperor can show
his disinterest in exotic food and fany clothes by eating common food and wearing plain clothes. But,
most importantly, he has to “close the gate of proﬁt talk”閉⾔利之⾨. What Guan seems to concretely
connect to “closing the gate of proﬁt talk” is to discourage oﬃcial suggestions on how to generate more
state income, and to encourage suggestions on how to cut costs and achieve savings for the state budget.1
The emperor can show his disinterest for ﬂattery by “opening channels of critique”開諫爭之路 and
inviting criticism of imperial politics. Pan emphasizes that it is important for the effectiveness of this
move that the “channels of critique” are really open to all oﬃcial strata and that these people have trust
in the fact that they are not going to be prosecuted for breaking taboos with their critique.
Guan emphasizes the point already touched upon in Chu’s text, that the “bureaucratic norms” or
“bureaucratic culture” has an impact on oﬃcials’ compliance to the law (fa) and to the eﬃcacy of the
system of sanctions in improving organizational control.2
1This is actually very similar to what Chu Fangqing understands under the seemingly abstract advice of prohibiting
“proﬁt talk”.
2This point is also made in a memorial by Huang Tifang⿈體芳 (1832–1899), who writes that the jiaohua of exemplary
provincial governors and governors-general such as Hu Linyi and Zeng Guofan, and speciﬁcally their “teaching of loyalty”
教 忠, involved establishing regulations (fa) which “mediocre men” could comply to. HCJSWXB/GE, 25:3a–4b. But note
that just as in Guan and especially in Chu, Huang complements his suggestions of a soft approach of “transforming” the bu-
reaucratic culture with an approach of “strict law enforcement”法在必⾏ through the system of administrative sanctions.
2.4 Taxation
This subchapter discusses the use of the ren-fa polarity in the writings included in the sections on tax-
ation (fuyi賦役) of the statecraft compendia. The writings employ the ren-fa polarity to contrast the
role of human agency (ren) and sound regulations (fa) for institutional eﬃcacy. They discuss how to
achieve the proper balance between discretion of the men (ren) in charge on the district or provincial
level and central control through central regulations (fa). Authors emphasize the role of fa to argue
that eﬃcacy of taxation (low corruption) establishing procedural rules that render abuse as diﬃcult
as possible (for example by specifying clearly demarcated responsibilities fulﬁllment of which easy to
monitor and hold individuals accountable), and performing consistent monitoring and sanctioning.
Authors emphasize ren to argue that eﬃcacy lies in recruiting personnel (ren) who are lest likely to
engage in abuse and in granting the men in charge locally (ren) a certain degree of ﬂexibility to adapt
regulations and quotas to the local circumstances, and that institutions (fa) vulnerable to abuse can be
kept by putting honest men in charge.
Before the 1850s, the Qing state’s ﬁscal income consisted of 75% agrarian taxes, while the remaining
25% was obtained in more or less equal shares from the salt gabelle and internal customs duties. The
oﬃcial agrarian taxes which the mass of the people had to pay was actually relatively low during most
periods in imperial times.1 Land taxation had even dropped from close to 10% of total agrarian produc-
tion during the Ming to 2% during the Qing according to estimates.2 Attached to the formal ﬁscal sys-
tem, however, was an informal system of fees and surcharges largely beyond the control of the central
government. The central government accepted the necessity of the informal system due to the chronic
underfunding of the provincial and sub-provincial administration. At times, it made attempts to reign
in excessive abuse that resulted from the lack of oversight.
The Qing state’s extractive capacity started to grow signiﬁcantly in the second half of the nineteenth
century, a development sometimes obscured by the “dynastic decline” narrative. The ﬁrst spurt of
growth arose in the context of the mid-century rebellions (Taiping, Nian and Muslim uprisings), and
was driven by the need for substantial military funds.3 The sudden need for military funds lead to the
introduction of the lijin (“one thousandth”), an internal tariff on commercial goods in transit.4
The taxation system of the Qing state was affected by ineconomies of scale. The great size of the ter-
ritory and great variation of land-holding patterns rendered the measurement of tax assets and moni-
toring of oﬃcial agents hard and costly. Further problems arose from the recruitment of sub-oﬃcial
1Wang (1973)
2Myers (1980), p. 161.
3As a result, the Qing state was able to appropriate between 5–10% of total economic output by the early twentieth
century. Halsey (2013) thinks that this marked the transition from a taxation system and a concept of statecraft focused on
maintaining an agrarian equilibrium to one prioritizing the protection of Chinese sovereignty and the beginning of the
development of a military-ﬁscal state, a development that culminated after 1949.
4According to Motono (2000), p. 4, the lijin was not calculated according to the price of a commodity like present-day in-
direct taxes, but rather imposed on merchants in exchange for performing a certain commercial service. The amount charged
was supposed to vary with the volume of trade and the costliness of the commodity, though. Mann (1987), p. 101.
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functionaries, who often inherited or bought their oﬃce and the inappropriateness of positive sanctions
(oﬃcial salary). The land tax was the most important tax until the second half of the nineteenth century.
It was assessed according to the size of land possessed by a tax payer, not his income or produce, which
would have harder and more costly to measure, and therefore lacked income and price elasticity. Mea-
surement of taxable assets was still not easy, which encouraged tax evasion. Tax evasion and tax exemp-
tion for members of the privileged gentry increased the tax burden placed on non-gentry households.
Three oﬃcial attempts at large-scale land surveys in the seventeenth century failed due to lack of collabo-
ration on the part of landowners. Diﬃculties in effectively monitoring and sanctioning due to the huge
distances which in formation had to travel oﬃcials encouraged corruption. Ineffective monitoring lead
to arbitrary and therefore ineffective sanctions.1 Theoretically, surcharges and also reallocation of funds
earmarked for remittance were more tolerable if they adhered to the principle of “using public funds
to pay for public expenses” (yi gong wan gong以公完公), and did not amount to “misusing pub-
lic funds for private purposes” (jia gong ji si假公濟私). But the disciplinary sanctions imposed on
local oﬃcials show that the central government was not always willing or simply not able to discrimi-
nate between deviant behavior induced by underfunding or corruption, between legitimate temporary
reallocation and illegitimate embezzlement, between legitimate surcharges and illegitimate extortion.2
Most corruption happened during the immediate collection of taxes from the tax payers through ex-
action of surcharges. Local magistrates were responsible for administering the collection of taxes at the
county level. They delegated the collection itself to clerks and runners. The clerks and runners were not
only hard to monitor but also hard to replace because they gained their knowledge on the job. Their
long-term ties to local landlords often encouraged collusion that resulted in the undervaluation of as-
sets against bribes.3 Positive sanctions in the form of oﬃcial salaries were lowest at the sub-oﬃcial level.
While oﬃcial salary is in general not linearly correlated with corruption in case other streams of income
exist, the low remuneration of sub-oﬃcial functionaries certainly promoted corruption because they in
general had no other signiﬁcant streams of income.4 Purchasers of oﬃce in particular wanted to gener-
ate a return on their investments.5 The data gathered at the 1728 tax clearance campaign on the order of
the Yongzheng emperor conﬁrms this. According to the data, 0.3% of tax deﬁcits were due to higher oﬃ-
cials, 41.1% due to sub-oﬃcial functionaries (lowest control, lowest positive sanctions), 54.7% due to tax
evasion (mainly by wealthy and powerful landowners) and 3.9% due to tax farming by elites.6
The ﬁrst three writings, one by Xiong Feiwei and two by Lu Shiyi, all three dating from the Kangxi
1Kiser & Tong (1992), pp. 311–319.
2Zelin (1992), pp. 39–42.
3Kiser & Tong (1992), p. 312.
4Ch’ü (1962), p. 43, notes that most clerks actually serving (not holding nominal posts) were members of the propertyless
class and were motivated by economic reward.
5Marsh (1961), p. 454.
6Zelin (1992), p. 254; Kiser & Tong (1992), p. 318. Tax farming (baolan包攬) refers to the practice of the tax-exempt gen-
try to establish contracts with peasants or members of the less privileged gentry to pay their taxes in exchange for a fee. See
Kiser & Tong (1992), p. 326.
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reign (1661–1722), discuss cadastral surveying, the procedure that creates the basis for the assessment of
the land-tax. The following three memorials concern policies that attempt to regularize the levying of
informal surcharges on the land-tax. The ﬁrst is a memorial from the Daoguang reign presented by Yan
Jian in 1822 that discusses the chaiyao, a labor-service surcharge imposed in Zhili province. The other
two are memorials advocating the regularization of the haoxian surcharge on the land-tax. The ﬁrst one
of them, presented by Gao Chengling, one of the original advocates of the regularization, dates from
the early Yongzheng reign (1723-1735). The second memorial dates from the early Qianlong reign and is
written by Sun Jiagan. The ﬁnal two writings by Guo Songtao and Mao Hongbin defend the lijin and
its modalities of implementation and both date from the ﬁrst half of the 1860s.
The basic problem constellation faced in the writings discussed in this section is unfair taxation result-
ing from defects in the tax regulations (fa) or corruption and tax evasion on the part of the oﬃcials in
charge of implementation or tax payers (ren). The solutions which the writings propose involve the re-
form of current regulations (fa), or the enforcement of existing regulations (fa). Several of the authors
opt to replace the current regulations (fa) by regulations which the average man in charge (ren) has a
realistic chance of implementing and complying to. This can mean to establish rules of procedure and
assign clear tasks and responsibilities to facilitate the supervision of subordinates by the average man
in charge. This strategy is expressed particularly clear in Lu Shiyi’s second text on methods of cadastral
surveying. It can also mean to establish rules of procedure render it hard for the man in charge himself
to commit any abuse. See Gao Chengling’s and Sun Jiagan’s memorials advocating the regularization
of the haoxian for a vehement expression of this position. Authors may also opt to pass more general
regulations (fa) and let the men in charge (ren) ﬂexibly adapt details such as fee quotas and collection
modalities to the local circumstances. See, for example, Yan Jian’s memorial concerning the chaiyao and
Guo Songtao’s defense of the lijin. Guo’s use of conventional idioms involving ren and fa strikes a
contrast with Gao’s and Sun’s memorials. The suggestions also involve the enforcement of the existing
regulations (fa) by putting compliant, honest men (ren) in charge, as well as controlling their perfor-
mance and compliance with the system of disciplinary sanctions. Xiong Feiwei’s remonstrance expresses
this position. Mao Hongbin’s memorial, while underlining the importance of putting complaint men
(ren) in charge, states that oﬃcials are not inherently more compliant and honest than members of the
local elite.
Xiong Feiwei熊⾶渭 († 1697), a district magistrate in Guangxi province, writes about the neces-
sity and method of conducting a cadastral survey to update the information that forms the basis of tax
assessments.1 Xiong motivates the revision of cadastral registers by reporting that the information on
tax units and individual households was so completely out-of-date and tax liabilities so unevenly dis-
tributed that people unable to pay their tax debts were driven to ﬂee their homes. Xiong emphasizes
that the men (ren) charged with conducting the survey had to be carefully chosen (bi ze ren必擇⼈)
1HCJSWB, 30:48a–49a.
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and the regulations (fa) strictly applied (bi yan fa必嚴法). All men recruited to assist the representa-
tives of the tax units and the magistrate in the survey would be “publicly chosen”公舉 from among the
elders and well-to-do households. The strict application of regulations (fa) pertains both to the regula-
tions specifying the method and the individual responsibilities as well as the sanctions for those attempt-
ing to boycott or subvert the method, for example landholders who attempt to make the survey team
undervalue their land in terms of size or soil quality.
Xiong regards his approach as a conﬁrmation that “from antiquity until the present day, it have been
men (ren) who order the country, not regulations (fa)”夫古今有治⼈，無治法. In Xiong’s interpre-
tation, the statement calls for a clear demarcation of responsibilities that allows for eﬃcient monitoring
and is backed by a rational system of sanctions: “carefully choose the men (ren) to be put in charge and
confer them their individual responsibilities in order to be able to evaluate their achievements, focusing
on the important points instead of compliance to arbitrary details”慎選其⼈，⽽責之事以考其
成；取其⼤，⽽不苛其細. “Focusing on the important points instead of compliance to arbitrary
details” probably means that the men involved in the land survey should be judged solely on the basis of
whether or not they have fulﬁlled their respective responsibility, but should not be punished for minor
lapses or required to follow an unnecessarily complicated protocol.
The HCJSWB contains two essays on cadastral surveys by the Neo-Confucian scholar and statecraft
advocate Lu Shiyi陸世儀 (1610-1672).1 In the two essays, Lu discusses the conditions of successful cadas-
tral surveying in terms of the men in charge (ren) and the regulations or procedural rules (fa). The ﬁrst
essay introduces the general idea of the cadastral survey and its intended function of ensuring fair tax-
ation. Lu points out that both the selection of the right men to be put in charge (ren) and adherence
to the right method (fa) are indispensable for the successful conclusion of surveys. The selection of a
good method will not lead to objective results if the men in charge are corrupt, improperly monitored
and therefore do not adhere to the method. Even virtuous men need to select a good method to achieve
objective results and diminish popular fear of corruption in the process. In the second essay Lu recom-
mends a method (fa) for conducting cadastral surveys that presents as perfect because it reduces the
opportunities for abuse of by the men (ren) in charge of the individual steps. It can therefore work
even if the magistrate overseeing the process is only “averagely talented” (zhongcai中才) in terms of his
perceptiveness and moral charisma.
In the ﬁrst essay, Lu calls cadastral surveying the foundation of good governance (zhizhi zhi genben
致治之根本) on the district level, on which the other tasks of the magistrate such as the organiza-
tion of education, maintenance of order, training of militia and the adjudication of civil and criminal
cases build. At the same time, cadastral surveying is not the kind of business which the magistrate can
completely delegate to his assistants and clerks while he remains “sitting in his oﬃce”坐于堂上. The
magistrate has to select the best men (rencai⼈才) in the district and make sure that they follow the
1HCJSWB, 29:23a–25b; HCJSWB, 31:15a–17b.
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method (fa). He must explain them the general principles (dao) of the survey and instruct them about
the method or procedural rules (fa). A survey can only be said to have “proceeded according the right
method (fa)” (de fa得法) if the men visit each and every tax unit in every village and report the survey
results truthfully and without omissions.
Due to the diﬃculty of the task, there are numerous historical examples where land surveys were not
conducted objectively and in consequence did not lead to the intended effect of establishing a fair and
objective basis for taxation. The reason is the dependence of successful application of the method (fa)
on the men (ren) who are in charge of applying it. The consequence to be drawn from history is that
the right method (fa) leads to order (zhi治) if the right men (ren) are put in charge of implementing it.
But the same method can equally lead to chaos when the wrong men are put in charge.
“In general, the same method (fa) leads to order if the right men (ren) are put in charge,
and to chaos if the wrong men are put in charge. The gentleman selects the right men
(ren) and manages them properly.”
總之。同是⼀法。⽤得其⼈則治。⽤不得其⼈則亂。君⼦亦擇⼈⽽慎⽤之⽿。
The method (fa), however, is just as crucial and fundamental for success. Only the right method (fa)
leads to an accurate survey. The effects of the accurate survey will help in winning over popular senti-
ment in the end. The common people are usually suspicious of cadastral surveys because they fear that
there will be corruption involved and the results will therefore turn out to be unfair and to their disad-
vantage. However, the people will change their assessment when they start enjoy the effects of the pol-
icy, which can be reaped after a few years if the policy is performed in accordance with the right method
(xing zhi you fa⾏之有法).
“The simple-minded common people, for that matter, will rejoice after the successful com-
pletion of the survey, but they will be suspicious in the beginning. If even Confucius and
Zichan1 could not avoid being attacked during the initial phase after the introduction of
new policies, why should lesser men be able to avoid it. But if the policy is implemented




While Lu Shiyi presents a general account of the importance of choosing the right men (ren) and
methods (fa) in the ﬁrst essay, the second essay presents the method (fa) that Lu regards as perfect
for effective cadastral surveying in some detail. In the beginning of the second essay, Lu underlines
1Courtesy name of the statesman Gongsun Qiao公孫僑 († 522 BC) from the state of Zheng鄭. Zhuang & Guo (1991),
p. 31.
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again the importance of not only choosing the right method (fa), but also putting the right men in
charge (ren) for the success of cadastral surveys. If either one is not given, the survey is likely to nega-
tively affect the people because it produces false accounts of land possession, which leads to an unfair
assignment of tax liabilities. The common people in general fear cadastral surveys much like they fear
natural catastrophes or marauding troops because they associate them with harassment by corrupt func-
tionaries. Corruption can occur if the cadastral survey proceeds without any predetermined method
(fa) in the ﬁrst place. It can also occur when men (ren) subvert the orderly application of the method
(shangxia qi shou上下其⼿). Incompetent magistrates, corrupt functionaries, powerful local families
and even common people interested to tweak the survey to their own advantage can hamper the eﬃ-
cacy of the method. As the central government cannot hope to monitor all these men at once, the local
magistrates play a most crucial role, Lu argues. If the magistrate positions are ﬁlled with the right men
(ren), the survey has a great chance of succeeding. Zhu Xi and Hai Rui海瑞 (1514–1587) conducted
successful surveys when acting as magistrates in Fujian and Jiangxi province. The cadastral surveys con-
ducted under Wang Anshi, on the other hand, famously failed because Wang did not appoint the right
men (ren) as magistrates. However, Lu points out, competent magistrates are no guarantee for the suc-
cess of the survey. If the method is not easy to monitor, the local assistants and sub-oﬃcial functionaries
may still subvert it and report false information. The cadastral surveys conducted in Hai Rui’s home
province Hainan failed although the retired Hai Rui himself provided counsel about the methods to
local magistrates. The reason was that the responsible supervising oﬃcials “lacked a good method (fa)
for monitoring”上司催督無法 the proper implementation of the policy, so that the assistants and sub-
oﬃcial functionaries in charge of conducting the survey engaged in fraudulent practices such as tweak-
ing the measurements in exchange for bribes, to the considerable detriment of interest of the common
people.
Lu Shiyi presents a surveying method (fa) that addresses the two critical points of ﬁnding able mag-
istrates and of monitoring assistants and sub-oﬃcial functionaries to prevent them from engaging in
corrupt practices. He credits Zhang Zai張載 (1020–1077) with the invention of the method. Lu con-
cedes that the method is also associated with Wang Anshi’s failed attempt to reform the inequalities
of the ﬁscal system of the Song. But apart from appointing the wrong men into local administration,
Wang Anshi had only understood the broad outline of the method and missed important details, insists
Lu. The central principle of the so-called square-ﬁeld (fangtian⽅⽥) method is to divide the county
(xian縣) land into squares with a side length of 1000 feet (bu步). The large squares are subdivided into
smaller squares with a side length of 100 feet. These squares function and their base area of 10,000 and
1,000 ancient mu畝 serve as control units for the measurements of the ﬁelds that lie inside. The cor-
ners of the large square are marked with stone poles, while the corners of the small squares are marked
with wooden poles with a stone base. This job is performed by the local sub-oﬃcial functionaries. The
measurements are taken by a team of local elders and other trustworthy men, and checked against the
information provided by the ﬁeld owners.
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Manipulation of measurements and assessments by corrupt functionaries has been the common ill
of cadastral surveying throughout history, says Lu. The great advantage of the fangtian method, Lu
emphasizes, is not much opportunity for lower-level corruption and manipulation. The inner logic of
the method makes it easy to detect abuse by any one of the parties involved. For example, the only job
of the sub-oﬃcial functionaries related to the survey is to set up the poles marking the corners of the
measuring squares. Their only opportunity for manipulation for the sub-oﬃcial functionaries would
be to shift the poles. But this is easily detected by the magistrate, and it also does not really provide any-
one with any particular advantage, which is why nobody would bribe the functionaries for doing so.
The method is likely to work even under magistrates of “average talent”中才. This immunity against
corrupt functionaries and its robustness to work even under averagely talented magistrates makes the
fangtian method the “most perfect method (fa) of all times”古今以來⾄妙之法.
Yan Jian顏檢 (1757–1833), governor-general of Zhili province, appeals to the Daoguang emperor in
1822 to revoke the endorsement of a proposal by the administration commissioner of Zhili, Tu Zhishen
屠之申 (ﬂ. between Qianlong and Daoguang reign), to merge a special labor-service tax, the chaiyao差
徭, into a universal surtax on the land-tax.1 The essay is part of a debate on the reform of the chaiyao in
Zhili during the early Daoguang reign that is documented in the Qingshi gao清史稿 (Draft History
of the Qing).2 Yan Jian and Tu Zhishen were leading ﬁgures of the two oppositional reform parties that
proposed different strategies for the reform of the chaiyao. The chaiyao was an informal fee that com-
prised both labor services, material goods such as carts, horses, and ﬁre wood, and monetary fees exacted
from the population.3 Due to Zhili’s proximity to the capital, the emperor, metropolitan oﬃcials and
the military frequently passed through Zhili, which placed a considerable ﬁnancial burden on the dis-
tricts. The goods and services exacted from the population in Zhili in the form of chaiyao province were
therefore quite considerable. The radical reform party criticized that the the irregular services, goods and
fees exacted as chaiyao were not distributed equally and that they generally placed a higher burden on
poor and middle-income households than on the wealthy gentry. They therefore advocated to convert
the chaiyao into a ﬁxed surcharge per mu on the land tax to be payed by everyone, without exemptions
granted to any members of the gentry. The conservative reform party, lead by Yan Jian, opposed such a
change in regulations (fa) and advocated to focus on the men in charge instead (ren) and prosecute and
punish abuse more harshly. So instead of changing the regulations (fa), men (ren should be changed
by recruiting more responsible oﬃcials and by sanctioning infringements of the regulations (fa) more
consistently. The other main argument of the conservative party was to discredit the reform proposal
of the radical reform party as a trick to increase the taxes and therefore impermissible, a point that both
parties discussed in terms of ming and shi.
Tu Zhishen had motivated the reform as protecting the people from uncontrolled exactions on the
1HCJSWB, 33:19a–22b.
2QSG, 121:3548. For an overview of the debate see also Zhou (2007), pp. 23–51.
3Zhou (2007), p. 2.
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part of the bureaucracy. Yan argues that the reform does not address the actual defects that lead to exces-
sive tax burdens for the common people, and that it will, on the contrary, have negative side-effects. He
advocates keeping the current historically grown system that allows for the amount of the labor-service
tax to vary ﬂexibly across the province and enables oﬃcials to strike a balance between their budgetary
needs and the ﬁnancial situation of the people. This system had recently fallen into disarray because
magistrates lacking empathy for the people had increased labor-service demands and failed to control
their functionaries, who started exploiting the population by exacting surcharges. Converting the labor-
service tax into a universal surcharge on the land tax does not address this defect, though, Yan argues.
The current system charges some people according to their possession of land, some according their pos-
session of draft animals, and some on a per-household basis. The universal surcharge on the land tax
frees merchant households from all liabilities and places the full burden on peasant households instead.
Moreover, in some districts magistrates have trouble collecting the whole land tax in time already. Rais-
ing the land tax would exacerbate this problem. When the emperor grants tax reliefs on the occasion
of natural disasters, magistrates would be deprived of all sources of income, as they would not even be
able to call people to perform labor service, Yan argues. What Yang also argues is that the unfairness of
the current system is not just the result of magistrates excessive labor-service demands. Another source
of unfairness is the fact that tax-exempt gentry households use tricks to win tax exemptions for their
friends and relatives or even establish a tax-farming business. As the proportion of tax-exempt house-
holds grows, the burden on the remaining households increases.
Having brought forward his arguments against Tu Zhishen’s reform proposal, Yan insists that “it
is ren who order the country, not fa”. Zhili should keep the current ﬂexible system and at the same
time make sure that “the right men (ren) are put in charge”得⼈ and properly monitored. The circuit
and prefecture level yamen administer the ﬂexible system and dispatch representatives who monitor the
exaction of the labor-service tax at the district level. Magistrates who display empathy for the people and
manage to impose the labor-service on a fair and appropriate basis are to be encouraged by earmarking
them for promotion. Functionaries who exact horrendous surcharges are to be immediately reported
and sentenced. The same applies to members of the gentry engaging in tax-farming.
In a memorial written in 1724, Gao Chengling⾼成齡 (1668–1748), administration commissioner
of Shanxi province, provides a remarkable reinterpretation of Xunzi’s dictum that “it is men (ren) who
order the country not regulations (fa)”, and thereby offers an example of an “articulate members of
the discourse community” able to draw on idioms that were “part of the common ground” of political-
economic discourse and “in ways that contested the very assumptions they were conventionally resumed
to convey”.1 With the memorial, Gao reacts to a proposal of the Grand Secretariat (neige內閣) to re-
voke the regularization of the meltage fee (haoxian耗羡) and disallow involvement of the provincial
1Guy (2010), p. 357.
2.4. TAXATION 123
administration in its collection and disbursement.1 Gao and the governor of Shanxi, Nuomin諾岷
(† 1734), had been the chief proponents of the policy of “returning the meltage fee to public coffers”
耗羡歸公 in 1723, the ﬁrst year of the Yongzheng reign.2 The policy regularized the haoxian, which
had been collected in an unregulated manner prior to the Yongzheng reign, by transforming it into an
oﬃcially sanctioned surcharge on the land tax to be collected according to a ﬁxed oﬃcial quota in the
districts. Once collected, the meltage fee had to be remitted to the provincial treasury. The provincial
treasury would paid the magistrates a part of the meltage fee back in the form of yanglian養廉 (“en-
couraging honesty”) payments.
Gao insists on leaving the management and redistribution of the meltage fee in the hands of the
provincial high oﬃcials. The provincial high oﬃcials have to meet the same additional expenses to sup-
port their families and pay the salaries of their secretaries as other oﬃcials. Were they deprived of the
funds from the meltage fee, the less scrupulous will demand their share in form of monetary gifts (jieli
節禮) which their subordinates will have to present on every imaginable occasion. The scrupulous oﬃ-
cials who abstain from the gift economy will be drained of funds to conduct their oﬃcial business. The
requirement to directly pass the meltage fee collected on the district level on to the provincial treasury,
on the other hand, also prevents the magistrates from illegally collecting a higher fee than stipulated.
A further use of the meltage fee at the provincial level established by Nuomin is the maintenance of
a backup fund for the compensation of ﬁnancial deﬁcits (kuakong虧空) in the budgets of the various
yamen. Deﬁcits arise when oﬃcials use funds for other purposes than the ones intended, or due to em-
bezzlement. If the private property of the liable oﬃcial is not enough to compensate for the deﬁcit, the
earmarked funds from the meltage fee can be used for that purpose. This is much better than the prac-
tice of requiring all magistrates to jointly compensate for a ﬁnancial deﬁcit they are not responsible for,
Gao points out. The whole process must be clearly documented so that the provincial high oﬃcials can-
not fabricate a deﬁcit in order to privately proﬁt from the earmarked funds. Provincial high oﬃcials
are required to submit detailed annual reports about the amount of huohao collected and the purposes
they plan to spend it on, notably the level of yanglian payments, expenditures of the provincial yamen
and funds needed to close ﬁnancial holes. This kind of ﬁnancial disclosure requirements render the in-
vention of cost items meaningless because they cannot be pocketed: “If they cannot deduce even the
slightest amount under a pretext and have no other way to obtain illicit funds, why would they take the
trouble to pretend a ﬁnancial gap in the hope of retaining payments?”既無絲毫假借，又無分釐染
指，何⾄有假捏虧空，希圖幫銀.
The new way of managing compensation of ﬁnancial deﬁcits is less dependent on the integrity of the
provincial high oﬃcials. Gao quotes the Xunzi dictum of “men (ren) who order the country not regu-
lations (fa)” to point out the negative consequences of having men in charge of managing the huohao,
but not putting related guidelines in place to regulate their actions.
1HCJSWB, 27:4a–5b.
2Wang (1884), pp. 530, 3270
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“The loopholes that existed previously arose because it was men (ren) who ordered the
country, not regulations (fa).1 It was quite possible for a dishonest superior oﬃcial to in-
vent costs in order to retain more yanglian payments than needed and use them for his
own private purposes.”
如從前之弊竇乎。惟是有治⼈。無治法。倘或上司不肖。借名提解。⾃便其私。
In Gao’s reading, Xunzi’s dictum is not a general truth, but an undesired state of affairs which needs
to be counteracted by proposing regulations or institutions (fa) that leave minimized opportunities
for abuse. Gao attributes the dependence on men (ren) to imperfect regulations that contain loop-
holes which dishonest men can abuse. Upon reversion, Gao implies that the regulations (fa) that he
and Nuomin have designed do not contain such loopholes and are therefore the basis of effective ﬁscal
policy.
In the early Qianlong reign, a debate as to whether the policy of “returning the meltage fee to public
coffers” should be discontinued and districts should revert to their informal fee systems ﬂared up again.
A memorial written by the governor-general of Huguang, Sun Jiagan孫嘉淦 (1683-1753), in support of
the policy of returning the meltage fee to public coffers in 1742 was part of this debate. Sun wrote the
memorial in response to an imperial edict inviting high oﬃcials of the metropolitan and provincial ad-
ministrations to submit suggestions on how to deal with the defects of the haoxian policy. 2 In 1842, the
year in which Sun Jiagan wrote his memorial, the Qianlong emperor concluded that the majority of con-
tributions to the debate had been in favor of the debate, and that the haoxian would therefore continue
to be levied as a regularized tax. The memorial breaks with the mainstream conventions of citing an id-
iomatic use of the ren-fa in a similar way like Gao Chengling. Sun critiques emphasizing “reliance on
men (ren)”, that is, putting men in charge who are unlikely to become corrupt, so much that “reliance
on regulations (fa)”, establishing regulations that are unlikely to be abused, gets neglected.
In the ﬁrst part of the memorial, Sun expounds on the intention of the policy to contain excessive
exaction of informal surcharges by regularizing the fee. Sun rejects the argument that the regularization
of the meltage fee represents a tax increase (jiafu加賦). These arguments employ the ming-shi polarity
and are discussed in chapter 4.1.3. In the second part of the memorial, Sun acknowledges that the policy
is causing problems. He argues that it is not the original policy that is causing the problems, however,
but a later revision of the regulations, and suggests how to solve the issue. Sun’s rejection of the argu-
ments of the opponents of his proposal employs the ren-fa polarity. Where Gao interprets “it is men
(ren) who order the country not regulations (fa)” as a characteristic of an unstable state of affairs rather
than as a general truth, Sun critiques emphasizing “reliance on men (ren)” so much that “reliance on
regulations (fa)”, gets neglected.
1There were men in charge managing the huohao, but no guidelines in place to regulate their actions.
2HCJSWB, 27:6a–9b.
2.4. TAXATION 125
Sun Jiagan argues that the policy of returning the meltage fee to public coffers started to show de-
fects when an important stipulation of the original policy was scrapped. This stipulation stated that the
regularized haoxian was not to be treated as part of the land tax and had therefore not to be remitted
to the central government. Shortly after the regularization of the haoxian, the Yongzheng emperor had
ordered that the haoxian funds remain with the province where they could be ﬂexibly used to provide
for local expenses, so as to grant the provincial and sub-provincial some ﬁnancial leeway. The emperor’s
rationale that the provincial needed a certain degree of ﬁnancial autonomy and would start to levy infor-
mal fees in order to gain it otherwise. This stipulation was conﬁrmed in 1726, when the court intervened
in support of the governor of Henan, Tian Wenjing⽥⽂鏡 (1662–1732), who had complained that the
Board of Revenue had interfered in his decisions on how to spend the haoxian.
In 1735, the year of the Yongzheng emperor’s death, however, an imperial edict retracted from the
policy in reaction to alleged ﬁnancial mismanagement on the part of some governors-general and gover-
nors. The edict ordered that the regularized haoxian had to be remitted together with the land tax from
now on, and that local spending had to be approved by the Board of Revenue. This lead to what the ear-
lier policies had meant to prevent. Oﬃcials who did not get their budget approved started to levy the
lacking funds in the form of customary fees from their subordinates. The customary fees translated into
rising informal fees exacted from the population at the lowest level, the “levying of haoxian on top of
the haoxian”耗外加耗之弊.
Sun’s solution to the problem is to revert to the initial policy of allowing the provincial administra-
tion to manage the haoxian funds autonomously. Sun cites opponents of his suggestion with the argu-
ment that this removes the only means available for the center to check corrupt governors-general and
governors. He counters the objection by suggesting that it is based on an erroneous line of reasoning.
“Don’t they realize that this policy still amounts to relying on the virtue of the men in
charge (ren), instead of relying on sound regulations (fa)?”
不知此在任⼈不在任法。
For Sun it seems obvious that good government is characterized by reliance on sound regulations (fa)
which make it comparatively easy to monitor the men in charge (ren) and check abuse. Relying on ren
is wrong because it makes the quality of government dependent on the quality of the ren in charge.
The current policy is completely dependent on the integrity of the provincial high oﬃcials (ren), who
can embezzle funds by transmitting false reports to the center. If a governor-general or governor is up-
right, he will not engage in corrupt practices, even if he is not required to report to and have his budget
approved by the Board of Revenue. If he is corrupt, on the other hand, he will engage in corrupt prac-
tices and ﬁnd ways to tamper with the ﬁnancial reports presented to the Board.
The regulations (fa) Sun proposes to avoid “reliance on men (ren)” build on the assumption that
embezzlement of haoxian funds is only possible in provinces which have a surplus of haoxian after de-
ducting administrative expenses. If a province is short of funds even after the haoxian has been added
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to the budget, there is no chance of embezzlement. The Board can use the information it has gathered
since the early Yongzheng reign on which provinces have surplus haoxian and order a reduction of the
haoxian levied in these provinces. This has the triple advantage of letting the people enjoy the beneﬁts
of light taxes, depriving the governor-generals and governors of the opportunity to embezzle funds, and
creating less work for the Board of Revenue, “it makes an optimal regulation (fa)”其法乃益盡善.
In 1864, Guo Songtao郭嵩燾 (1818–1891), governor of Guangdong, writes in favor of continuing
the levying of the lijin introduced to fund the provincial armies established to suppress the Taiping Re-
bellion (1850–1864).1 Guo cites with positive connotations the two idioms which Gao Chengling and
Sun Jiagan had referred to as descriptions of undesirable circumstances. Gao had used to Xunzi’s “it is
men (ren) who order the state, not regulations (fa)” as a reference to legal loopholes or weaknesses that
provide oﬃcials with opportunities to commit abuse. Guo cites it as evidence that institutional eﬃcacy
is completely dependent on the men in charge (ren), which legitimates the continuation of the lijin tax
although it does not qualify as perfect example of a benevolent policy. Sun had referred to “reliance on
men (ren)” instead of “reliance on regulations (fa)” as a description of an undesirably high dependence
of institutional eﬃcacy on the integrity of the men in charge (ren). ﬂexible adaption of the details of
central regulations to local circumstances by the men in charge (ren) leads to fairer outcomes.
Guo writes at a time when the lijin had become the greatest source of revenue for the provinces and
was soon to become an important source of revenue for the center. In the ﬁrst part of the memorial enti-
tled Detailed discussion of the origins of the lijin and the arguments for and against it (Xiangchen lijuan
yuanliu libi shu詳陳釐捐源流利獘疏), Guo contrasts the lijin with its predecessor policies in the
Zhou, Han and Tang dynasty, concluding that the Qing lijin is much more effective. The Taiping up-
rising necessitated the establishment of provincial armies because the imperial troops proved not match
for the Taiping army. Today’s lijin is put to better use than the lijin of the Han, Tang and Song dynasties
because it is used to better effect: “In the Han, Tang and Song dynasty, the people are taxed heavily, but
the beneﬁts were small. Today, the people are taxed moderately, and the beneﬁts are great”然⽽漢唐
宋取之民者多。⽽為利反少。今取之民者約。⽽為利反多者. The reason was that in the Han
and Tang, legislators imposed a complicated set of rules to protect the people from arbitrary charges.
Notably, magistrates had to levy the lijin according to a ﬁxed standard (dingfa定法). Apparently levied
as a ﬁxed duty, the standard did not pay heed to the general level of wealth of the merchants in the re-
gions and whether there was a lot of commerce at all. While the magistrates were held accountable for
observing the standards, the sub-oﬃcial functionaries went comparatively unchecked and could charge
more without being held accountable. Nowadays, the lijin is not levied as a ﬁxed amount or according
to a set method. Both the quotas and the method can be ﬂexibly adjusted to every location. Guo calls
this ﬂexible adaption to local circumstances as successful application of the principle of “relying on the
1HCJSWXJ/RAO, 26:37a–41b; HCJSWXB/SHENG, 56:32a–39b. For a discussion of a joint memorial by Mao Hongbin
and Guo Songtao from the same year that repeats several of the points made in Guo’s memorial, see Mann (1987), pp. 100-
102.
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men in charge (ren) not on regulations (fa)”任⼈不任法.
In the second part of the memorial, Guo sets out to discredit a number of common arguments for
the abolition of the lijin, namely that the lijin harms commerce or discriminates against the merchant
class, that it endangers the people’s livelihood, that most of the lijin is embezzled. Guo’s strategy is not
to outrightly dismiss these arguments but to considerably play down their signiﬁcance in light of the
important role the lijin for domestic security. He argues that the lijin only deprives merchants of 1-2%
of their proﬁts. While the burden may be slightly critical for merchants in the provinces hit hardest dur-
ing the rebellion, the policy is moderate compared to the oppressive treatment of merchants in previous
dynasties. Guo points out that popular protests against the lijin are instigated by troublemakers. Giv-
ing in to popular sentiment and abolishing the lijin in these cases would mean to leave the provinces to
rebels and bandits, which is not an option. Embezzlement (zhongbao中飽), Guo points out, can never
be completely eradicated, but the lijin administration is characterized by a signiﬁcantly lower degree of
corruption than other parts of the bureaucracy. With regard to the argument that the population needs
time to recover from the destruction wrought by the uprisings and the suppression campaigns, Guo re-
torts that the lijin is a progressive tax designed so that everyone is only taxed the amount he can spare.
Raising funds to send in armies that suppress the remnants of the Taiping rebellions is the best means
of providing the population with a chance to recover. Regions like Shanghai and Hunan are actually
able to shoulder a major portion of the tax. Another reason why the lijin works much better than in the
Han and Tang is that it is levied in a more uniform way, and that it is levied by members of the gentry
(shenyuan紳員). The gentry has regular contact with merchants and can therefore better adapt the tax
to merchants’ needs. That the lijin has been levied for several years now without signiﬁcant abuse “can
be credited to the men (ren) who are implementing the policy (fa), and also to the fact that the policy
(fa) is rather good”存乎⽤法之⼈⽽法亦稍良矣.
In the third part of the memorial, Guo discusses why there still is a need for the lijin. Guo argues that
the danger of rebellion is still real, as remnants of the Taiping armies have gone into hiding in the bor-
der regions of Jiangxi, Fujian and Guangdong. Guo attacks those stirring popular resent and organizing
protest against the lijin. He accuses them of taking advantage of the natural tendency of the people to
cling to their personal property, while in fact not caring about the long-term protection of the people
against rebels and bandits. Guo cites the Xunzi’s dictum that “it is men who order to country, not regu-
lations” to emphasize the responsibility of the governor-general and governor to reign in corruption.
“Since antiquity it has been men (ren) who order the state, not regulations (fa). If the
right men (ren) are put in charge, then even faulty regulations (fa) will not create much
disturbance. If the wrong men (ren) are put in charge, then even tax deferrals, tax exemp-
tions and such supposedly beneﬁcial policies as the baojia system and community granaries
can be abused and create problems.”
⾃古有治⼈無治法。苟得其⼈。雖稗政亦無所擾。苟⾮其⼈。則緩征蠲賑。及
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⼀切保甲社倉之美政。皆⾜以滋獘端。
As evidence, Guo cites two examples of successful action taken against corruption in the regions with
the highest degree of embezzlement, the provinces north of the Yangtze river and the province of Guang-
dong. The role of the “men in charge” (ren) is not to rule arbitrarily, but to create local standards ac-
cording to which the policy (fa) is to be implemented: the high level of corruption was due to a lack of
procedural rules (zhangcheng章程) alone, Guo says. In the Jiangbei provinces, corruption was signif-
icant among the oﬃcials and gentry involved. A determined circuit intendant brought back the disci-
pline and stopped the abuse. In Guangdong, it were the merchants themselves proﬁting illegally. Guo
Songtao himself worked out a strategy to solve the issue.1
Guo draws on the ren-fa polarity in each of the three parts of the memorial. For him, “realizing
the principle of relying on men (ren), not on regulations (fa)”得任⼈不任法之意 does not mean
to do without regulations (fa) but to entrust local men (ren) with the ﬂexible local determination of
the quota and the collection modalities. This will ensure merchants taxed in a way that does not seri-
ously hurt commerce in the individual regions but generates suﬃcient income for the state, Guo says. It
also helps to ward off the “constant temptation to maladministration invited by legalistic methods”, as
Mann (1987) suggests.
“Because the lijin was not administered according to laborious, detailed regulations, its
administrators escaped (the memorial alleged) the constant temptation to maladministra-
tion invited by legalistic methods. If local oﬃcials had no quotas to meet, it was argued,
they would make no effort to overfulﬁll them by squeezing the peolpe in rich areas, or by
attempting to extract the impossible in poor areas.”2
In a memorial most probably written during his term as governor of Hunan province (1861–1863),
Mao Hongbin⽑鴻賓 (1806–1868), an advocate of the lijin tax like Guo Songtao, opts to continue the
Hunanese practice of appointing members of the local communities (weiyuan委員) to manage the col-
lection of the lijin instead of putting local oﬃcials in charge. Mao employs the ren-fa polarity to reason
about the role of the human factor (ren) in institutional (fa) eﬃcacy and the strategy that minimizes
the risk of abuse of institutions by men.3 Mao questions the ability of the local oﬃcials (difang guan地
⽅官)4 to “stop abuses and raise moral standards”弊絕⾵清. The oﬃcials put in charge may be just
as corrupt as the appointed members of the local community. They may also be upright, just as the ap-
pointed members of the local community may be upright. But weighing the risks involved in each of
1It must be noted that Guo Songtao’s counterarguments are slightly removed from the facts. For example, lijin riots
were not as infrequent as the memorial would have it, and complaints about “extortionist” lijin functionaries, especially in
Guangdong and Jiangbei, were increasing. See Mann (1987), pp. 101–102.
2Mann (1987), pp. 100–101.
3The memorial is included in the HCJSWXJ/RAO, the HCJSWXB/GE and the HCJSWXB/SHENG, a sign that all
three editors attached importance to Mao’s position and reasoning. HCJSWXJ/RAO, 26:3a–8b; HCJSWXB/GE, 25:3a–4a;
HCJSWXB/SHENG, 56:26a–31b.
4This usually refers to the lowest levels of the bureaucracy, magistrates and sometimes also prefects.
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the two options (management by oﬃcials vs. management by appointed locals) against each other, the
management by locals emerges as the choice involving lower risks.
“There are no regulations (fa) that cannot be abused, so the main concern should be to
ﬁnd men (ren) who abide by the regulations (fa). If the right men (ren) can be recruited,
they can be appointed members of the local community or local oﬃcials, it does not change
the fact that they are men of integrity. If the wrong men (ren) are recruited, they can be
appointed members of the local community or local oﬃcials, it does not change the fact
that they are corrupt. But abuses committed by local oﬃcials are worse than those commit-
ted by appointed members of the local community.”
天下無無弊之法。惟貴有守法之⼈。得其⼈則歸委員可也。歸地⽅官亦可也。
不得其⼈。則委員有弊。地⽅官亦有弊。⽽地⽅官之弊更甚於委員。
Mao associates incorruptibility with the adherence to the regulations (fa). He does not attribute oﬃ-
cials more moral vigor in this respect than the members of the local community. Mao emphasizes the
agency of men (ren) in complying with the regulations (fa) or neglecting the regulations. The crucial
question in deciding whether to put oﬃcials or members of the local community in charge for Mao is
the harm done if men fail to comply to the regulations and act in the public interest. Mao regards abuse
of the regulations by oﬃcials as more critical than abuse of the regulations by the common people, prob-
ably because oﬃcials have more means to cover up their own deviant acts and because there is nobody
there with equal status on the local level to check their power. Mao therefore opts to put locals in charge
of the collection of the lijin because the effects of their potential abuses can still be contained by the of-
ﬁcials. He thereby relativizes the moral superiority of oﬃcials over the (gentry) members of the local
community.
2.5 Granaries
This subchapter looks at writings on state-run ever-normal granaries (changpingcang常平倉) and
state-policed community granaries (shecang社倉) included in the statecraft compendia that discuss
problems that compromise the eﬃcacy of these granaries with ren and fa.1 The writings conceptualize
institutional eﬃcacy as interplay of men or, more abstractly speaking, human factors (ren) and regula-
tions (fa). “Nourishing the people” (yangmin養民) and securing their basic subsistence was one of the
raisons-d’être of the Qing state. The major functions of state-run and state-policed granaries were the
provision of seed credits, the provision of famine relief and the regulation of the market price for grain.
Their main socio-economic function was to preserve the social peace within the local community, to
protect the life and possessions of the wealthy by securing the livelihood of the poor (an pin bao fu安
貧保富), and thereby prevent the social fabric from unraveling.2
Ever-normal granaries were intended to keep the grain price at a reasonable, “ever-normal” level all
year round by selling grain to local residents at a price lower than the market rate in spring, when the
grain price was high. The ever-normal granaries could replenish their stocks in autumn after the har-
vest, when the market prices were low. Ever-normal granaries could also grant interest-free grain cred-
its during famines. Despite being a great idea in theory, the ever-normal granaries could not always
be operated smoothly. The administration of the granaries was in the hands of the local magistrates.
Magistrates had to coordinate every step with their superiors, which introduced delays. They had to re-
port price and quantity of every sale and to their superior and also turn over funds obtained from the
sale to the provincial treasurer in spring. In autumn they had to report quantity and price of the grain
they intended to purchase, after which the approved funds, often less than the required amount, were
transferred back for them to make the purchase. Oftentimes the delays introduced by the communi-
cation, transferring of funds and inspection visits by the prefect were so long that prices were up again
before a purchase could be made. Granaries were usually located in the county seats and branch gra-
naries, though warranted in theory, were seldom established so that the population living at a distance
could not directly beneﬁt from cheaper prices. Another problem was embezzlement of stocks by oﬃ-
cials and sub-oﬃcial functionaries. Furthermore, government students, runners, and grain brokers, with
the cooperation of the clerk in charge of the granary, often bought large quantities of grain under differ-
ent false names. The clerks managing the transfers might demand fees from people selling or returning
grain. Magistrates might force residents to sell grain at a lower-than-market rate or force residents to
1The HCJSWB contains two chapters on granaries (cangchu倉儲) with forty writings. The topic does not receive as
much attention in the HCJSWXJ/RAO and the HCJSWXB/GE which both only include eleven writings on granaries.
The HCJSWXB/SHENG contains thirty-three writings. See Ch’ü (1962), pp. 156–159, for a general introduction of granary
policies on the county level. Will & Wong (1991) discuss the operation of ever-normal granaries between 1650–1850 and the
practical diﬃculties that beset the system. Rowe (2002), pp. 250–287, introduces ever-normal and community granaries in
the context of the activism of the exceptional statecraft oﬃcial Chen Hongmou. Dunstan (2006) describes the debates that
marked the transition from the state interventionism of the Yongzheng emperor in provisioning activities to minimized state
involvement of the young Qianlong emperor.
2See, for example, the essays by Liu Ruliao and Wei Xi discussed below.
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borrow grain who did not need it in order to please their superiors.1
Community granaries were conceived as the counterpart institutions of ever-normal granaries. Their
main purpose was to lend grain at no or low interest instead of selling it. They were managed by the lo-
cal elite instead of being state-run. They were smaller in size but located not just at the county seats but
also in the hinterland. They were to be stocked primarily by voluntary donations from the local com-
munity. The director was nominated by the local community and conﬁrmed by the magistrate, who
also supervised the operation of the granaries. Stocks had to be regularly inspected and replaced to pre-
vent mildew.2 In the ﬁrst century of the Qing dynasty, the director of the Board of Revenue, Zhang
Boxing張伯⾏ (1651–1725) and the governor of Zhili, Li Guangdi, both Zhu Xi partisans, were leading
champions of the community granaries. Both Zhang Boxing and Li Guangdi invoked Xunzi’s “it is men
(ren) who orer the country not regulations (fa)” in the arguments they brought forward in favor of
the policy.3 While the Kangxi and the Qianlong emperor were skeptical of the model, the Yongzheng
emperor promoted the establishment of community granaries. Ch’ü (1962) doubts that the system was
ever effective on a larger scale. Liu (1980) suggests that the granaries were moderately successful prior to
1800, a point after which the system started to gradually deteriorate, especially after 1850.4 Rowe (2002)
conveys the impression that most provincial oﬃcials, except Chen Hongmou, were having diﬃculties
keeping the granaries operable. The system was deﬁnitely hard to maintain and provincial high oﬃcials
frequently submitted complaints to the emperor that they were having a hard time to maintain the gra-
naries.5
In the writings discussed, the term fa is translated as “regulations” where appropriate, or, where fa
refers to a speciﬁc set of regulations, as “model”. The emblematic models referred most often in the writ-
ings on granaries are Wang Anshi’s “Green Sprout” program (qingmiaofa青苗法) and the community
granary program associated with Zhu Xi. The “Green Sprout” program was an initiative to provide
seeds or seedlings to peasants in the form of credits at interests lower than customary usury. Commu-
nity granaries were established from the 1150s onwards by Neo-Confucian scholar-oﬃcials. After the
end of the Song dynasty, the community granaries were chieﬂy identiﬁed with Zhu Xi. Zhu Xi had ini-
tially only played a secondary role in the institutionalization of the granaries by his contemporaries, but
he was certainly an advocate of the granaries as an opportunity to engage Confucian literati in social
action and showcase the value of Confucian leadership for the community. Under pressure of his intel-
lectual peers that suggested similarities of the program with Wang Anshi’s discredited “Green Sprout”
program, Zhu Xi rushed to explain the ostensibly marked differences of their operational principles in
1Ch’ü (1962), pp. 157–158.
2Ch’ü (1962), p. 158–159.
3For Li Guangdi’s use of the ren-fa polarity, see the discussion of one of his essays below. Liu Ruqiu劉汝璆 (ﬂ. Xi-
anfeng reign) quotes Zhang Boxing using Xunzi’s phrase in replying to the Kangxi emperor’s doubts whether state-policed
community granaries were feasible. Liu’s paraphrase of the quintessence of Zhang’s reply is that “since antiquity, benevolent
government has depended on the men in charge (ren)”則知古來仁政存乎其⼈. HCJSWXJ/RAO, 40:11a–b.
4See the discussion of the eﬃcacy of state-managed and state-initiated granaries during the Qing dynasty in Liu (1980).
5Rowe (2002), p. 274.
132 CHAPTER 2. BUILDING BLOCKS OF EFFICACY: REN ⼈ AND FA 法
the Jinhua shecang ji⾦華社倉記.1 In the key passage of the Jinhua shecang ji, Zhu Xi points out ﬁve
differences between the communal granaries and the “Green Sprout” program.2
1. Lending of grain vs. lending of cash
2. Establishment of a decentralized network of granaries in the villages vs. establishment of one cen-
tral granary located in the county seat
3. Management by the local elites vs. management by oﬃcials and sub-oﬃcial functionaries
4. Main objective of enhancing the welfare of the peasant population vs. enriching the state; mani-
festing in voluntary borrowing according to the individual household’s needs vs. regular compul-
sory borrowing irrespective of needs
5. Interest charged in grain vs. interest charged in cash
The passage became a much-cited mantra in writings on the topic and Wang Anshi’s program, as repre-
sented by Zhu Xi, came to serve as negative example of how not to institutionalize granaries thencefor-
ward.3
This subchapter discusses twelve writings on state-run and state-policed granaries. The focus is on
eight writings from the HCJSWB, complemented by a shorter discussion of four writings from the
HCJSWXJ/RAO, HCJSWXB/GE and HCJSWXB/SHENG. The writings selected from the HCJSWB
and discussed in detail below date mostly from the early Qing. The essays by Li Guangdi, Huang Liu-
hong, Lu Shiyi, Liu Wen and Wei Xi were written during the Kangxi reign (1661–1722). Li Fu’s essay was
probably written during either the Kangxi or the Yongzheng reign (1723–1735). Sun Hao’s memorial
dates from the early Qianlong reign (1735–1796) and Zhang Haishan’s essay from the early Daoguang
reign (1820–1850). The four writings from the HCJSWXJ/RAO, HCJSWXB/GE and HCJSWXB/
SHENG date from the Daoguang reign and later.
The basic problem constellation presented in the writings is that state-run or state-policed granaries
are not effective. The intended effects of the granaries stand in sharp contrast to the actual failure of gra-
nary policies. The granaries do not fulﬁll the functions they were intended to fulﬁll, be it to prevent the
population from starvation by providing famine relief, to secure the livelihood of the peasant popula-
tion by granting grain credits, or to secure the people’s livelihood in general by stabilizing crop prices
through oﬃcial grain trade. The granaries do not beneﬁt or may even harm the people they are intended
to beneﬁt. At the same time, they beneﬁt people who proﬁt from the granaries through illicit means.
1Tillman (2004), pp. 126–127.
2Zhu (n.d.), p. 2880.
3See, however, Lu Shiyi’s essay discussed below that does not regard the “Green Sprout” program as a bad model per se,
and Huang Shisan, who regards both options as equally impracticable under realistic circumstances.
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From the analysis of the defects and solutions proposed to remove these defects speaks the belief of
most authors that the institutions can be operated successfully.1
The writings discussed characterize the relationship between men (ren) and regulations (fa) as com-
plementary. Part of the writings highlight the role of regulations (fa) and propose entire institutional
blueprints or speciﬁc regulations for a more effective operation of the granaries. Lu Shiyi’s and Wei Xi’s
writings discussed below are good examples. Both authors emphasize robustness against abuse as prin-
cipal criterion of good regulations (fa). Lu regards Xunzi’s dictum that “it is men (ren) who order the
state, not regulations (fa)” as the description of an imperfect and ultimately undesirable state of affairs,
the heavy dependence of institutional eﬃcacy on the integrity of the men in charge.2 Wei Xi points out
that regulations should establish checks between the different parties involved in the operation of the
granaries that make it hard to commit abuse.
Other authors put more emphasis on the agency and competence of the men (ren) involved in the
operation of the local granaries, mostly oﬃcials or members of the local community charged with spe-
ciﬁc managerial tasks, for example Li Guangdi, Li Fu and Zhang Haishan. Li both proposes a number
of regulations (fa) and emphasizes the need for supervising oﬃcials to monitor the men (ren) oper-
ating the granaries and sanction infringements. Li Fu argues that Zhu Xi’s and Wang Anshi’s granary
programs were both good models (fa), but both depended very much on the men in charge (ren) of
operation. Zhang Haishan emphasizes the role of the men in charge (ren) to argue for mobilizing the
members of the local communities by putting them, instead of oﬃcials, in charge of granary manage-
ment (compare Mao Hongbin’s similar argumentation in chapter 2.4. It is important to note that the
objective of the argument that regulations and institutions (fa) are never entirely immune from abuse
and that trustworthy personnel (ren) must be put in charge is not to do away with all procedural rules
and regulations and let the granary personnel or the magistrate operate arbitrarily. It is to defend spe-
ciﬁc favored granary models against objections that they are vulnerable to abuse.
All of the writings both advocate speciﬁc models or regulations (fa) and regard the agency of men
(ren) as essential in implementing the model and complying to its regulations. For an explicit state-
ment of the simultaneous importance of both appropriate regulations (fa) and trustworthy and capable
personnel (ren), see Huang Liuhong’s and Liu Wen’s writings discussed below. In general, authors
who advocate changes to the existing regulatory frameworks according to which the state-run or state-
initiated granaries are operated tend to emphasize the role of fa more than authors who just advocate
the continuation or reestablishment of the granaries. Emphasis on the role of men (ren) is at the same
time an emphasis of the duties these men are supposed to perform, such as choice of appropriate mod-
els and regulations (fa), control and oversight of sub-oﬃcial functionaries and mobilization of the local
community in the case of oﬃcials, operating the granary without embezzling funds in the case of sub-
1There are a few writings in the compendia that regard the granaries as too interventionist, impractical and/or anachronis-
tic, see, for example, Huang Shisan’s essay discussed below.
2Compare with Gao Chengling’s essay discussed in chapter 2.4.
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oﬃcial functionaries and appointed members of the local community. Their administrative aptitude is
not so much deﬁned as spontaneous administration through ad hoc solutions, but rather as taking the
right decisions within the existing framework of regulations, managing the implementation of policies,
and appointing and demoting key personnel. A special case is Sun Hao’s memorial that points out that
there are limits to (the average) men’s (ren) capabilities and that the dictum that “it is men (ren) who
order the country, not regulations (fa)” should not be used to defend policies (fa) that are not operable
under the given circumstances.
The writings collected in the compendia of the self-strengthening period brieﬂy discussed at the end
of this subchapter present a similar spectrum of opinions as the earlier writings. Chen Tingjing and
argues the granaries failed only because they were not operated according to Zhu Xi’s regulations (fa).
To counteract this implementation deﬁcit, Li Zhaoxi calls for more careful selection of personnel and
for harnessing the power of sanctions by connecting the granaries more closely with the evaluation of
the magistrates (ren). Liu Shutang proposes a number of modiﬁcations to the regulations (fa) for the
operation of the granaries. Huang Shisan ﬁnally regards all available granary models as too dependent
on the availability of extraordinarily committed personnel (ren), and therefore opts to give up on the
institution of public granaries altogether.
In “Advice to extend the storage system”飭廣積貯牒, Li Guangdi advises on how to effectively
establish and operate granaries in local communities. Li both proposes a number of regulations (fa)
and emphasizes the need for supervising oﬃcials to monitor the men (ren) operating the granaries and
sanction infringements. Li probably wrote the essay during his appointment as governor-general of
Zhili province between 1698–1705. Li divides his policy suggestions into those concerning regulations
(fa) and those concerning the human factor (ren). He lauds imperial edicts for urging magistrates to
provide for local granaries, but also for underlining the need to closely supervise the operation of the
granaries and investigate the reasons for failures.
“(The imperial edicts) are all earnestly committed to the operation of local storages among
the people. But they also show concern that among oﬃcials there might be no men (ren)
who can operate the institution (fa ). And if the policy is not properly carried out, a facility
that should have beneﬁted the people just causes them trouble. This is why the herdsmen
of the people (magistrates) should pay attention to and closely monitor the operation of
the granaries. The task of supervision cannot be conferred to ministerial documents, this
will only aggravate problems.”
每以民間蓄積為拳拳。又慮有司奉法無⼈。推⾏不善則利民之事。適以滋擾。
故宜使民牧講試以引其端。不可使部⽂督責以重其累。
Li’s suggestions basically cover both points. He ﬁrst makes a few recommendations regarding the
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regulations (fa) and then points to three diﬃculties with respect to the men (ren) involved in the oper-
ation of local granaries.
In order to “beneﬁt the people” in an optimal way, the granaries should be established in a decentral-
ized way in the townships and villages. The granaries should be stocked with local grain, partly obtained
through donations from the rich and partly obtained through a one-time obligatory charge per mu of
arable land exacted from everyone. Management should be conferred to local people as well. The gra-
naries should operate on a non-proﬁt basis. When selling grain, the price should not be calculated with-
out adding a proﬁt margin. When lending grain, no interest should be charged, and if people are unable
to pay back even the interest-free loan, debt cuts can be considered.
Li argues that the above regulations can make the granaries an effective institution, if they are adhered
to. But this blueprint (fa) alone does not guarantee success. There are three diﬃculties that can arise
with respect to the personnel involved in the operation of local granaries, and that the magistrate has
confront.
“When the granary is established, it has to be ensured that the people cooperate readily and
are not harassed by oﬃcials and functionaries. That is the ﬁrst diﬃculty. During the op-
eration (probably referring to lending and repayment), incorruptible and impartial men
(ren) have to be appointed to direct the operations. Thorough checks and supervision by
the magistrate are crucial here, otherwise there is bound to be much harm from infringe-
ments. That is the second diﬃculty. After operation (when there are no transactions and
the stocks only have to be safeguarded), if the granary is entrusted to the people, super-
vision is diﬃcult. If the granary is entrusted to oﬃcials, some of them can cause trouble
(bullying the people). This makes good people reluctant to become directors, and the crim-
inals will jump in as directors and abuse the power thus gained. That is the third diﬃculty.
Due to these three diﬃculties, a ’good model devised with good intentions’ (liang fa mei







The above diﬃculties can render the best model (fa) ineffective, which is why they have to be prevented
by the supervising oﬃcials at the circuit and provincial level (ren). Li quotes Xunzi’s “it is men (ren)
who order the state, not regulations (fa)”. The supervising oﬃcials must monitor and sanction the per-
sonnel at the district level to ensure the effective operation of the granaries. They should closely cooper-
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ate with the local elite (xianshen qilao賢紳耆⽼) and send obligatory annual reports to the governor-
general reporting how successfully the diﬃculties have been tackled.
The Complete Book of Blessings (Fuhui quanshu福惠全書) by Huang Liuhong⿈六鴻 (ﬂ. 1653-
1693) contains an essay on “Grain Storage”積貯 included in the HCJSWB.1 In the essay, Huang Liu-
hong argues that while it may seem that granaries are entirely dependent on the men (ren) who run and
administer them, regulations (fa) also play an important role. Effective granary policy rests on putting
honest and responsible men (ren) in charge and on establishing regulations (fa) which allow for effec-
tive monitoring. Huang calls the “system of grain sales at normal price” (pingtiao平糶), ever-normal
granaries and community granaries the best systems (fa) for state-managed grain reserves since the be-
ginning of imperial times. Whenever they were established, the granaries were effective in the beginning,
when they were managed by committed personnel (ren). They became ineffective and even harmful
when subsequent generations of personnel (ren) turned the institution into an instrument for their
own proﬁt.
“After the Three Dynasties, there were no granary institutions (fa) superior to the system
of grain sales at normal price, the ever-normal system and the community granary system.
But they tended to be only effective in the beginning. After some time, they often became
defective and failed. The founders (ren) implemented the institution (fa) with full com-
mitment so that it operated smoothly and brought much beneﬁt. Their successors (ren)





Huang illustrates this common tendency with historical evidence. The system of ever-normal granaries
instituted by Geng Shouchang耿壽昌, assistant of the chamberlain of the national treasury under
Han Xuandi, had to be terminated by Han Xuandi’s great great grandson Liu Ban劉般.2 Powerful
households were reaping illegal proﬁts from the system, while the common people did not enjoy the
beneﬁt of “ever-normal” grain prices. As an oﬃcial under Sui Wendi, Changsun Ping⾧孫平 insti-
tuted public granaries (yicang義倉), which he placed under the management of the local community.3
1HCJSWB, 39:3a–5b. The HCJSWB includes a considerable number of essays from the Complete Book of Blessings, an
oﬃcial handbook (guanzhen官箴) that Huang published in 1696 after retiring from his last appointment as supervising
secretary at the oﬃce for the scrutiny of works. The Complete Book of Blessings was one of the most inﬂuential collections
of its kind during the Qing dynasty. What distinguished it from other collections was that it did not only put an emphasis
on moral character and comportment, but also went into details about topics related to the daily routine of local adminis-
tration referencing Huang’s own experience. Gong & Liu (2011) write the Complete Book of Blessings conveys a markedly
utilitarian perspective on local administration.
2Huang (1997), pp. 32, 97
3Huang (1997), p. 353.
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The system beneﬁted the common people at ﬁrst. But soon the system failed because the personnel in
charge (ren) started to misappropriate the stocks under their control. Another problem was the loca-
tion of the public granaries at the county seats. This meant that most beneﬁts brought by the granaries
were only enjoyed the city inhabitants but not the rural population. Tang emperor Taizong ordered the
institution of both public granaries for grain credits, ﬁnanced with a surcharge on the land-tax, as well
as ever-normal granaries for famine relief. The system broke down, however, when his son and succes-
sor on the throne Tang Gaozong started to channel off granary stocks to feed his army. This happened
again during the Song dynasty, after ever-normal granaries had been reestablished. Wang Anshi took
what was left of the ever-normal stocks and put them into his “Green Sprouts” credit program. The pro-
gram was administered so badly that the people did not only suffer in years of famine but also in years
of abundance.
The historical records supports the impression that the granary policies failed because the wrong men
ren were put in charge of managing the granaries, Huang concedes. But this does not mean that the
procedural rules (fa) regulating the operation of the granaries should not be subjected to discussion.
“Seen from this angle, the failure of the granaries was not a defect in the regulations (fa),
but the result of failing to put the right men (ren) in charge of the administration of the
granaries. This does not imply, however, that we should only start discussing the regula-




Both the recruitment of honest men (ren) for the job and the making of appropriate regulations (fa) to
guide them in the performance of their job are crucial tasks.
This brings Huang to the analysis of the weaknesses of current ever-normal granaries. Ever-normal
granaries are currently ﬁnanced with a surcharge on the land tax paid by the people. However, oﬃcials
and functionaries use half of the stocks for gifts to superior oﬃcials, the other half disappears directly
in their private pockets. To make up for the losses, it has become common practice to claim that the
stocks were spoiled and demand their replacement (most likely by contributions made by the people).
Memorials regularly report cases of granaries virtually emptied by embezzlement, which often comes
to light when an oﬃcial leaves for another posting. This amounts to extortion of the people’s money to
ﬁnance the illegal activities of local powerholders, exactly what Liu Ban had criticized when he abolished
the Han dynasty ever-normal granaries. What is more, the rural population does not proﬁt from the
system at all, as the granaries are located at the administrative seats, a point already criticized with the Sui
dynasty welfare granaries.
Huang concludes that “putting the right men (ren) in charge” is only one aspect of the solution to
the problem of the granaries’ ineﬃcacy.
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“If we want full granaries, the solution is to put the right men (ren) in charge. If we do
not want the granaries to negatively affect people’s livelihood, the solution is to manage
the granaries according to the regulations (fa). If we want that both the people near and




Huang attributes importance both to ren and fa factors. His analytical distinction between the role of
“putting the right men (ren) in oﬃcial charge”官得其⼈ and “managing the granaries according to
appropriate regulations (fa)”制得其法 is slightly blurred.
The right men in charge (ren) will prevent the granaries from running short of grain, Huang says.
Currently, there is no proper control of the granaries so that sub-oﬃcial functionaries can misappropri-
ate stocks. If the missing stocks are not replaced in a timely manner, the deﬁcit becomes unmanageable.
Therefore, the magistrate should put cautious, law-abiding sub-oﬃcial functionaries in charge of mon-
itoring the volume of incoming and outgoing grain. The magistrate in turn should never channel off
grain from the granary for other purposes.
fa in the context of “management according to the right fa” refers to speciﬁc regulations or meth-
ods that render the men in charge more accountable, not just the institution or model of the granary.
Huang argues that management of the granaries according to appropriate regulations (fa) will prevent
exploitation of the people. Right now, the poor do not enjoy the beneﬁts of the ever-normal system in
the form of the state sale of grain at a lower-than-market price. They have to ﬁnance the operation of the
granaries by paying a surcharge on the land-tax. But the cheap grain is all illegally bought up by inﬂu-
ential big buyers. Therefore, the director of the community granary and his deputy should be required
to document all sales and expenses. These records should be submitted to the magistrate who will also
perform on-spot checks of whether the actual stocks correspond with the records. These signs of effec-
tive management will also increase the readiness of local beneﬁciaries to donate stocks for the granary,
Huang says.
In proposing a combined system of ever-normal and community granaries, Huang presents putting
the right men (ren) in charge and managing the institution according to the appropriate regulations
(fa) as indispensable building blocks of an effective granary policy. The “right” men (ren) are magis-
trates, sub-oﬃcial functionaries and appointed granary directors who do not embezzle stocks them-
selves and do not let others embezzle stocks. Management according to regulations (fa) that require
detailed book keeping and reporting to facilitate the control of the men in charge means that abuses that
infringements of the regulations that have so far prevented the common people from beneﬁting, for
example the illegal buying up of large quantities of low-price grain by grain brokers, clerks and govern-
ment students, are strictly prosecuted.
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Lu Shiyi’s陸世儀 (1610-1672) essay “On salt tax, grain tax and famine relief policies”論鹽糧賑貸
諸法 contains a section on granaries.1 Having never held public oﬃce, Lu Shiyi nevertheless attached
importance to the practical affairs and rejected metaphysics in the abstract.2 As Lu presents it, the choice
of the model (fa) for the granaries matters a lot. Some model (fa) promise a higher chance of eﬃcient
operation because they are less susceptible to abuse. Lu’s contribution to the debate on the eﬃcacy of
granaries consists of a ranking of granary models (fa) according to their susceptibility to human factors
(ren). According to Lu, ever-normal granaries are less sensitive to disruption than community granaries
because there is a lower risk of failure due to human factors (ren). The community granaries distribute
grain in spring and request it back in winter at an interest rate of ten percent. The downside is that suc-
cessful operation depends critically on whether the right men are put in charge (zui xu de ren最須得
⼈) of managing the distribution and collection of grain. Lu points to Wang Anshi’s “Green Sprout”
granaries as the classic cautionary example of what happens if the wrong men are put in charge. Instead
of administrating the credit bureaus in the interest of the people, Wang Anshi’s oﬃcials forced the peo-
ple to sell their private stocks and borrow grain from the granaries in order to maximize the through-put
of the granaries and let public coffers (and themselves) proﬁt from the high interest rates.
This kind of abuse is not possible with the ever-normal granaries, argues Lu, because they operate on
a different scheme. The oﬃcials managing the ever-normal granaries regulate the grain price through
strategic buying up and selling of grain. The downside is that the ever-normal granaries with their cen-
tral location only beneﬁt the urban dwellers, not the peasants in the countryside. Both communal and
ever-normal granaries share the downside that they operate on capital managed by oﬃcials. If there
is corruption and the money gets embezzled they become defunct because the capital base is drained.
Ever-normal ﬁelds (changpingtian常平⽥) are the least susceptible to human factors (ren). With
ever-normal ﬁelds, local granaries get stocked with grain from the ever-normal ﬁeld and can perform the
three standard functions of providing famine relief, granting credits and regulating prices, depending on
current needs. Corruption and embezzlement will never destroy the capital base completely. After the
corrupt personnel has been replaced, the ﬁeld is still there to restock the granary.
1HCJSWB, 28:4a–5b.
2Lu advocated that scholars not only study the classical canon and literary composition, but also works on astronomy,
geography, construction and military affairs. The Complete Library in Four Sections (Siku quanshu四庫全書) quotes Lu
with the remark that “if no one in the realm engages in learning, public morale will decline; if everyone in the realm engages
in learning, public morale will also decline”天下無講學之⼈，此世道之衰；天下皆講學之⼈，亦世道之衰.
The HCJSWB includes a number of writings from Lu’s Record of Pondering Distinctions (Sibianlu思辨錄). In the essay
“On Government” (Lun zhi論治) from this collection, Lu notes that before education of the population through ritual and
music (liyue禮樂) can be effective, the government has to ensure the economic subsistence of the people through a fair and
equal taxation system. “In antiquity, the governance of the realm was all about ritual and music. Nowadays, it is all about
taxes and corvée labor. If taxes and corvée labor were distributed equally, already half of the task of government would be
achieved”古之天下禮樂盡之。今之天下賦役盡之。能平賦役。治天下為得半矣. Lu goes on to recommend “if
we want excellent troops, we should cut down on their numbers and increase their pay; if we want incorruptible oﬃcials, we
should cut down on their numbers and increase their salary”欲兵之精不如省兵⽽增糧。欲官之亷不如省官⽽增俸.
HCJSWB, 11:33a–b. Li Hongzhang李鴻章 (1823–1901) and other oﬃcials would call for the streamlining of Green standard
troops in several provinces according to a similar logic of improving quality by reducing quantity in the 1860s in the context
of “self-strengthening”. Kuo (1983), p. 503.
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However, Lu seems to mention ever-normal ﬁelds only for the sake of argument, in order to illustrate
the principle of minimizing dependence on human factors (ren): “the other two models combined
are even better than ever-normal ﬁelds”視前⼆法兼之且勝之矣. The solution he proposes is a
combination of ever-normal and communal granaries, similar to Huang Liuhong’s idea. The communal
granaries are to be stocked with interest grain earned through the granting of credits. In times of scarcity
of grain, both ever-normal granaries and community granaries can be used for price regulation. In case
of serious famines, ever-normal granaries regulate the prices and community granaries provide relief
grain. As long as both kinds of granaries are well-stocked, famines do not represent a danger.
Huang Liuhong and Lu Shiyi argue for the eﬃcacy of their own suggestions by aﬃrming that spe-
ciﬁc regulatory guidelines of models (fa) matter. They both point to Wang Anshi’s “Green Sprout”
granaries as a negative and Zhu Xi’s community granaries as a positive precedent. Li Fu’s李紱 (1673–
1750) “Discussion of Green Sprout and communal granaries”青苗社倉議 also refers to these two
historical precedents.1 The essay is undated so we cannot be sure when during his long, but not com-
pletely straightforward oﬃcial career he wrote it.2 Similar to Lu Shiyi and Huang Liuhong, he proposes
a combination of community and ever-normal granaries. But unlike Huang Liuhong and Lu Shiyi,
who claim that Zhu Xi’s model is superior, Li argues for the equality of the Wang Anshi’s and Zhu Xi’s
models (fa) in terms of eﬃcacy. The reason all later granary policies related referred to Zhu Xi as their
model is not that it was genuinely better, but that Wang Anshi was a persona non grata. Similar to Gao
Chengling, Lu regards “it is men (ren) who order the state, not regulations (fa)” as the description of
an imperfect and ultimately undesirable state of affairs, the heavy dependence of institutional eﬃcacy
on the integrity of the men in charge.
A staunch defendant of Wang Anshi’s reform policies3, Li claims that Zhu Xi’s communal granaries
and Wang Anshi’s “Green Sprout” granaries equally suffered from the perennial problem (gujin zhi
tongbing古今之通病) that “it is men (ren) who order the state, not regulations (fa)”有治⼈無治
法. The success or failure of the granaries depends upon the performance of the men in charge (ren).
Wang Anshi’s designs were in accord with the teachings of the former sages (qianxian zhi lun前賢之
論) just like Zhu Xi’s. Later attempts to revive Zhu Xi’s policy failed for the same reason that Wang
Anshi’s policy failed: the men in charge (ren) did not share the sincere attitude of the founders. In fact,
all valid critique of Wang Anshi’s “Green Sprout” program concerns human factors (ren) and is equally
valid for any other granary model, including Zhu Xi’s.
“Zhu Xi’s model (fa) of communal granaries is the same as that of the ‘Green Sprout’ gra-
1HCJSWB, 40:21a–23b.
2Winning his jinshi in 1709, Li had become governor-general of Zhili in 1725, but suffered from demotion afterwards.
Grand Secretariat Archives at the Academia Sinica Institute of History and Philology #6500中央研究院歷史語⾔研究所
內閣⼤庫檔案 6500號, as cited in DBCMAGC, http://npmhost.npm.gov.tw/ttscgi/ttswebnpm.
3Wei Yuan points this out in a comment on this essay discussed below, remarking that many of Li’s collected writings
were written in defense of Wang Anshi. Note that Li’s collected writings ﬁgured as an important source for Wang Jinggong
nianpu kaolüe王荊公年譜考略 compiled by Cai Shangxiang蔡上翔 (1717–1810). Pi (1987), p. 169.
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naries. Over the past six hundred years, people thought the model was Zhu Xi’s unique
invention and frequently wished to emulate it. But it always failed after a short time, be-
fore people had had the chance to enjoy its beneﬁts, and had only suffered from its defects.
Only knowing that their model (fa) was Zhu Xi’s model (fa), they did not realize that
their personnel (ren) was not Zhu Xi’s personnel (ren), and that they could just as well




The operation of Zhu Xi’s communal granaries does not depend on the work of a single man, but on
a considerable number of oﬃcials and commoners performing their tasks of oversight and management,
Li points out. Zhu Xi’s communal granaries worked ﬁne as long he and his students, all of them “gen-
tlemen committed to the Way”學道君⼦, were in charge. The high oﬃcials initiating and presiding
the implementation of the granaries today (shoushizhe⾸事者), says Li, are just as impartial and up-
right as Zhu Xi. The problem are the many people who are in charge of the numerous subtasks (fenren
qi shizhe分任其事者). If the personal qualities of these subordinates do not match the ones of Zhu
Xi’s students, it is impossible to implement Zhu Xi’s model (fa). “Measuring the personal qualities of
the men put in charge (ren)”量度其⼈ is therefore a critical step in the administration of the granaries.
But already Zhu Xi had a hard time recruiting enough qualiﬁed personnel (ren) after his petition to
extend the model (fa) to the whole empire had been approved. Dependence on the integrity of the men
in charge (ren), the fact that “it was men (ren) who order the state (or rather, the granaries), not regula-
tions (fa)” became the reason why Zhu Xi’s communal granaries were not successfully implemented on
a larger scale, neither in his own times nor in later times.
The same applies to Wang Anshi’s “Green Sprout” granaries. In their original implementation, the
communal granaries were not different from the “Green Sprout” granaries in terms of their interest
policy and other basic rules of operation. During his assignment as magistrate in Zhejiang, Wang Anshi
had presided over the implementation of “Green Sprout” granaries personally. The policy had met with
so much success that the people still offer sacriﬁces to him in the local temples. After he had become
chancellor, Wang Anshi wanted to promote the policy that he had successfully tried on a small scale to
the whole empire, but failed disastrously. Just like Zhu Xi, Wang Anshi neglected the fact that the men
in charge (ren) in other parts of the empire did not match himself in their personal qualities.
Li concludes that “if the right men (ren) can be put in charge, the ‘Green Sprout’ program is just as
good as the community granaries; if the right men (ren) cannot be put in charge, the communal gra-
nary is just as bad as the ‘Green Sprout’ granary”是故奉⾏⽽得其⼈，則青苗亦社倉矣；奉⾏⽽⾮
其⼈，則社倉即青苗矣. He quotes Zhu Xi’s criticism of the “Green Sprout” system from the Jinhua
shecangji: payments in money not in grain, granaries located at county seats not in villages, manage-
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ment by oﬃcials, not by local elites, main objective of enriching the state, not charity, interest charged
in money not in grain. Li goes on to argue that all the points that Zhu Xi has cited as its disadvantages
could in fact also be counted as advantages. Whether they turn out to beneﬁcial or harmful depend
fully on their execution by the men in charge (ren). If the aim is to make sure that an affair is carried in
a steady manner, it is necessary to appoint oﬃcials to take charge of it. In the exchange of funds between
oﬃcials and the people, cash is easy to handle, while grain is more diﬃcult to handle. If all payments are
made in cash, it is appropriate to handle things in the cities, not in the villages. If they are not located
in the villages, payments must indeed be made in cash and cannot be made in grain. In serious cases of
embezzlement, the responsible persons have to be send to the county seat for trial and it has to be guar-
anteed that they compensate for the loss inﬂicted. It is impossible to only appoint members of the local
gentry for this. Li utilizes the fact that Zhu Xi’s last critique of the “Green Sprout” policy is formulated
fairly abstractly to his advantage. The “urgency”亟疾 that characterizes the “Green Sprout” program ac-
cording to Zhu Xi is conventionally interpreted as alluding to the fact that the sub-oﬃcial functionaries
and oﬃcials in charge of the granaries forced people to participate in the program in order to maximize
the granaries’ proﬁt and without regard for the people’s interest. Li interprets the ‘urgency’ as a general
sense of one’s oﬃcial duty that does not conﬂict with the sense of “charity” (canda zhonghou zhi xin慘
怛忠厚之⼼) to serve the people’s interests.
“Although it is possible possible to act with a sense of ‘charity’ (citing Zhu Xi) all along,
but there also has be a sense of ‘urgency’ (citing Zhu Xi again) to seek and ﬁnd the funda-
mental causes of beneﬁt or harm. I do not see why one should exclude the other.”
則雖能全⽤慘怛忠厚之⼼。⽽究亦歸於亟疾。推求利害。始終之故。未⾒為此
得⽽彼失也。
Having said all this in defense of Wang Anshi, Li’s own proposal of how to proceed in implementing
the granaries actually deviates from Wang Anshi’s model (fa). Li concedes that building up grain stocks
for on-the-spot relief funds during famines should receive priority, not provision of monetary funds.
Similar to Lu Shiyi and Huang Liuhong, he proposes a combination of community and ever-normal
granaries.
A comment in the HCJSWB appended to Li’s essay, very probably by Wei Yuan, disapproves of Li’s
remarks about the practical equality of the community and “Green Sprout” models. The commenta-
tor points to the inconsistency of Li’s stating that monetary payments are easier to handle than grain,
conﬁrming Wang Anshi’s policy, but later recommending to focus on storing grain, which corresponds
to Zhu Xi’s policy. A decisive difference between the policies is the low interest rate of communal gra-
naries, says the commentator. He suggests that Li Fu misquotes Xunzi, who was merely saying that
institutions (fa) cannot be entirely fail-safe but depend on the hard work of men (ren) to function.
The commentator seems particularly disconcerted about Li Fu’s statement that both policies are equally
valid from a practical standpoint. The commentator’s main point is that everything else being equal, in-
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cluding the capability and integrity of the men in charge (ren), there exist differences between the two
models (fa) in terms of viability and beneﬁt, and that the optimal choice is the model (fa) that is “long-
lasting”可久: “accepting that there is no model (fa) that administers itself, we have to ﬁnd a (fa) that
can last long”⾄于無治法之中。⽽必求可久之法. In this context, the commentator cites Lu Shiyi’s
ranking of models (fa) by their resilience against infringements and abuse by the men in charge (ren),
in order to underline that such distinctions matter. The commentators elaborates on this criterion of re-
silience by synthesizing Li Fu’s two seemingly inconsistent statements that monetary funds are easier to
establish and maintain, but that grain stocks should receive priority, into a consistent principle: “mone-
tary funds are not as convenient as grain stocks, grain stocks are not as long-lasting as a communal ﬁeld.
But what is hard to establish is also hard to discard”⾦不如穀之便，穀不如⽥之可久；但創始益
難，惟難興故亦難廢⽿.
In “Personal opinion on the establishment of granaries and lending of grain”預備倉貸穀私議,
Liu Wen劉汶 (juren 1688) advocates alterations to a proposal for the installation of granaries by the
provincial governor of Shandong, Foron佛倫 († 1701), in 1690.1 Liu warns that Foron’s proposal will
be a political failure if implemented unchanged because it does not follow Zhu Xi’s model (fa) for com-
munal granaries, as Foron asserts. Foron’s plans are not based on the model which Zhu Xi laid down
in the Jinhua shecangji and which drew from fourteen years of experience, Liu argues. They are based
on the cruder model with which Zhu Xi started out in the beginning that was not quite different from
Wang Anshi’s “Green Sprout” granaries. The ﬁve differences between community granaries and “Green
Sprout” granaries that Zhu Xi laid out in the Jinhua shecang ji “decide about whether (the granaries )
beneﬁt or harm the people”此利害之所由分歟, Liu underlines. To support his own proposals to
amend Foron’s scheme, Liu deﬁnes a calculus of ren and fa in which adequate regulations (fa) solve
seventy percent of the problems and qualiﬁed men (ren) step in to take care of the remaining thirty
percent.
Liu lists ﬁve problematic characteristics of Foron’s plans of which four are identical with the short-
comings of Wang Anshi’s “Green Sprout” program as listed by Zhu Xi.
1. According to Foron’s scheme, a central granary is to be established at the county seat instead of
establishing a decentralized network of granaries in the villages. This puts the rural poor at a dis-
advantage. They do not dispose of vehicles such as boats and carts to carry lots of grain at a time,
but the distance renders transport in smaller installments uneconomic. Efforts to relocate grain
to the villages in order to make it more convenient for the people will have to confront a lack of
storage facilities and transportation funds. In the end, it will mainly be people not engaged in
agriculture and without a regular occupation who proﬁt from the grain credits, not the peasants,
whom the policy is intended to support.
1HCJSWB, 39:15a–17b.
144 CHAPTER 2. BUILDING BLOCKS OF EFFICACY: REN ⼈ AND FA 法
2. The granaries are to be managed by oﬃcials and sub-oﬃcial functionaries instead of local elites.
Sub-oﬃcial functionaries are prone to corruption. If they manage the distribution and collection
of the stocks, they may let the grain go bad but force the people to accept it nevertheless. They
may demand far more than the oﬃcial surcharge that they are allowed to request for covering
their expenses.
3. The main objective is to enrich the state instead of securing popular welfare, manifested in an-
nual compulsory borrowing irrespective of needs instead of voluntary borrowing according to
needs. Because Foron’s plans stipulate that a predetermined amount of the stocks has to be lent
and recollected in each county, county magistrates will either force each locality to borrow a ﬁxed
amount, or impose higher surcharges from those who borrow in order to meet the requirements
imposed and receive a good evaluation. In the ﬁrst case, all people are forced to borrow, no mat-
ter if they need a credit or not. In the latter case, the people virtually have to pay back grain that
they did not borrow. Liu points to a scandal in Shaanxi (“Shaanxi seed scandal”陝西籽粒⼀案)
where oﬃcals harmed the people by committing both abuses excessively.
4. Interest is to be charged in cash instead of grain. Foron plans with a ﬁxed return earned through
a surcharge on the borrowed grain (jia er zhi e加⼆之額). It is legitimate to charge interest on
grain lent if the grain in the granaries itself was borrowed from some other source until this exter-
nal loan has been paid back (as in the case documented by Zhu Xi). But if this is not the case (as
for Foron’s granaries), no interest should be charged. Otherwise, there will be less and less people
willing to borrow from the granaries because of the interest charged. Some may even give up agri-
culture, and the granaries will end up with large amounts of excess grain (gu duo nong shao穀
多農少). This and the forced borrowing and excessive surcharges mentioned in point three will
result in a situation where “what was intended to beneﬁt the people, harms them”本以救民。
反以害民.
5. The plans devote no special attention to the fact that in many county granaries, a lot of grain is
misappropriated for other purposes than intended (nuoyi那移), so that the actual amount of
grain stored is much lower than oﬃcially prescribed. Also, a considerable amount of grain turns
bad, so that the amount of usable grain is still smaller. If this issue is not addressed, the county
magistrates are bound engage in illicit practices such as distribution of spoiled grain and forgery
of receipts in order to make up for the deﬁcit. They will forge receipts for grain that has never
been distributed, and if they feel that their superiors cover the fraud, exact the grain from the
people, as it happened in the “Shaanxi seed scandal”.
According to Liu, seventy percent of the listed problems can be solved if Foron’s alters the regula-
tions (fa), while the remaining thirty percent of the problem can only be remedied by putting the right
men (ren) in charge of supervising the granaries.
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“The right plan can only be to implement Zhu Xi’s communal granaries according to the
guidelines (as he reﬁned them) after fourteen years (of experimentation). But this will not
remove all ﬁve defects, only three of them. Seventy percent of the defects can be prevented
through the establishment of appropriate regulations (fa). After we have good regulations
(fa), preventing the last thirty percent hinges upon the men in charge (ren), it is nothing
that the regulations (fa) can take care of.”
亦惟⾏朱⼦⼗四年以後之社倉⽿。然且不能悉除五弊。僅可免其三焉。蓋⽴法
防弊。⼗得其七。已為良法。其⼗之三則待⼈⽽後⾏。⾮法所能及也。
Liu Wen proposes three regulations (fa) to remedy problems number three, four and ﬁve from the
above list of problematic characteristics of Foron’s granary scheme. To address point three, the granaries
should lend ﬂexible amounts of grain calculated according to the previous harvest, instead of a predeter-
mined amount. This will remove twenty percent of the defects, says Liu. To address point four, interest
for the grain loans should not be charged in cash, but in form of ﬁxed amount of grain per unit (dan
⽯) of grain lent, as proposed in Zhu Xi’s guidelines. This will take care of thirty percent of the defects.
To address point ﬁve, magistrates should be held responsible for the replacement of spoiled grain and
deﬁcits. Magistrates who tolerate or even order the distribution of spoiled grain, fake receipts, or exact
illicit surcharges are to be punished and demoted. Subordinates on the provincial, circuit and prefec-
tural level can receive punishment for covering up the fraud of their subordinates. This prevents twenty
percent of the defects.
What remains are the defects inherent in the ﬁrst two points, the location of granaries are at county
seats instead of villages, and management by oﬃcials instead of local elites. These defects cannot be ad-
dressed with a change in regulations (fa) here, but must be “gradually removed”漸去 by “wise and
capable governors-general and governors”賢能督撫 (ren).
“To make the changes necessary (to remove these defects) lies with the men in charge
(ren). This cannot be solved quickly by establishing regulations (fa) that restrict the peo-
ple.”
變⽽通之。存乎其⼈。⾮可以⼀切之法。束縛⽽馳驟之者也。
They make up for the fact that oﬃcial agents administrate the granaries by delegating the tasks wisely
and only to people they see ﬁt. They do not let greedy clerks embezzle stocks, they do not let the stocks
leak to folks not entitled to receive credits from the granaries. Liu Wen does not go into detail how the
governor-general or governor are to mediate the problems associated with the location of granaries in
the county seats and out of reach for many villagers. He probably regards it as one of the tasks that a
wise governor-general and governor will solve through expedient delegation.1
1Tillman (2004), p. 127, notes that since the state-established ever-normal or charitable “granaries were usually located
in urban areas, central government oﬃcials took charge of distribution in cities and nearby towns, but often delegated
charitable distribution in remote villages to Buddhist monks.”
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The scholar Wei Xi魏禧 (1624–1681) advocates the establishment of communal granaries as one of
eight preventive measures (xianshi zhi ce先事之策) in his essay on “Famine Relief Policies”救荒策.1
The Ming loyalist Wei Xi never served in an oﬃcial position after the fall of the Ming dynasty, but a
proliﬁc essay writer, he liked to comment on practical affairs.2 To make the communal granary a “model
(fa) without defects”其法無弊者 he proposes a mechanism of mutual control between oﬃcials and
the people (guanmin xiangzhi官民相制). Wei presents granaries as a means to alleviate class conﬂicts
over resources between the rural rich and poor. Granaries are “an optimal institution (fa)”為法⾄
善 in this respect as they preserve social peace by saving people’s life and property and at the same time
fostering their sense of honor (lianchi廉恥).
In Wei Xi’s model, all parties involved have to face sanctions if they do not play by the rules. Oﬃcials
are not directly involved in collection and distribution, but play a supervisory role: “oﬃcials are not
involved in determining the amount of grain collected and distributed. They are only to show up in the
beginning for updating the cadaster and at the date ﬁxed for rice sale, when the yamen is to dispatch
people to patrol and monitor the process”⾄義穀出⼊之數，官府不預；只於當發糶時，先期
出⽰，令各坊清覈丁數，定於某⽇糶⽶，官府時⾏巡訪. Rich households that refuse to help
the charitable cause (zhuyi助義) through donation of stocks, and granary masters engaging in actions
that are “illegal and harm the public interest”不法不公 are to be punished by the supervising oﬃcials.
Criminal granary masters are to be replaced immediately. If it, on the other hand, turns out that it is
oﬃcials who engage in illegal actions, for example by exacting surcharges for private beneﬁt, they are to
be “sent to the yamen and detained for investigation”仍送官驗押.
The fact that the involved parties mutually supervise each other makes this a “model (fa) without
defects” (read: without opportunities for abuse) in Wei Xi’s opinion.
“If the power to reward and punish is put into the hands of oﬃcials, the people will be
fearful not to commit crimes. If the management of the amounts collected and distributed
is put in the hands of the people, the oﬃcials will be unable to embezzle funds for their
own private gain. This is what is called ‘mutual restriction between people and oﬃcials’, a
model (fa) without defects.”
以賞罰之權歸於官。則⼈知所畏。以出⼊之數歸於民。則官無可私。所謂官民
相制。其法無弊者也。
Wei Xi believes that regulations (fa) must be designed so as to leave as little opportunity for abuse by
the men in charge (ren). At the end of his essay on famine relief measures and on a contradictory note,
however, Wei Xi relativizes his statements by pointing out that men (ren) must adapt regulations (fa)
to the circumstances for them to be without defect.
1HCJSWB, 41:10a–20b.
2Wang (1987), p. 532. The HCJSWB includes several of Wei Xi’s writings.
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“There is the antique saying that ‘there is no miraculous policy for famine relief’. There is
indeed no miraculous policy for anything. If someone is able to react to the circumstances
when sorting things out, while others are not, then people will call it ‘miraculous’. This
compilation mostly assembles ready-made models (fa) of the ancients with some alter-
ations made by myself. But one person’s experience and way of thinking is limited. The
good models (fa) I have come up with may not be without defects in practice. It is the task
of later gentlemen to increase what turns out good and remove what turns out bad (during





The “Memorandum requesting to consider the issuance of relief funds in both silver and grain”請酌
銀穀兼賑之法疏, written in 1743 by the investigating censor Sun Hao孫灝 (1700-1760), is part of a
debate over soaring prices and the ever-normal system of the years 1738–1743.1 That overly aggressive oﬃ-
cial buying up of grain for the ever-normal granaries was one principle cause driving up grain prices con-
stituted more or less a consensus of the participants in the debate. Sun advocated a “radical” stance in
the debate.2 In the memorandum, Sun defends his plan to halt restocking of the granaries completely,
until the prices would have returned to a reasonable level. He rejects the suggestion to solve the problem
by exchanging “excessive buyers” by more prudent colleagues. Sun also criticizes that proponents of this
suggestion attempt to justify it with Xunzi’s dictum “it is men who order the state, not laws”有治⼈無
治法.
Sun does not reject the dictum itself, but rather how his opponents use it to justify their positions in
the debate. Sun calls the phrase inappropriate, an empty phrase (kongyan空⾔), in the given context.
Replacing the thousands of county magistrates engaging in excessive buying is not a feasible option.
Sun argues that “clinging fast to regulations (fa) is not helpful in the exercise of administration”天下
州縣千百，安得良有司如許；矧拘⽂法，不⾜為政也. He emphasizes the importance of both
regulations fa and men ren when putting forward his own suggestion.
“The ever-normal granaries are a good institution (fa), excessive oﬃcial buying is the fault
of the men in charge (ren). If we put oﬃcial buying temporarily on hold, we can get rid of
this problem. We must keep the institution (fa) has to be kept, there is no reason to throw
the baby out with the bath water. But we cannot but take care of solving the problem,
and we should not get distracted by impractical talk. We have to entrust men (ren) who
are up to the task with enforcing the oﬃcial halt on buying for the granaries. They have to
1HCJSWB, 44:17a–20a.
2Dunstan (2006), p. 188.
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respond to the times with shifts in the policy. This way, we can get rid of the accumulated




Zhang Haishan’s張海珊 (1782–1821) “Opinions on organizing grain storage associations”積穀會
議 puts forward suggestions concerning the establishment of granaries in Wujiang, Jiangsu.1 Zhang’s ar-
gument is replicated in Mao Hongbin’s memorial advocating the management of the lijin by local elites,
discussed at the end of chapter 2.4. Zhang links abusive practices surrounding the granaries such as ag-
gressive oﬃcial buying, forced borrowing, misappropriation and embezzlement of funds to Xunzi’s
dictum that “it is men (ren) who order the state, not regulations (fa)”. According to Zhang, the mo-
bilization of ren the local community is key to the success of any undertaking, including the operation
of granaries. Also, it is gradual improvement that leads to long-term success. To prevent the above men-
tioned abuses of the institution (fa), empower the right men (ren) and mobilize the local community,
Zhang advocates to let the local community manage the granaries: “to let oﬃcials manage the granaries
is certainly not as appropriate as letting the people themselves take care of the management”官為之
計固不如民⾃為計之為得. This suggestion is in line with the general tendency in the HCJSWB
to give preference to Zhu Xi’s communal granaries managed by the local community vs. Wang Anshi’s
“Green Sprout” granaries managed by oﬃcials.2 Zhang considers the distribution of competences to
local, non-state actors a human (ren) aspect, not a technical (fa) aspect.
Interest in the question why an institution that could be immensely beneﬁcial for the local com-
munity is so hard to establish and maintain continues throughout the compendia of the self strength-
ening period represented by the writings collected in the HCJSWXJ/RAO, HCJSWXB/GE and the
HCJSWXB/SHENG. Chen Tingjing’s, Li Zhaoxi’s and Liu Shutang’s writings discussed below express
optimism that granaries can be effectively implemented if the right regulations (fa) are adapted, while
Huang Shisan regards them as an impracticable institution because they are too dependent on the avail-
ability of extraordinarily committed personnel (ren). Chen Tingjing suggests that the granaries suffer
from an implementation deﬁcit. Were the granaries operated according to the regulations (fa) speciﬁed
by Zhu Xi, they would be an eﬃcient institution. Li Zhaoxi calls for a careful choice of personnel (ren)
and recourse to the institutional levers of evaluations (kaocheng考成) and sanctions (shangfa賞罰).
Liu Shutang argues that the men in charge (ren) only have a chance to operate the granaries success-
fully of the regulations (fa) undergo some modiﬁcations. Huang Shisan, on the other hand, contends
1HCJSWB, 39:18a–b
2It is also in line with Liu Wen’s assessment that the system functioned as long as it was managed by the townspeople
(xiangdang鄉黨) as an internal matter (sishi私事), and became dysfunctional only when management was transferred to
sub-oﬃcial functionaries representing the public hand (gongjia公家).
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that all available models (fa) for operating the granaries share the weakness that their eﬃcacy depends
on whether the men in chrage (ren) are equipped with outstanding integrity and commitment, which
makes their large-scale implementation unrealistic.
Chen Tingjing陳庭經 (jinshi 1844), an academician reader-in-waiting in the Grand Secretariat, be-
lieves in the feasibility of the community granaries.1 The problems encountered with the community
granaries, such as embezzlement of stocks, illegal monopolization of stocks by large buyers instead of the
local peasants, and inﬂexible repayment modalities, would not have been encountered had the granaries
indeed been run according to the regulations: “these were not defects in the design of the regulations
(fa) but defects in the implementation of the regulations (fa)”⾮⽴法之弊，⾏法者之弊也. Had
the management been entrusted to the local people instead of oﬃcials, had granaries been established in
more localities instead of just the county seats, and had the repayment policy been designed ﬂexible so
as to consider the harvest situation, as speciﬁed by Zhu Xi’s regulations, the model (fa) could have been
operated without abuse in the long run: “the model (fa) could have been implemented without defects
in the long-term”其法可久⾏⽽無弊者也.
The solutions of those who believe in the feasibility of state-run granaries repeat points made by ear-
lier statecraft thinkers. Li Zhaoxi李肇錫 (jinshi 1868), a censor during the Guangxu reign, regards re-
cruitment of the right men (de ren得⼈), ﬂexible adaption the local circumstances and enforcement
of sanctions as the preconditions that have to be met for the establishment of an effective system of
granaries. It is better to put magistrates in charge of the local granaries because they can be controlled
through the oﬃcial evaluation system (kaocheng). The eﬃcacy of the local granaries has to be made a
criterion for the evaluation of magistrate’s achievements. Magistrates regard the granary regulations as a
“mere piece of paper only because it is irrelevant for their evaluation”惟無關考成。故視為具⽂.2
Liu Shutang劉樹堂 (*1831) calls for a relaunch of ever-normal granaries, community granaries and
“public granaries” (yicang義倉).3 Liu comments the fact that most granaries have gone defunct in
terms of ren and fa, arguing that all three granary models can be effective with modiﬁed regulations
(fa). The men in charge (ren) only have a chance to operate the granaries effectively if these modiﬁca-
tions are made.
“Few commentators have not remarked that ‘it is men (ren) who order the country, not
regulations (fa)’. But what if the models (fa) cannot be implemented? There are histor-
ical models which can be adapted with only minor changes, models which need not be





3“Public granaries” were similar to the community granaries in that were intended to provide grain loans to local resi-
dents. See Ch’ü (1962), p. 158.
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盡同者。有已⾏⽏庸變更者。有彼此異勢不妨稍為參酌者。
The regulations (fa) ever-normal granaries can remain relatively unchanged, but the rule to sell only to
the common people and only sell limited quantities per person must be strictly enforced. The commu-
nity granaries can be reestablished without any changes. For the public granaries, Liu suggests a mod-
iﬁed model where oﬃcials and local gentry mutually check each other (guan shen xiang zhi官紳相
制). Members of the local gentry should be put in charge of the administration of the granaries, while
oﬃcials monitor their performance.
Huang Shisan⿈式三 (1789–1862) is skeptical that either state-run or state-policed can work on a
permanent basis and advocates to reduce government activity to temporary interventions to regulate
grain prices.1 Available models (fa) are too dependent on the availability of personnel (ren) that is not
just honest but extraordinarily committed. Huang quotes, approvingly, Li Fu’s assessment that Wang
Anshi’s “Green sprout” granaries and Zhu Xi’s community granaries were equally valid granary schemes
(fa) that work if the right men (ren) are put in charge and fail if the wrong men are put in charge. The
oft-cited key passage from Zhu Xi’s Jinhua shecangji in which he lists how his community granary pro-
gram differs from Wang Anshi’s “Green sprout” program do not perfectly reﬂect the historical reality.
When Zhu Xi discussed his plans for community granaries he prescribed that they should only be es-
tablished if the local community consented, that people only should borrow grain if they so wished,
that the credits should be paid in form of grain, not in form of money, and that the men in charge of
the granaries should consider the people’s economic security ﬁrst, not the granaries through-put or the
state’s proﬁt. Wang Anshi declared very similar intentions when describing his scheme. In practice, how-
ever, his men in charge implemented the policy without regard for the people’s interests, people were
forced to borrow grain, and credits were granted in money instead of grain. When Zhu Xi’s community
granaries were established all over the country after the incubation period had passed, the same abuses
occurred. In practice, the operation of the community granaries did not match Zhu Xi’s theoretical
standards. It was not free of involvement of oﬃcials and use of force. Zhu Xi’s documented later plan
to build up enough funds by charging a medium interest on credits during the ﬁrst years of operation,
and then cut the interest back to a low rate could not enough to cover administrative expenses and loss
incurred though dampness and mice, Huang argues. The reason why the community granaries and the
“Green Sprout” program worked when Zhu Xi and Wang Anshi implemented them in their own juris-
dictions was that the men put in charge were all Zhu’s and Wang’s disciples. The success of the schemes
was due to these men’s integrity and extraordinary commitment, and is no proof of the general feasibil-
ity of the scheme. Apparently, the granaries were all well-stocked through generous donations in the
beginning and then well-managed by well-off and committed masters afterwards and probably also re-
stocked from private funds in case of deﬁcits. No funds were allocated for supervision of the men in
charge as supervision was unnecessary. But when ordinary oﬃcials and functionaries were put in charge
of extending the policy all over the country, abuses became numerous.
1HCJSWXB/SHENG, 43:1a–3b.
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Some advocates of the granary schemes compared it with a micro loan policy initiated by the Duke
of Zhou and an ever-normal policy of price regulation under Guan Zhong, which reportedly worked.
The antique schemes worked because they were not permanent institutions but temporary measures
implemented only at times when rulers deemed them expedient. The loans granted under the Duke of
Zhou were occasional interest-free loans granted to people who needed funds to pay for funerary and
other ceremonies, not regular loans to be taken out by every household. The objective of the scheme
was not to generate any surplus for the state treasury. Similarly, Guan Zhong’s price regulation scheme
was not a permanent institution, but employed to regulate the market price when necessary (“an occa-
sionally employed scheme to react to temporary problems”觀時獘⽽⾏⾮常法). Ordinary men in
charge (ren) are in general not capable of administrating such policies in such an expedient way because
they cannot empathize with the common people (renmin zhi xin仁民之⼼) and only care for per-
sonal proﬁt. The combination of merchants’ attitudes (shangjia zhi yi商賈之意) with oﬃcial position
(juguan zhi zun居官吏之尊) is a bad one. People can evade merchants if they are corrupt and greedy,
but they cannot evade their local oﬃcials. Were these oﬃcials advised to implement the schemes from
the Western Zhou or Spring-and-Autumn period today, they would force people to take loans with an
interest, buy up grain when there is no surplus on the market, and sell it regardless of whether or not
this has a beneﬁcial or bad inﬂuence on the market at a ﬁxed date.
2.6 Salt monopoly
This subchapter analyzes the use of the ren-fa-polarity in texts dealing with problems connected to the
administration of the salt monopoly.1 The consensus of the ﬁve writings discussed in this chapter is that
the salt monopoly is failing because men (ren), both oﬃcials and private individuals, are disregarding
the established regulations (fa) of the salt administration. The strategies for action proposed on the
basis of this shared understanding, however, differ, with one authors proposing to emphasize integrity
in the recruitment of oﬃcials, others proposing reforms of the regulations (fa) that render abuse more
diﬃcult or unproﬁtable, or a combination of both.
The management of the government’s monopoly on the production and sale of salt was the respon-
sibility of the Salt Administration (headed by the yanzheng鹽政), one of the so-called Three Great
Administrations (san da zheng三⼤政), three functionally specialized bureaucracies that were set apart
from the regular civil administration and the military. The other two Great Administrations were the
Grain Tribute Administration (headed by the caoyun zongdu漕運總督) responsible for collecting and
delivering of grain tribute from eight southern and central provinces to the Beijing area, and the Grand
Canal Administration (headed by the hedao zongdu河道總督) for the maintenance of the Grand
Canal and parts of the Yellow River infrastructure.2 All three administrations were centered in Beijing
and their provincial arms paralleled the regular provincial administration. The eﬃciency of all three ad-
ministrations started to decline in the late Qianlong reign due to corruption and mismanagement. Inﬂu-
ential oﬃcials created sine-cure posts in these three agencies for expectant oﬃcials under their patronage
(houbuguan候補官).3 Their reform therefore became an area of heightened attention in the Daoguang
reign.
The salt administration in Qing times divided China into eleven administrative regions. The so-called
Lianghuai region was the most signiﬁcant of the eleven administrative regions in terms of tax revenue.
Salt from the coastal area of Jiangsu was distributed to consumers in Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi and Anhui.
The speciﬁc administrative setup varied in each of the eleven regions. The Qing dynasty had adopted
the basic mode of operation of the salt monopoly from the Ming dynasty, but had at the same time
expanded the salt bureaucracy in order to better enforce the monopoly, suppress smuggling and secure
state revenue. In some districts, magistrates were jointly responsible for collecting the relevant taxes, in
others, there were special salt oﬃcers. However, the magistrates were always responsible for ensuring
that the centrally determined quota of licensed salt was sold.
One common source of problems was that smuggled salt tended to be signiﬁcantly cheaper than
licensed salt, and that people therefore preferred to buy smuggled salt. In the Lianghuai region capi-
tal costs connected to the salt trade started to rise in the Jiaqing and Daoguang reign due to balloon-
1The HCJSWB, HCJSWBB/ZHANG, HCJSWXJ/RAO, HCJSWXB/GE and HCJWXB/SHENG all dedicate several
chapters to topics concerning the administration of the salt gabelle.
2Hucker (1985), p. 402.
3Mann Jones & Kuhn (1983), pp. 121, 123, 128
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ing customary fees collected by the different organs of the salt bureaucracy from the salt merchants.
What further added to the capital costs were customary fees collected by local oﬃcials and the militia
dispatched to suppress smuggling. Salt merchants passed the costs on to the consumers, resulting in ris-
ing salt prices. Salt merchants had to cope with low returns, while more and more people turned to the
black market for smuggled salt.1 This made it hard for magistrates to enforce the sale of the licensed salt
in full quota. The involvement of organized crime in the smuggling also became an increasing threat to
law and order in the countryside. This lead to a series of dismissals in the Daoguang reign, most promi-
nently of the Lianghuai salt supervisor Fuzhulong’a福珠隆阿 (ﬂ. 1801–1837) and the governor-general
of Liangjiang, Jiang Youxian.2
The most prominent reform of the Lianghuai salt administration was the ticket system (piaoyan票
鹽) enacted under Tao Zhu and chieﬂy devised by his advisers Bao Shichen and Wei Yuan in the North-
ern Huai region from 1832 onwards. The ticket system abolished the monopoly of Yangzhou merchants
on the wholesale of salt and facilitated the payment process through the introduction of tickets that li-
censed the purchaser to buy and sell a certain amount of salt. The introduction of the ticket system was
accompanied by measures such as tighter control of illegal surcharges and reduction of oﬃcial person-
nel that all aimed at rendering smuggling unproﬁtable and at rendering legal salt more competitive than
black market salt. 3
This section discusses the use of the ren-fa polarity in ﬁve writings on the salt monopoly. The ﬁrst
text by Deng Qinglin deals with the salt monopoly in Shanxi during the Tongzhi reign, i.e. the 1860s.
The remaining four texts all discuss the salt monopoly in the Lianghuai (and Liangjiang) region, and
were written during the Daoguang and the Tongzhi reign, respectively. The ﬁrst of the remaining texts
discussed is a memorial by Tao Zhu motivating a reform of the Lianghuai salt monopoly and presenting
a ﬁrst reform program that he enacted from 1831 onwards.4 The other three texts by Jin Anqing, Luo
Bingzhang and Li Zutao, written in the 1850s, all refer back to Tao Zhu’s reform. Problems in the en-
forcement of the salt monopoly in most of districts of the Lianghuai region had developed into a major
crisis by 1830. Not only did widespread smuggling negatively affect the sale of licensed salt and thereby
government revenues, it also posed a serious threat to law and order as criminal gangs became involved
in the smuggling business.
The question that authors deal with in the speciﬁc cases is whether strict law enforcement of the ex-
isting regulations will render the monopoly effective again, whether the regulations (fa) have to be
changed, or both. Previous scholarship identiﬁes three schools of reform: stricter law enforcement, low-
1Liu (2005), pp. 235–236.
2Sokoloff (1980), p. 76.
3Most outlines of the administration of the Lianghuai salt monopoly during the Qing dynasty focus on Tao Zhu’s
reforms of the monopoly in the Northern Huai region. See, for example, Mitchell (1970), pp. 80-99, Metzger (1972),
sokoloff1980, Liu (2005). See Ho (1954) for a perspective on the Lianghuai merchants. For a cultural and technical history of
the Chinese salt monopoly, see Vogel (forthcoming).
4This memorial does not yet present the ticket system that Tao Zhu developed together with Bao Shichen and Wei Yuan
one year later.
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ering the salt price by appropriate means to combat smuggling (jianjia disi減價敵私), and levying the
tax directly from the producers, which was referred to as “taxing salt at the yards” (jiuchang zhengshui
就場徵稅).1 Authors do not in general perceive of the merchants involved in the trade as a more prob-
lematic group than the oﬃcials and sub-oﬃcial functionaries, and regard their commercial interests as le-
gitimate. An anonymous author puts the optimal distribution of beneﬁts as follows: “the state beneﬁts
above, the people beneﬁt below, and the oﬃcials and merchants in the middle also get their legitimate
share of the beneﬁts”上益國，下益民，⽽中之官與商亦交受其益.2 What the author wants to
see prevented is proﬁteering of public and private agents by illegal means, i.e. embezzlement of public
funds (zhongbao中飽) and smuggling.
The theme of regulations (fa) that are inherently deﬁcient vs. regulations that are not complied with
or abused by the men in charge (ren) resonates in all the texts on salt administration discussed here.
The tenor is that effective administration needs adequate regulations (fa), but that regulations can only
be effective if men (ren) execute them and comply with them. Deng Qinglin advocates the enforce-
ment of the existing regulations of state shipment and sale in Shanxi, which he associates with the re-
cruitment, monitoring and sanctioning of “men (ren) who order the state”. Deng states that after the
right regulations (fa) are in place, it is crucial to acquire the right men (ren), local magistrates in Deng’s
case, to implement them. Tao Zhu attributes the problems of the Lianghuai salt administration to the
disregard of the men (ren) involved both on the oﬃcial and the merchant side for the regulations (fa).
Tao proposes a reform of the regulations (zhangcheng章程) to render abuse inherently more diﬃcult
to commit and conceal. The rationalization of transportation routes and modes is to enhance central
control, tighter controls are to eliminate illegal oﬃcial surcharges, short weighings and other dishonest
practices. If these new regulations were enforced, it could lower the price of legal salt and render smug-
gling unproﬁtable, Tao argues. Jin Anqing similarly associates corruption with disregard of the men
(ren) involved in the operation of the salt monopoly for the established regulations (fa). Jin advocates
reestablishing and enforcing the regulations in force during the Ming dynasty. Luo Bingzhang proposes
a six-point program to eliminate dishonest practices in the salt administration and associates the enforce-
ment of this program and the regulations (fa) in general with the recruitment of the right men (ren)
into the administration. Li Zutao, ﬁnally, emphasizes that to ensure a high chance of being effectively
enforced, regulations (fa) need to be enforceable by and executable by any man (ren), not just particu-
larly capable and virtuous oﬃcials. An important characteristic of such regulations (fa) are the reliance
on as few oﬃcial personnel as possible and as a sale to merchants as direct as possible.
The provincial censor in Shandong province Deng Qinglin鄧慶麟 (ﬂ. between Daoguang and
Guangxu reign) builds his arguments for strict law enforcement on the assertion that the current reg-
ulations (fa) are not inherently deﬁcient, just utterly disregarded by the men in charge (ren). Writing
1Sokoloff (1980), pp. 76–93.
2HCJSWSIB/HE, 20:8a–b
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during the Tongzhi reign (1862–1874), Deng advocates not to alter the current regulations for the admin-
istration of salt affairs in Shanxi province.1 His stance is strict law enforcement instead. Deng points out
that at the time of writing, the salt tax is the main source of state revenue from Shanxi province, as the
land-and-labor service tax has been suspended because of a severe drought. The administration of the
salt monopoly is not equally successful across the province, however. In some places, it is effective and
legal salt sells well. In other places, the markets are ﬂooded with smuggled salt, so that oﬃcial salt does
not sell and the revenue from the salt tax is negligible.
The root of insuﬃcient law enforcement lies with the men in charge (ren), Deng says. Many local
oﬃcials are not up to the task of enlisting wholesale merchants and overseeing the distribution of gov-
ernment salt as required by the system of state shipment and state sale (guanyun guanxiao官運官銷).2
Deng contrasts the eﬃcacy of the arrangement of state shipment and state sale in the past with ineﬃ-
cacy at the time of writing that results from disregard of the regulations in many localities. When state
shipment and state sale was still widely in force, Deng says, it ensured that the salt price was kept at a rea-
sonable level so as to avoid competing for beneﬁts with the people (yu min zhengli與民爭利). Oﬃcials
took their duty of securing the meeting of the salt tax quota seriously, not least because it was relevant
for their ranking in the regular performance evaluations. This also kept them from getting involved in
the smuggling of salt, as that would have lead to a drop in salt taxes.
Overwhelmed by the diverse duties they faced, more and more newly appointed magistrates have left
the salt business in the hands of head merchants over time, however. With the management of oﬃcial
salt business completely in the hands of private merchants, the designation of oﬃcial in charge of trans-
port (yunguan運官) is reduced to an empty title (xuming虛名), Deng says. For Deng, this amounts to
a disregard of the regulations and has lead to a number of further detrimental developments. Neglect of
oversight of the chief salt merchants or even tacit agreements between merchants and oﬃcials leaves the
merchants room to engage in illegal activities. For each certiﬁcate they acquire, the head merchants are
entitled to receive a certain amount of salt on top of the certiﬁed amount, to make up for losses incurred
during transport. Instead of contenting themselves with the amount speciﬁed in the regulations, many
merchants raise claims to receive more than double that amount. As they can sell this extra salt duty-
free and earn an extra proﬁt, merchants give the sale of the extra salt priority to the oﬃcial salt that is
subject to taxation. This is leads to a lower consumption of oﬃcial salt, which is a problem for the mag-
istrates, who have to ensure that a certain sales quota is reached. Furthermore, practices such as using
manipulated scales and adding muddy water to the salt are common among merchants, which harms
the interests of the common people, who receive less for the same price.
In order to prove that magistrates can prevent this kind of development and enforce the current salt
regulation, Deng cites two examples of Shanxi magistrates, a Magistrate Lai and Magistrate Hu. Deng
1HCJSWXJ/RAO, 50:59a; HCJSWXB/GE, 46:1a.
2Shanxi belonged to a number of regions where the salt business was under government management during the Qing
dynasty. In these areas, magistrates were directly involved in the transport and sale of salt. Ch’ü (1962), pp. 298–99.
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suggests that the two committed men were able to reverse local fortunes by counteracting the both
above mentioned problems. Lai and Hu enforced state shipment and state sale of salt by closely over-
seeing merchant operations and prosecuting fraudulent practices. Deng credits the two magistrates with
securing both the state’s interest by fully meeting the sales quotas, and the common people’s interest, as
evidenced by outspoken praise on the part of the local community for their magistrate that Deng under-
lines in both cases.
Having presented his evidence that the enforcement of state shipment and state sale is a realistic goal
and that it contributes to the eﬃcacy of the salt administration, as it helps to achieve the bureaucracy’s
goals of providing state revenue while protecting the people’s livelihood, Deng advances his conclu-
sion. He reiterates his demand for better oversight of salt merchants by the state agents and strict en-
forcement of current regulations that clearly state that salt smuggling has to be consequently prose-
cuted. From a moral standpoint, salt smuggling means tax evasion and therefore illegal proﬁt, Deng
says. Provincial authorities should therefore make sure that magistrates adhere to the current regula-
tions. They should take the exemplary magistrates cited above as example and put their energy into the
management of salt affairs instead of leaving the ﬁeld to irresponsible merchants. Deng ﬁles law enforce-
ment under the aspect of ren. Varying Xunzi’s dictum that “it is men (ren) who order the state, not
regulations (fa)”, he states that his demands are in line with “what we mean when we say that after the
right regulations (fa) are in place, it is crucial to acquire the right men (ren)”所謂有治法尤貴有治⼈
也 to take care of its implementation.
In 1830, the beginning of his governor-generalship over the Liangjiang provinces, Tao Zhu outlines
the central ideas of his reform proposal for the Lianghuai salt administration.1 Tao is more reserved in
this memorial than Deng Qinglin when it comes to making promises of success for his reform plans.
One of the arguments that Tao cites in favor of his reform proposal rests again on the view that regula-
tions (fa) can only be effective if they are complied with by the men (ren) involved in the salt admin-
istration and salt business, and that no regulation (fa) is completely immune to abuse. The problem
with the current salt regulations (fa) is not that they are impracticable and therefore force men (ren) to
circumvent them, but that men (ren) deliberately disregard them: “This is not the regulations (fa) cor-
rupting the men (ren) involved, but in fact the men (ren) outrightly discarding the regulations (fa)”
此⾮法之敝⼈⼈實廢法.
Tao sees this disregard of men (ren) for the established regulations (fa) manifested in three illegal
practices that contribute to the ineﬃcacy of the salt monopoly. The ﬁrst illegal practice are numerous
surcharges (fufei浮費) that increase the cost of salt for merchants and reﬂect upon the consumer price
of salt. Oﬃcials and functionaries in both the salt producing and the salt consuming regions demand
fees for various regular and irregular items from merchants, such as anchorage, stationaries and refur-
1HCJSWXB/SHENG, 51:41a–50b; also included in HCJSWXB/GE, 42:3a–b. See Mitchell (1970), pp. 89–91, for a brief
outline of the context of this memorial and the ﬁfteen reform points suggested in it.
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bishment of the yamen. Oﬃcials habitually demand several times their actual expenses for said items
from merchants. The second illegal practice is the clandestine carrying of large quantities of untaxed salt
for private sale on the part of merchants, shippers and their hired hands. Sellers can make bigger proﬁts
from the untaxed portion of the salt and therefore give its sale priority, selling it at favorable conditions
to buyers. This leads to a reduced demand for licensed salt. The third illegal practice smuggling activities
of organized smuggling networks. Places in the Northern Huai region notorious for being hot spots of
smuggling activity are not policed effectively, as police men frequently collaborate with the smugglers.
Even harder to control and reign in are smugglers who cross the borders with salt from other provinces.
Tao proceeds from the same premise as Deng Qinglin that the disregard of men (ren) for the estab-
lished regulations (fa) is at the heart of the ineﬃcacy of the salt monopoly. The way in which Tao em-
beds the assertion into the logic of his argument is different from Deng’s use of the polarity in this con-
text, however. Deng had referred to men’s disregard of the regulations as an argument for strict enforce-
ment of the existing regulations. Tao, on the other hand, regards it as a sign that a major reform of the
salt administration is necessary. Tao argues that the regulations of the current system are so habitually
disregarded by the parties involved that a major reform is the only way to restore respect for the laws.
“The root of the problem is actually that established regulations (fa) are regarded as for-
malities without practical relevance. Lack of discipline has reached a point where (respect
for these regulations) cannot be restored. Attempts to tackle the defects one by one with
some slight revisions here and there will not reverse this. The only solution left is a major
revamp of the statutes.”
⽽推求致病根源。實因視成法為具⽂。久之遂渙散⽽不可收拾。誠⾮區區補偏
救獘所能轉機。惟有將舊章⼤加厘剔。
Disregard for the existing regulations has become so deep and widespread that it cannot be regained
by means of law enforcement. The salt administration has to be reorganized. The statutes have to be
revamped in a way that abuse becomes inherently more diﬃcult and illegal actions become inherently
more diﬃcult to conceal. Tao sketches the scope of s ﬁfteen-point reform program that comprises the in-
stitutionalization of ﬁnancial audits and the exchange of head merchants in order to curtail corruption
and nepotism, and the standardization of scales and buckets and the registration of transport vessels in
order to prevent fraudulent practices during wholesale and transport. All non-transparent surcharges
are to be prohibited. This will lead to a considerable reduction of the price of legal salt and make it com-
petitive with smuggled salt. Tao assures that for all these measures there are precedents which can be
followed (jiu che ke xun舊轍可循), which is a point that makes his proposal superior to the solution of
taxing salt at the yards.
Jin Anqing⾦安清 (1817–1880), salt distribution controller in Hubei, proceeds from the same premise
as Tao Zhu, that the decline of the salt system in the Jiaqing (1796–1820) and early Daoguang reign is
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not due to an inherent defect of the regulations (fa), but to the utter disregard of the regulations (fa)
by the men (ren) involved in the administration and trade: “the men involved (ren) undermined the
regulations (fa), it was not the regulations (fa) that forced the men involved (ren) to commit abuses.”
乃⼈敝法⾮法敝⼈也.1 Although Deng Qinglin, Tao Zhu and Jin Anqing depart from the same
premise, Jin’s proposal is neither entirely in line with Deng’s stance of strict enforcement of the current
regulations, nor with Tao’s proposal of reforming the current regulations (fa). Instead, Jin proposes a
return to the regulations (fa) that were in place when the eﬃcacy of the system started to decline, the
system that the Qing had inherited from the Ming. He argues that if it is not the regulations (fa) that
are at fault, but the men involved (ren), it is best to enforce the old system inherited from the Ming and
count on its strict enforcement by the men in oﬃcial charge (ren).
Writing several decades after Tao Zhu’s reform of the Northern Huai salt administration, Jin reca-
pitulates Tao’s reforms, as well as two further reforms aimed extending the ticket system to the South-
ern Huai salt administration. He credits Tao with successfully transforming the salt administration of
the Northern Huai region during his time as governor-general in Liangjiang. However, Tao never un-
dertook a reform of the salt administration in the other area that was part of the Lianghuai salt admin-
istration, the Southern Huai region.2 When a successor of Tao as governor-general of Liangjiang, Lu
Jianying陸建瀛 (1792–1853), instituted Tao Zhu’s ticket system in the South some ﬁfteen years later,
it failed. Lu Jianying started to restore the old system just when the Taiping uprising began to wreak
havoc in the region. After the Taiping had been fought back by imperial forces, Zeng Guofan became
governor-general of Liangjiang. In 1863, he instituted a reform that Jin presents as a rather successful
compromise between the Ming system and Tao Zhu’s ticket system. It licensed a larger pool of mer-
chants to buy tickets and trade in salt, but placed these licensed merchants under tighter control.
The only problem that remained was that in the large ports, salt from the Huai region currently had
to compete against cheaper, but lower-quality salt from other regions. To make the salt from the Huai
region more competitive, Jin argues, large dealers have to reenter the market because only they dispose
the means to buy large quantities of salt and adjust the prices ﬂexibly. This amounts to a return to the
early Qing system inherited from the Ming dynasty. Jin claims that this system has proved its eﬃcacy
by staying in operation for several hundred years and is also the way to solve the current problems. The
preconditions for its success is the recruitment of upright oﬃcials (xiancai賢才), the allocation of an
appropriate budget, the establishment of clear regulations and the strict enforcement of oﬃcial duties.
This section concludes with one memorial written shortly after the outbreak of the Taiping rebel-
lion and one probably written shortly before the rebellion that present strategies for ensuring that men
(ren) comply to the regulations (fa). For the sake of the argument, the two memorials are discussed
in reverse chronological order. The ﬁrst memorial is a six-point program to increase tax revenues from
1HCJSWXB/SHENG, 14:1a–4b.
2Wei Yuan was working on an essay proposing a scheme for extending of the policy to the Southern Huai region in 1839,
but Tao Zhu died before Wei Yuan could present the essay to him as intended. Mitchell (1970), p. 117.
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Huai salt presented by the governor of Hunan, Luo Bingzhang駱秉章 (1793–1867), in 1855.1 Luo’s
ﬁrst point is the abolition of the lijin on salt, the commercial tax collected on consumer goods in transit
levied to provide for the provincial forces ﬁghting the Taiping. The salt lijin hampers the salt trade and
deprives the army of revenues from the salt tax, its other big source of funding, argues Luo. The taxation
of salt at the numerous lijin posts along the transportation routes renders the salt business unproﬁtable
for merchants and delays the delivery of the salt to consumer regions. This reduces the tax revenues ob-
tained from the sale of salt certiﬁcates in the end. Furthermore, most of the lijin levied from salt mer-
chants is withheld by tax agents who only report a tenth of the taxes they collect (zheng shi bao yi徵
⼗報⼀). As a result, the amount of salt lijin that actually arrives at the state treasure is not enough to
feed the armies. Luo’s second point is the enforcement of the prohibition of salt smuggling, especially
smuggling activities involving the personnel of the salt administration itself, in order to increase the sale
of legal salt. His third point is the reduction of sinecure posts along the trading routes that notoriously
overcharge when collecting customary fees from the merchants, in order to reduce the merchants’ cap-
ital burden. The same is true for the fourth point, enforcement of the limitation of the administration
fees (jingfei經費) to twenty percent, that is already part of the existing regulations. Luo’s ﬁfth point
consists of ﬁxing the price of salt on a level high enough to ensure that the salt workers can make a liv-
ing. Finally, waterways must be maintained in a good state to ensure smooth transport.
Luo presents these six points not as reforms but rather as minor adjustments meant to facilitate en-
forcement of the existing regulations (chu bi xing li除弊興利). He frames the whole solution as “hir-
ing the right men (ren) so that the regulations (fa) will stand by themselves”得⼈則法⾃⽴. Luo
urges the emperor to dismiss inept bureaucrats and replace them by upright oﬃcials (xianyuan賢員).2
“It is diﬃcult to understand fully what will beneﬁt and what will harm the salt adminis-
tration in the Northern Huai region. But if the right men (ren) can be put in charge, the




Judging from the fact that Luo spells out his ideas of appropriate regulations (fa) in some detail, when
he speaks of “the regulations (fa) establishing themselves (fa zili法⾃⽴), he rather seems to have in
mind that the upright oﬃcials help to enforce existing regulations, like Deng Qinglin and Jin Anqing
did, rather than that they should devise and institute major changes. His point seems to be that the
choice of personnel is important and that law enforcement depends on hiring superiors (ren) with
enough integrity to closely supervise the enforcement of the regulations (fa) among their staff and con-
1HCJSWXJ/RAO, 49:14a–17b; HCJSWXB/GE, 43:13a–14b.
2See Liu (1959) for an introduction of what the classiﬁcations of Chinese bureaucrats implied across time and different
writing genres.
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sistently sanction illegal actions. Following this interpretation, “the regulations establish themselves”
can be rendered as “the regulations enforce themselves” or “are enforced as a matter of course”.
It is likely that Li Zutao李祖陶 (1776–1858) wrote formulated his approach to foster compliance
to fa before the outbreak of the Taiping rebellion, as he calls Lu Jianying’s regulations enacted shortly
before the Taiping uprising the “current regulations (fa)” (jin fa)今法 and makes no mention of the
rebellion and its disruptive effects on the salt administration.1 Instead of insisting on the need to recruit
men (ren) of outstanding integrity (xianyuan) to enforce the regulations (fa), he emphasizes the need
to make regulations (fa) that even men (ren) of less than outstanding integrity can implement and
comply with. Li’s credo is that proper regulations (fa) can be executed by everyone, not just by persons
of outstanding integrity.
“There is the old saying that ‘any regulation (fa) established stands and falls with the capa-
bility and willingness of the men in charge (ren) to execute it’. I do not think that regula-
tions (fa) established with this idea in mind are good regulations (fa). Good regulations
(fa) are regulations (fa) which turn out to be executable by anyone.”
前⼈有⾔凡⽴⼀法必待其⼈⽽後⾏者。⾮良法也。必⼈⼈可⾏⽽後可稱良法。
Li walks the reader through several historical and recent scenarios from the salt administration to illus-
trate his hypothesis. For the historical part, Li draws heavily on a treatise on salt trade by Gu Yanwu
(placed prominently in the HCJSWB).2 Quotes from Gu Yanwu’s treatise provide the foundation for
Li’s discussion of Tao Zhu’s and Lu Jianying’s reform of the salt administration in the Lianghuai region.
Gu Yanwu’s treatise is a collection of historical precedents that strung together into a narrative by a run-
ning commentary. The commentary presents the precedents as evidence that strict law enforcement
alone does not render the salt administration eﬃcient and that a more liberalized system with more eco-
nomic incentives and less government personnel involved is the preferred alternative.
Li states that the historical necessity to establish the salt monopoly arises from the fact that the state
needs an additional stable source of revenue apart from the land-and-labor-service tax. A perennial
source of problems was the staff of the salt administration. Periodic overstaﬃng lead to rising levels of
corruption. The people and the state had to face ﬁnancial losses, while corrupt oﬃcials and functionar-
ies proﬁted. The lesson to be drawn from this is that overstaﬃng should be counteracted and salt should
be passed on to merchants as directly as possible. Li quotes a passage from Gu Yanwu that presents the
successful reforms of Liu Yan劉晏 (716–780), a shining ﬁgure in the Tang dynasty ﬁnancial adminis-
tration. Liu Yan reduced the number of oﬃcial personnel involved in the salt administration. He only
stationed oﬃcials at the salt producing regions and some strategic inland points where they sold salt di-
rectly to the merchants and could react ﬂexibly to changing market conditions. The success of the policy
1HCJSWXJ/RAO, 49:11a–13b; HCJSWXB/GE, 42:14a–15b.
2HCJSWB, 49:3a–6b.
2.6. SALT MONOPOLY 161
manifested itself in a tremendous rise in sales quotas Liu Yan had managed to secure state revenue with-
out impoverishing the people.
Li continues citing Gu Yanwu with his comments on his contemporary Li Min’s李雯 (1608–1647)
arguments for taxing salt at the yards. Li Min suggested that having only one tax, collected directly
at the salterns or saltern ﬁelds, would decrease the proﬁtability of smuggling salt. If the salt tax was
charged where it was produced, this would render the price difference between oﬃcial and smuggled
salt negligible. Gu Yanwu comments that the good point about Li Min’s plan is that it takes into ac-
count that the main factor rendering the salt monopoly ineffective is that its implementation relies too
heavily on too many oﬃcials and functionaries.
Li ends his selective quoting of Gu Yanwu’s essay with passages in which Gu Yanwu expounds why
strict law enforcement alone will not stop the smuggling of salt if the general circumstances render
smuggling attractive. If the smuggled salt comes from a nearby place and is cheaper and of better qual-
ity than legal salt, people will always opt for smuggled salt. This reduces the sales quota of legal salt, and
attracts criminals at the same time. With the circumstances in favor of the smuggling business, it is not
effective to operate with prohibitions and arrests. Smuggling will continue as long as the conditions
do not change, as “government laws cannot change what a geographical location renders favorable”
此地利之便⾮國法之所能禁也. Li underlines that many memorials picked up Li Min’s argu-
ments and proposed reforms, but none of them were endorsed by the court until the governor-general
of Liangjiang, Tao Zhu, was allowed to reform the salt administration and introduce his ticket system
in the Northern Huai region. Here we see that what Li regards as the most important point of Li Min’s
approach is not his idea of “taxing of salt at the yards” per se. Li regards Tao Zhu’s ticket system as a con-
ﬁrmation of Li Min’s strategy, although Tao Zhu explicitly rejected the viability of “taxing of salt at the
yards” in the Lianghuai region. The crucial points of Li Min’s strategy that Li Zutai sees conﬁrmed in
Tao Zhu’s plan seem to be instead the fact that there is a realistic chance of successful enforcement under
the given circumstances, and that the number of oﬃcials and functionaries required is minimized. Li
points out that pushing Tao Zhu’s reform through in the other half of the Lianghuai area, the Southern
Huai region, proved diﬃcult because of the many people with vested interests in the old system who
were inﬂuential enough to prevent the reform.
A big ﬁre catastrophe that destroyed part of the salt ﬂeet triggered another reform effort by Tao Zhu’s
successor in oﬃce, Lu Jianying, to extend Tao Zhu’s system to the Southern Huai region. Similar to Tao
Zhu, Lu Jianying ﬁgured that oﬃcial salt did not get sold because it was more expensive than smuggled
salt and that this was due to the high price of silver (as compared to copper cash) and the soaring extra
fees collected along the salt’s way from the producers to the consumers. To counter smuggling he set out
to lower the price of oﬃcial salt by abolishing surcharges and lowering the salt tax (tanjian keze攤減科
則).
Lu Jianying’s reform has been successful in so far as in brought down the salt price considerably, says
Li. However, the system has its weaknesses, he warns. Even according to the new statutes, there are still
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numerous oﬃcials and functionaries in place. Furthermore, the new system is similar to Tao Zhu’s
ticket system, but it allocates too much power in the hands of oﬃcials, without the necessary controls
in place. The rationale behind this seems to be the common assumption that any regulation (fa) estab-
lished depends on the capability and willingness of the men in charge (ren) to execute it anyway (and
that this readiness is more likely to be found in oﬃcials), suspects Li. But this is a fallacy and will not
result in good regulations (fa). Good regulations (fa) are regulations that any man (ren) can execute.
So the weak point of Lu Jianying’s system is that its future success depends entirely on whether his
successors will supervise its operation as closely as him. Otherwise, surcharges will surge again, salt prices
will rise and the whole point of the reform will be lost. The central government cannot be expected to
be of much help here, Li says. The court habitually fails to interfere in cases of rising surcharges, as is evi-
dent from the many cases of horrendous surcharges reported in the context of grain tribute shipments.
Li seems to equate regulations (fa) that anyone can execute no matter his integrity with regulations
(fa) that can require the smallest number of government personnel possible. For him, less government
personnel means less potential for abuse of power and embezzlement of money. This amounts to a dis-
trust in the professional abilities and moral capacities of the government personnel (ren). Li seems to
impute that the relevant authorities cannot be expected to perform their duty of oversight and control
properly, and that their subordinates cannot be expected to refrain from levying illegal surcharges. This
impression is reinforced by his hint that the court does nothing to counteract the spiraling surcharges
levied in the context of the grain tribute shipments.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the function of the ren-fa polarity in the political-administrative discourse
of the pre-1898 statecraft compendia. The statecraft writings employ fa in the context of the ren-fa
polarity to refer to what the author of this dissertation would call administrative solutions: particular
institutions or speciﬁc regulatory frameworks such as the regulations for the administration of the salt
monopoly in the Huaibei area. fa stands for control through centralized regulation combined with re-
porting requirements. Authors generally agree that regulations (fa) must be complied with, and that
they should be adapted if this improves institutional eﬃcacy and reduces the chance of abuse. Speciﬁ-
cally, fa also refers to administrative sanctions. ren refers both to the men in direct charge of operating
the administrative institutions and frameworks and to the men in charge of overseeing them in their
operation. On a more abstract level, ren does not just stand for personal integrity and compliance of
oﬃcials, but also their ability and readiness to monitor and sanction subordinate personnel to enforce
compliance with administrative regulations. Many authors underline that sanctions must be consis-
tently and rationally applied to have an optimal effect. This is why authors often attribute the aspects of
monitoring and sanctioning in general to ren, rather than fa, although these aspects imply the admin-
istering of speciﬁc administrative sanctions. For the majority of authors, fa symbolizes control through
centralized regulation combined with reporting requirements, while ren symbolizes control through
careful appointments, monitoring and sanctioning, but less centralized regulation and requirements
and instead more local ﬂexibility in implementation. Still, for some authors (e.g. Huang Liuhong),
monitoring and sanctioning counts towards the aspects of fa and only personal integrity and compli-
ance are counted as ren. As will be discussed in chapter 4, this changes altogether in the last years of
the Qing dynasty, when authors increasingly employed fa to refer to the institutional framework in its
entirety, which was then extended to comprise mechanisms of monitoring and sanctioning, as well as
education, appointments and remuneration.
The ren-fa polarity is used to discusses two important problem constellations that fall under the um-
brella of the relationship of regulation vs. implementation: control vs. ﬂexibility and sound institutions
vs. human agency. Authors discuss how to balance control through central commands and reporting
requirements (fa) with the need for local adaption and ﬂexibility of the local personnel (ren). Authors
concede that central control and regulation is necessary, but that it must be rationally balanced with ef-
ﬁcacy.1 Statements that point out that regulations (fa) give rise to abuse and cannot be relied upon are
not just the entry point for demands to abandon procedural rules, recruit virtuous oﬃcials and grant
them extensive autonomies instead. An emphasis on ren over fa in this context must not mean that an
author opts to dispense with regulations altogether. The author may rather suggest to pass the compe-
tence to regulate certain locally dependent details such as quotas to the local level.2 Authors also discuss
1See Zhou Hao’s request that only end results should be reported but not every step that leads up to them discussed in
chapter 2.3.
2See Guo Songtao’s memorial discussed in chapter 2.4 for an example.
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the role of human agency in complying or not complying with established regulations (and in making
sure that others comply with the regulations) as compared the potential of the regulatory frameworks
and institutions to decrease opportunities for abuse and corruption. Emphasis on ren points to the
role of human agency in complying with rules and implementing regulations and also to the monitoring
of subordinates and the consequent application of sanctions. While authors emphasize that recruitment
must prefer men of integrity and appointments must take individual capabilities into account, they also
recognized the necessity “to provide objective rather than subjective restraints on the uses of power”.1
At the same time, both administrative regulations and administrative sanctions (fa) must be as simple
and rational as possible so that the potential of the men in charge (ren) can be utilized to the fullest.
The writings discussed in the section on civil governance employ ren and fa to propose improve-
ments concerning all aspects of the internal organization of the bureaucracy (recruitment, appointment,
monitoring and sanctions, task structure) to increase eﬃcacy and contain corruption. Authors associate
aspects of recruitment and appointment with ren, while monitoring and sanctions in combination
with task structure are attributed to ren by somet authors and to fa by others.
The consensus of the writings discussed in the section on taxation is that eﬃcacy of taxation (low cor-
ruption) lies in creating constellations in which men (ren) are unlikely to engage in abuse. One strategy
proposed to create such a constellation is the establishment of procedural rules (fa) that render abuse
as diﬃcult as possible (for example by specifying clearly demarcated responsibilities the fulﬁllment of
which is easy to monitor and hold individuals accountable for), and performing consistent monitoring
and sanctioning. Another strategy proposed is to put honest men (ren) in charge and granting them
autonomy to ﬂexibly adapt details to the local circumstances.
The authors of the writings discussed in the section on granaries similarly underline that eﬃcacy of
granaries depends both on establishing adequate regulations (fa) regarding the operation of the gra-
naries and in putting reliable men (ren) in charge. Everything being equal, some regulations are better
than others and provide a much higher chance that the men in charge (ren) successfully operate the
granaries. Recourse to positive and negative sanctions is also mentioned but does not receive as much
emphasis as in the debates on civil governance and taxation. It is notable that authors regard the ulti-
mate dependence of the eﬃcacy of institutions on the integrity and commitment of the personnel (ren)
variously as a chance (Lu Shiyi) and as a intolerable risk (Huang Shisan).
The authors of the writings discussed in the section on the salt monopoly argue that the salt monopoly
suffers from an implementation deﬁcit. Regulations (fa) are not adhered to by the different parties of
men (ren) involved (oﬃcials, wholesale merchants, smugglers). Among the solutions proposed are the
reform of the regulations (fa) that renders abuse less attractive or easier to prevent, strict enforcement
of the regulations through recruitment of capable magistrates, as well as consistent monitoring and sanc-
tioning and a clear task structure.
The ﬂexibility of the ren-fa polarity is evidenced by authors departing from different different
1Metzger (1973), p. 236.
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rhetorical statements and arriving at the same proposal. For example, in chapter 2.5, Huang Liuhong
and Lu Shiyi both propose a similar combination of public granaries and ever-normal granaries, but
Huang’s stance emphasizes the role of men (ren), while Lu emphasizes regulations (fa). It is also evi-
denced by authors referring to the same statement and interpreting it in divergent ways. This happens
with “it is men (ren) who order the state not regulations (fa)” and “relying on men (ren) not on regu-
lations (fa)”. Some authors interpret the two phrases as a universal principle effective in administration
or human society. Guo Songtao’s memorial on the lijin tax discussed in chapter 2.4 is an example. He
uses the phrase to argue for keeping existing regulations (fa) in place, and rely on trustworthy personnel
(ren) to adequately interpret and enforce them. Others such as Sun Hao and Liu Shutang regard it as a
principle that is active in some contexts but not in others. Gao Chengling and Sun Jiagan, on the other
hand, regard the phrase as the description of a state of underregulation in a certain administrative area,
a problem that introduces arbitrariness and intransparency into the administration. They therefore use
the phrase to argue for a reform of regulations or a return to former regulations, in combination with
better enforcement of regulations.
The tenor of the writings examined in this chapter is that the eﬃcacy of institutions depends both on
adequate regulations (fa) and on competent men (ren) who administer the institution in accordance
with the regulations. No regulation (fa) is entirely safe from abuse, and there is also no fail-safe way
to check men’s (ren) integrity. Containment of corruption, therefore relies on recruiting men (ren)
who are lest likely to deviate, establishing clear responsibilities, and monitoring and sanctioning them
consistently. It furthermore relies on establishing procedural rules that render deviance diﬃcult.
3
Conditions and goals of eﬃcacy
This chapter discusses the role of three polarities, ming-shi, gong-si and li-yi, in Qing dynasty
statecraft discourse. This dissertation calls ming-shi and gong-si the “conditions of eﬃcacy” because
in discussing the proper balance of the poles, authors reason about the conditions of eﬃcacious govern-
ment. These conditions are, for example, the proper balance between formal and informal systems in
the bureaucracy, the correspondence of oﬃcial responsibilities and performance, and between saying
and doing, in the case of ming-shi. The gong-si polarity ﬁgures most importantly in discussions of the
proper balance of orientation towards the public good and motivation by private interests. li and yi are
called the “goals of eﬃcacy” because the li-yi polarity is most often employed in the discussion of the
proper goals and ends of government. The politically correct consensus is that governance must serve
ﬁrst and foremost the people, not the state. Authors differ in what and how they propose to beneﬁt the
people and promote the “greatest happiness of the greatest number”.
Separate sections in the subchapters dedicated to each of the polarities discuss the use of the polarity
in the discourse predating the Qing dynasty, sketch its functions in the discourse of the pre-1898 state-
craft compendia, and trace its use in debates pertaining to a speciﬁc administrative area. As the subchap-
ters on the pre-Qing history of the polarities show, all three polarities already played a role in statecraft
discourse before the Qing dynasty, and never quite disappeared from its surface.1
In the context of ﬁscal debates discussed in subchapter 3.1.3, ming-shi is employed to refer to the fric-
tions between the bureaucracy’s formal and the informal system of funding, as well as to interrogate
the honesty of political claims. The gong-si polarity is referred to frequently in debates of personnel
politics. An orientation towards the public interest (gong) and a critical awareness of and distance to-
1See Levine’s (2008) work, referenced several times in this chapter, from which we can get a glimpse of the use of the
polarities in the Song dynasty discourse connected to Wang Anshi’s reforms.
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wards one’s own private interest (si) is expected ﬁrst and foremost of the civil servant. How to use the
instruments of personnel policy (recruitment, appointment, monitoring and sanctioning) to produce a
public-minded bureaucracy is the subject of the debates in subchapter 3.2.3. The li-yi polarity is rarely
employed in actual debates on concrete policies, which tend to directly employ li as a standard of va-
lidity. The subchapter 3.3.2 therefore focuses on the usage of the polarity in theoretical writings. It at-
tempts to establish that the essays of Wei Yuan bridge the logical gap between conventional treatment of
the compatibility of li and yi that restricts the predicate of “righteous beneﬁt” to traditional measures
associated with promoting economic subsistence and the straightforward use of li as a positive predicate
in statecraft writing.
The theme of organizational control is prominent in the context of formal and informal systems
within the bureaucracy, and the capabilities of the “average man” appear again as touchstone of effec-
tive administration. The discrepancy between formal regulations (ming) and actual compliance (shi)
is interpreted as a sign of decline of dynastic power. Monitoring and sanctions (both positive and nega-
tive) are emphasized as means to enforce the correspondence between ming and shi.
While not all authors regard perfect altruism as a necessary qualiﬁcation for public oﬃce, free pur-
suit of private interests on the part of oﬃcials is associated with abuse of power and corruption. Mann
Jones and Kuhn (1983) assert that the central government’s “role in dominating and deﬁning the sphere
of public interest” was irreparably damaged as its “capacity to defend its realm against the assertion of
private interests” eroded in the course of the late and post-Qianlong reign, when patronage networks,
salt smugglers, oﬃcial and sub-oﬃcial personnel turned public resources (tax revenues, military funds,
hydraulic engineering projects, grain and salt distribution systems) and into private proﬁt.1
The objective that emerges from the statecraft writings is to reach a state of bureaucratic public-mindedness
that is realizable with a work force consisting in its majority of “average men” who cannot be expected
to be altruistic, but still have to be made act impartially and public-minded. The rhetoric of authors
such as Wei Yuan and Wang Liu declares the beneﬁt of the people the goal of government and detaches
it from the Mencian methods of promoting economic subsistence. They demand the expansion of the
range of government activities qualifying as “righteous”, to include ﬁscal, monetary and economic poli-
cies.
1Mann Jones & Kuhn (1983), pp. 161–162
3.1 ming名 and shi實
The basic meaning ming and shi is the “name” of an object and its substance or physical “reality”. On
an abstract level, the name (ming) is a title, reputation or status designation that is connected to certain
expectations with regard to the behavior of the bearer of the title. Expectations and actual behavior can
be in tension, as men may not be inclined or even able to match the expectations implied by their title.
This mismatch can lead to problems because it may obscure actual problems and make it hard to take
effective action. Authors therefore tend to insist on the necessity of bringing name (ming) and reality
(shi) into congruence by either adapting name (ming) to reality (shi), or by changing reality (shi) to
conform to the name (ming).
In the political-administrative context, the ming-shi polarity is used to speak about oﬃcial duties
(ming) and their fulﬁllment (shi), about the intended (ming) and actual outcomes (shi) of a policy,
about commands (ming) and their execution (shi), and about political claims (ming) and their reality
(shi). When speaking about oﬃcial duties, ming refers to the title of an oﬃcial and the duties implied
by the title, while shi can be translated as “performance”.1 shi are the “empirical facts”, the actual out-
come of a policy or the actual behavior of a person, as contrasted with the expected outcome or behavior
according to the ming.
The ﬁrst section of this subchapter presents a short overview of the ming-shi polarity and its connec-
tion to two important related concepts, the “rectiﬁcation of names (ming)” (zheng ming正名) and the
concept of “title and performance” (xing ming刑名). The second section discusses the prominence of
the ming-shi polarity as subject of theoretical treatises included in the statecraft compendia throughout
the nineteenth century. The third section examines the use of the polarity in debates related to taxation.
In the case of the ﬁscal system, ming and shi are used to discuss problems arising from the informal
system of bureaucratic funding that co-existed with formal system of funding (ming).
3.1.1 Pre-Qing political career
Depending on whether the context which ming and shi ﬁgure in is a philosophical, social or bureau-
cratic context, ming can be translated as “name”, “reputation”, “title”, “claim” or “responsibility”, and
shi as “object”, “actuality”, “performance”, “behavior” or “deeds”.2 The Mozi墨⼦ (Book of Master
Mo), a text presumably compiled between the ﬁfth and third century B.C. by a number of anonymous
1This translation of ming and shi is used, for example, by Liu Guangjing in the context of the task of the Board of Civil
Service to monitor and sanction oﬃcials’ performance or “comparing names and realities”. Liu (2000), p. 182.
2See, for example, Creel (1970), Graham (1978), Makeham (1994), Liu (2000). Makeham’s primary translation of ming
and shi is “name” and “actuality”. Liu translates the polarity as “responsibility” and performance”. Creel (1970), pp. 82–83,
points out that the term ming had a multitude of meaning in the texts of the Warring State period, and that it was some-
times intentionally used in more than one sense in one passage. He suggests the translations “name”, “speech”, “reputation”
and “title” for ming, and “reality”, “actual conduct” and “actual performance” for shi. Creel suggests the basic translations
“name” and “object”.
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authors1, discusses ming and shi in the context of remarks on the nature of knowledge. It lists ming
and shi as two of four objects of knowledge: ming, shi, he合 (“how to relate”) and wei為 (“how to
act”). Knowledge starts with names that relate to objects and is completed in action.
“What something is called by is its ‘name’ (ming); what is so called is the ‘object’ (shi).
The mating of name and object is ‘relating’. To intend and to perform is to ‘act’.”2
所以謂，名也。所謂，實也。名實耦，合也。志⾏，為也。3
The Mozi associates ming with the terms of a language, and shi as objects referred to with the terms.4
The Mohist or Neo-Mohist view played a formative role for Xunzi’s theory of naming that he devel-
oped on the basis of the Confucian zhengming thinking, both discussed below. Xunzi’s theory in turn
inﬂuenced the thought of his student Han Fei about xing ming (“title and performance”).5
Yan Zhitui’s顏之推 (531–591) Yanshi jiaxun顏⽒家訓 (Family Instructions of the Yan Clan) com-
piled in the Sui dynasty contains a chapter on “Name and actuality” (ming shi名實) which deals with
the polarity in a social context. It relates to ming as a person’s reputation and shi as a person’s behavior.
“Reputation (ming) and behavior (shi) are like an appearance and its reﬂection in a mir-
ror. A person who is morally honest and capable will have a good reputation (ming). A
person with good looks will have a pleasant mirror image. If someone who does not culti-
vate his own character and behavior expects to enjoy a good reputation in society, it is as if
someone with an unattractive appearance blames the mirror for his nasty mirror image.”
名之與實，猶形之與影也。德藝周厚，則名必善焉。容⾊姝麗，則影必美焉。今
不修⾝，⽽求令名於世者，猶貌甚惡，⽽責妍影於鏡也。6
The Guanzi管⼦ (Book of Master Guan) is repository of pre-Han or early Han literature of various
kinds, including realist or pragmatic politico-philosophical writings.7 It deals with the polarity in the
political-administrative context and speaks about ming as an oﬃcial’s title and the duties connected to
the title, and shi as the performance of these duties.
“The performance of duties (shi) should be monitored for its correspondence with the
title (ming). The title of an oﬃce (ming) should be assigned according to the actual duties
to be performed (shi). Title (ming) and performance (shi) give rise to each other and
mutually deﬁne each other. If they match up, there is order, if they do not match up, there
is chaos.”
1Johnston (2010), p. xxvi
2Translation following Graham (1978), p. 352.
3Mo & Sun (1907), p. 256.
4See also Graham (1989), pp. 137–155, and Makeham (1994), pp. 51ff, on Mohist theories of naming.
5Makeham (1994), pp. 51, 67
6Yan & Zhao (1928), p. 86.
7Rickett (2001), p. 3.
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修名⽽督實，按實以定名，名實相⽣，反相為情。名實當則治，不當則亂。1
Two pre-Han doctrines intimately related with the ming-shi polarity are xing ming (“performance
and title”) and zheng ming (“rectiﬁcation of names”). Previous scholarship disagrees as to which of
the two theories originated earlier and inﬂuenced the other one.2 The notion of zheng ming appears
in the Lunyu論語 (Analects). A common interpretation of zheng ming is that it is closely connected
to the idea of stable social relationships. It is used when it comes to making people follow instructions
properly, carry out tasks or perform social roles. Social roles come with a set of responsibilities or rules
of interaction that one’s own behavior must conform to, and with certain entitlements and treatment
to expect from other roles. The bearer of a role (ming) can only enjoy the entitlements if his behaviors
matches the rules. Confucius’ statement in the Analects that the pivotal precondition of good govern-
ment is “that the prince is prince, the minister minister, the father father and the son son”君君、⾂⾂、
⽗⽗、⼦⼦ can be read as a sequence of ming-shi pairs (ming-shi ming-shi ming-shi ming-shi).
A person with a certain title or status (ming) should observe the responsibilities that come with that
role in his actual performance (shi).3 For example, a parent can only be expected to be treated as parent
if the behavior of the parent matches the responsibilities of a parent towards a child. Another oft-cited
example is Mengzi’s assertion not to have heard of “regicide” in connection with the assassination of the
tyrannical King Zhou of Shang.4
Similar to the Mohists, Xunzi regarded ming as the names of particular objects (shi). Naming in-
troduces social, political and moral distinctions. The classical examples of systems of names are the ter-
minologies for titles of nobility and with respect to ritual and etiquette. Names have no intrinsic ap-
propriateness but are ordained (by the ruler) and then become established custom. They can both be
neologisms created to meet the exigencies of the times and circumstances or be “creatively culled from
tradition”. There are good and bad systems of names. The social, political and moral distinctions intro-
duced by a system of names should ensure social cohesion and political order. Introducing a system of
names does not just imply the invention of designations but also the demarcation of objects in the ﬁrst
place. The sage kings created names and distinguished objects in order to ensure that their intentions
were conveyed clearly and the Way could be carried out.5
Han Fei appropriated the ming-shi polarity to reﬁne Shen Buhai’s theory of xing ming. Makeham
(1994) regards Han Fei’s ideas as the “third phase in the application of nominal prescriptivism to polit-
ical philosophy”, of which the Analect’s “rectiﬁcation of names” represents the ﬁrst phase. The ideas
of Han Fei’s teacher Xunzi on the correct use of names act as Han Fei’s stepping stone and represents
the second phase. The central idea of Shen Buhai’s and Han Fei’s theory of xing ming is that the perfor-
mance of an oﬃcial should match his oﬃcial title and his own words, and be in accordance with laws
1Guan & Zhu (1619), p. 510.
2Graham (1989), p. 284.
3He (n.d.), p. 106. See also Cheng (1974), pp. 64–74.
4Meng & Li (2000), p. 64.
5Makeham (1994), pp. 57–63.
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and commands (all subsumed under ming). Shen Buhai and Han Fei are associated with Legalist and
the Huang-Lao school of thought that was popular during the Warring States period and came to domi-
nate political discourse in the ﬁrst century after the founding of the Han dynasty in 206 B.C.1
In a passage of the Han Feizi the author (probably Han Fei himself) writes:
“Shen Pu-hai talked of ‘methods’ [...]. His ‘methods’ were to confer oﬃce according to
ability, to hold the actual performance (shi) accountable to the oﬃcial’s title (ming, alter-
natively: his claims), to keep in his own hand the power of life and death, and to examine
the ability of the various oﬃcials; this is controlled by the ruler.”
今申不害⾔術 [...]術者，因任⽽授官，循名⽽責實，操殺⽣之柄，課群⾂之能
者也，此⼈主之所執也。2
Shen Buhai’s “methods” consisted of the checking systems sketched by Han Fei and accountability con-
stituted their central principle. According to Han Fei, these methods enable the ruler to “ensure that
only those competent would be admitted to, remain in, or be promoted in oﬃce”.3
“If the ruler wishes to prohibit treachery, he should observe the congruence of people’s ac-
tions (xing刑) and claims (ming). This is equivalent to the congruence of words (yan⾔)
and tasks (shi事). Based on the words of an oﬃcial, the ruler assigns him tasks and evalu-
ates his performance only on the basis of these tasks. If the performance does justice to the
tasks, and the tasks therefore do justice to the oﬃcial’s words, the oﬃcial is rewarded. If
the performance does not do justice to the tasks, and the tasks therefore do not do justice




The expression xing ming was in use until the Han dynasty in connection to concerns of personnel
control. It later dropped out of use, perhaps because of its simultaneous association with Shang Yang
1The Shiji史記 associates Shen Buhai and Han Fei with the Huang-Lao school and also counts Shen Dao among its
adherents. Concerning the association of Shen Buhai with the Legalist school or fajia, Creel assumes the fajia principally
developed from two fourth-century schools, the one of Shang Yang and the one of Shen Buhai. Shang Yang’s school empha-
sized harsh penal law as chief instrument of government. Shen Buhai’s school was indifferent if not opposed to harsh penal
law, and rather emphasized the role of the ruler and the methods by which he could organize and control the bureaucracy.
Due to reasons unclear, however, “[h]istory has exaggerated the role of the school of Shang Yang and its ideas, while that
of Shên Pu-hai is almost forgotten. Yet there is clear evidence that the latter school played an important role well into For-
mer Han times, and possibly even later. It is by no means certain that the impact of the ideas of Shang Yang upon Chinese
institutions has been as great as that of the philosophy of Shên Pu-hai.” Creel (1970), p. 93.
2Han & Chen (1992), p. 76. Translation following Creel (1970), p. 82, and Makeham (1994), p. 68.
3Makeham (1994), p. 68.
4Makeham (1994), p. 72, argues that ming should be translated as “claim” in this case because the ruler assigns tasks
based on what an oﬃcial claims with his words what jobs he is capable of performing. However, as the assigning of tasks is
connected with the conferring of oﬃcial titles and entitlements, “title” also seems legitimate.
5Han & Chen (1992), p. 181.
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or the negative connotation of xing which could also refer to corporal punishment.1 Phrases including
the ming-shi polarity, however, such as “holding actual performance (shi) accountable to the oﬃcial’s
title (ming, alternatively: his claims)”循名⽽責實 and Han Xuandi’s漢宣帝 (91–48 B.C.) appeal to
“observe the correspondence of name (ming) and reality (shi)”綜核名實 remained in use. “observing
the correspondence of name (ming) and reality (shi)” is one of two loci classici from the Book of Han
(Hanshu漢書) that appear time and again in the writings of the compendia. The phrase appears in Ban
Gu’s praise at the end of the biography of Han Xuan Di. When praising Han Xuandi’s domestic pol-
icy, Ban Gu writes that the emperors eﬃcient bureaucratic evaluation system brought about scholarly
progress and social peace.
“During the Xiaoxian reign (of emperor Xuandi), one could be sure that achievements
would be rewarded and crime would be punished. Scholars of administration, literature
and jurisprudence all reﬁned their competences and perfected their skills. Craftsmanship
and technology reached an unsurpassed level. And oﬃcials also did a good job, so that the
people could pursue their daily business in peace.”
孝先之治，信賞必罰，綜核名實。政事、⽂學、法理之⼠咸精其能，⾄於技巧。
⼯匠、器械，⾃元、成間鮮能及之。亦⾜以知吏稱其職，民安其業也。2
Han Xuandi was reportedly a reader of Shen Buhai’s writings, an author his great-grandfather Wudi
had oﬃcially blacklisted after declaring Ru thought (rushu儒術) the national creed.3
The second locus classicus from the Book of Han is the phrase “answer to Heaven with substantial
(shi) action not with symbolic (wen⽂, here synonymous with ming) action”應天以實不以⽂. The
chancellor of Han Aidi漢哀帝 (27–1 B.C.) tried to dissuade the emperor from following the sugges-
tion of one of his advisers to use military action against border tribes to divert attention from domestic
problems by warning the emperor that neither the people nor Heaven could be fooled.
“I have heard that the people are moved by deeds not words, and that one should respond
to Heaven with substantial (shi) not with symbolic (wen) action. The common people
cannot be fooled, and much less so the spirits in Heaven!”
⾂聞動民以⾏不以⾔，應天以實不以⽂。下民微細，猶不可詐，況於上天神明
⽽可欺哉！4
3.1.2 Functions in Qing statecraft discourse
In the writings collected in the statecraft compendia, the ming-shi polarity is used to point to deﬁcits
in the implementation or enforcement of regulations. It is also used to criticize intentionally delusive
1Creel (1970), pp. 87–90.
2Ban & Yan (n.d.), p. 168.
3Creel (1970), p. 87.
4Ban & Yan (n.d.), p. 1357.
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speech and indicate that claims do not match actions. The authors of the writings use the term ming
to refer to an oﬃcial title, status, reputation, command (legislation) or claim, and the expected actions,
responsibilities or duties associated with it (what someone is expected to do). shi refers to actual per-
formance (what someone is really doing) of the bearer of the title, status, reputation or the receiver of
the command, that may or may not conform with the expectations. The polarity is also used to point to
corruption and subversion of the formal systems of government by informal systems.
Zhou (2014) furthermore suggests that in the political-administrative context, the ming-shi repre-
sents a means for speaking about the relation between symbolic power and actual power.1 Although
the emperor had absolute symbolic power, he had to yield considerable power to the different local lev-
els of the bureaucratic hierarchy most of the time. This power sharing was not entirely formally ﬁxed,
but instead mostly based on informal consensus. Zhou (2014) argues that the relationship of ming and
shi entailed “mechanisms of transformation between formal and informal imperial power”, and sug-
gests that there were primarily two mechanisms. At times, the central government granted autonomy
(actual power) to the local administration, while holding up the absolute power (symbolic power) of
the emperor (yi ming dai shi以名代實). The intention of such a move was to protect the emperor’s
authority, while granting the local administration a reasonable amount of ﬂexibility in their decisions
and actions. This in turn was thought to reﬂect back positively on imperial authority, provided that it
resulted in increased eﬃciency of the local administration. At other times, the central government took
back autonomy from local administration in order to strengthen the power of the center (yi shi zheng
ming以實正名). The intention of such moves was to reduce abuse in the short term, but could affect
ﬂexibility of the local administration and overall outcomes negatively in the middle to long term.2 Zhou
(2014) argues that in light of the consensus that the symbolic power of the central was not to be ques-
tioned, exact correspondence of formal (ming) and informal power (shi) did not necessarily represent
an ideal balance because it unduly limited the discretion of local agents.3
The authors of the writings collected in the statecraft compendia use the ming-shi polarity to phrase
complaints about institutional ineﬃcacy, and sometimes also intransparency and hypocrisy. A title, reg-
ulation, command or claim (ming) comes with an associated set of rules, norms or expectations, that
may or may not be complied with in practice (shi). A rule is effective if the majority of people, includ-
ing oﬃcialdom, obeys it4, that is, if behavior (shi) conforms to legislation (ming). Authors present
institutional ineﬃcacy as either the result of intentional abuse (bi弊) or as being caused by impersonal
forces and defects (also called bi弊), and therefore associate it with either ren or fa. For example, if a
tax item is not in correspondence with tax payers’ ﬁnancial capacities, this may be either due to corrup-
1Zhou (2014), pp. 119–127
2Note that Kiser & Tong’s (1992) meta-language referred to in chapter 2.2 employs the terms autonomy and power in
a slightly different way. They contrast nominal autonomy with actual power where Zhou (2014) contrasts nominal power
with actual autonomy. Kiser & Tong (1992), p. 301. It is therefore better to stick to the terms of symbolic and actual power.
3Zhou (2014), p. 125.
4This is also the position of legalis positivism, see the deﬁnition of “eﬃcacy” in Hart (1961).
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tion or tax evasion on the part of some oﬃcials or tax payers (ren), or due to unfair ﬁscal legislation
(fa). Regulations may not have the intended effect due to intentional neglect of oﬃcial duties, non-
compliance to regulations, or withholding of information on the part of the ren.
Authors indicate this kind of “overt compliance and covert deviance”陽奉陰違with expressions
such as “although implemented in name (ming), (the command) is never implemented in actuality
(shi)”名雖奉⾏，實未曾⾏.1 For example, if the yanglian payments (lit.: “encouraging honesty” or
“nurturing incorruptibility”) to local magistrates do not cover their actual expenses, “the yanglian pay-
ment ‘nurtures incorruptibility’ in name (ming), but in reality (shi) it nurtures corruption”是養廉者
其名⽽養不廉者其實也.2 Another example is the policy of sale of oﬃce, which Feng Guifen regards
as inherently ﬂawed. In oﬃcial statements, Feng says, “the government wants to recruit persons who
are eager to promote the public good and and who cherish righteousness to confer them oﬃcial titles
(ming)”上以急公好義為招，特假以為名. The people attracted to this kind of call, however, are
mostly persons “interested in huge returns from their investment, so this is what they strive for in reality
(shi)”下以利市三倍為券，將務求其實.3 Instead of promoting the public good, the purchasers of
oﬃce exploit the people to enrich themselves, says Feng.
Authors use the ming-shi polarity to suggest how responsibilities are shared in the case of adminis-
trative ineﬃcacy, for example, whether higher instances should have been more proactive in adapting
regulations or observing compliance or whether the men in charge at the local level are to blame. The
ming-shi polarity is often connected to a series of moral implications or charges. Irresponsibility or
imprudence in the implementation or making of regulations leads to injustice (for example, an unfair
distribution of ﬁnancial liabilities). This may in turn lead to a loss of trust in the government. When
using ming and shi, an author constructs both the “is” (shi) and “ought” (ming) of a particular case.
Authors use ming and shi to argue for their own versions of a story and to contest accounts of reality
that differ from their own representation of things. An example is Zhong Peixian’s鍾佩賢 (ﬂ. 1860–
1882) memorial criticizing a discrepancy between ming and shi in connection to the Tongzhi emperor’s
“soliciting the free airing of views”廣開⾔路, an invitation to high oﬃcials to submit constructive
critique of the current state of affairs.4 In the memorial, Zhong criticizes the court for not reacting to
Woren’s倭仁 (1804–1871) critique of the establishment Tongwenguan同⽂館 (School of Combined
Learning), a school for Western learning attached to the Zongli Yamen總理衙⾨ (Oﬃce in Charge of
Foreign Affairs), extending the institution instead of decreasing its funding or abolishing it. Zhong is ef-
fectively implying that the implication of “soliciting the free airing of views” must be to implement any
suggestion that is “aired”, at least if it is aired by such a respectable person as Woren. Another example
is Sun Jiagan’s defense of the regularization of the meltage fee discussed in section 3.1.3. Sun argues that
the opponents of the policy are making claims (ming) about the policy’s negative effects that do not
1HCJSWB, 16: 34a–b
2HCJSWB, 17:30a–31b.
3HCJSWXB/GE, 18:2a–b; also included in HCJSWXB/SHENG, 21:5a–6b; HCJSWTB/SHAO, 32:1a–b.
4HCJSWXB/GE, 12:7b.
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correspond to reality (shi).
The ming-shi polarity receives the most theoretical attention in the pre-1898 compendia of all po-
larities discussed. The HCJSWB, HCJSWXJ/RAO, HCJSWXB/GE and the HCJSWXB/SHENG all
include several short treatises dedicated to discussing the nature of ming and shi. The remainder of
this section dicusses several of the treatises. The ﬁrst three essays, by Zhang Shiyuan, Zhu Qi and Gao
Yandi, present a spectrum of uses of the ming-shi polarity. The ﬁnal two writings, by Huang Juezi and
Wang Boxin, present two strategies of achieving the correspondence of ming and shi. Huang Juezi’s
strategy is to adapt performance (shi) to make it conform to the formal system of statutes and regu-
lations (ming). Compliance to existing statutes and regulations is to be achieved through consistent
monitoring and sanctioning, and through education. Wang Boxin, on the other hand, appeals to adapt
the formal system of statutes and regulations (ming) to performance (shi). More precisely, Wang opts
to improve compliance with statutes and regulations by adapting them to the capabilities of the average
man (zhongren).
Zhang Shiyuan and Gao Yandi use ming and shi to discuss the eﬃcacy of the formal order, that it
is, basic statutes and regulations as well as ritual. In Zhang’s essay, ming refers to both the title of an
oﬃcial, well as to the duties or responsibilities connected to the title, including the duty to comply to
commands and regulations. This is also one of Gao Yandi’s uses of the polarity. In addition, Gao Yandi
uses ming to refer to the formal institutional framework of the state in its entirety, including regula-
tions, oﬃcial titles and ritual order. Gao uses shi to refer to the actual power of a state and the material
foundation of this power, achievements in ﬁelds such as military and agriculture. Both Gao Yandi and
Zhu Qi also employ ming and shi to discuss the responsibilities or expectations that come with a cer-
tain status or reputation.
In the essay “Discussion of ming and shi”名實論, Zhang Shiyuan張⼠元 (ﬂ. 1800) discusses the
relationship between commands and regulations on the one hand and the duties of an oﬃcial on the
other hand.1 In Zhang’s eyes, the true mandate or vocation (ming) of an oﬃcial does not consist in fol-
lowing commands and regulations (geling格令) to the letter.
Zhang insists that oﬃcials should be evaluated according to their actual achievements (shi) in per-
forming their oﬃcial duties (ming). Performing oﬃcial duties is not, however, equivalent to meticu-
lously following commands without regard for the bigger picture, Zhang says. What Zhang seems to
criticize here are cases where oﬃcials do not engage in an action that would be the right course of action
because they don’t see a regulation that explicitly allows them to do so. “If someone is completely re-
stricted by what is speciﬁed as commands and regulations and cannot depart a bit from this, then this
may seem right in theory (ming), but is actually wrong in practice (shi)”若限於格令⽽不可稍變
者。按其名則是，究其實則⾮也. Most oﬃcials only act if they can ﬁnd a precedent (li例) for a
1HCJSWB, 11:26q–28b
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decision, and remain inactive if not in order to “avoid suspicion” (bixian避嫌) of acting counter to the
administrative regulations.Truly heroic (mingyi明毅) oﬃcials act even if there is no precedent and they
have to exceed their personal authority to do what is truly beneﬁcial for the state and the people.
Zhang Shiyuan outlines a number of historical examples of Han oﬃcials outstepping their own com-
petencies in faking or ignoring imperial commands to prevent famines, save the lives of innocent con-
victs, and prevent senseless war. Zhang concludes that oﬃcials should have embrace their responsibili-
ties instead of neglecting them in order to be on the safe side.
“The right way of personnel management is therefore to check the correspondence of the
title (ming, title and the duties connected to the title, such as the duty complying to ba-
sic statutes and regulations) of an oﬃcial and his actual performance (shi). This way it
becomes possible to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal and superior from inferior oﬃ-
cials. This way the court will be able to employ its civil servants to real effect.”
是故⽤⼈之道。在核其名實⽽已。名實既核。則忠佞與優劣俱⾒。⽽朝廷可以
收⼈才之實效矣。
Zhu Qi’s朱琦 (1803–1861) “On ming and shi”名實說 is included in both the HCJSWXB/GE and
the HCJSWXB/SHENG.1 The essay discusses reputation (ming) as a reﬂection of actual performance
(shi).2 According to Zhu, performance (shi) is assessed by observing someone’s actions and behavior
(xing⾏) and evaluating whether it is useful (you yong有⽤). Based on this criterion, Zhu argues that
the personal traits of prudence (jinhou謹厚), modesty (lianjing廉靜) and yieldingness (tuirang退讓),
that are generally regarded as the characteristics of the “great man” (daren⼤⼈) qualiﬁed to hold oﬃce,
are really the characteristics of the “petty villager” (xiangqu鄉曲). The vocation of the “great man” is
to ensure order and peace, Zhu says. He needs resolution, steadfastness, political integrity and must be
resilient against critique. He must not give up long-term plans that might not be initially popular with
everyone out of anxiety about his personal convenience and the security of his oﬃcial position.
Due to the immense requirements placed on the great man, not everybody can be a great man. The
real problem, however, is that many men strive for a reputation of being prudent, upright and yielding,
because they see it as an innocuous and convenient way to gain a reputation of being a “great man” and
gaining or maintaining their oﬃcial position. These three qualities are of little use when these men are
faced with great decisions but cannot or do not dare to act the right way and cannot or do not dare to
speak the truth, says Zhu. In this moment, it will become clear that there is a deﬁcit of oﬃcials who do
not shirk away from denouncing uncomfortable truths and able to make long-term plans. In antiquity,
being a great man equally was not everybody’s vocation. But even people with a personal fault such as
being greedy, arrogant or lacking self-restraint could still be put to use in government on the basis of
1Another exception are a number of essays from Feng Guifen’s Jiaobinlu kangyi校邠廬抗議 (Counterproposals from
the Jiaobin Studio)
2HCJSWXB/GE, 20:1a; HCJSWXB/SHENG, 23:1a–2a.
3.1. MING 名 AND SHI 實 177
their other talents. The greedy, arrogant or unrestrained today are worse. They pretend not to be greedy,
arrogant or lack self-restraint and then turn out to be of no use at all because their claims (ming) are
twice removed from the reality (shi) of the “great man”.
The HCJSWXB/SHENG includes a treatise by Gao Yandi⾼延第 (1823–1886), editorial assistant
in the Hanlin Academy, entitled “Discussion of ming and shi”名實論. The HCJSWXB/SHENG
divides Gao’s into three parts. The ﬁrst part is included in the chapter “On learning”原學, while the
other two parts are included in the chapter “On government” (Yuan zhi原治).1 Gao proceeds from the
responsibility of the scholar-oﬃcial to engage in solid learning to the formal order and actual power of
the state and ﬁnally to the evaluation of oﬃcials according to their performance in fulﬁlling their oﬃcial
duties.
Gao’s ﬁrst essay deals with the responsibility of the individual scholar-oﬃcial to engage in solid learn-
ing and develop the theoretical grasp and practical knowledge necessary to fulﬁll his duties towards so-
ciety and state. ming is the title of a professional vocation, often inherited from father to son, such as
craftsman, merchant, peasant, scholar-oﬃcial.2 The various professions all have in common that they
aim for creating something useful (youyong有⽤), Gao says. This is what is meant by actual or solid
(shi). shi is solid performance: not just doing one’s job but doing it solidly because one disposes of all
necessary professional skills. Craftsmen have to know how to use their tools to build implements, appli-
ances or buildings. Merchants have to be able to estimate the worth of goods, know how to calculate a
surplus, understand ﬁnancial matters and react to customer demand. Peasants need to be able to distin-
guish different kinds of soil and crops and know how to maximize yields by observing the right timing.
A scholar-scholar has to know how to act appropriately, understand past and present and the essence of
government and has to take up responsibilities and fulﬁll them.
While the other professional groups more or less fulﬁll the criterion of doing a solid job and manage
to keep ming and shi not too far apart, the scholars fail in this regard. They practice the skills neces-
sary to compose examination essays but do not spend time to acquire an independent moral stance,
broad understanding of the world or the ability to be a moral guide for others. They read their copies
of the commented ﬁve classics and four books to prepare for the examination but not the histories, or
the works of other masters of the hundred schools. They are not able to tell proﬁtable (li) from righ-
teous (yi), good from bad, the worthy from the unworthy, and so their words and behavior cannot be a
model for others. They do not know about rites, music, punishments, administration or military strat-
egy. In short, they lack solidness (shi).
Among craftsmen, merchants and peasants, there are few who only rely on their professional desig-
nation (ming) and do not make an effort to deliver solid (shi) work. The reason is that in all three cases
there are natural feedback mechanisms that match their professional designations (ming) and perfor-
1HCJSWXB/SHENG, 2:16a–18a; HCJSWXB/SHENG, 8:39a–42a; HCJSWXB/SHENG, 8:43a–44b.
2Gao employs the term shi⼠, “scholar”, but it makes sense to translate this as “scholar-oﬃcial” because Gao focuses on
scholars in government service in his discussion.
178 CHAPTER 3. CONDITIONS AND GOALS OF EFFICACY
mance (shi). If both do not match, they will struggle to make a living. If someone employs a number
of craftsmen, merchants or peasants, and a few of them deliver inferior work, the employer might still
accept it, but if half of them do not deliver work up to the standards, he will dismiss them. Bad perfor-
mance of a craftsman, merchant or peasant only affects his own family’s livelihood in the long run.
If a scholar-oﬃcial does not possess the skills it takes to be a scholar-oﬃcial, it causes harm for ev-
eryone. These skills include both a theoretical grasp of government and practical know-how. Scholar-
oﬃcials should not just readily memorize other people’s interpretations of the classics, but be in com-
mand of the techniques to conduct their own exegesis of the classics. This enables them to connect the
meaning of the classics to real life and substantiate it in their own actions. It is also important to gain
competence in topics of practical administration such as imperial ceremonies, taxation, the salt and al-
cohol monopolies, military strategy, epidemiology, banditry, naval defense and hydraulic engineering.
Today’s scholar-oﬃcials are mostly ignorant of how to implement the lessons of the classics. At most,
they practice caution in everything they do and make sure that social restrictions imposed on women
are observed. If a scholar-oﬃcial does nothing to beneﬁt the other social groups, he should not regard
himself as superior to them and expect them to obey and serve him because he has just “stolen” (qie竊)
the title (ming) of scholar.
Irresponsible scholar-oﬃcials are not as easy to distinguish and punish by their superiors or the ruler
as the other vocational groups. But there are ways and means to observe the correspondence of ming
and shi for all important administrative tasks such as personnel management, ﬁnance, military, punish-
ments, agriculture and hydraulic engineering. Anyone would sue a craftsman, merchant or peasant who
deceives others. The same must apply for scholars, or else social norms will be adversely affected. Even
more fundamental is the observation of the correspondence of ming and shi when selecting and ap-
pointing oﬃcials because regulations (fa) are only as good as the men (ren) who administer them (“it is
men who order the state not regulations”), and the scholar-oﬃcials have the function of role models for
others.
Gao’s second essay deals with the correspondence of formal (ming) and actual power (shi) on the
global level of the state. ming refers to the codiﬁed institutional framework including the symbolic or
ritual order embodied in the systems of rites and music (liyue禮樂). shi refers to the realization and
effective operation of the institutional framework, as well as to the material basis of state power, agri-
cultural production and military strength. Gao describes the dynamics of ming and shi in the abstract,
emphasizing that a system of formal power (ming) can only be stable if it corresponds to the actual con-
ditions of power.
“What is maintained at the outside is the name (ming), what is cultivated inside is the
actual (shi). After there is a reality (shi), the corresponding name (ming) can attach itself.
A name (ming) that does not have a corresponding reality (shi) anymore cannot stand on
its own.”
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飾於外之謂名。修於內之謂實。有其實者名附之。徒有其名者實去之。並其名
亦不可獨存。
Gao sees three types of ming-shi-dynamics manifested in history. The ﬁrst is an occupation with the
actual (shi) after the establishment of a new dynasty, followed by a commitment to the establishment
of a system-of-names (ming) after the dynasty has been consolidated. This dynamic is exempliﬁed by
the great dynasties of the Zhou, Han and Tang. The second dynamic is an occupation with the system-
of-names (ming) in central states (zhongxia zhi guo中夏之國), paralleled by a commitment to estab-
lishing the actual (shi) in peripheral states, exempliﬁed by the Qin, Wei, Jin and the Yuan dynasties. The
third is a commitment of establishing the actual (shi) during a mid-dynastic revival (zhongxing中興)
and the decline of both the actual (shi) and the system-of-names (ming) of a state in decline, exempli-
ﬁed by the reign of Han Xuandi and Han Guangwudi.
When the house of Zhou dynasty was expanding its power in Shaanxi, attention was focused on agri-
culture and border consolidation. Its sophisticated system of rites and ceremonies and architectural
styles had not been created yet. All institutions (zhidu wenwu制度⽂物) were still of a simple and
make-shift nature. The Zhou had achieved actual strength (shi) but had not found the time yet to estab-
lish an elaborate system-of-names (ming). Only after conquering the Shang and consolidating the new
empire, the system of rites and music was established, which reinforced the stability and prosperity if the
Zhou. According to Gao, actual performance (shi) lays a solid foundation for the state. Establishing a
ritual framework of oﬃcial roles (ming) fosters the development of the state’s structure (tizhi體制) fur-
ther. The empires of the Han and Tang dynasties did not match the one the Zhou dynasty created and
operated, says Gao, but they exempliﬁed more or less the same logic.
The state of Qin was a vassal of the Zhou for centuries. Its territory was rugged and its neighbors
were foreign tribes. During the Eastern Zhou, when the rulers of central states were engaging in diplo-
macy and developing a luxurious lifestyle, the customs in Qin remained simplistic and the people hard-
working. The threat of conquest by foreign tribes prompted Qin to improve its administration and
military, and to expand farmland and increase agricultural yields in order to build military strength.
This ﬁnally made Qin so strong as to be able to conquer all other states. Instead of displaying the same
perseverance in the consolidation of the empire as had been necessary for the conquest, the First Em-
peror wanted to quickly establish the same splendor for his house as the nobility of the central states
had indulged in. He proclaimed himself emperor, built a prestigious palace, put up the stele on the Tais-
han with a uniﬁed minor seal script, and established a sacriﬁcial rite on the Taishan. But this system-
of-names (ming) was far inferior to the Zhou model and the actuality (shi) that it was supposed to be
based on was already gone. The Qin dynasty perished after only two generations. The history of the
Northern Wei, Jin and Yuan dynasty all conform to the same pattern of gaining strength as a periph-
eral state and conquering the empire, followed by gradual disciplinary, military and ﬁscal decline after
the conquest. Their actual strength and performance (shi) waned quickly and their system-of-names
(ming) never remotely matched those of the Han and Tang.
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Due to political circumstances, Han Xuandi had grown up as a commoner. He therefore had a clear
idea of the troubles of the common people and of the state of the imperial bureaucracy (lizhi吏治)
with its good points and problems, says Gao. Xuandi was able to establish strict “checks of the corre-
spondence of title (ming) and performance (shi)” (zhonghe ming shi綜核名實) so that rewards and
punishments were meted out consistently (xin shang bi fa信賞必罰). The result achieved was increased
professional competence both among the learned elite and in the technological ﬁeld. In Han Xuandi’s
late years, there was general prosperity and peace, as foreign tribes all accepted the authority of the Han
emperor. But Han Xuandi’s successors failed to distinguish loyal from treacherous ministers and lacked
good advisers, following, in Gao’s words, the “vulgar teachings of false scholars”偽儒俗學. Imperial
power declined and the mandate of the Western Han dynasty was lost. The ﬁrst emperor of the Eastern
Han, Han Guangwudi, merged administrative districts, downsized the bureaucracy and streamlined
oﬃcial communications and the tax system. Guangwudi understood well the conditions of effective
sanctions. On the occasion of a large scale campaign against robber bands, the emperor ordered that of-
ﬁcials would not be punished if they sat on their hands or let robbers escape out of fear, but that they
would be rewarded if they fulﬁlled their duty of pursuing and punishing the bandits. Han Guangwudi
did not put much energy into the establishment of palace and temple complexes, rites and music. How-
ever, he achieved that oﬃcials fulﬁlled their duties and the people could live in peace and pursue their
professions. The emperors and ministers of the late Eastern Han dynasty had no clear moral standards,
high oﬃcials pursued personal proﬁt and power, petitioners crammed the doors and lanes of inﬂuential
oﬃcials, the sale of oﬃce boomed, which lead to the fall of the Eastern Han dynasty.
Gao concludes that in a strong and stable state, the formal institutional and ritual framework (ming)
and its actual material basis (shi) should either be achieved simultaneously, or the material basis (shi)
should precede the establishment of a formal and ritual order (ming). If all affairs only have ming but
no shi, this leads to weakness and defect. Observing the backing of formal frameworks by actual perfor-
mance is easier said than done, Gao concedes. People are accustomed to hearing about the proper rela-
tionship of ming and shi, but few people really take it to heart. The reason is that the average man and
the below average man (zhongren yixia中⼈以下) ﬁnd it hard to fulﬁll their duties in reality (shi).
The ruler can confer formal titles (ming) to them which they will readily accept because of the beneﬁts
that come with the titles. But the announcement of a check of whether they fulﬁll the duties connected
with titles in reality (shi) will trigger a storm of protest that only ends if the announcement is revoked.
This is why later attempts to emulate Han Guangwudi failed.
Gao’s third essay connects the message of the ﬁrst two essays and focuses on the relationship between
the state and its oﬃcials in terms of ming and shi. The most important application of “checking the
correspondence of ming and shi” (zonghe ming shi綜核名實) is to “tell the worthy from the unwor-
thy” (bian xian buxiao辨賢不肖, says Gao. The most important step in telling the worthy from the
unworthy is the “examination of an individuals achievements and wrongdoings”考察功罪. The most
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important effect of a successful examination of an individuals achievements and wrongdoings is that
“due rewards and punishments will be meted out without fail”信賞必罰 (there is sure punishment
and reward). If small achievements are not valued and minor crimes are not sanctioned, then at some
point, no great achievements will made anymore and major crimes cannot be prevented anymore. Small
achievements have to be registered, even if the person who has made the achievement does not have a
high status and is not close to the person meting out the rewards. Minor crimes have to be sanctioned,
even if the person who has committed the crime is close to the person meting out the punishments.
Gao points out and counters two major objections to his suggestion. The ﬁrst objection is that com-
prehensive monitoring of bureaucracy is infeasible. Gao’s response to this objection is that the ruler
does not have to monitor, reward and punish every oﬃcial personally, only a few dozen people at maxi-
mum, which will be those whom he meets most regularly. Rewarding and punishing them will improve
the virtue and competence of this group of people, and it also has an effect on the rest of the bureau-
cracy. The group of oﬃcials monitored at the top can then in turn fulﬁll this duty for their immediate
subordinates, who will in turn monitor their subordinates. This pattern replicates down the hierarchy
to the lowest level.
The second objection interrogated by Gao is that the principle observing the correspondence of ming
and shi originates from Guan Zhong’s and Shang Yang’s theories of government, and is not compat-
ible with Confucian didactic strategies of subtle moral suasion, lenience and forgiveness towards the
incompetent. Gao’s response to this second objection is that it is an argument brought forward by men
with vested private interests(si) who try to fool people with these allegations. The instruction to use
moral suasion and lenience and forgiveness towards the incompetent is intended as a guide for scholars
dwelling in the countryside and not holding oﬃce as to how to interact with and instruct their fellow
villagers, says Gao. It is not a guideline for rulers and oﬃcials. Their task is to clearly distinguish be-
tween upright and crooked characters, and between good and bad deeds. They have to reward what is
good and beneﬁts the people (not themselves), and punish what is bad and harms the people (not the
ruler). They have to ensure that the same impersonal standards (fa) are applied on the local level and at
court. The emperor should not rule according to his own personal opinion but act as a proxy of Heaven
on earth. Even less should he let the high ministers at court arbitrarily interfere into his decisions. The
cosmic dimension opened up by Gao at this point with the reference to the impersonal standard (fa)
and Heaven reminds of the xing ming of the Huang-Lao theorists discussed in chapter 3.1.1. Moral sua-
sion cannot act as a method of government in today’s world. Neither oﬃcialdom nor the people are like
the oﬃcials and people of antiquity anymore. It would be inappropriate to treat them with lenience
and forgiveness. Most people are mediocre men (zhongren中⼈). It is important to register their good
deeds even if they are minor and reward them in the end, and to punish their bad deeds even if they are
minor. Moving away from the correspondence of ming and shi in exchange for arbitrariness will result
in shrinking numbers of people who do good and growing numbers of people who do bad. They way of
impartiality (gong) will end. Even Yao and Shun would not be able to govern under these conditions.
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The wicked and primitive would be able to bring doom to the world to advance their private interests
(si).
Gao Yandi is not the only one to connect ming and shi with ren and fa. Both Huang Juezi⿈爵
滋 (1793–1853) and Wang Boxin王柏⼼ (jinshi 1844) relate ren-fa with ming-shi and an effective
system of sanctions. In 1844, Huang Juezi, at the time censor supervising the activities of the Board of
Works, appeals to the emperor to “observe the correspondence of nominal responsibilities (ming) and
actual performance (shi)”綜核名實 in order to solve the most pressing contemporary challenges to
the order of the state. Huang presents the relationship of men in charge (ren) and regulations (fa) as
complementary and interdependent, and connects it to the correspondence of responsibilities (ming)
and performance (shi).
“Sanctions (rewards and punishments) are based on judgments of right and wrong. Judg-
ments of right and wrong are based on nominal responsibilities (ming) and actual perfor-
mance (shi). The meaning of the statement that since antiquity ‘it has been men (ren)
who order the state, not regulations (fa)’ is not that we do not need regulations and in-
stitutions (fa) if good men are in charge. It means that if good men (ren) are in charge,
regulations (fa) can be enforced and institutions can operate properly.”
⾂聞賞罰出於是⾮。是⾮出於名實。⾃古有治⼈無治法者。⾮謂有⼈可無法也。
蓋有⼈然後有法⽿。1
After the foundation of the Qing dynasty, writes Huang, institutions and laws (fa) were established
and enforced. But over time, enforcement of legislations declined and bureaucratic discipline (lizhi)
deteriorated. Huang connects the “observation the correspondence of nominal responsibilities (ming)
and actual performance (shi)” with the emperor’s link to Heaven and the responsibility for the people
that results from this link.
“The Way of the sage is to emulate Heaven. Heaven cherishes the people. [...] The great-
est trouble in the world is when there are nominal responsibilities (ming) without corre-
sponding performance (shi). If responsibilities (ming) and performance (shi) correspond
to each other, then right and wrong are clear. If right and wrong are clear, then sanctions
(rewards and punishments) are fair (gong). When sanctions are fair, the people are at
peace. When the people are at peace, there is agreement with Heaven.”
夫聖道法天。天⼼愛民。[…]有名無實者。天下之⼤患也。故名實正則是⾮明。
是⾮明則賞罰公。賞罰公則民志安。民志安則天⼼順。
Huang Juezi lists seven concerns frequently voiced by his contemporaries: heterodox beliefs spread-
ing among the population, sectarian bandits who recruit themselves from among the poor, the plight of
1HCJSWXB/SHENG, 13:1a–10b.
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the victims of natural disasters and the fear of future crop failures, the bad state of the army, the unpre-
dictability of the British intentions in China, and the irresponsibility of the majority of the bureaucracy:
oﬃcials in the provinces do not care about the people, while oﬃcials in the central government do not
care about their tasks. Huang argues that the solutions to these problems already exist and lie in existing
Qing law. The Qing dynasty has appropriate institutions (dianzhang典章) and laws (faling法令). The
problem is not a lack of legislation but a lack of enforcement of these “established institutions (fa) of
the imperial ancestors”祖宗之成法The operation of these institutions and enforcement of the laws
is the task of the bureaucracy. The ruler cannot rule alone, he delegates the authority of enforcement to
the high oﬃcials, who delegate the task to the local magistrates. Huang proposes Confucian education
and transformation against heterodox beliefs (strengthening of the position of local scholars). Stricter
selection of oﬃcials by provincial and metropolitan high oﬃcials can prevent self-interested, unlawful,
lethargic, and incompetent candidates from lowering the standards within the bureaucracy. Defunct
local institutions have to be reestablished and existing regulations have to be clearly communicated and
strictly enforced.
Huang Juezi provides details on how to enforce existing legislation and how to render the institutions
effective again so that they can fulﬁll their function (chengxiao成效, shouxiao收效). Huang argues
that schools prevent people from following millenarian sectarian groups because they educate local lead-
ers who in turn educate the people and prevent them from being deluded by heterodox religious beliefs.
The baojia system can prevent sectarian bandits building strongholds in local communities. Appropriate
hydraulic engineering schemes (shuili⽔利) can help resettle disaster victim and prevent future disas-
ters. Granaries prevent famines in years of crop failure. The introduction of a strict inspection routine
can strengthen the discipline of the troops and the authority of military commanders and increase the
strength of the army. Strict enforcement of existing laws with regard to foreign trade will frustrate un-
lawful intentions of criminal foreigners. By holding every individual oﬃcial accountable for the fulﬁll-
ment of his oﬃcial duties, oﬃcials will develop responsibity towards their job.
Wang Boxin王柏⼼ (1799–1873), secretary in the Board of Punishments, employs the ming-shi
polarity to demand an adaption of regulations (ming) to the realistic capabilities (shi) of the men in
charge.1 Sanctions can only be effective if if they are proportionate and based on realistic estimates of
what oﬃcials can control.2 Wang Boxin emphasizes the dependent nature of the name (ming). A ming
follows after something actual (shi) is present, just as a reﬂection or shadow appears automatically if an
object is present. Grasping the nature of the relationship of name and actuality is essential for effective
action.
“The conduct of affairs always involves actual performance (shi). The evaluation of achieve-
ments always proceeds from actual performance (shi). After the actual (shi) has been es-
1HCJSWXB/SHENG, 12:1a–2b.
2Compare Metzger’s conditions of effective sanctions mentioned in chapter 2.3. Metzger (1973), pp. 236–237.
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tablished, the name (ming) follows, like a shadow follows a person’s physical appearance.
When something continues to exist in name (ming) but no actuality (shi) corresponds
to it anymore, it is like ‘setting out to buy a horse on the market with a painting of a good
horse in one’s hand’ (antiquated and impractical methods of administration and govern-
ment).1 When the name (ming) gets neglected and the focus is on actual performance
(shi), every endeavor will succeed. If actual performance (shi) is neglected when the name




Wang posits that the most important condition for fostering achievement and preventing deviance
among the bureaucracy is not just to mete out sanctions, nor even just to consistently mete out positive
sanctions for achievement and negative sanctions for deviance (xin shang bi fa信賞必罰). It is to en-
sure that sanctions are proportionate, that “positive sanctions are commensurate with the achievement
and negative sanctions are commensurate with the offense”賞當功，罰當罪. Wang further demands
a simpliﬁcation and clariﬁcation of regulations in order to give oﬃcials a realistic chance of complying
with them: “commands should be simple and clear, regulations (fa) should be easy to comply with”是
故令簡⽽易明，法成⽽可守.2
If laws and commands (faling) are complicated, oﬃcials have to delegate more authority to the sub-
oﬃcial functionaries of their yamen (fushi zhi tu府史之徒), whose compliance is hard to control.
Because of the diﬃculty of controlling their subordinates actual performance, superiors prefer to only
control their subordinates’ compliance “in name” (ming). This invites their subordinates to conﬁrm
that they have performed all their tasks in accordance with the regulations although they have not. Supe-
riors only monitor the formal claims (ming), so the subordinates only report in terms of formal claims
(ming) but are uncommitted to actually complying with these claims. The result is an erosion of law
(fa) and the undermining of commands.
“If (superiors and subordinates) only exchange formal claims (ming), and keep each other
in the dark with their formal claims (ming). Which regulation (fa) is not eroded by this,
and which command (ling) is not undermined by this?”
名與名相求。名與名相蒙。然則法何由不蠹。令何由不圯乎。
1The locus classicus of this chengyu is the Book of Hanshu, where it is mentioned in connection of a statement criticiz-
ing that the recruitment methods of the Three Dynasties cannot be used to recruit oﬃcials in the present. HYDCD, vol. 6,
p, 588.
2Alternative translation: “if commands are simple and clear, the regulations as soon as they are deduced (from these
commands) can be easily complied with”. Administrative regulations were in general compiled from selected executive
commands by competent government agencies. Metzger (1973), pp. 167ff.
3.1. MING 名 AND SHI 實 185
It becomes hard to track down responsibility in case of failures. The solution is to simplify the content
and reduce the number laws and commands. This amounts to a strengthening of actual performance
(shi) with respect to nominal responsibility (ming), and a strengthening of human agency (ren) with
respect to regulations (fa). Wang likens ming to the nets used to catch wild animals, and shi to the
hunters operating the nets. Delegating the execution of laws and commands to sub-oﬃcial functionaries
is like putting out nets in the wild and telling them to catch animals, Wang says.
3.1.3 Taxation
As mentioned in chapter 2, oﬃcial agrarian taxes were in general relatively low in imperial times.1 At-
tached to the formal ﬁscal system, however, was an informal system of fees and surcharges largely be-
yond the control of the central government. The unoﬃcial levies and fees imposed by oﬃcials and sub-
oﬃcial functionaries created a considerable discrepancy between the letter of tax law and the actual bur-
den placed on the population. The surcharges increased the burden on the peasantry without increasing
revenue for the state.
The Qing dynasty had inherited the Ming ﬁscal system, but increased the central grip on ﬁscal re-
sources. Local levels remitted most taxes to the center and only a small portion retained at the provincial
level and below. This system ﬁxed oﬃcials’ salaries at a level much too low given to the expenses they
faced. The taxes retained originally had reserved funds to pay the wages for runners. But as the num-
ber of runners considered in this scheme had been ﬁxed at a time when corvée labor had been still in
existence, the reserved funds were not enough to meet administrative needs, and oﬃcials had to hire ad-
ditional runners at their own expense. There was no provision at all in the retained taxes for the salaries
of clerks. The oﬃcial had to pay their wages, as well as the salaries of his private secretaries and servants,
from his private pockets. Apart from this, the oﬃcials had to pay their family’s living expenses, oﬃce
equipment, travel costs, maintenance of public buildings and infrastructure and small and middle-scale
famine relief.2 They also had to jump in when the cost of centrally funded projects exceeded the allo-
cated amount, and had to regularly submit customary charges (guili規禮) to the staff of superior ya-
men. At times, the center withheld parts or all of provincial oﬃcials’ salaries and wages to make up for
military expenses or tax deﬁcits, a practice called juan feng捐俸 (“donation of salaries”).3
The need to cover the difference between oﬃcial salaries and ﬁnancial expenses and the fact that tax
raises were regarded as taboo4 gave rise to an informal system of funding. At the district level (zhou州
and xian縣), one illegal way of meeting local administrative needs in the face of chronic underfunding
was to channel off funds allocated by the central government for other purposes and taxes earmarked
for remittance. Another option was to collect funds from the people during tax collection or in the mar-
ket place in the form of surcharges (jiapai加派 or kepai科派) or by manipulating scales, conversion
1Wang (1973)
2Zelin (1992), pp. 38–39.
3Zelin (1992), pp. 45–46.
4See, for example, Sun Jiagan’s and Zhang Jie’s essay discussed below for evidence.
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rates etc. (“collecting more and reporting less” zheng duo bao shao徵多報少). One common form of
surcharge was the wastage allowance (haomi耗⽶ if taxes were paid in kind, huohao⽕耗 if they were
paid in silver) that had been designed to make up for losses incurred during transport or melting down
into larger ingots. Magistrates also obtained various customary fees from their clerks and runners. The
clerks and runners, in turn, charged the people.
Oﬃcials above the district level similarly obtained additional ﬁnancial resources by levying various
informal fees, and, in the case of the customs administration, surcharges on duties.1 In oﬃcial correspon-
dence denouncing corruption, the term customary fees (lougui陋規) was commonly used to refer to
all kinds of unauthorized revenues. In the narrow sense, customary fees referred to all fees and gifts sub-
ordinate oﬃcials sent their superiors, up to the ministers of the central government. No matter where
in the bureaucratic hierarchy a transaction of customary fees was taking place, the original source of all
customary fees of this kind were the people. The oﬃcials at the provincial and sub-provincial levels, in-
cluding the customs and salt administration, obtained the means to pay the customary fees by levying
taxes at a higher rate than authorized, and by collecting unauthorized fees and duties. The revenues thus
generated were then distributed upwards in the form of customary fees. Subordinate yamen sent fees
on occasions such as the superior’s birthday or his arrival at a new post, and on a regular basis when oﬃ-
cially dealing with the superior yamen, e.g. when delivering taxes or documents connected with account-
ing and record-keeping functions. From the names of the latter kind of customary fees it is evident that
they were originally meant to subsidize the expenses for stationary, food and wages of the superior ya-
men. In face of the regularity and standardization regarding the paths of transmission and the amount
and types of fees, Zelin (1992) calls the exchange of customary fees an “informal system of funding”.
Assessing the nature of this informal network in the 18th century before the ﬁscal reform of the
Yongzheng reign (1723-1735), Zelin (1992) and Zhou (2012) estimate that it served real administrative
ﬁnancial needs and not just the private aggrandizement of the bureaucracy. It had, however, serious
drawbacks, as its intransparency made it hard for the central government to check abuses. The ﬂow of
fees in the network gave rise to symbiotic relationships between oﬃcials on different levels, which fur-
ther impeded transparency. Oﬃcials tended to cover up each other’s involvement of the system: “based
on bribery from below and coverups and favoritism from above, [it] was this convergence of interests
that formed the backbone of the informal funding system and made it work”.2 The system included
not only overtaxation and the levying of unauthorized fees, but also the clandestine misappropriation
of earmarked funds for other purposes, e.g. using famine relief funds to balance the local tax deﬁcit, or
vice versa, using taxes to be remitted for famine relief or other projects. If a famine occurred before the
funds had been restored, no help could provided to famine victims. The central government, unaware
of the reallocation, might even demand that the tax deﬁcit be collected from the tax-paying population,
1For details on the different strategies available to imperial bureaucrats at different levels for funding their yamen’s
operations, see Zelin (1992), pp. 47–72.
2Zelin (1992), p. 71.
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increasing the burden on the common people.
Even in the absence of such extreme grievances the practice presented a threat to oﬃcial discipline be-
cause it subverted checks against corruption built into the formal taxation system. Because magistrates
contributed heavily to the provincial budget through the system of informal funding, high provincial
oﬃcials tended to be reluctant to impeach oﬃcials for irregularities in their annual accounts (zouxiao奏
銷). Similarly, they pressured new magistrates to silently accept the inventory of treasury and granaries
that their predecessor presented to them (jiaodai交代), even if it contained large deﬁcits. Board oﬃcials
in the central government tasked with scrutinizing provincial annual accounts also contributed to the
subversion of central ﬁscal scrutiny. They would accept or reject the annual account based on whether
or not they had received a customary fee (bufei部費), regardless whether the ﬁgures presented in the
account matched the authorized budget or not. When deﬁcits came to light nevertheless there was a
tendency to wave them off as “legitimate shifting funds for public expenses” (yin gong nuoyi因公挪
移).
The Yongzheng emperor’s tax reform, initiated soon after the emperor’s ascension to the throne, was
the ﬁrst Qing reform that did not view treasury shortages as a normative problem to be solved by ex-
horting oﬃcials, but as an institutional problem to be solved by replacing the system of informal fund-
ing with adequate formal funds. The reforms had no long-lasting effect, with a demise of the yanglian-
system and a return to informal funding in the late 18th century, but oﬃcials of the 19th century still
regarded the rational approach of the reforms as a positive model of reform.1 The idea was to make of-
ﬁcials able to follow Confucian values and administrative codes of conduct by providing them with ad-
equate funds. The Jiangnan tax clearance (qingcha清查) initiated by the Yongzheng emperor revealed
that most arrears were not traceable to poor households unable to pay taxes, but instead to tax resistance
by large households, proxy remittance by village clerks, embezzlement by yamen runners, and clerical
tampering with the accounts, dividing embezzled taxes among many households and falsely registering
land ownership.
According to Zelin (1992), the Yongzheng ﬁscal reforms represented a watershed in the assessment
of the causes supporting the system of informal funding. Before the ascension of the Yongzheng em-
peror to the throne, many still thought “that corruption was causing shortages and did not see that it
was actually shortages that had necessitated corruption”.2 During the reforms, it came to light that, to
a large extent, it were actually the shortages that were causing corruption because they fostered the de-
velopment of an informal funding network that was beyond control. Zhou (2007) suspects that both
institutional and personal factors contributed to the exacerbation of the situation. Institutional prob-
lems, notably underfunding of the provincial and sub-provincial administration, were the root causes
that induced personnel problems, notably the decline of bureaucratic discipline and morale and habit-
ual overcharging of the population for personal gain, as symptoms. The symptoms complicated the root
1Zelin (1992), pp. 77; 304
2Zelin (1992), p. 71.
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cause and at some point became part of the causes themselves. Corrupt habits had become so deeply
ingrained in oﬃcials, sub-oﬃcial functionaries and the local elites, that corruption continued and, in
the end, subverted the Yongzheng emperor’s efforts to “rationalize” the tax system.1 Contemporary ob-
servers therefore tended to view corruption as root cause.2
The countermeasures enacted by the Yongzheng emperor were the establishment of a secret palace
memorial system for direct communication with the emperor and a rationalization of the ﬁscal system
by raising oﬃcial salaries through the introduction of a yanglian (“nourishing incorruptibility”) pay-
ment. The pay rise successfully reduced corruption and generated tax surpluses in several provinces,
generally in those close to the capital with non-complex land-holding patterns, for several decades.3 The
reason why the reforms failed to be successful empirewide in the long-term was that they could only
affect corruption in the oﬃcial hierarchy, not the corruption outside the oﬃcial hierarchy among sub-
oﬃcial functionaries and the local elite.4
From the middle of the eighteenth century, China experienced rapid population growth and an in-
crease in commodity prices. This meant rising administrative costs at the local level, that were not ac-
companied by a rise of oﬃcial budgets consisting of oﬃcial salary and yanglian. At the same time, the
practices of tanjuan and conﬁscation of salaries (caikou裁扣) became ever more pervasive, which fur-
ther worsened the ﬁnancial condition at the district level. The system of informal funding reemerged as
the primary source of administrative funds, with funds being extracted from the people in the form of
customary fees, and part of those funds then remitted to higher levels in the form of customary charges
(guili規禮) and tanjuan. This lead to complaints that the sub-oﬃcial functionaries at the lowest level
were extracting multiple times the required amount from the people.5
The system of informal funding impeded top-down control and the concentration of ﬁscal authority
at the center. Superiors had no overview of the customary fees their subordinates received. This applied
to all levels, the governor-general and governor’s oversight of magistrates, as well as magistrates’ over-
sight of their sub-ordinate functionaries.6 Nor were superiors particularly willing to strictly monitor
their subordinates as they were dependent on the funds forwarded in the form of customary charges
and allocations.
After his ascension to the throne, the Daoguang emperor set out to “re-rationalize” administrative
ﬁnances by conducting a tax clearance. The aim of the tax clearance was to determine the kinds and
amounts of customary fees in the districts and then retaining those that were necessary, while outlaw-
1Zelin (1992), pp. 220–221.
2Zhou (2007), p. 69.
3Kiser & Tong (1992), pp. 319–321.
4Zelin (1992), p. 221. Zhou (2012), p. 150, thinks that another factor reducing the long-term effectiveness of the reform
was that the measure of converting the informal customary fees into a ﬁxed formal tax surcharge to be allocated to the mag-
istrates unduly reduced the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility of the district yamen, as they could not determine the amount by themselves
according to current needs.
5A district magistrate reports the practice of exacting a transportation fee amounting to twenty times the actual cost of
hiring a cart, horse and driver. HCJSWB, 33:32b–33a.
6Zhou (2012), p. 157.
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ing all others. The Daoguang emperor ended up rowing back with his tax clearance plans, apparently
because a ﬂood of warnings about the consequences of harsh cutbacks in the provinces began to pour
in. The intervention convinced the Daoguang emperor that the best solution was to “stick to the estab-
lished practice, but reign in excesses”因仍舊例去其太甚. This lead to the perpetuation of a state of
“mismatch of name (ming) and actuality (shi)”名實不符 in which higher levels of the bureaucracy,
including the center, had no insigh into the ﬁnancial transactions (and possibly, abuses) at lower levels.
In a situation where mutual interests in informal funds impeded top-down control and monitoring,
and institutional solutions could not be implemented, many oﬃcials favored “human” solutions, which
they propagated in the form of frequent calls for “high oﬃcials serving with utmost loyalty and lower
oﬃcials fulﬁlling their obligations”⼤法⼩廉 and “it is the men in charge (ren) who order the state
not regulations (fa)”.
The pre-1898 statecraft compendia grant the discussion of taxation ample room. Without exception,
the compendia contain several chapters on taxation in general, as well as several chapters dedicated to
speciﬁc important taxes such as the grain tribute and the salt gabelle, and chapters on miscellaneous
special taxes such as the tax on alcohol and tea. The writings in the sections on taxation are mostly con-
cerned with excessive and unequal tax burdens that result from problems related to the basis of tax cal-
culation, the implementation of tax reductions and illegitimate surcharges. Authors point out that ex-
cessive and unequally distributed tax burdens affect the people’s trust in the government and jeopardize
social peace and stability. Depending on whether the subject of their critique is the formal or the infor-
mal system, authors criticize tax regulations as being “not right in theory (ming) and harmful in practice
(shi)”與名不正與實有傷1 or that “there is a discrepancy between legislation (ming) and actual prac-
tice” (shi)名與實悖2.
The ming-shi polarity is used to point out discrepancies between the letter of tax law and compli-
ance to the law; oﬃcial responsibility and actual performance, claim and reality; the nominal amount of
taxes and the actually collected amount. Almost all cases are cases of oﬃcial corruption, while tax eva-
sion (that often involves oﬃcial corruption) is rarely mentioned. Authors who criticize an unfair basis
of tax calculation refer to the oﬃcially claimed basis of assessment for calculation of taxes as ming and
the actual, inappropriate basis of assessment, or the consequences of calculating taxes on such an inap-
propriate basis as shi.3 Authors discussing problems in the implementation of tax reductions refer to
the policy of tax reduction as ming and the fact of local non-implementation due to corruption as shi.4
Authors demanding the suppression of customary fees refer to the oﬃcial, legal purpose of a customary
fee as ming and the unoﬃcial illegal use of a customary fee as shi.1
1HCJSWB, 27:42b.
2HCJSWXB/SHENG, 34:12a.
3See, for example, HCJSWB, 34:39a–41b; HCJSWB, 33:39a–41b; HCJSWB, 30:34a–35b.
4See, for example, HCJSWB, 29:61a–63b; HCJSWXB/SHENG, 36:86a–90b; HCJSWXB/GE, 30:4b.
1See, for example, HCJSWB, 26:61a–b; HCJSWXB/GE, 25:10a; HCJSWXB/GE, 11:5a–b.
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The writings selected for discussion in the remainder of this section deal with the problem of infor-
mal surcharges. The earliest texts are Ren Yuanxiang’s essays, dating very probably from the Kangxi
reign, and the latest text is an essay by Huang Tifang written in 1878. Ren and Huang discuss informal
surcharges in general. Zhang Jie’s essay, written either in the late Jiaqing or the early Daoguang reign,
is part of a debate about the regularization of a labor-service surcharge in Zhili. The other four writings
discussed, memorials by Sun Jiagan, Tang Zhengjing, He Changling and an essay by Feng Guifen, are
related to the yanglian payments introduced in the course of the Yongzheng reforms to replace the infor-
mal network of funding. Sun Jiagan’s essay dates from the Yongzheng reign, Tang Zhengjing’s and He
Changling’s essays date from the Daoguang reign, and Feng Guifen’s essay is from his Jiaobinlu kangyi,
compiled during the late Xianfeng reign.
The authors of these writings use the ming-shi polarity in two basic ways. On the one hand, authors
use ming to refer to formal administrative regulations regarding taxation and shi to refer to actual ad-
ministrative practice that includes informal practices and their effects. This applies to the writings by
Ren Zuanxiang and Zhang Jie, as well as to Tao Zhengjing’s and He Changling’s writings. Ren and
Zhang put more emphasis on the fact that it is oﬃcials’ duty to adhere to the administrative regulations
established in te context of a policy, while Tao and He underline the discrepancy of the intended effect
of a policy and its actual results. On the other hand, authors employ the the ming-shi polarity to refute
arguments of their political opponents by pointing to a discrepancy between their opponents’ claims
(ming) and the actual state of affairs (shi). Sun Jiagan’s memorial is an illustrative example.
Focusing on the perspective of the local magistrate, the authors base their reasoning on the premise of
the Yongzheng reforms: that ﬁnancial shortages increase the likelihood of corruption. They emphasize
that solutions must be sought by considering magistrates’ actual situation (shi). The reality of local
administration is that magistrates’ income according to formal regulations (that ﬁx oﬃcial salaries etc.)
is eaten up by the payments magistrates have to make in the context of the informal funding network
and other irregular practices. To counteract the detrimental effects of excesses of the informal network
for state and society, authors do not just propose stricter monitoring and sanctioning (adjusting shi to
ming) but also providing magistrates with suﬃcient funds (adapting ming to shi). See Feng Guifen’s
and Huang Tifang’s writings discussed at the end of this section.
ming and shi are key categories in Ren Yuanxiang’s任源祥 (1618–1674) discussion of the ineﬃcacy
of the Ming dynasty single whip reform (yi tiao bianfa⼀條鞭法) by the early Qing dynasty.2 The
single whip reform was a series of ﬁscal reforms promulgated empire-wide in 1580 with the aim of sim-
plifying the tax structure and securing tax collection by reducing the opportunities for fraud and tax
evasion. Important measures were the simpliﬁcation of the land classiﬁcation scheme, the monetization
of the ﬁscal system that made taxes payable in silver not in kind, and the combination of various taxes,
most notably the land taxes and the corvée labor tax, into a single one. The ﬁscal legislation enacted in
2HCJSWB, 29:33a-34b
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the course of the reforms was nominally still binding in the early Qing dynasty, but had lost its effect of
ensuring simple and fair taxation.
Ren employs the ming-shi polarity to make his point that the whole oﬃcial hierarchy is responsi-
ble for ensuring the enforcement of the single whip measures and has to prevent actions that subvert
the measures, notably the collection of unauthorized surcharges. The high oﬃcials who establish and
promulgate regulations (fa) in a way that magistrates are forced to turn to other sources of funding are
just as responsible for excessive fees as the magistrates who order their collection and thereby violate the
regulation (fa) that prohibits the levying of surcharges. In the ﬁrst part of his essay, Ren outlines the
promulgation of the single whip reform. He emphasizes its success of simplifying tax measurement and
collection and reducing opportunities of abuse. In the second half of the essay, Ren discusses how the
system ceased to be effective in the early Qing dynasty because illegal surcharges levied subverted the
logic of the uniﬁed system.
Ren presents the single whip reform as a system that responded so perfectly to the circumstances of
the time (shi勢) that “even the sages would not have changed this model (fa), had they risen again”聖
⼈復起其法不易 at the time.1 Before the reform during the Longqing reign (1567–1572) of the Ming
dynasty, various surcharges on the land tax and the corvée tax had become so onerous that the house-
holds in charge of tax collection (lizhang⾥⾧) were starting to go bankrupt. This situation prompted
the governor of Jiangxi, Zhang Juzheng張居正 (1525–1582), to combine the land tax, the corvée labor
tax, and the various miscellaneous taxes into one uniﬁed tax. The new “single whip” model alleviated
the people’s burden considerably, Ren says, and was therefore extended to the whole empire in the
following Wanli reign (1573–1620). The main advantage of the single whip system, according to Ren,
was that it combined all the various taxes into one, and that the amount of taxes to be paid was deter-
mined according to the amount of land a household owned.2 The positive effects of the uniﬁed system
were that sub-oﬃcial functionaries had less opportunities to deduct tax money for their personal self-
enrichment, oﬃcials were provided with suﬃcient funds to conduct their business, and, freed from
corvée obligations, the common people could dedicate all their energies to productive work.
Ren underlines that the continued eﬃcacy of the reform depends on the careful implementation and
enforcement of the single whip measures by all members of the bureaucratic hierarchy. It becomes clear
here that Ren regards ming as the responsibility to adhere to the regulations introduced in the context
of the single whip reform. Ren may be even said to equate ming with the regulations.
“It is the duty of the magistrate to implement the policy. But the basis of the magistrate’s
actions are the governor-general and governor. The basis of the governor-general and gov-
ernor’s actions are the metropolitan board ministers. The basis of the metropolitan board
1This is reminiscent of an assertion in the Mencius that “the sages would change nothing of my words, were they to rise
again”聖⼈復起不易吾⾔矣. Meng & Li (2000), p. 211.
2The advantage of this, in Ren’s eyes, was probably that this number stayed fairly constant in comparison to the number
of male adults that was subject to frequent change.
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ministers’ actions is the court. Therefore, the success of the single whip policy depends on




Ren substantiates the meaning of this statement in the second part of the essay, that outlines how the
system of informal funding rendered the single whip system ineffective in the early Qing dynasty, and
how all levels of the bureaucracy bear responsibility for this failure. The single whip reform had abol-
ished all corvée duties and included them into the uniﬁed silver tax on land. The obvious condition
for this measure to take its intended effect of making the system simpler and fairer was that the people
would indeed not be forced to do any corvée labor or pay any related fees.
“If all fees and obligations are converted into a single silver tax according to the single whip
reform, but the exaction of corvée obligations does not stop, then nominal responsibilities
(ming, here: responsibilities as deﬁned by administrative regulations) and actual perfor-
mance (shi) are diametrically opposed to each other.”
條編已折差役。⽽⾥徭之科派不⽌。則條編之名實⾇矣。
But this was what happened in the early Qing, says Ren. The Qing dynasty, after its founding, adopted
the Ming ﬁscal system, publishing tax registers for all localities accordingly, and repeatedly issuing exhor-
tations that prohibited the levying of unauthorized fees. However, fees were still levied. Based on his
earlier analysis that the responsibility for enforcing the system is shared by the whole bureaucracy, Ren
points out that the magistrates are not the sole culprits, although it is them who are directly responsible
for administering the collection of taxes.
“If the magistrates are so unreliable as to not observe an imperial decree banning the levy-
ing of additional fees, and levy additional fees in spite of everything, then the magistrates
are clearly to blame. But any regulation (fa) is implemented by the governor-general and
governor. Therefore, the command (ming, here: license) to levy additional fees is issued by
the governor-general and governor. All regulations (fa) are established by the metropoli-
tan board ministers. Therefore, the actuality (shi) of levying (here: necessity to levy) ad-
ditional fees is created by the board ministers. The magistrate cannot be blamed alone be-
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It is the duty of the magistrate to implement the single whip policy in his district. But the eﬃcacy of the
single whip policy also depends on whether the oﬃcials on higher levels, the governor, governor-general
and the board ministers fulﬁll their nominal duties and contribute their share in ensuring that the pol-
icy is successfully implemented. The magistrates do not comply to the prohibition, forcing people to do
corvée labor and levying illegal surcharges. The high provincial oﬃcials, governor-general and governor
also share some blame, however, as it is them who order the levying of surcharges (Ren may be referring
to the fact that the provincial high oﬃcials request customary charges from the sub-provincial oﬃcials
here). The metropolitan ministers who deduce too much tax income from the provinces also share part
of the responsibility. The ultimate responsibility for the failure of the single whip policy, however, lies
with the court. What Ren regards as the responsibility of the court is probably to initiate or guide the
restructuring of the ﬁscal system in a way that provides the provinces with a more adequate budget, so
as to reduce the heavy reliance on the system of informal funding.
The HCJSWB contains several other essays by Ren Yuanxiang that discuss defects of the taxation
system in general and point to the urgency of tax reform. Ren Yuanxiang sees a problematic mechanism
at work that he regards as responsible for the long-term ineffectiveness of many historical tax reforms.
The following formulation of the mechanism with ming and shi appears in two of his essays and is
cited in a third essay by a later anonymous author.1
“They would scrap a tax in name (ming, i.e. as an independent tax item) but collect it in
reality (shi, i.e. as part of the combined tax), then neglect this reality (i.e. the fact that the
tax had been merged into the combined tax) and create it again in name (i.e. as an indepen-
dent tax item).”
削其名⽽收其實。復隱其實⽽增其名。
The repeated merging of independent tax items into a combined tax lead to a steady increase of the tax
burden, Ren argues.2 According to Ren, administrators applied this mechanism both to the merging
to the various surcharges that had been merged into the uniﬁed tax by the single whip reform, and to
the conversion of taxes in kind to taxes in silver (zhese折⾊). Ren regards the monetization of the tax
system as a step just as inevitable as the abolition of well-ﬁeld system’s unity of taxes per land and capita.
However, the original rationale for commuting taxes to silver on a case-by-case basis in Zhejiang had
been to make things convenient for the people in areas short of agricultural land or badly accessible areas
that rendered the transport of taxes in kind diﬃcult. Later, the commutation to silver was made obliga-
tory and the it became an oﬃcial surcharges. It was included into the universal tax with the single whip
1HCJSWB,29:3a–4b; HCJSWB, 29:5a–6b; cited in HCJSWSANB/CHEN, 34:30b–31a.
2This problem is cited as “Huang Zongxi’s law” in PRC academic literature on tax reform in rural China because Huang
Zongxi called this common phenomenon in Chinese tax history “the ill of steady accumulation”積累莫返之害. Huang
(n.d.), p. 23. See Wang (1973) for a refutation of this hypothesis of steady accumulation of the land tax.
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reform. Oﬃcials later neglected the fact that the zhese had been included into the uniﬁed tax and the
practice of zhese became yet another instance of the familiar mechanism, says Ren.
“There was a ﬁxed tax quota (for taxes in kind) in ancient times, as there is a ﬁx tax quota
today. Nobody could alter the quota as they wanted. Therefore, proﬁt seekers had to ﬁnd
other systematic means to conceal (their corrupt practices) from the ears and eyes of the
empire. They would scrap a tax in name (ming, i.e. as an independent tax item) but col-
lect it in reality (shi, i.e. as part of the combined tax), then neglect this reality (i.e. the fact





According to Ren, both the administrators’ ﬁnancial shortage and their corruption are fuelling the
mechanism. Under the original Ming dynasty single whip system, magistrates who were only able to
collect 70-80% of the taxes were not be impeached. The Qing introduced the requirement that the mag-
istrate had to collect the full tax quote to prevent impeachment. This further increased pressure on tax
payers and drove up the silver price. Also, under the original single whip system, the income from the
zafan雜泛, one of the three corvée duties included into the single tax, remained at the local level for
perusal of the district yamen. Now these funds have to be remitted to the province, so that a new zafan
fee has come into existence, further driving up the price of silver, and devaluing the worth of agricul-
tural produce. But Ren Yuanxiang also clearly links the phenomenon of the accumulating tax burdens
through unwarranted fees or hidden surcharges with a moral charge: it is not only structural deﬁciencies
(underfunding of the provinces and sub-provincial administrative levels) that push up the tax burden,
but also the personal interest for private enrichment of oﬃcials and sub-oﬃcial functionaries.
There are other essays in the chapters on taxation that use ming-shi polarity to ﬁle claims of abuse
connected to the levying of informal surcharges, fees and duties. In an essay dating either from the last
years of the Jiaqing reign or the ﬁrst years of the Daoguang reign, Zhang Jie張杰 (ﬂ. during the Jiaqing
reign), magistrate of Shenzhou district in Zhili province (modern Hebei), illustrates how Yongzheng’s
prohibition of unauthorized surcharges had become ineffective by the end of the Jiaqing reign.1 Zhili
was one of the provinces in which Yongzheng’s reform had been rather successful.2 But only a few
decades after the Yongzheng reforms and the regularization of customary fees, a new kind of customary
fee appeared in Zhili under the collective term chaiyao差徭. Zhang employs the ming-shi polarity to
convey his analysis of the problem as well as to refute criticism voiced against the solution he proposes.
1HCJSWB, 33:28a.
2Zelin (1992), p. 130; Kiser & Tong (1992), p. 322.
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Zhang’s essay is part of a debate on the reform of the chaiyao in Zhili during the early Daoguang
reign mentioned in chapter 2.4. Zhang was a member of the more radical reform party led by the ad-
ministration commissioner of Zhili province, Tu Zhishen. Their suggestions were opposed by a more
conservative party lead by the governor-general of Zhili province, Yan Jian. Yan Jian’s position is dis-
cussed in chapter 2.4 on the basis of a memorial that expresses Yan’s opposition to the reform party’s
proposal and employs the ren-fa polarity. Zhang makes reference to the debate at the beginning of his
essay, where he mentions a meeting of like-minded oﬃcials who in their majority agreed that the con-
version of the chaiyao into a common surcharge on the land tax. Only one dissenting view was raised
by a “certain gentleman” (Yan Jian) who regarded the proposal of “raising the taxes” (jiafu加賦) as
taboo. Note that in the memorial discussed in chapter 2.4, Yan’s main argument is not the tax raise, as
indicated by Zhang in this essay, but that the current ﬂexible system allows for a fairer burden sharing
than any universal regulation could. But the Qingshi gao cites Yan Jian with the words “their intention
is to achieve the real (shi effect of lowering the chaiyao via the land-tax, but they are not aware that this
would create a false name (ming) for raising the land-tax via the chaiyao”其意在藉賦以收減差之實
效，不知適藉差⽽添加復之虛名. With “false name”, Yan means a legal disguise for a tax raise. QSG,
121:3548. Zhang says that the purpose of his essay was a defense of the reform idea against this point.
A decisive disadvantage of the informal chaiyao system, argues Zhang, is that there are no clearly ﬁxed
regulations (mingding zhangcheng明定章程) specifying the amount and basis of calculation of the
burden placed on each household. Some places levy the chaiyao on the basis of the number of draft ani-
mals owned, some levy it per village, some per group of households. But as this is nowhere documented,
superiors have no means of monitoring the process. Because there are no clearly ﬁxed regulations, of-
ﬁcials can exact more than the amount needed for their private enrichment. Exemption practices also
vary. Some places exempt city dwellers, some exempt the gentry, some exempt oﬃcials and sub-oﬃcial
functionaries. These practices are not only inherently unfair (pianku bu gong偏枯不公) in themselves
because the common people bear all the burden, says Zhang, they also give rise to other unfair practices
such as tax farming. With the rising amount of surcharges for private enrichment, the number of house-
holds who are able to pay the chaiyao decreases, which places an additional burden on the remaining
small independent households. Zhang estimates that the burden placed on these households in some
places has risen to the ten-fold amount of the regular land tax. He warns that the extreme inequality re-
sulting can get volatile in times of natural disasters and crop failure because households are not able to
build up stocks under the present conditions.
Zhang points out that the reason why the chaiyao came into being is a structural deﬁcit of the ﬁnan-
cial system. The Yongzheng reforms created a lack of funds for certain expenses in the yamen above the
district level. These yamen requested the funds from the district magistrates, which basically used up
all the yanglian funds allocated. The magistrates now deprived of the bulk of their administrative bud-
get but nevertheless facing considerable administrative expenses started to retrieve these funds from the
people.
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The big problem with this development is the informal and therefore intransparent nature of the
system. With no oﬃcial regulations specifying the amount and use of the chaiyao, the system is beyond
the control of the usual administrative control mechanisms. Zhang uses ming and shi to formulate the
problem.
“(The various fees) all exist (shi) covertly, no oﬃcial or sub-oﬃcial functionary wishes
them to become oﬃcial tax law (ming). As there is no ﬁxed quota, and no expense item
(that chaiyao have to correspond to), this leads to overcharging on the part of the oﬃcials
and sub-oﬃcial functionaries. This creates opportunities for the rich and powerful to en-
gage in tax farming, while people with limited income have to bear the burden.”
然皆陰有其實。⽽不欲顯居其名。既無派辦之定額。又無⽀銷之准數。以致官
吏從⽽浮派。豪強從⽽包攬。使薄產⼩民。獨當其苦。
Here, ming refers to oﬃcial written regulations specifying the purpose and amounts of tax items that
superiors can refer to in performing their oversight duties. According to Zhang, the complicated and
informal nature of the fee system renders superiors unable to perform inspections. The fact that the
miscellaneous fees (zafei雜費) exacted from the people do not exist oﬃcially (ming), but are actually
(shi) still exacted leads to intransparency and to excessive and unfairly distributed burdens.
The solution to the problem, says Zhang, must therefore be a reform that establishes and enforces
clear rules (mingli xianzhi明⽴限制) that ensure that all services, goods and fees are only levied at a
speciﬁed ﬁxed rate that corresponds to the actual administrative needs. The crux is to make sure that the
yamen are equipped with enough funds so as to discourage them from “using administrative needs as an
excuse”以辦公⽽無所藉⼜ to levy irregular chaiyao again. The aim is to prevent private enrichment,
while acknowledging the need for an appropriate administrative budget that provides for both local
expenses and funds requested by superior yamen.
Zhang argues that clear rules lead to equally distributed burdens which leads to reduced burdens for
the common people. Specifying a ﬁxed uniﬁed surcharge and documenting it in the district tax registers
(fuyi quanshu賦役全書) solves the problem that superiors lack a basis for control. Making the sur-
charge to be payable by every household in proportion to the amount of land the household possesses
and regardless of gentry or oﬃcial status solves the problem of tax farming. Strict enforcement of the
prohibition to levy surcharges exceeding the speciﬁed amount solves the problem of arbitrary overcharg-
ing for private gain on the part of oﬃcials and their agents. Zhang contrasts the surcharge of one fen per
mu of land he proposes with the status quo where a household may have to pay several hundred up to a
thousand wen. One fen equals ten wen, so Zhang is talking of the chaiyao burdens amounting to several
dozen times, up to a hundred the oﬃcial land tax.1
In the ﬁnal part of his essay, Zhang employs ming and shi to present a condensed refutation of the
arguments against the regularization of the chaiyao. The opponents of turning the chaiyao into a ﬁxed
1Beijingshi qianbi xuehui mishuchu (1991), p. 17.
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surcharge, Zhang says, belong to those parties whose vested interests are threatened by such a move:
oﬃcials and sub-oﬃcial functionaries who proﬁt from the present non-regularized chaiyao by habitu-
ally overcharging the people for private gain and the members of the labor-service-exempt gentry who
proﬁt from the the non-regularized chaiyao through tax farming. They object that the regularization of
the chaiyao amounts to a tax raise for the people on the one hand, and that the additional funds thus
collected will be distributed among the oﬃcials for their private enrichment (fenfei分肥) on the other
hand. Zhang calls this objection a distortion of facts. Instead to representing a tax raise in disguise, the
proposed regularization of the chaiyao corresponds to a net reduction on taxes, Zhang contends.1 Those
who worry that the additional funds distributed among the provincial and sub-provincial oﬃcials will
only serve the oﬃcials’ private enrichment should point out ﬁrst alternatives to handle the ﬁnancial
strains of those administrative levels, Zhang says. The uniﬁed surcharge provides funds for those provin-
cial projects that are currently ﬁnanced by depriving the magistrates of their yanglian. This will deprive
superiors of excuses for demanding funds from their subordinates. The center could also allocate funds
for those district projects that are currently ﬁnanced by levying chaiyao from the people, so that oﬃcials
who are still caught levying chaiyao can be singled out.
Zhang starts this refutation with an abstract comment about the relation between name (ming) and
actuality (shi). The comment provides the rhetorical basis of his defense, that rests on pointing out
that the claims (ming) of the opponents of the regularization of the chaiyao do not correspond to facts
(shi).
“A name (ming) is something that refers to an actuality (shi). An actuality (shi) is the
certiﬁcate of a name (ming). An actuality (shi) without a name (ming) that refers to it




If there was no chaiyao in Zhili in the past, it would indeed be appropriate to speak of the proposed
reform as an attempt to raise the tax. But as magistrates clearly do levy chaiyao, this does not apply. If
the proposed uniﬁed surcharge is not remitted as part of the land tax, but retained at the sub-provincial
levels and used for items at the district and higher levels that were previously ﬁnanced from the chaiyao,
this cannot be called a tax raise.
1“Going from few to much means to raise. Going from much to few means to reduce. If we now go from a fee of several
hundred wen per mu to a uniﬁed fee of one fen per mu, is this a raise or a reduction? Why should the people regard one fen
as much and several hundred wen as few just because it was not raised an oﬃcial part of the land tax? They call tax what is
obviously a kind of chaiyao. They call something that obviously amounts to a reduction of chaiyao a tax rise. One does not
have to be particularly clever to see this.”夫由少⽽多謂之加。⾃多⽽少謂之減。今以⼀畝數百⽂之差錢。⽽均之
以⼀分。加乎減乎。向之百姓所交數百⽂差錢。獨不出於正賦之地乎。豈將以⼀分為多。⽽轉以數百⽂為少
乎。明明差錢也。⽽謂之賦。明明減差也。⽽謂之加賦。此不待知者⽽辨矣。
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“The actuality (shi) of the court raising the taxes will not occur, so that there will not be
any claim (ming) of the court raising the taxes. There will be no claim (ming) of the of-
ﬁcials sharing illegitimately gathered funds for private gain, just as there will not be the
actuality (shi) of the oﬃcials sharing illegitimately gathered funds for private gain.”
是　朝廷既無加賦之實。即無加賦之名。各官既無分肥之名。即無分肥之實。
One objection that Zhang considers justiﬁed is the worry that the added income from the surcharge
on the land tax will not prevent more excessive surcharges in the future. This, Zhang says, is to be thwarted
by establishing unambiguous prohibitions and by putting the responsibility of top-down monitoring
of transgressions on superior oﬃcials. In this way, there will be a clear basis to punish magistrates for
transgressions, and to sanction superiors who fail to perform their oversight duties for collaboration. At
the end of the day, Zhang argues, it is always better to take measures to ﬁght current abuses rather then
sitting on one’s hands out of fear of future abuses (or, as a popular proverb goes, to refuse food for fear
of choking).
In 1742, Sun Jiagan,孫嘉淦 (1683-1753), then governor-general of Huguang (modern Hubei and
Hunan), responds to an imperial edict inviting high oﬃcials of the metropolitan and provincial adminis-
trations to submit suggestions on how to deal with the defects of the current haoxian policy.1 Sun urges
the emperor not to retract from the policy of levying the haoxian as a regular surcharge on the land tax
to be spent for administrative operations at the provincial and sub-provincial level. Sun operates with
the ming-shi polarity to differentiate between formal and informal tax burdens and to dismiss the argu-
ments of critics of the haoxian as invalid.
Before Yongzheng’s decision to regularize the haoxian, there were informal fees for which no oﬃcial
regulations as to the quota to be levied and its intended use existed: the fees “were covertly in existence
(shi), but there was no wish to give them an oﬃcial designation (ming, i.e. turn them into regular tax
items)”然皆陰有其實，⽽不欲居其名. Corrupt magistrates would levy arbitrary amounts and use
them for private instead of administrative purposes. Their superiors would not intervene because they
received a share of the illegal revenues. If oﬃcials encountered unforeseen actual administrative expenses
later, they would not cover it with the pocketed money but levy yet another fee.
The aim of Yongzheng’s efforts to regularize the haoxian and thereby rationalize the tax system was to
counteract these tendencies. The Yongzheng emperor ordered that the haoxian be converted into a ﬁxed
surcharge on the land tax. A part of the funds thus collected was to be payed to the oﬃcials on each level
in form of yanglian payments. The rest was to be used to fund the operations of the local administra-
tion. Oﬃcial taxes were slighted raised, but the actual burden on the people decreased.
Critics of the regularization concentrated on the fact that the nominal tax burden had increased, in-
stead of admitting that the actual tax burden had decreased.
1HCJSWB, 27:6a-9b
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“If the critics call this a tax raise they don not know what they are saying. For any affair,
its actuality (shi, here: the facts, factual consequences) has to be examined instead of just
going for claims (ming).
⽽議者猶訾以為加賦。可謂⽿⾷者矣。夫事當核其實。不可騖其名。
Sun criticizes that the arguments with which the critics attempt to move the court to abolish the current
haoxian policy are mere claims (ming) solely aimed at protecting the critics’ own vested interests under
the surface: “they try to move the court with claims (ming), while in reality (shi) they want to fulﬁll
their own private interests, that is for sure”顯以名動　朝廷，實欲⾃便其私，可概置不議也.
Giving in to the critics and abolishing the the regularized haoxian is not an option, Sun says. It would
mean a reversion to the fully informal system of funding. This amounts to giving up all oversight over
local ﬁnance, with no control over how much of the customary fees is needed for legitimate expenses
and how much just serves the private enrichment of oﬃcials and sub-oﬃcial functionaries. In the re-
mainder of the memorial, Sun Jiagan acknowledges some defects in how the policy is currently imple-
mented and expounds on how to render the haoxian policy effective again. This argument employs the
ren-fa polarity and is discussed in chapter 2.4.
Recent scholarship on the tax system of the Ming and Qing dynasties basically conﬁrms the part of
Sun Jiagan’s argument saying that the increase in regular land taxes represented no considerable bur-
den for the people. There is no evidence that supports any signiﬁcant steady accumulation of the land
tax as implied by “Huang Zongxi’s law”. What historical data does conﬁrm, however, is a periodic re-
currence of excessive informal customary fees, followed by a tax reform aimed at regularizing part of
the fees and strengthening control, followed by a renewed excess of customary fees.1 One reason why
the Yongzheng reforms of the ﬁrst half of the 18th century lost their effect quickly was that oﬃcials on
all levels in the provinces could not use the additional funds allocated to them in the course of the re-
form autonomously after 1735. Low yanglian payments for clerks and runners explain the ineﬃcacy of
yanglian at lowest levels. From the early 19th on the situation worsened, as the yanglian payments for
oﬃcials on all levels were increasingly retained and earmarked for military expenses instead of being dis-
bursed.2 All this lead to an increase in informal fees and surcharges levied from the population.
Tao Zhengjing陶正靖 (jinshi in 1730) states that the yanglian policy is failing because it fails to pro-
vide local oﬃcials, especially district magistrates, with suﬃcient funds to face the expenses for adminis-
trative affairs.3 He writes of the yanglian payment:
“Its name (ming) is ‘nurturing incorruptibility’, its reality (shi) is that it fosters corrup-
tion.”
1Zhou (2012), pp. 110–111.
2For example, Chen (2000), p. 90, notes that the yanglian income of the governor of Henan decreased from 28,900 taels
in 1725 to 20,000 taels in 1732, to 12,000 taels in 1747.
3HCJSWB, 17:30a–31b and HCJSWB, 1:21
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是養廉者其名。⽽養不廉者其實也。
According to Tao, it is notably the considerable costs associated with personal secretaries’ salaries whose
services magistrates depend on that the yanglian payments do not take into account. Tang underlines
that positive sanctions are an important instrument in personnel politics. Adequate remuneration pre-
vents oﬃcials from engaging in corruption, promotions increase oﬃcials’ motivation. Negative sanc-
tions are only an effective instrument if positive sanctions are taken care of. A suﬃcient administrative
budget that supports the local yamen’s operations is a precondition for rendering the prosecution of
corrupt oﬃcials an effective preventive measure.1
Tao therefore opts to increase district magistrates’ yanglian payments. The reason they went down in
the ﬁrst place is that governors-general and governors are retaining more and more of the yanglian funds
originally intended for the lower levels to ﬁnance provincial projects. This development runs counter to
the original intention of the Yongzheng reforms.
He Changling voices a similar demand hundred years later in a memorial possible written during his
appointment as ﬁnancial commissioner of Shandong province between 1826–1827.2 He advocates to
stop deductions that higher levels incur to district magistrates’ yanglian payments as a necessary measure
for ﬁghting both oﬃcials’ misappropriation of public funds and their levying of excessive surcharges.3
Magistrates will not stop to misappropriate money from the local treasury or overtax the people unless
they are provided with a suﬃcient budget, He argues. Therefore, incoming magistrates must have the
full amount of their yanglian at their disposal, and be relieved from budget deﬁcits caused by predeces-
sors and also from contributions to ﬁnance projects of the provincial level.
“In my humble opinion, affairs must always be assessed in their actuality (shi). It is better
to settle the old deﬁcits and prevent new deﬁcits than to solve the problem of insuﬃcient
funds in name (ming) while deﬁcits are the reality (shi).”
竊謂凡事當核其實。與其名為補苴⽽實則暗損。何如緩補舊⽋⽽⼒杜新虧也。
Adequate remuneration can ensure that oﬃcials stick to proper conduct and prevent new deﬁcits, He
says. If the higher level drains up local ﬁnances too much, this magistrates turns into proﬁteers, as they
get used to moving around funds and overtaxing the population. If, on the other hand, they have a
suﬃcient budget, He Changling argues, magistrates will have moral scruples to “oppress the people”
1Note here the conﬂation of an oﬃcial’s salary with his administrative budget in the imperial administration. Ch’ü
(1962), p. 24. This view is illustrative of the view in Kiser & Tong (1992) that positive sanctions (increasing remuneration) are
a rational choice anti-corruption measure that can be effective given that there is effective monitoring, and relative depen-
dency of oﬃcials on oﬃcial position and salary.
2During his appointment as ﬁnancial commissioner of Shandong, He concerned himself with the yanglian issue.
One of the memorials he wrote during this time bears a title similar to the memorial included in the HCJSWXB/GE
discussed here. See Archives of the Grand Council軍機處檔摺件, ﬁle no. 056298, as recorded in DBCMAGC, http://
npmhost.npm.gov.tw/ttscgi/ttswebnpm.
3HCJSWXB/GE, 16:1b–2a.
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(nüe min虐民) with excessive surcharges. This will also positively effects the ﬁnances of the central
government in the end. Unburdened by excessive surcharges, the people will have a higher tax morale,
which reﬂects positively on state ﬁnances.
Feng Guifen馮桂芬 (1809–1874) and Huang Tifang⿈體芳 (1832-1899) deal with the adaption
of reality (shi) to nominal rules (ming, i.e. law enforcement), and with the adaption of nominal rules
(ming) to reality (shi) in the context of enforcing anti-corruption law. In an essay advocating a rise in
yanglian payments, Feng Guifen emphasizes that magistrates are not inherently corrupt, but corrupted
by the system.1 Feng’s assessment of the moral dilemma of magistrates with insuﬃcient budgets differs
from his verdict about the kind of people entering the lower ranks of the bureaucracy through purchase
of oﬃce mentioned in chapter 3.1.2.2
“These oﬃcials are not inherently corrupt. They cannot but act corrupt because the state
forces them into it. And then the state establishes empty and useless laws according to
which anyone to takes the tiniest bit outside of his regular salary is guilty of breaking the
law and engaging in corruption. If everybody is punished according to these ‘laws which
reestablish the unity of symbolic and actual power’ (zonghe ming shi zhi fa), the oﬃces
will soon be empty. The court cannot be ignorant of this, but they ignore it. The kingly




In a memorial dating from 1878, Huang Tifang⿈體芳 (1832–1899) discusses the best strategy to
reign in the excesses of the system of customary fees.3 According to Huang, the best way to revert the
current depressing state of bureaucratic morale reﬂected in the excesses of the customary fee system is
to “make regulations (fa) compulsory and enforce that the performance (shi) matches the legislation
(ming)”法在必⾏正名覈實. Huang’s approach in reconciling performance and legislation is not
simply strict law enforcement, but also an adaption of legislation to the realistic capabilities of the men
in charge. Huang furthermore emphasizes that legislation must be complied with by all levels of the
bureaucracy in order to be effective.
The kinds and amounts of customary fees levied vary from region to region and from oﬃce to of-
ﬁce, but they all have a detrimental effect on collective bureaucratic morale. Huang points out that the
integrity of the oﬃcials on the lowest level, the district level, is constantly improving, while it is high of-
ﬁcials who engage in illegal extortion of funds. This puts them under the inﬂuence of their subordinates
1HCJSWXB/GE, 16:1a–1b.
2HCJSWXB/GE, 18:2a–b; also included in HCJSWXB/SHENG, 21:5a–6b; HCJSWTB/SHAO, 32:1a–b.
3HCJSWXB/GE, 25:3a–4b. Guan (2010), p. 69, dates the memorial to the year 1878.
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from whom they accept money and impedes them from impartial performance of their duties. Circuit
intendants fail to report their underlings’ misdoings, and provincial commissioners in charge of person-
nel appointments and adjudication cannot perform their tasks with the necessary objectivity. Huang
also argues that it weakened the effect of regulations intended to contain customary fees that in the past,
governors-general and governors could impeach their subordinate provincial oﬃcials on the charge of
accepting customary fees, but no governor-general or governor them was ever sentenced.
Huang emphasizes that it should be kept in mind that oﬃcials’ incomes have been slashed by half,
in some cases even by 80-90%, due to increased military expenses. High oﬃcials are also just humans.
They will openly chastise the practice of accepting customary fees and readily accuse their own personal
opponents’ involvement in customary fee scandals, but vehemently deny involvement when they get
impeached themselves. High oﬃcials also tend to justify their own lax implementation of the regula-
tion and containment customary fees with the excuse that it would be imprudent to deprive their sub-
ordinates from this source of income, where they are instead afraid to be deprived of this side income
themselves. The objective of the prosecution of illegal customary fees should be to deter corrupt oﬃcials
from extorting them and to render oﬃcials with enough integrity free from demands of their superiors.
Ideally, the amount of customary fees that oﬃcial are legally allowed to exact should vary depending
on their position and their income from other sources. Governor-generals, governors and provincial
commissioners are ﬁnancially well-equipped and should therefore not be allowed to receive any custom-
ary fees whatsoever. The fees allowed for surveillance commissioners, circuit and prefecture intendants
should be clearly regulated.
Huang reviews the successful measures taken by Hu Linyi as governor of Hubei, Zeng Guofan as
governor-general of Liang Jiang together with Shen Baozhen as governor of Jiangxi, Zuo Zongtan as
governor-general of Minzhe, and Yan Jingming as governor of Shandong. Yan Jingming diminished the
ﬁnancial contributions required from magistratess. The reforms of the other provincial leaders consisted
of regularizing the customary fees to ensure their transparency and adequacy.
In Huang ’s eyes, the steps initiated by above provincial leaders are superior examples of good gover-
nance and good leadership. Their provincial leadership had the two positive effects of “directing their
subordinates towards integrity” (jiao lian教廉) and “directing their subordinates towards loyalty”
(jiao zhong教忠). Huang sees an element of empathy in all restrictions they imposed on their subor-
dinate oﬃcials. By acting as good models of “dealing with public affairs strictly according to public
rules”公事公⾔, they were able to “direct their subordinates towards integrity”教廉. They made
sure that all prohibitions and regulations (fa) were straightforward enough so that the “average man
(ren)” (zhongren) could comply without much effort. This had the positive side effect that provincial
oﬃcials do not develop the habit of deceiving the central government because they have to hide their
non-compliance, which is why Huangg calls this part of the strategy “teaching subordinates loyalty”教
忠.
Having cited the above examples as evidence of an effective strategy, Huang concludes the essay by
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spelling out his suggestions which he represents as in line with the strategy. The surcharges must be
regularized by determining kinds and amount of fees according to actual needs. A feeling for what is
realistic can be gained by referring to the accounts about customary fees of twenty to thirty years ago,
before they spiralled out of control. Magistrates have to report the fees collected back to the governor-
general or governor, and are liable to punishment if the fees exceed the permitted amount. The practice
of requesting magistrates to ﬁnance provincial projects in the form of tanjuan (“equally shared contri-
butions”) also has to undergo regularization. Governor-generals and governors have to ensure that the
money exacted from magistrates is indeed spent as intended and does not end up in the provincial ﬁnan-
cial commissioner’s private pocket. Provincial authorities should put a reasonable limit on the amount
of contributions that magistrates can be legally required to make.
3.2 gong公 and si私
In their most basic meaning, gong (public) and si (private) are used to demarcate spheres of the so-
cial. gong refers to the larger and si referring to the smaller sphere (usually not the atomistic self), for
example state (gong) and individuals or individual households (si), or local community (gong) and in-
dividual households (si).1 From the fact that the opinions and interests of the gong and si spheres may
be in tension derives a second meaning of general vs. particular interests or impartial vs. partial perspec-
tive.2 This second usage associates gong and si with value connotations. The impartial perspective takes
into consideration the views and (legitimate) interests of the larger social whole and is associated with
fairness. The partial perspective is based on the limited view or private interest of the individual (ren
in charge). It is associated with potential unfairness because free indulgence in one’s private interests
may harm the interests of others and the public good. Extended to value orientation, gong designates
an orientation towards the public good (“public-mindedness”), while si designates an orientation to-
wards personal advantage (“selﬁshness”). There is no agreement in historical sources as to what exactly
the public good is and what a public-minded attitude consists of exactly.
gong and si are in both cases in tension but not necessarily mutually exclusive. They can be regarded
as inseparably related and interdependent. Just like the si (private) sphere is usually in some sense part
of the gong (public) sphere, a truly gong (impartial) perspective would result from taking all si (par-
tial) perspectives and producing a balanced synthesis. Therefore, the second meaning of gong and si
has two basic use cases. The ﬁrst use case regards si (private) interests simply as the totality of interests
of the private individual or family. It assumes that some of these si (private) interests are legitimate. It
therefore regards gong and si interests as reconcilable and may even view gong as accumulated and
balanced si interests. How this balance of si and realization gong is to be achieved is another question,
but gong and si do not stand in a general zero-sum relationship. The second use case use the term si to
exclusively designate those private interests that are in contradiction with the public interest (gong) and
therefore illegitimate. Here, gong and si stand in a zero-sum relationship because illegitimate private
interests are by deﬁnition illegitimate because the harm the public good. Both use cases are reconcilable,
that is, the same author can employ both usages, and which case is used can be determined from the
context.
1Huang (2000), p. 59, underlines that these are not absolute categories, but applied on a contextual basis. For example,
clan organizations can be regarded as extensions of the family and therefore labeled si, but in other cases they are labeled
gong to contrast them with the individual family. See also Elman (1990), p. 34.
2Another derivative meaning are actions of state oﬃcials authorized by the state, that is by a regulation or a superior
(gong), vs. unauthorized (si) actions. “Unauthorized (si) levying customary fees” is the most adequate translation私 取 陋
規, not “privately levying customary fees” or “selﬁshly levying customary fees”.
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3.2.1 Pre-Qing political career
The cluster of meanings associated with si then includes what is private, unoﬃcial, partial, partial, par-
ticular, divided while the cluster of meanings associated with gong includes what is public or oﬃcial as
well as public-mindedness, impersonality, impartiality, universality, fairness, objectiveness and unity.1
Liu (2003) and Goldin (2001) point out that condemnation of si and praise of gong often coincided
with attempts to unify and increase autocratic control during the Eastern Zhou period.2 Brindley (2013)
argues that this should not distract from the fact that the concept of gong was still regarded as an “ide-
ological solution to a wide variety of complicated political and cultural problems” and should not be
reduced to a synonym for the interests of the state, also because “it also was a method of keeping royal
power in check”.3
Chinese administrative law distinguished between gong and si offenses committed by oﬃcials. Met-
zger (1973) sees the distinction of oﬃcial offenses into gong and si in Chinese administrative law in the
context of a “rationalization of the concept of responsibility”. gong offenses were offenses regarded as
out of an oﬃcial’s might to prevent, or that the oﬃcial committed in order to protect the general public
good. si offenses were offenses regarded as in an oﬃcial’s might to prevent. If an oﬃcial did not, it was
assumed that this was because the oﬃcial could get a beneﬁt out of it.
“Rationalization of the concept of responsibility [...] also had a long past. The idea of
‘turning one’s back on public interests and pursuing private ones’ was commonly applied
to oﬃcials in Han times, and the distinction between kung-tsui (public offense) and ssu-
tsui (private offense), basic in all major dynasties since the Sui, has been traced back to the
Ch’en dynasty (557-589) or earlier. Roughly speaking, public offenses were shortcomings
involving governmental affairs and lacking any corrupt self-interest, while private offenses
involved corruption [...]. By routinely making this distinction, the government weighed
motivation more rationally when considering the seriousness of an offense.”4
An early example of a dichotomic usage of gong and si is Shen Dao’s opting for the use of fa as im-
personal administrative techniques of determining rewards and punishments discussed in chapter 2.1.
Shen Dao argues that basing decisions on impersonal and therefore impartial (gong) standards pre-
cludes the interference of partial personal (si) elements. Such personal factors can be personal likes or
dislikes or manipulation through lobbying. If decisions are not taken according to the ruler’s personal
judgment but according to some impersonal standard, people will be less prone to lobbying and also less
prone to opposing decisions because they are unlikely to succeed in inﬂuencing the decision this way.
1Brindley (2013), p. 2.
2Relatedly, Kuhn (1995) suspects a blend of fears and authoritarian attitudes of a privileged elite behind arguments
against Feng Guifen’s proposals to expand political participation based on public-mindedness (gong) vs. self-interest (si)
circulated for comment among high oﬃcials by the Guangxu emperor.
3Brindley (2013), p. 4.
4Metzger (1973), pp. 268–269.
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This stress on the need for impartiality (gong) as opposed to partiality (si) in administration modeled
after “nature’s impartiality and unchangingness” is characteristic of Legalist and semi-Legalist writing.1
Brindley (2013) argues that gong and si became increasingly viewed as a oppositional, dichotomic
pairs of concepts towards the end of the Warring States period (approximately 350–221 BC).2 gong and
si had become an inextricably linked and hotly debated pair of concepts by the Warring States period.
In the process, si “accrued a negative, moral connotation of self-interest”, while gong “became imbued
with positive, moral meanings associated with impartiality and unity, usually associated with a universal
Way, and sometimes associated with an imperial ruler who was supposed to represent such an interest”.
Brindley argues that while in sources from the early to middle Warring States period, uses of gong and
si as neutral designations of different social contexts dominate, si was increasingly used to refer to neg-
ative qualities such as “self-centeredness” and “revolving around the self”, and gong and si were often
paired to highlight contradiction. si came to be associated with “breaking with the norms of proper
behavior and the limits of proper desire in order to seek excess proﬁt for the self”. gong, on the other
hand, came to be associated not just with state and the public realm, but also with righteousness (yi),
and the Way. gong as invoked in relationship to si came to imply “an idealized, universally encompass-
ing state [...] that takes everyone’s interests into account in an objective and impartial manner” ruled by
“the idealized cosmic ruler, who demonstrates gong values and implements gong measures through stan-
dardized or objective measures.3 Brindley’s main sources are the Analects, Mozi, Zuozhuan, Shangjun-
shu, Mencius, Guanzi, Zhuangzi, Shenzi, Lüshi chunqiu呂⽒春秋 and the Zhuangzi莊⼦. The Mozi
associates si with the ruler spending money on a huge private harem instead of reserving it for public
expenditures, criticizes self-interested leadership as “depleting others to beneﬁt oneself (or: one’s pri-
vate circle)” (kua ren zi li虧⼈⾃利), and juxtaposes universal standards (gong) with the particular
interests of individuals and groups and with contemporary problems of nepotism, family solidarity and
favoritism. The Shangjunshu contrasts the si of private interest groups with the gong of the central,
royal state, and also refers to favoring one’s relatives (qin qin親親) as selﬁsh (si). Both the Shangjunshu
and the Mencius refer to unauthorized and unlawful action as si. Both Shenzi and the Guanzi regarded
“laws and methods” (fashu法術) as one of the means by which a ruler approximates the ideal of impar-
tiality (gong) and prevents partiality (si). The fragments of the Shenzi which mention gong and si are
evidence that gong was in theory not necessarily equivalent with the personal perspective of the ruler,
but designated a perspective transcending the partial inclinations of individual rulers and connected to
the universal, unbiased tendencies of the cosmos.4
Common good and private interest were regarded as complementary by some thinkers by the early
Qing. The common good was not to be identiﬁed with the private interest of the ruler or ruling clan,
1Metzger (1973), p. 28
2Brindley (2013). Brindley seems to suggest that gong-si as a neutral reference to social spheres was replaced by the use as
value orientations. This is a bit odd, as gong-si certainly continued to be used as neutral references to social spheres.
3Brindley (2013), pp. 5; 11; 14.
4Brindley (2013), pp. 11–27.
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however, as pointed out by Huang Zongxi. Rather, the ruler should reconcile the natural self-interest
(li) of everyone (the common people and the oﬃcialdom) into the public good by means of an appro-
priate institutional framework. This view was popularized by an essay in Gu Yanwu’s顧炎武 (1613–
1682) Rizhilu⽇知錄 (Notes on Knowledge Accumulated from Day to Day), that was extremely popu-
lar during the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns and inﬂuenced, amongst others, Gong Zizhen.1 Gu posited
that the “‘invisible hand’ [...] of the sage who consciously built recognition of self-interest into his de-
signs for governmental structure” would see that private selﬁshness leads to public beneﬁt.2
“It is the human condition to cherish one’s family and to have partiality (si) for one’s own
sons. […] The sage will take advantage of this predisposition. He will use everyone’s self-




Building private interests “into the system” and then proactively advocating their pursuit goes one step
further than admitting that the “average man in charge” cannot be expected to act altruistically and free
from personal interests (realizing that he is being partial may already represent a problem for him) and
therefore building up countermechanisms to prevent their pursuit. The changes to the bureaucratic sys-
tem advocated by Gu included providing magistrates with “personal stakes” in the system, for example
by permitting them to appoint their own successors. Gu Yanwu’s ideas were part of a notable tendency
in late Ming and early Qing Confucianism to relax moral absolutism that probably started in the six-
teenth century. The conviction that economic independence was the precondition for individual dig-
nity and morality (intellectual and moral independence) became more widely shared at the same time as
conviction of the existence of legitimate self-interest (si) and legitimate desires (yu欲). This is evidenced
by statements by Chen Que, Dai Zhen and Qian Daxin, amongst others.4
3.2.2 Functions in Qing statecraft discourse
The writings collected in the statecraft compendia use gong and si in their argumentations to desig-
nate both social spheres and interests related to these spheres. In extension, they are also used to refer
to general inclinations to impartiality, universalism or even altruism on the one hand, and partiality,
particularism and egoism on the other hand. When using gong and si to refer to interests or value
orientations, authors employ both of the modes described in the previous subchapter. What authors
1Yu (1997), pp. 20–28.
2Dunstan (1996), pp. 65–66. Dunstan (1996) shows that while Gu Yanwu’s point was related to political theory, the same
idea can be found in remarks about political economy in the Qing dynasty.
3Gu (1983), pp. 14–15.
4si can also designate moral-intellectual and economic independence, for example in the writings of Chen Que. Yu
(1987), pp. 101–104. See also Yu (2013), p. 123.
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unanimously condemn is pursuit of private interests on the cost of others and the public good, to “seize
public property (gong) for one’s private use (si)”占公為私 and to “harm others to beneﬁt oneself”損
⼈益⼰.1
Numerous texts in the statecraft compendia deal with oﬃcial corruption and irresponsibility. si inter-
ests are regarded as particularly problematic when they lead people who have considerable power over
resources or other people to abuse their power to their own private beneﬁt at the expense of the public
good. These can be oﬃcials, community leaders, or merchants. The common people’s legitimate si inter-
ests, for example, for food and shelter, are regarded as inherently reconcilable with and actually outright
constitutive of the gong interest. Oﬃcials also have such legitimate private interests. The objective of
any policy is to beneﬁt both state (gong) and the people (si) while preventing embezzlement of pub-
lic funds (zhongbao中飽) by the layer “in between” the people and the state, i.e. oﬃcials, sub-oﬃcial
functionaries and other informal groups attached to the bureaucracy.2
gong is associated with fair outcomes of policies, that promote the eﬃcacy of government. If the
public-minded (gong) and self-interested (si) inclinations of the men in charge (ren) are properly bal-
anced, this promotes the outcomes in the public interest (gong). Proper selection of the men to be put
in charge (ren) and sanctions, that is promotion and demotion and other rewards and punishments,
help to keep the balance. Because selection cannot guarantee that only perfectly public-minded (gong)
gain access to public oﬃce, both personnel management and legislation need to strive to create condi-
tions under which less public-minded individuals “have no way to pursue their selﬁsh interests (si)”無
所容其私. Up to a certain degree, negative sanctions can inhibit self-interested (si) and promote public-
minded (gong) action. Subsistence is a legitimate private interest (si), so that extreme altruism cannot
be expected from the average oﬃcial. Providing oﬃcials with a suﬃcient budget can therefore also help
to contain oﬃcial corruption. Both positive and negative sanctions are mostly regarded as an aspect of
ren or personnel management, not an aspect of fa. At the same time, certain institutional settings or
regulations (fa) can help to promote public-minded (gong) behavior and discourage self-interested (si)
behavior.
But in the end, it remains a fact that regulations (fa) have no agency of their own, but that it has to
be implemented and complied to by ren who are “oriented towards public interest (gong)”秉公執
法. Compliance to administrative regulations (fa) is associated with public-mindedness (gong), non-
compliance with self-interest (si). If the oﬃcials in charge of recruiting pay attention to select oﬃcials
(ren) according to whether they are public-minded (gong) not self-interested (si), regulations (fa)
can be designed less restrictive.3 At the same time, gong is associated with compliance to regulations
(fa), while si is associated with deﬁance of regulations (fa). Acting in accordance with the regulations
(fa) is classiﬁed as gong behavior, acting against the regulations (fa) is classiﬁed as si behavior. gong
1HCJSWB, 36:23a–29b.
2Note that local, i.e. sub-provincial oﬃcials are at times associated with the gong (public) sphere and sometimes associ-
ated with a third, guan官 (oﬃcial) sphere separate from both gong and si.
3See Ren Yuanxiang’s and Tao Zhengjing’s writings discussed the next section.
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is closely connected with “guarding” or “complying to the regulations (fa)”守法, and both are again
connected to “restricting oneself and cherishing others”約⼰愛⼈. For example, Ji Yun紀昀 (1724–
1805), a member of the Grand Secretariat, writes in 1754 that the ranks of district magistrates were not
completely devoid of persons of integrity and public-mindedness (gong) who respect the regulations
(fa), and who restrict themselves to cherish others”⽅今清公守法約⼰愛⼈者.1 Self-interest (si) on
the contrary gets linked with bending and breaking the regulations (fa). For example, Li Jian李建 (?)
associates the demise of a policy of regular cadastral surveys (bianshen編審) with the fact that “some
men harbored the selﬁsh (si) idea to evade the regulations, and bad functionaries encouraged them to
do so, so that abuse became frequent”⼈懷規避之私念，⽽奸蠹胥書復從⽽熒惑之，於是弊竇
叢⽣.2 Zheng Guanying similarly associates law-abiding behavior with public-mindedness (gong) and
deviation from the laws (wubi舞弊) with personal interest (si).
“What men strive for in the world is reputation (ming) and proﬁt (li). If reputation
weighs heavier than proﬁt for a person, this person will respect the public good (gong)
and abide by the regulations (fa). If proﬁt weighs heavier than reputation for a person,
this person will engage in deviant acts and work to advance his personal interests (si).”
天下⼈之所齗齗⽽爭者。名利⽽已矣。名重於利者。奉公⽽守法。利重於名者。
舞弊⽽營私。3
Note that Zheng Guanying also says that the yamen clerks (shuli書吏) receive such a low salary that
if they “abnegated their personal interests to advance the public good”奉公潔⼰ they would not be
able to make ends meet. Zheng Guanying, as well as other authors, were well aware that “the kingly way
never ignores the human condition (renqing), the average oﬃcial (zhongren) must be able to comply
with the regulations (fa)”王道不外⼈情,法期於中⼈能守, and that “impoverished oﬃcials engage
in corrupt practices”官窮則貪.
The gong-si polarity becomes considerably more dominant in late nineteenth century discourse.
gong and si are conceptualized as binary opposites, but public-mindedness (gong) usually does not
refer to self-denying altruism but rather to legitimate self-interest (si). There is more readiness in the late
nineteenth century to attribute public-mindedness or self-interestedness to institutions or regulations as
an inherent feature, not just to the men who run them and their outcomes.
3.2.3 Civil governance (lizheng吏政)
The texts about personnel politics and bureaucratic discipline talk about the private interest (si) of men
in charge (ren), not the private interest (si) of the common people. As discussed in chapter 2.3, bureau-
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fundamental issue underlying other major problems such as budget deﬁcits and domestic unrest. Cor-
ruption is per deﬁnition selﬁsh (si). Oﬃcials, who are bestowed considerable power by virtue of their
oﬃce, must be public-minded (gong), not self-interested (si). It is part of their job description (ming)
that they do not abuse their power to pursue private interests (si) that run counter to the public interest
(gong). Illegitimate private interests (si) are illegitimate because their pursuit involves harming others,
the people or the “public interest”, in order to attain personal beneﬁts.
Remarks on gong and si by Zhang Lüxiang, Chen Hongmou and Woren are illustrative of the con-
cept of illegitimate si. Zhang Lüxiang juxtaposes gong-harming si with beneﬁting on the expense of
others: “seizing public property (gong) for private use (si) and harming others to beneﬁt oneself is not
what a man should do.”若乃占公為私，損⼈益⼰，⾃⾮⼈之所為矣.1 Chen Hongmou陳宏謀
(1696–1771) does not use gong and si as a polarity, but both categories still play a key role in his letters
so that they can serve to illuminate the spectrum of meaning of gong and si. Instead of contrasting si
with gong, Chen Hongmou contrasts si with “for the people” (wei min為民), and gong with partial
(pian偏). In a letter to Yang Xifu楊錫紱 (1701–1768), Chen paints a scathing portrait of bureaucratic
egoism.2 Chen criticizes “those pursuing oﬃcial careers who harbor selﬁsh intentions to turn everything
into their own beneﬁt and convenience”仕途中⼈懷便利之私.
“For every matter they encounter, they are very much concerned about themselves and
very little concerned about the people. If they are aware that something will beneﬁt the
people but that there will be no beneﬁt for themselves, they will refuse to do it. And even
if the performance of a task just requires some effort from their part, they will put on a
terriﬁed face and warn against it.”
每遇⼀事，為⼰之念重，為民之念輕。明知其於民有益，⽽於⼰無益，亦不肯
為。若更于⼰有累，則動⾊相戒。
Woren diagnoses “petty men” (xiaoren⼩⼈) with a sort of cognitive dissonance that makes them con-
fuse their own private interests (si) with the public interest (gong).3 The most important task of per-
sonnel politics is therefore to tell the “superior men” (junzi君⼦) from “petty men”, says Woren.
Theoretical texts that approach the problem of bureaucratic discipline on a more general level talk
more about reconciling gong and si, for example about differentiating legitimate and illegitimate si,
and about how private interests and behavior constitutes public interests and behavior. In general, writ-
ings concerned with speciﬁc practical problems more often talk about gong-harming si. The follow-
ing discussion of writings on bureaucratic discipline from the pre-1898 statecraft compendia will there-
fore primarily be dealing with authors associated with gong and gong-harming si. This section exam-
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SHENG. The writings from the HCJSWB mostly date from the seventeenth and eighteenth century,
with the exception of Zhang Pengzhan’s essay written in the nineteenth century, while the writings
from the HCJSWXB/GE and HCJSWXB/SHENG all date from the nineteenth century.
The solutions that the authors propose in the context of their speciﬁc problems follow different pat-
terns.Ren Yuanxiang and Tao Zhengjing suggest that public-mindedness gong must become the cen-
tral criterion in the recruitment of oﬃcials (ren). If oﬃcials are gong instead of si, regulations (fa)
can be relaxed, energies bound up in efforts to follow minute protocols are freed and administrative eﬃ-
cacy will go up. Wang Huizu recommends the readers of his handbook that they themselves can abstain
from colluding with their superiors in private (si) business if they position themselves clearly from the
very beginning as being only interested in dealing with matters of public (gong) interest. Zhou Xifu
argues that current monitoring and sanctioning magistrates by their superiors is not enough to ensure
that magistrates stay public-minded. He suggests a combination of moral instruction and more moni-
toring instances. Li Fu insists that sanctioning must distinguish between gong offenses, committed in
the public interest or unintentionally, and si offenses, committed for private gain. Wei Xi and Zhang
Pengzhan propose mechanisms of mutual control to ensure a proper balance of gong and si inclina-
tions.
Bao Shichen’s, Hu Linyi’s and Wu Ting’s solutions focus on the provision of adequate funds (pos-
itive sanctions) that enable oﬃcials to put the public good before their private interests Tang Peng, on
the other hand, suggests that oﬃcials’ private interests have to be eliminated through instruction in
modesty. Zeng Guofan writes about the ability of the emperor to act perfectly public-minded (gong).
He interrogates the idea by pointing out that not everything the emperor decides and does is automati-
cally public-minded and that the emperor has to make an effort to understand the public good and the
perspective of the people. Feng Guifen challenges the idea that the public good can only be achieved in a
top-down manner, and proposes a bottom-up approach instead. His suggestion to let low oﬃcials elect
high oﬃcials points to the construction of the “public opinion” that represents the “public interest”
and is supposed to counterbalance biased or particularist interests.
Ren Yuanxiang and Tao Zhengjing argue in their essays about recruitment and appointment that the
laws (wenfa⽂法) controlling and restricting civil servants can be relaxed if oﬃcials are recruited for
the public-minded character.1 Ren argues that careful observation of candidates’ speech and comport-
ment is a good indicator of their character and can be used to tell public-minded from self-interested
candidates: “One cannot really learn to tell men’s (ren) character but observing their comportment and
speech is already half the story”豈知⼈本不可學，⽽冥⾏聽數，亦有得半者乎. The avoidance
of appointing oﬃcials to posts within ﬁve hundred miles of their native place (huibi迴避) becomes
obsolete if the oﬃcialdom consists solely of public-minded individuals.
“We have the expression ‘forgetting one’s family when caring for the state’ and ‘forgetting
1HCJSWB, 17:1a–2b.
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one’s personal interest (si) when caring for the public interest (gong). If this is carefully
observed and appointed oﬃcials do not think about advancing their own family’s interests,
then there is no reason for suspicion. If the oﬃcial only strives to serve the ruler, the ruler
can slightly relax the regulations (wenfa⽂法).”
語云。國爾忘家。公爾忘私。當此講求詳慎之時。任事者果不以私家為念。則
嫌疑不必避。⽽惟以⼈事君之是圖。上亦稍寬其⽂法。
Tao Zhengjing doubts that the avoidance rule is effective in inﬂuencing oﬃcials’ behavior at all.1
“If a man put in charge (ren) cannot administer regulations (fa) in the public interest
(gong), why would he not be just the same in a place a thousand miles from his native
place? If a man is public-minded (gong) and without self-interest (si), why should he
change when appointed to his native place?”
夫⼈⾂苟不能秉公執法。雖在數千⾥外。庸必無姻親故舊耶。若其公正無私者。
雖在本籍。又安能撓之。
The selection of public-minded instead of self-interested candidates would make the avoidance of assign-
ing oﬃcials to their home region obsolete. It would even be beneﬁcial not to assign oﬃcials to posts too
far from their home, as was the practice during the Tang dynasty. It saves time and funds if oﬃcials do
not have to resettle, and ensures that they can rush home in case one of their parents gets sick. This will
reduce their worries so that they can be even more public-minded in their administration of their local
business, and ever more loyal to the court, says Tao.
In an extract from the Xuezhi yishuo學治臆說 (“Personal thoughts on scholarship and gover-
nance”), a handbook addressed magistrates and private secretaries, Wang Huizu汪輝祖 (1730-1807)
discourages the mingling of public (gong) and private (si) spheres in the relationship with superiors.2
Wang employs gong and si to relate to the superior’s public business, related to the sphere of adminis-
trative affairs, versus his private affairs, related to the sphere of family and friends. Wang recommends
the readers of his handbook that the best strategy to avoid involvement in corruption is to never assist
their superiors in private business by principle. According to Wang, this should apply both to straight-
forward private matters (si shi私事), as well as to matters that “seem public (gong) but are conducted
with private (si) intentions”名為公事⽽⾏私意於其閒. Once a subordinate accepts to assist in
private business, he parts with his personal conscience (ben xin本⼼) and is prone to be drawn into as-
sisting in more and more private affairs, which in the end is very likely to involve “losing all restraint and
bending the law”喪檢骫法. To steer clear of this risk, subordinates should show their superiors from
the ﬁrst day in oﬃce that they “do not care about private interests (si), and only care about the public
1HCJSWB, 17:30a–31b.
2HCJSWB, 21:58a–59b.
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interest (gong)”不知有私惟知有公. Wang assures that this strategy is a valid way of gaining one’s su-
perior’s trust. Gaining one’s superior’s trust is an important ﬁrst step when taking up oﬃce, but it does
not mean that one has to ingratiate oneself with one’s superior by whatever means necessary. Usually,
superior oﬃcials have accumulated enough experience with affairs and people to be able to tell whether
an oﬃcial is honest about maintaining his independence and will accept it.
Zhou Xifu周錫溥 (1745–1804) argues that a combination of top-down control and instruction
promotes public-minded (gong) attitudes and inhibits self-interested (si) attitudes among magistrates.1
The people’s lives depend on the tasks that are the magistrate’s responsibilities, the two most important
of which are the provision of granaries and the adjudication of crimes. The magistrate’s superiors only
learn about the situation of the local granaries once a year and they only get involved in the adjudication
of criminal cases if they are particularly serious. It is therefore vitally important that the magistrates are
public-minded (gong) in their administration because superiors cannot intervene in time to prevent
the harm caused by selﬁsh (si) magistrates.
“If the abuse has not been committed just most recently, then even a superior oﬃcial’s
undiscriminating public-mindedness (gong) cannot undo the gradual destruction of hu-
man lives caused by the magistrate’s selﬁshness (si). This is why the fate of the state de-
pends all on the magistrate.”
⾃⾮弊之既破。則雖以上官⼀視同仁之公。不能勝州縣積漸殺⼈之私。今天下
⼤命獨懸於州縣⽽已矣。
It is not enough to have public-minded (gong) superiors, as they cannot necessarily learn of and re-
verse selﬁsh (si) acts of the magistrates. Magistrates have to be and act public-minded themselves. The
measures with which the upper levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy have to ensure that magistrates act
public-minded are a combination of hard and soft methods. On the one hand, the magistrates have to
receive instruction in modesty and frugality to improve their attitudes. On the other hand, control in-
stances have to be set up to ensure that magistrates perform their duties.
We ﬁnd a short comment on the importance of differentiating gong and si motives for offenses
against administrative regulations in an essay by Li Fu李紱 (1675–1750) on the fundamental tasks of
personnel management: appointment, monitoring and sanctioning of oﬃcials.2 In the discussion of
sanctioning, Li Fu conforms with the widely-held view that offenses committed with private (si) mo-
tives should be punished heavier than offenses committed with public (gong) motives.
“The dismissal of misguided oﬃcials and the promotion of clear-sighted oﬃcials is a funda-
mental principle of managing oﬃcials (zhi guan治官). How can we not punish an oﬃcial
1HCJSWB, 20:33a–38b.
2HCJSWB, 15:33a–36a.
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who has committed an offense? However, we have to be discriminatory when it comes to
the motive of the offense. We have to examine whether it was public interest (gong) or
personal interest (si). An oﬃcial who takes bribes and bends the law (fa), should not be
retained in oﬃce even if the offense is small, provided there is actual evidence of his cor-
ruption. An oﬃcial who commits a deviant act for the sake of public interest or due to the




Li deﬁnes private (si) offenses as offenses involving the acceptance of bribes and the bending of the law,
while he regards public (gong) offenses as acts in the public interest and forced by circumstances.
Li emphasizes that harshness (yanke嚴刻), that is, prosecution that does not properly distinguish be-
tween public and private offenses, is not in the public interest. Governors-general and governors should
cease to “regard harshness and the impeachment of subordinate oﬃcials on a daily basis as a service to
the public interest”以嚴刻為公⽇以參官為事 because it leads to personnel shortage and bad gov-
ernance on the district level. Many magistrates only manage to hold onto their post for half a year, or
even only a few months before they are dismissed for an offense. They cannot develop an administrative
routine in such a short period of time, so that sub-oﬃcial functionaries run most of the administration,
who are diﬃcult to monitor. Li cites the Song dynasty oﬃcial Fan Zhongyan范仲淹 (989–1052) warn-
ing that harsh rules foster bureaucratic lethargy.
“Oﬃcials must not commit offenses for the sake of their personal interests (si). But they
usually cannot avoid committing offenses in the public interest (gong). If they are made
to fear committing offenses in the public interest (gong), they will also shun taking up
responsibility and doing their administrative work.”
當官者私罪不可有。公罪不可無。誠以畏避公罪。則無敢任事者。
The above argument employing gong and si is part of a larger argument that takes its fullest form
only at the end of Li’s essay. Here, Li presents the relaxation of sanctions for offenses “committed in
the public interest” as but one point among the suggestions on how to accommodate mediocre oﬃcials.
Because the number of vacant posts in the bureaucracy exceeds by far the number of truly upright (xian
賢) men available, the throne has to resort to employing the more mediocre candidates (zhongcai中
材) and creating conditions under which they can play their part well and do not go astray. In order
to make sure that oﬃcials fully carry out their oﬃcial duties, the duties of each oﬃce should be very
clearly delineated. Oﬃcials found guilty of corruption or brutality are to be put under trial at once,
and oﬃcials who are particularly incompetent are to be dismissed immediately. Oﬃcials who display
extraordinary talent and integrity should be granted exceptional promotions (teba特拔). The ordinary,
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mediocre oﬃcials, however, should be enabled to climb the local career ladder successively, according to
their seniority, and as their administrative experience grows with the time they spend in oﬃce.1 Minor
offenses (xiao guo)⼩過, that is, offenses committed “in the public interest” and owed to the force of
circumstances, should not serve as a cause of dismissal for mediocre oﬃcials.
Censor Zhang Pengzhan張鵬展 (†1840) lists ﬁve issues concerning bureaucratic discipline which
need to be addressed in a memorial written in 1800, one of them the shortage of funds on the district
level induced by magistrates’ diverting earmarked funds for other purposes.2 Zhang emphasizes that
the overwhelming majority of cases of misappropriation of public funds happen out of private (si) mo-
tives, not out of public (gong) motives. According to Zhang, insuﬃcient salaries are not the cause of
widespread budget deﬁcits, as magistrates receive a decent salary. Instead, he blames misappropriation
on magistrates’ luxurious lifestyle, their efforts to improve their own advancement to lucrative posts by
bribing their superiors, poor ﬁnancial management (characterized by a lack oversight of the spending
habits of family members and personal servants, as well as an over-readiness to give in to ﬁnancial de-
mands of superior yamen), and, ﬁnally, the “pursuit of personal (si) gain” (ying si營私, that is, oﬃcials
sending administrative funds home or using public funds to buy posts for junior family members) as
reasons.
“Corruption in general involves so many people that it is hard to punish everyone. Oﬃ-
cials therefore pursue their personal interests (si) unimpeded. The number of those who
create deﬁcits for the sake of the public interest (gong) is minuscule. It is really not more
than three to ﬁve percent.”
牽纏攀累。或難盡誅。所以侵私迄無顧忌也。若因公賠墊。以致短少。實不過
百中三五⽽已。
Zhang doubts that governors-general and governors are unaware of the embezzlement going on at
this scale, but that there are four reasons holding them back from reporting their subordinates to the
censorate: fear of punishment for failure to monitor their subordinates properly, fear of punishment
for involvement because they have accepted gifts from their subordinates, sympathy for their subordi-
nates and reluctance to cause them trouble, and capitulation in the face of the sheer dimension of the
task and the feeling that their own actions, however determined, will never reverse the trend but only
earn them a “bad reputation for oppressive treatment” (kebo zhi ming刻薄之名) of subordinates.3
Embezzling public funds has thus become such an ingrained habit and cases so numerous that mere
reliance on disciplinary action is not effective enough. All this justiﬁes a thorough reworking of the
1What Li imagines is to locally advance from district magistrate (of a zhou or xian) to assistant of the local prefect (ben fu
zuoni本府佐貳), to local prefect (ben fu本府), to local circuit intendant (ben dao本道).
2HCJSWB, 20:27a–32a.
3In the Qing dynasty, the ﬁrst person expected report oﬃcial offenses were the superiors, not the censors. See Metzger
(1973), pp. 270–271.
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task structure in the upper echelons of the provincial administration with the aim of regulating duties
more clearly and establishing mechanisms of mutual control. All past cases of misappropriation of pub-
lic funds have to be put under thorough investigation. Furthermore, to facilitate exposure of future
cases, Zhang Pengzhan suggest to change the current situation where the responsibility to monitor of-
ﬁcial budgets is shared by all high provincial authorities, including the governor-general, governor, the
provincial administration commissioner (buzhengshi布政使 and the provincial surveillance commis-
sioner anchashi按察使) and (daoyuan道員 or daotai道臺, heading branch oﬃces of the provincial
administration commission and the provincial surveillance commission), and instead confer all mon-
itoring responsibility to the lowest of the four, the circuit intendants. The circuit intendants of one
province are just enough in number and their other duties just light enough so as to render them able of
shouldering the monitoring responsibility. Zhang points out that the system he envisions is an example
of “mutual control” (xiang wei xiang zhi相維相制). To reduce incentives to collaborate with oﬃcials
guilty of embezzlement, circuit intendants are to be made liable for failure to impeach corrupt oﬃcials.
The circuit intendants do not only monitor magistrates, but also the higher provincial authorities. The
governor-general, governor, provincial administration commissioner and provincial surveillance com-
missioner will be reluctant to engage in corruption for fear of being exposed by circuit intendants. Due
to the nature of the task, the circuit intendants themselves have little opportunity to engage in corrup-
tion, but if they nevertheless manage to do so, the governor-general and governor can impeach them.
Wei Xi has a similar approach of a model (fa) that realizes “mutual control between people and oﬃ-
cials”官民相制 to promote public-mindedness (gong) and impede selﬁshness (si) on the part of the
people in charge.1 The intention behind community granaries is not just famine prevention, but also to
foster people’s sense of honor and social peace between the rich and poor in the local community. Wei
Xi presents a roadmap for the adaption of Zhu Xi’s granary scheme (fa) to the current times. He lays
out the operations of the granaries that involves two kinds of personnel: local granary masters (chosen
from among the local people, their number depending on the size of granary and local community) and
the magistrates. The special feature of Wei Xi’s model for the operation of the granaries is that the pro-
fessional relationship of these two groups of personnel is one of mutual control (xiangzhi相制). The
oﬃcials monitor all operations and ensure that everyone proceeds according to the regulations (fa),
especially that the local people put in charge of the granaries do not engage in actions that are “not in
accordance with the law (fa) and public interest (gong)”不法不公. The people, meanwhile, monitor
the in- and outﬂow of grain, which in turn keeps the monitoring oﬃcial from diverting stocks into his
own pocket.
“Equipping the oﬃcial with the power to reward and punish will instill respect (for the
regulations) in the people. Conferring the task of keeping account of the amounts of in-
coming and outgoing grain to the local people will render the oﬃcials unable to (illegally
1HCJSWB, 41:10a–20b.
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proﬁt from the granary) for their own private (si) advantage. This is a scheme (fa) that
implements so called ‘mutual control’, it is without ﬂaw (bi).”
蓋以賞罰之權歸於官。則⼈知所畏。以出⼊之數歸於民。則官無可私。所謂官
民相制。其法無弊者也。
The HCJSWXB/SHENG contains a letter authored by Bao Shichen on the challenges facing an of-
ﬁcial such as developing an empathy for the people and dealing with local opposition. 1 Another chal-
lenge is the proper balance of public (gong) and private (si) interests. A commentary appended to Bao
Shichen’s letter identiﬁes the clear analysis of the relationship of gong and si as the main distinguishing
feature of the letter. The commentary must have been authored by one of the editors of HCJSWXB/
SHENG, as it justiﬁes the placement of the letter in the general chapter “On civil servants” (lilun吏論)
within the lizheng with its relevance for both magistrates and higher ranking oﬃcials.
Gong presents public (gong) and private interests (si) as generally compatible but their balancing
as a non-trivial challenge that is easily lost. Because literati are worried about their livelihood, especially
those who hold oﬃce, they tend to give equal weight to public (gong) affairs and their own private (si)
affairs. If their oﬃce cannot bring their family any advantage, this will affect their conduct of public
affairs, and oﬃcials will not be able to conduct administrative business freely. This is dangerous, Bao
suggests. If one puts the public affairs (gong) ﬁrst and one’s private affairs (si) second, the public affairs
will still allow to take care of one’s private affairs, but not the other way around. If one puts one’s pri-
vate affairs (si) ﬁrst and the public affairs (gong) second, the private affairs will affect the public affairs
negatively. A critical awareness of this fact is crucial to preventing private interests (si) from affecting
the conduct of public (gong) affairs.
Bao Shichen’s contemporary Tang Peng湯鵬 does not think of gong and si as reconcilable. The ﬁrst
writing in the opening chapter of the personnel section of HCJSWXB/SHENG is a treatise by Tang
Peng on “Instruction in modesty and integrity”訓廉.2 In order to do justice to the trust that the em-
peror has placed in them in conferring them a post in the bureaucracy, Tang Peng says, and in order to
put all efforts and energies in the administration of their jurisdiction, oﬃcials “must eliminate all private
interest (si) and pursue the public interest (gong)”不能⽏割其私以從公. Pursuit of public good and
private interest clearly exclude each other in Tang’s view.
“It is not possible to pursue the public interest (gong) and one’s private interest (si) at the
same time. Someone who pursues his private interest cannot pursue the public interest
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What Tang suggests is to prevent oﬃcials from pursuing private interests is to “instruct them in modesty
and integrity”訓廉.
gong and si ﬁgure among the key categories of Hu Linyi’s胡林翼 (1812–1861) argument on how
to improve bureaucratic discipline (lizhi吏治) with respect to excessive surcharges.1 According to Hu,
economic autonomy fosters moral autonomy. A number of fees, for example, the lijin厘⾦, have been
established to meet the enormous military costs China is facing. The problem is that all these fees come
with surcharges that are unoﬃcially established (si she私設) or even extorted from the people. Fees
allegedly levied for “urgent public purposes (gong)”急公 harm the state and its people instead.“The
amount raised for the public purpose (ﬁnancing the military) is meagre, they amount they deprive the
people of is considerable”其所繳於公者薄。其所取於民者厚. The fees levied by oﬃcials pri-
vately (sishou私收, that is, unoﬃcially, without oﬃcial authorization) cancel out tax reductions in
disaster-struck regions. Hu says there is no doubt that these funds are either pocketed by sub-oﬃcial
functionaries or end up in oﬃcials’ “private (si) pockets”私囊.
To impeach and dismiss overcharging oﬃcials will likely further exacerbate the shortage of personnel
on the local level. The solution Hu suggests is therefore to speciﬁcally target “bad habits in connection
to oﬃcial entertainment”官場應酬陋習 and thereby reduce ﬁnancial pressure on subordinate oﬃ-
cials. Superiors play a decisive role in this process because they can contain the spiralling costs of their
subordinate yamen. If superiors do not demand generous gifts and do not expect luxurious entertain-
ment from subordinate yamen, their subordinates will not run into ﬁnancial diﬃculties and are in a
position to cultivate their own integrity. Furthermore, the moderation and integrity of a superior will
retroact upon his subordinates. If extravagant instances of spending for oﬃcial entertainment are put
under strict punishment, oﬃcials will come to cherish an honesty and simpleness (chunpu淳樸) and
cut spending on superﬂuous items.
“It is in human nature to strive to make things convenient for oneself (si). As long as a su-
perior does make ﬁnancial demands, his subordinates can support themselves. If we want
oﬃcials to accept the obligation to act with integrity, we ﬁrst have to improve bureaucratic
culture. The values endorsed by the lower oﬃcials depend on the values endorsed by the
high oﬃcials. If we keep this in mind, we do not have to worry about constant exhorta-
tions because oﬃcial attitudes will improve by themselves.”
觀⼈情固欲⾃便其私。上無所求。則下可⾃贍。責以廉潔⽽無辭。⾵尚必使先
趨於正。⼤官所好。即吏所瞻。不煩董戒⽽⾃變。
We see here once again that si is a ﬂuid category. It can indicate both legitimate and illegitimate si (detri-
mental to the “public good”), without the author making this explicit. Here, Hu puts the natural hu-
man tendency of striving to accommodate one’s personal interests at the root of the solution. The fact
1HCJSWXJ/RAO, 15:3a–7b; HCJSWXB/SHENG, 94:11a–15b.
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Hu regards this tendency as legitimate and does not suggest to suppress it, but to work with it, indicates
that Hu adheres to a understanding of private interest (si) that accepts that there an oﬃcials has legiti-
mate private interests (si).
Wu Ting吳鋌 (?–?) departs from a similar point of view as Hu Linyi, that economic independence
fosters integrity and alleviates the burden of surcharges on the population.1 He argues that oﬃcials will
readily “serve the public interest (gong) and forget their personal interest (si)”奉公忘私 if given a
decent salary. Wu presents the ability to “serve the public interest (gong) and forget one’s personal
interest (si)” as a professional requirement which men who pursuing an oﬃcial career have to fulﬁll. An
oﬃcial who has the duty to use the special powers invested in him by virtue of his position responsibly,
and must not abuse them for his personal advantage.
For Wu Ting, decent salaries resonate with the fundamental principles of good governance, moral
transformation and wise ordering (hua li化理). Raising oﬃcial salaries and ensuring that they can both
support their family and perform their oﬃcial duties was the measure of choice to prevent corruption
employed by the sage rulers of antiquity and by the more enlightened rulers of the Han and Tang dy-
nasty. In later times, oﬃcial salaries were in general insuﬃcient to support the oﬃcial and his family.
Oﬃcials above the district level were supported by customary fees that they received from the magis-
trates who levied them as surcharges on the regular taxes. Upright oﬃcials suffered from a chronic short-
age of funds, while oﬃcials with lower moral standards impoverished the people with their surcharges.
The only practical problem with higher oﬃcial salaries is that the funds have to come from somewhere.
A general salary raise would deprive the state treasury of funds needed for other things. Wu Ting sug-
gests that instead of increasing oﬃcials’ monetary compensation, oﬃcials can be compensated by giving
them right to collect the rent from so-called public ﬁelds (gongtian公⽥). This will also get oﬃcials
closer involved with peasant life and the toils of agricultural work, Wu Ting claims.
Feng Guifen employs gong and si to argue for turning the recruitment procedures for state oﬃ-
cials upside down in the essay “Making the evaluation of oﬃcials a public (gong) process” (Gong
chuzhi yi公黜陟議) from Feng Guifen’s famous collection of reformist essays, the Jiaobinlu kanyi
校邠廬抗議.2 Feng criticizes that after qualifying for oﬃcial status by means of a written exam, future
oﬃcials are selected by a small exclusive body of high oﬃcials. Feng doubts that such a “private” (si)
method that bases selection of oﬃcials on the personal judgment of a few does indeed select the most
talented and virtuous candidates. What Feng proposes instead is the abolition of written examinations
and the involvement of broader sections of the bureaucracy in the selection of high oﬃcials, including
low-ranking oﬃcials.
1HCJSWXB/SHENG, 20:1a–2b.
2HCJSWXB/GE, 14:2a–b. “Making the evaluation of oﬃcials a public process” is Kuhn’s (1995) translation of the title,
Kuhn (1995), p. 324.
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“Should recruitment of oﬃcials (textscren) today give more weight to the personal (si)
opinion of a few, or should it give more weight to the public (gong) opinion. The answer
is deﬁnitely: public opinion should be given more weight!”
取⼈者 [...]將重⼀⼆⼈之私⾒乎？將重千百⼈之公論乎？則必⽈：公論重矣！
Nominated candidates should be ranked according to the number of nominations received, and then
be appointed to the respective oﬃce in the order of their position on the ranking list as soon as there
was a vacancy. A similar “public” (gong) procedure should be set up for the selection of local oﬃcials,
and even ﬁrst-degree holders and village elders should have a vote in their election. Feng presents the
proposed procedure as an adaption of current practices.
“The guiding principle is to adapt the Ming procedure of recruiting oﬃcials through col-
lective nomination, and to broaden the circle of people qualiﬁed to nominate candidates.
This means to adapt the current system of recruitment and reverse its rules, shifting the
right to name candidates to the lower level.”
道在以明會推之法廣⽽⽤之。又以今保舉之法反⽽⽤之。會推必重⾂之貴，今
廣之於庶僚。保舉為⾧吏之權，今移之於下位。
According to Feng, “making the evaluation of oﬃcials a public (gong) process” consists in basing judg-
ments on the opinion of a greater number of people. The advantage advertized by Feng is that the pro-
cess becomes more objective and more alented and virtuous candidates will be selected.
Handwritten copies (chuanchao傳抄) of the Jiaobinlu kangyi circulated after Feng had compiled the
ﬁnal version in 1861. The ﬁrst printed edition appeared in 1876, two years after Feng’s death, and became
an important piece of writing for scholar-oﬃcials associated with the self-strengthening movement.
The Guangxu emperor read the collection on the recommendation of his tutor in 1889 and reportedly
copied six of the essays by hand. In 1898 and following a proposal of the general secretary and minister
of personnel Sun Jiading孫家⿍ (1827–1909), the Guangxu emperor ordered to reprint of one to two
thousand copies of the Jiaobinlu kangyi and distribute them to the oﬃcials in the metropolitan admin-
istrative agencies and have them hand in comments and annotations on the viability of Feng Guifen’s
reform proposals within ten days, with the aim of probing their attitude towards the planned reforms.
The result of order were 251 annotated copies of the Jiaobinlu kangyi returned to the throne from the
various metropolitan oﬃces, making for a total of 502 booklets (because the Jiaobinlu kangyi comprises
two volumes), as well as 106 stand-alone notes. 1
Most of the 1898 comments on Feng’s proposal to “make the evaluation of oﬃcials a public (gong)
process” were hostile, and several employed the gong-si polarity to rebut Feng’s arguments for the re-
1Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan (2008), foreword. 463 booklets and 63 notes have been preserved in the First Histori-
cal Archives in Beijing and were compiled into a 25-volume facsimile edition in 2007.
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form of the appointment process.1 In their comments, Feng’s critics argue that it is the conventional
procedure of examining and appointing candidates, not the procedure envisioned by Feng, that maxi-
mizes objectivity and public good while reducing the opportunities for private interests to distort the
process. For example, the Hanlin academician Cheng Ding陳⿍ points out that the “public” opinion,
the opinion of the crowd, which Feng praised as capable of producing impartial evaluations of merit
was really motivated by private interest. Basing appointments on the opinion of lower oﬃcials and the
local elite are not more objective or impartial (gong), but instead allow private interests (si) to invade
a previously objective and impartial (gong) procedure. The group of high oﬃcials in charge of select-
ing candidates are men who, specially qualiﬁed by education, have the ability to see and decide things
from an objective (gong) viewpoint that gives them clear view of the public interest because they can
transcend their own private interests (si). They will in general select good men, and are additionally held
personally accountable for misconduct of the men they have recommended and have the duty to im-
peach misconduct among their subordinates.2 The lower oﬃcials and ﬁrst degree holders are not capa-
ble of such an impartial view of the public interest (gong) because they are too fond of promoting their
own personal interests (si). Introducing their opinions into the decision process would make objectivity
impossible. Therefore, the procedure suggested by Feng would lead illegitimate private interests to dom-
inate the selection of oﬃcials and, subsequently, the operations of the bureaucracy. The many men with
questionable moral standards among the lower ranks of the bureaucracy and among the local gentry will
form factions to heave men into oﬃce who will advocate their illegitimate private interests, while the
honestly talented aspirants will have no voice because it goes against their personal moral standards to
form factions.3
gong-si became an omnipresent pair of concepts in the debates at the time. The issue looming be-
hind the debates and the use of the gong-si was the controversial question as to which strata of society
could be expected to have internalized the “public” perspective so as to be granted a voice in public af-
fairs. Kuhn summarizes the reasons why Feng’s critics preferred the current system of evaluation and
appointment over Feng’s proposal because they regarded it as the best system to ensure that the bureau-
cracy worked for the public interest and not particular private interests of some of its members.
“What the critics feared was [...] a political system dominated by factional strife, a scram-
ble for advantage, and the exaltation of purely private ends. In such a system, not the
cream, but the scum would rise to the surface. We must regard this fear as the deeply-
ingrained attitude of a tiny privileged elite, which understood its monopoly of political
power through the mandarin premise: that education raised men above petty, private con-
1In the following I refer to the sample of comments on Feng’s essay presented in Kuhn (1995), who had access to the orig-
inal documents in the First Historical Archives. There is one inconsistency issue with Kuhn’s sample and the 2008 facsimile
edition. While Kuhn cites from Li Hongzhang’s “comments” (jianzhu箋 註), the foreword of the facsimile edition says that
Li Hongzhang’s commented version of the Jiaobinlu kangyi (qianzhuben簽註本) is among the 39 booklets lost.
2Kuhn (1995), p. 327.
3Kuhn (1995), p. 330.
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siderations; and that high oﬃcials specially qualiﬁed by education must therefore embody
a purer view of the public interest than those below them.”1
There was a perception among even reform minded oﬃcials in the 1870s and 1880s that too many low-
ranking men had gained access to government posts via the rank-purchase system. One of the leaders of
“purist party” (qingliudang清流黨), an aﬃliation of oﬃcials who opposed the court’s appeasement
towards foreign powers, said the rank-purchase system was beginning to threaten order because it con-
fused social distinctions and the proper relationship between public and private.2 At least in an age,
where people did not have public values internalized as in antiquity, an authoritarian rule was necessary
to keep private interests in check.
“Assuming that top oﬃcials would do so [i.e., keep the private interests of their subordi-
nates in check] presents a vexing problem: how could you be sure that top oﬃcials were
not, themselves, acting on behalf of private interests? The problem ceased to exist if you
believed that higher oﬃcials would inevitably have a more objective view of the public in-
terest than lower ones, an that the bureaucracy as a whole would have a more objective
view than mere private persons.”3
Feng, on the other hand, Kuhn believes, was as weary of unchecked power of local bosses and middle-
men and longed as much for “greater objectivity and ﬁrmer enforcement of public interest over private”
as his critics but that he believed, like Wei Yuan, “that the public the public interest was more widely
internalized, among the elite, than conventional wisdom assumed”.4
The conventional perspective shared by many critics of Feng Guifen’s proposal was that the elevated
position of the emperor at the apex of the power hierarchy was justiﬁed by the fact that the emperor
“owed favors to no man” and was therefore “anchoring the system in the purest public-mindedness”.5
Zeng Guofan曾國藩 (1811–1872) qualiﬁes this assumption in a memorial written in 1850, the ﬁrst year
of the Xianfeng reign (1850–1861).6 In it, Zeng Guofan indirectly criticizes three weaknesses of the em-
peror by way of writing about three imperial virtues that can turn into weaknesses unless emperor is
wary of it and takes precautionary measures. Respectfulness and carefulness can turn into pedantry,
fondness of antiquity can turn into fondness of empty formulas. The third of the virtues-turned-weaknesses
is openness towards criticism turned into wariness of criticism and overvaluation of one’s personal judg-
ment.
Zeng Guofan says that the this third risk looms in the Xianfeng emperor’s approach to personal pol-
itics. In the previous year, the Xianfeng emperor had issued an edict calling for suggestions in the ﬁelds
1Kuhn (1995), pp. 326–327.
2Kuhn (1995), p. 321.
3Kuhn (1995), p. 332.
4Kuhn (1995), p. 333.
5Kuhn (1995). p. 327.
6HCJSWXB/GE, 14:2a–3a.
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of personnel politics (yongren) and administration (xingzheng⾏政). In an edict this year, the em-
peror had rowed back as far as personnel politics were concerned, stating more than once that the power
of appointing oﬃcials still rested ﬁrmly in his hands, virtually discouraging everyone else to get involved
in personnel politics. Zeng Guofan extends the gong-si polarity with a third category, ming明 (en-
lightened, wise, farsighted) to explain why it is not a wise tactic for the emperor to monopolize the se-
lection of oﬃcials and bar views from below on the matter. The emperor’s rationale for not heeding the
opinion of critical oﬃcials is that he himself just acts as the proxy of Heaven, the highest moral instance
in the cosmos. Heaven acts and through decides through the emperor, thus “there is not the slightest
partiality (si)”無纖毫之私 in the emperor’s opinion, as it is really Heaven’s opinion. The emperor
then, per deﬁnition “does never hold his own personal opinion (but Heaven’s), why then should the
emperor still consult the opinion of his oﬃcials?”初⾮⾃執⼰⾒豈容⾂下更參末議.
Zeng objects that this reasoning leaves out one other group whose perspective the emperor needs
to combine with his own perspective in order to arrive at a complete image of Heaven’s perspective.
This group are the people, with whose eyes and ears Heaven sees and hears, according to the Book of
Documents (Shangshu尚書). The emperor has access to the views of the people via the oﬃcials in the
censorate.1 It is not enough if a candidate selected by the emperor receives the approval of the members
of the Grand Council (junjichu軍機處) and the emperors immediate trustees, not even if he receives
the approval of the high ministers in the metropolitan oﬃces. Truly qualiﬁed candidates, Zeng says,
receive approval from the oﬃcials in the censorate (kedao科道) and all the people in the state (guoren
國⼈). The emperor may formally have the power of appointment, but he shares the capability to make
the right decision with the rest of the empire. If the emperors views about a person are devoid of even
the slightest partiality (si) can indeed be called impartial (gong), Zeng says. However, they can only be
called enlightened (ming) if they are conﬁrmed by all people. What Zeng is effectively saying is that the
emperor’s decisions are not automatically gong without the emperor making an effort to understand
the perspective of the people.
1Zeng Guofan speaks of the kedao科道 here. According to Hucker (1985), pp. 133, 145–146, 280 and 536, kedao is a col-
lective designation for the Oﬃces of Scrutiny and Circuits, and their staff, the Supervising Secretaries (jishizhong給事中),
organized in the six Oﬃces of Scrutiny (ke六科, paralleling the Six Ministries), and Investigating Censors (jiancha yushi
監察御史), associated with regional Circuits (dao道). Hucker (1985) also notes that Supervising Secretaries and Investiga-
tive Censors frequently collaborated on investigatory missions. In 1723, the Oﬃces of Scrutiny were incorporated into the
Censorate, which is why Hucker argues that the Supervising Secretaries should be called Supervising Censors for the time
after 1723.
3.3 li利 and yi義
Cheng (1991) suggests to understand yi as the fundamental principle of morality that helps to relate
the universal to the particular and thereby confer qualities of right and wrong to human actions. In
other words, yi assesses the “ﬁtness” or “appropriateness” of an action.1 yi is the criterion that decides
whether a certain action connected to the pursuit of gains is acceptable or unacceptable, whether a
virtue is acceptable as virtue or not, and whether a certain norm can be used to justify actions. Function-
ing kind of like a meta-virtue, yi engenders the decision-making ability that lets one apply a virtue prop-
erly to a particular situation. Assuming with Confucius that “every virtue considered by itself could lead
to an excess which violates other virtues”2, yi represents the ideal of the “total good” that has to inform
the decision. A moral agent capable of yi is able to assess the “ﬁtness of a virtue for a particular situa-
tion” and to “adjudicate among other established virtues” so as to make a right decision that preserves
the unity and harmony of all virtues.
The meaning of li oscillates between neutral or even positive “beneﬁt”, and a negative “beneﬁt” that
can sometimes be rendered as “proﬁt”. li can appear with a neutral or even positive connotation in
the context of describing “pros and cons”, where li refers to aspects that are beneﬁcial as opposed to
harmful (hai害 or bi弊). The nature of the relationship of li and righteousness (yi), and thus the value
connotation of li in the context of the polarity, is not obvious and consequently subject to debate (see,
for example, the debates preceding Wang Anshi’s reforms). Li may refer to beneﬁts that are in accor-
dance with righteousness because they do not harm anyone’s legitimate interests. But it may also refer
to proﬁts that are obtained at the expense of others and by harming their legitimate interests.
3.3.1 Pre-Qing political career
One of the foundational passages in the classics which the authors of the writings in the statecraft com-
pendia refer to in their discussion of policies is a passage in the Analects that records Confucius saying
“that which superior men understand is righteousness (yi); that which petty men understand is (only)
proﬁt (li)”君⼦喻於義；⼩⼈喻於利.3 Levine (2008) reconstructs how the critics of the Northern
Song reformer Wang Anshi “recycled” the language of the Analects, in particular this very passage, in
1This conforms with the later deﬁnition of yi in the Doctrine of the Mean: “Benevolence is the accordance of things with
what is right”義者宜也. Legge (1876), p. 383, italics in the original.
2Cheng (1991), p. 235. The relevant passage from the Analects is: “There is love of being benevolent without the love of
learning. The beclouding here leads to foolish simplicity. There is the love of knowing without the love of learning. The
beclouding here leads to an injurious disregard of consequences. There is the love of straightforwardness without the love of
learning. The beclouding here leads to rudeness. There is the love of boldness without the love of learning. The beclouding
here leads to insubordination. There is the love of ﬁrmness without the love of learning. The beclouding here leads to extrava-
gant conduct.”好仁不好學，其蔽也愚；好知不好學，其蔽也蕩；好信不好學，其蔽也賊；好直不好學，其蔽
也絞；好勇不好學，其蔽也亂；好剛不好學，其蔽也狂。Legge (1861), p. 260.
3Legge (1861), p. 44. Translation adapted from Levine (2008), p. 87. Note however that both Legge and Levine render
li as gain, which I changed into proﬁt in order not to further increase the number of translations used in parallel in this
dissertation.
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their attacks on his reform plans. Both Sima Guang, one of the chief leaders of the anti-reformist coali-
tion, and the two censors Yang Hui (1027–1088) and Liu Zhi (1030–1097) stressed the binary distinction
between the superior man’s pursuit of righteousness (yi) and the petty man pursuit of proﬁt (li), and
made it clear that Wang’s personnel were petty men and that Wang’s plans were enabling these petty
men to pursue proﬁt at the expense of the people and the state. It is illustrative to observe how Wang
Anshi responded to his critics’ attacks: “Wang succeeded in persuading the emperor that the useful and
the good were not mutually exclusive binaries, as antireformists like Sima Guang and Liu Zhi had re-
peatedly insisted: ‘Gain is to be in harmony with righteousness; righteousness surely is to do what is
advantageous.”’1 When responding to Sima Guang’s critique, Wang simply denied that ﬁnancial man-
agement, which Sima associated with proﬁt-seeking, conﬂicted with the interests of the people and the
state, emphasizing that “proper management of human and material capital would demonstrably en-
hance the overall prosperity of the empire, expanding effective governance and building a stronger mili-
tary”. Convinced, the emperor appointed Wang to the Council of State. In response to Yang Hui’s and
Liu Zhi’s critique of his personnel, Wang insisted that the roles were distributed the other way round,
with his own men representing superior men, and Yang and Liu being the petty men who should be
barred from the civil service. Wang successfully managed to persuade the emperor to dismiss Yang and
Liu and to turn the Censorate into “empty shell, staffed by a skeleton crew of loyal reformists”.2
Another passage of decisive importance is a passage from the Great Learning that exhorts “not to re-
gard proﬁt (li) as beneﬁt (li), but to regard righteousness (yi) as beneﬁt (li)”不以利為利，以義
為利.3 The passage exhorts the ruler and his ministers not to regard the net tax income as an indicator
of the state’s prosperity, but a fair distribution of tax liabilities that secures the people’s subsistence. A
reference often cited to evoke the positive connotations of li is the Book of Changes. li ﬁgures promi-
nently in the hexagram texts (guaci卦辭) of the Book of Changes, where it generally represents a pos-
itive term, the “advantageous” or “beneﬁcial”. The Book of Changes also contains a passage that treats
li and yi as compatible aspects. The Commentary on the Words of the Text (Wenyanzhuan⽂⾔傳) of
the ﬁrst hexagram (qian乾) in the Book of Changes explains li as a descriptive term for actions that are
fully compatible with righteousness (yi). The text of the ﬁrst hexagram reads “qian represents what is
great and originating, penetrating, beneﬁcial (li), correct and ﬁrm”乾元亨利貞. The Commentary on
the Words of the Text commentary comments on the term li in the text: “what is called ‘the beneﬁcial’
(li) is the harmony of all that is right”「利」者，義之和也 and “the superior man [...] beneﬁting all
creatures, is ﬁt to exhibit the harmony of all that is right”君⼦ […]利物⾜以和義.4 This makes li a
condition of yi. Righteousness (yi) and harmony (that results from righteousness) are achieved through
beneﬁcial (li) actions.
The locus classicus cited most frequently in connection with the li-yi polarity in the compendia is a
1Levine (2008), p. 89.
2Levine (2008), pp. 77-78; 87–88
3Legge (1861), pp. 344–345.
4Translations adapted from Legge (1899), pp. 57; 408.
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passage from the Mencius. The Mencius juxtaposes beneﬁt (li) with humanity and righteousness (ren
yi仁義). In the passage, Mencius, when passing through the state of Liang, is invited to an audience
with King Hui of Liang梁惠王 (5th–4th century BC). The king greets him with the request to offer
advice from which his state can beneﬁt (li). The advice Mencius offers in response is that the king needs
to change his attitude. Instead of asking for advice on what could beneﬁt his state, he should ask for ad-
vice on what could bring humaneness (ren仁) and righteousness (yi) to his state. Mencius explains that
an orientation towards beneﬁt (li) is an unstable foundation to build a state upon. A king who thinks
only about the beneﬁt of his state will induce an atmosphere in which their king’s vassals will only think
about they can beneﬁt their own families and the lower nobles and commoners will only think about
how they can beneﬁt themselves. In short, bonds of mutual sympathy and trust based on the premise of
reciprocal giving and taking will dissolve. Instead, a struggle for beneﬁt will arise between the strata of
the socio-political hierarchy, which ultimately endangers the stability of the state. Just like people who
cease to cherish righteousness will stop to care for their parents, vassals who cease to cherish righteous-
ness (yi) will enter into competition for power with their feudal lords.1 Mencius criticizes that the king
is putting the cart before the horse. Real, long-term beneﬁt is only achievable of the ruler focuses on
humaneness and righteousness.
In another episode, Mencius meets Song Ke, a fellow scholar and paciﬁst from the state of Song, who
is on his way to the state of Chu. Chu is about to wage war with the state of Qin. Song Ke tells Mencius
that he is on a peace mission and wants persuade the rulers not to enter into a war with each other. Men-
cius inquires how he plans to persuade the rulers.2 Song Ke replies that he will tell the rulers that there is
no beneﬁt (li) to be gained from a war. Mencius approves of Song Ke’s plans to stop a war between the
two states, but his advice for Song Ke follows a similar argument as the one for the king of Liang: better
not bring up beneﬁt. Renouncing to enter a war for reasons of proﬁt will send the wrong message to the
public, which will have serious consequences. Song Ke should instead persuade the rulers of Chu and
Qin with arguments based on benevolence and righteousness.
“‘Master,’ said Mencius, ‘your aim is great, but your argument is not good. If you, starting
from the point of proﬁt (li), offer your persuasive counsels to the kings of Qin and Chu,
and if those kings are pleased with the consideration of proﬁt (li) so as to stop the move-
ments of their armies, then all belonging to those armies will rejoice in the cessation of war,
and ﬁnd their pleasure in the pursuit of proﬁt (li). Ministers will serve their sovereign for
the proﬁt (li) of which they cherish the thought; sons will serve their fathers, and younger
brothers will serve their elder brothers, from the same consideration - and the issue will be,
that, abandoning benevolence and righteousness (ren yi), sovereign and minister, father
and son, younger brother and elder, will carry on all their intercourse with this thought of
proﬁt (li) cherished in their hearts. But never has there been such a state of society, with-
1Meng & Li (2000), pp. 2–4.
2Meng & Li (2000), pp. 382–384.
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out ruin being the result of it. If you, starting from the ground of benevolence and righ-
teousness (ren yi), offer your counsels to the kings of Qin and Chu, and if those kings are
pleased with the consideration of benevolence and righteousness (ren yi) so as to stop the
operations of their armies, then all belonging to those armies will rejoice in the stopping
from war, and ﬁnd their pleasure in benevolence and righteousness (ren yi). Ministers will
serve their sovereign, cherishing the principles of benevolence and righteousness (ren yi);
sons will serve their fathers, and younger brothers will serve their elder brothers, in the
same way - and so, sovereign and minister, father and son, elder brother and younger, aban-
doning the thought of proﬁt, will cherish the principles of benevolence and righteousness
(ren yi), and carry on all their intercourse upon them. But never has there been such a state
of society, without the State where it prevailed rising to the royal sway. Why must you use








Again, Mencius’s point is that if the ruler’s plans are based on arguments of proﬁt (li), although effec-
tive in the short term, this will lead to a proﬁt-consciousness that dissolves the socio-political fabric and
drive state and society to the brink of ruin. The counter-program is again to argue from the standpoint
of benevolence and righteousness (ren yi).
The two passages leave room for interpretation as to how Mencius would have characterized the re-
lationship of li and yi. Mencius does not so much associate li and yi with different courses of action,
but with different ways of motivating these actions towards the public and the moral climate thus in-
duced. What the passages clearly brings across is that motivating actions with arguments that emphasize
beneﬁt or utility (li) on the actions will have non-beneﬁcial outcomes, while motivating actions with
arguments that emphasize the righteousness and benevolence (ren yi) of the actions will have beneﬁcial
outcomes. But it is not clear whether Mencius regards li and yi as a fundamental dichotomy. Dong
Zhongshu later summarized Mencius by coining the motto “follow righteousness (yi) without pursu-
ing utility (li); illuminate the Way without calculating success”正其誼不謀其利，明其道不計其功.2
That Dong’s exegesis was not accepted as the only possible interpretation can be seen from Yan Yuan’s
correcting Dong’s statement into “follow righteousness in order to pursue utility; illuminate the Way in
1Translation in Legge (1876), pp. 429–430
2Ban & Yan (n.d.), p. 1555.
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order to calculate success”正其誼以謀其利.1 The debate on how to interpret Mencius continues in
the writings collected in the statecraft compendia.
3.3.2 Functions in Qing statecraft discourse
There are relatively few memorials in the statecraft compendia that employ the li-yi polarity in the con-
text of practical arguments for speciﬁc policies. Most texts expounding on the polarity in detail are the-
oretical essays that advocate the discussion and implementation of statecraft reforms on a more general
level. Texts written in the context of a speciﬁc debate usually operate exclusively with li, either to ac-
cuse political opponents of being motivated by vested interests (li) or to point out the beneﬁts (li) of
a policy. li appears thus frequently both as pejorative and as positive term in the discussion of practical
statecraft in the compendia, while li-yi polarity rarely shows up in such speciﬁc practical contexts.
The considerable number of theoretical essays dedicated to the discussion of the relationship of li
and yi shows the important status of the polarity in late imperial economic thought, though. With few
exceptions, the authors of these essays emphasize the compatibility and interdependence of li and yi.2
Authors do not conceptualize li-yi polarity as a general and absolute dichotomy. What authors con-
trast with righteousness (yi) is not the concept of beneﬁt (li) in general, but unrighteous proﬁt (li).
The writings conceptualize legitimate beneﬁt (li) as the goal of government and equate if with beneﬁt-
ting the people by securing their economic wellbeing. Its antonym is unrighteous or illegitimate proﬁt
(li), which implies beneﬁts on the cost of others by appropriating for oneself that which is other peo-
ple’s due. The most innocuous example of legitimate beneﬁt is the economic subsistence of the farming
population. An important reference in this context is a passage in the Mencius that speaks about teach-
ing people how to properly utilize arable land with the right mix of crops and timely cultivation, how to
engage in husbandry, and how to show reverence to parents, elder brothers and the elderly.3
Legitimate beneﬁt conforms with or even deﬁnes righteousness (yi), while illegitimate proﬁt forms
a true dichotomy with righteousness. Righteousness (yi) is a state of balance or optimal distribution of
beneﬁts (li) among the people. This state of balance where everyone gets his due usually is not imagined
as a perfectly equal distribution of resources, but instead as a distribution deemed suﬃcient to secure
social peace. Chen Shouqi’s description of this state is “those who are poor do not riot, those who are
rich do not live in excess”然⽽窮不能濫，富不能淫.4 The idea is to prevent riots by securing popular
1Yan (1987), p. 163; Cheng (1991), p. 429.
2One of the exceptions is Fang Junyi’s (1815–1888)⽅濬頤Understanding obscuration通蔽說, that expresses a binary
view of li and yi and among other polarities. HCJSWXJ/RAO, 3:34a. “If things in nature are obscured (e.g. a mountain by
trees, grass by snow) it is not in all cases harmful. This is different when it comes to human personality. Desire obscures rea-
son. Badness obscures goodness. Unjustness obscures justness. Partiality obscures impartiality. Beneﬁt obscures righteous-
ness. Falseness obscures honesty. [...] Therefore, one should follow reason, goodness, justness, impartiality, righteousness
and honesty, and block out desire, badness, unjustness, partiality and falseness.”凡物之蔽。不盡為害也。獨⾄⼈⾝則不
然。欲者理之蔽。惡者善之蔽。邪者正之蔽。私者公之蔽。利者義之蔽。偽者誠之蔽。此無他。循理窒欲。
充善?惡。守正敵邪。秉公遏私。慕義忘利。⽴誠袪偽。
3Meng & Li (2000), p. 11.
4HCJSWXB/SHENG, 4:25a–31b. See also the discussion of Chen’s essay below.
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subsistence through adequate instruction in how to cultivate one’s land and one’s social relationships
and low taxation. The opposite of legitimate or righteous beneﬁt is overtaxation and exploitation of the
people, which disturbs the state of balance. 1
Oﬃcials, more than any other professional group, have the duty to renounce from illegitimate self-
beneﬁting. Yang Mingshi’s楊名時 (1661–1736) view argues that oﬃcials should not act selﬁsh (si) and
pursue proﬁt (li) because they have been entrusted with considerable responsibilities. Even egoistic,
proﬁt-seeking oﬃcials are educated enough to know what reason and righteousness (yi) are. They just
decide not to follow it, which is not acceptable, Yang says. “Suppose someone in whom the emperor
places great trust and whom the emperor appoints to a position where he is above other oﬃcials and the
people only pursues his own personal interests (si) and his own proﬁt (li). This is not due to his being
born with a character devoid of reason and righteousness (yi), but rather due to his not cultivating his
(innate) sense of reason and righteousness.”夫受君⽗重寄。⽴官民之上。⽽唯⾃私⾃利之圖。豈
性無理義哉。亦素不講於此故⽿.2 It is their duty to listen to their inner moral feeling and to “use
other men as a mirror for oneself”因⼈⽽鑒已 in order not to turn into men who “only see their own
beneﬁt (li), and are not be aware of what righteousness (yi) is, so if they encounter an opportunity to
act with righteousness, they will not chose it”惟利是視則不知有義即⾒義亦不為矣.3　
Some writings rank the policies of historical statesmen and political advisers according to their level of
righteousness (yi), also referred to as the “foundation” (ben本) of government.4 The highest category
are Confucius and Mencius who “regarded righteousness (yi) as beneﬁt (li)”. To the lowest category,
government solely oriented towards considerations of proﬁt (li), in this case synonymous with state in-
come, belong the chief representatives of the Legalist camp of the Debates on Salt and Iron (yantielun
鹽鐵論) in the Han Dynasty, as well as Legalist Warring States Reformers such as Shang Yang, famous
historical statesmen from the Warring States to the Han and Tang such as Guan Zhong and Liu Yan. In
the middle category reside reformers who associated with ﬁscal and economic policies as exploitative as
Shang Yang or the hardliners of the Salt and Iron discussion. The discussion is altogether very superﬁ-
cial, however, and consists mainly of references to historical ﬁgures, seldom accompanied by details as
1See for example a memorial in which Tang Xiu湯修 (1811–1871) discusses general principles that military budget policy
should follow in 1849 in the beginning of his career when serving as secretary (clerical worker) in the Grand Secretariat. The
measures he prioritizes include to allow for collection of taxes and fees in kind instead of silver to avoid that tax payers have
to bear conversion and melting fees and to ﬁght corruption by better monitoring oﬃcials and functionaries. The surcharges
represent a “taking proﬁt (li) without righteousness”以⾮義取利, which will lead to the loss of popular trust (minxin
民信), one of the three pillars of government according to the sages. HCJSWXB/SHENG, 29:55a–57b
2HCJSWB, 16:31a–b.
3He Guizhen何桂珍 (ﬂ. 1817–1855) writes this about Mencius’ statements that the “proper relationship between ruler
and oﬃcial is based on righteousness (yi)”君⾂有義 and that proper relationships (between ruler and oﬃcial, father
and son, or elder and younger brother) should not “be entertained on the basis of beneﬁt (li)”以利相接 in a memorial
on the need of appointing a few reliable men in key positions who are not motivated by proﬁt (li) alone written in 1852.
HCJSWXB/SHENG, 16:18a–20b In a way, He Guizhen transforms the radical prohibition of pursuing li (that one should
not pursue proﬁt at all) into a prohibition of radical pursuit of li (that one should not only pursue proﬁt) by interpreting
Mencius’ “basing a relationship upon mutual beneﬁt (li)”以利相接 as “only seeing one’s own beneﬁt (li)”惟利是視. He
Guizhen relativizes the statement by paraphrasing it in a way that removes the absoluteness of the statement.
4See, for example, HCJSWXB/SHENG, 29:15a–16a and HCJSWXB/SHENG, 5:21a–24b.
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to which concrete policies of theirs are representative. If the economic subsistence fraction makes ref-
erence to economic policies conforming to “regarding righteousness (yi) as beneﬁt (li)” at all, it is the
propagation of knowledge on agricultural cultivation methods as well as the instruction in Confucian
virtues through Confucian ritual, and is generally linked to low taxation. Associated with the opposite,
“regarding gain (li) as beneﬁt (li)”, is a ﬁscal policy aimed at increasing the state’s extractive capacities,
with high taxes and oppressive labor service demands. Because of they have a wrong conception of what
true beneﬁt is, this policy ends up harming both the state and the people. The statesmen of the middle
category had a remote grasp of the foundations of true beneﬁt, but still so incomplete that their ﬁscal
policies were still harmful.
li and yi are closely connected with li and hai. Illegitimate proﬁt (li) is short-sighted or even self-
destructive because short-term beneﬁts (li) lead to long-term harm (hai), and someone who harms
others will in the end be harmed by others himself. In his essay discussed below, Wang Jin criticizes in-
dividuals ignoring future generation’s harm for a short-time beneﬁt. Chen Shouqi states that righteous
beneﬁt is without harmful side-effects (hai), while unrighteous beneﬁt harms oneself in the end. Dou
Xu argues that because the statesmen criticized for “speaking of proﬁt (li)” did not speak of economic
subsistence and social relationships, they actually spoke of harm (hai), not li.
Wang Xun吳詢 (ﬂ. around 1808) highlights the similarity he sees in the nature of the polarities
ming-shi and li-yi with a parallel construction. Wang argues that beneﬁt (li) and name (ming), here
representing status or title, are among the most fundamental principles of the sages’ way of government.
He identiﬁes beneﬁt (li) with the institutions of the well-ﬁeld system and the educational system.
“(The source of) beneﬁt (li) is the well-ﬁeld system (agriculture). (The source of) name
(ming, title and status) are schools (education). Of everything in the universe, only bene-
ﬁt li and name (ming) are everlasting (as abstract principles or institutions). With them
gone, the statecraft of the sages becomes impossible (they are the most fundamental princi-
ples of the sages’ way of government).”
利井⽥也。名學校也。宇宙惟名利不朽。名利毀。聖⼈之經綸息矣。
At the same time, however, beneﬁt (li) and name (ming) derive from something even more fundamen-
tal. A person’ss “name” (ming), that is, his title, status or reputation, derive from something more fun-
damental, namely his performance (shi). A name cannot be attained without the corresponding perfor-
mance. Beneﬁt (li) is the result of righteousness (yi). Any beneﬁt that does not result from righteous-
ness is therefore no real beneﬁt in the deﬁnition of the sages.
“Those who strive for a small name (ming, e.g. reputation or oﬃcial title and status) but
are ignorant of actual (shi) eﬃcacy (; those who ignore great harm (hai) when they spot a
small beneﬁt (li): what they understand as name (ming) is not what the sages understood
as name (ming); what they understand as beneﬁt (li) is not what the sages understood as
3.3. LI 利 AND YI 義 231
beneﬁt (li). A name (ming) must be the name of something actual (shi). Without this ac-
tuality (shi), there is no name (ming). Beneﬁt (li) must be beneﬁt that arises from some-
thing righteous (yi). Without righteousness (yi), there is no beneﬁt (li).
求⼩名⽽昧實效。⾒⼩利⽽忘⼤害者。名其名⾮聖名。利其利⾮聖利。名實之
名也。舍實無名。利義之利也。舍義無利。
An illustrative example of irresponsible policies that “ignore great harm (hai) for a small beneﬁt (li)”⾒
⼩利⽽忘⼤ is the conversion of marsh land necessary for natural ﬂood prevention into arable land.1
The quintessence of the large majority of writings in the compendia discussing li and yi may be sum-
marized by Huang Yan’s⿈炎 (ﬂ. 1727) phrasing of the proper relationship of li and yi.
“There are talented people who act right, and there are talented people who act wrong.
(Or: Everyone has a talent to act right and everyone has a talent to act wrong.) Those who
act right are informed by righteousness (yi). Those who act wrong are informed by beneﬁt
(li). It is not that the gentleman does not know about beneﬁt (li), but for him, beneﬁt
(li) is (a means to achieve) righteousness (yi). The petty man always fakes righteousness, to
him, righteousness (yi) is (just a means to achieve) beneﬁt (li).”
有為善之才。有為惡之才。為善之才喻於義。為惡之才喻於利。君⼦⾮不知利。
利亦義也。⼩⼈未嘗不假義。義亦利也。2
Huang Yan states the compatibility of li and yi, albeit on a very abstract level. The question is how this
translates on the level of the individual administrator and on the level of administrative policies. On the
level of the individual administrator, the most radical stance represented in the statecraft compendia
is that the ruler and his oﬃcials should never be motivated by beneﬁt (li), even if it does not encroach
upon other people’s beneﬁts, because this opens the door to proﬁt orientation. Administrators will
slowly lose their sight of the public good and turn into those oﬃcials who only act if there is some ben-
eﬁt involved for themselves. At the other end of the spectrum, Shao Yichen argues in an essay discussed
below that it is alright to be motivated by personal advantage if the end result of their actions is good.
Shao’s example is the preservation of the classical teachings and the widespread propagation of at least
the most important points through the examination system. On the policy level, most of the pre-1897
writings discussing li and yi do not leave the framework of economic subsistence established in the
Mencius. This is true of the writings of Ren Qiyuan, Wang Jin and Chen Shouqi discussed below, but
does not apply to the writings of Wang Liu and Wei Yuan that employ the li-yi polarity to propagate
the typical statecraft program: ﬁscal, monetary and economic policies focused on economic growth and
increase of tax income.
1HCJSWB, 106:4a–6b.
2HCJSWXJ/RAO, 3:1a–4b.
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The following discussion of individual essays is divided in two subsections. The ﬁrst subsection dis-
cusses essays by Ren Qiyuan, Wang Jin and Chen Shouqi DATING FROM WHEN. The second sub-
section discusses three essays by Wei Yuan, Wang Liu and Shao Yichen. Wang Liu’s essay dates from the
1830s, while Shao Yichen’s and Wei Yuan’s essays were ﬁrst printed in 1849 and 1851. While the writings
of the ﬁrst subsection represent the highly theoretical stance of the compatibility of li and yi that is
grounded ﬁrmly in a theory of economic subsistence. The writings by Wei, Wang and Shao, on the other
hand, while similarly emphasizing the compatibility of li and yi, depart from the subsistence stance.
Especially Wei and Wang feel the need to defend their carefully drafted ﬁscal, economic and monetary
policies against the charge of unrighteous beneﬁt because they leave the classical range of measures for
the promotion of agriculture and local mores. They provide the theoretical link between the statements
involving li and yi of the Book of Changes, the Great Learning and the Mencius, and the practical state-
craft writing that employs li as a standard of validity. Wei, Wang and Shao defend institutions and poli-
cies that do not fall under the orthodox deﬁnition of “righteous beneﬁt”. Their strategy is to emphasize
that, all things considered, everybody beneﬁts from these institutions or policies, which qualiﬁes them
as “righteous beneﬁt”. This section closes with a discussion of how Wei Yuan builds on the argument
of the compatibility of li and yi to conﬁrm that the Mencius has been misread all the time. Further dis-
cussed is a passage in which Wei Yuan gives prominence to the Book of Changes and seems to underline
that li is the ultimate standard of validity and link between Heaven and man.
Theoretical perspectives on li and yi and the exegesis of the Mencius and Book of Changes
Ren Qiyuan任啟運 (1670–1744) discusses the relationship of li and yi in the Mencius and the Book
of Changes. Ren explains that yi is inseparably related with humaneness (ren). Ren is the highest virtue
in existence and yi is its application in government. Humane governance must be concerned with the
people’s daily activities, such as agriculture, sericulture and husbandry. His practical example of what it
means to “beneﬁt (li) all creatures” so as to bring about the “harmony of all that is right (yi)”, as stated
in the Book of Changes, is a policy that encourages agriculture in the Northern provinces and a parsimo-
nious lifestyle in the South.
Ren Qiyuan juxtaposes statements about li and yi by Dong Zhongshu and Mencius with statements
about li and yi in the Book of Changes attributed to King Wen of Zhou and Confucius. According to
Dong Zhongshu “a benevolent (ren) person strives to act in accordance with what is right (yi), not ac-
cording to what is advantageous (li)”仁者正其誼不謀其利.1 Mencius asks “why speak of advantage
(li)? Humaneness and righteousness (renyi) is all that counts”何必⽈利？亦有仁義⽽已矣. These
negative statements about li stand in contrast with the hexagram statement of qian, the ﬁrst hexagram
in the Book of Changes, that mentions li in the positive though ambiguous context of “originating and
penetrating, advantageous (li) and ﬁrm”元亨利貞.2 Equally positive is the Wenyan commentary at-
1Dong Zhongshu uses the character誼, which is largely equivalent withs the character義. Dou & Geng (1936), p. 372.
2Legge (1899), p. 57.
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tributed to Confucius that remarks “beneﬁcial (li) is the harmony of all that is right (yi)”利者義之和
and that “beneﬁting (li) all creatures” is suﬃcient to “balance things into a state of collective righteous-
ness”利物⾜以和義. These statements, Ren points out, “do not just speak of beneﬁt (li), but go so far
as to unite beneﬁt (li) and righteousness (yi)⾮特⾔利，且合利與義. Heaven has produced all things
on earth to nurture the people. But only someone with the quality of qian can make everyone proﬁt
(li) from this great advantage (li). The quintessence is that great advantage (li) in the world brought
about by persons with the virtue of qian leads to great righteousness (yi), which realizes benevolence
(ren), the highest virtue of all. The reverse is also true: without a means to “beneﬁt (li) all creatures”利
物 there can be no “balancing things into a state of collective righteousness (yi)”和義. The means to
bring about the “great beneﬁt”, and thereby balance righteousness and achieve humaneness is economic
policy or “administration of resources” (licai理財), says Ren.
The world of the present is still the same as the world of the past in so far that nature is still produc-
ing new things all the time. However, in the past there was aﬄuence, while the present is often charac-
terized by scarcity. This is a sign that bad administration of resources is causing scarcity. Bad resource
management coincides with a failure to make people use correct language to keep them from doing the
wrong things. A concrete application of “making language appropriate and keeping people from doing
the wrong things”正辭與禁民為⾮ is to turn the people in the North-West into industrious peasants
and make the people in the South East thriftier. A strategy for achieving the latter is to establish speciﬁ-
cations for wedding and funeral ceremonies, clothing, buildings etc. that demarcate social gradations.
Ren’s strategy seems to be to indoctrinate people with a puritan ideal of industriousness and parsimony
that makes them value the pursuit of agriculture and devalue luxury. That, Ren says, is the quintessence
of “by beneﬁting (li) all creatures, (the superior man) is ﬁt to exhibit the harmony of all that is right
(yi)”利物之所以和義.
Wang Jin汪縉 (1725–1792), too, emphasizes that righteousness (yi) entails beneﬁt (li). Wang’s es-
say on Mencius included in the HCJSBW is the ﬁrst part of a series of essays assessing the teachings of
Mencius, Xunzi, Shang Yang, Han Fei, Sunzi, and the Wuzi吳⼦, a military strategist.1 The part dis-
cussed in the following draws on the li-yi polarity and forms the beginning of the essays on Mencius’
and the whole essay collection. Wang Jin writes that the main characteristic of governance in accordance
with the Way (shundao順道) is utmost impartiality or public-mindedness (zhigong⾄公).2 Wang Jin
proposes that there are two competing approaches to government, one of them characterized by impar-
tiality (gong), the other one by partiality or bias (si). The impartial approach builds upon humaneness
and righteousness (renyi仁義) as central values, while the partial approach builds upon or beneﬁt (li,
here perhaps aptly rendered as utility) as central values.
While beneﬁt (li) is a necessary condition of good governance, it is not a suﬃcient condition, writes
1Xie & Zheng (2012), p. 6. Apart from the essay on Mencius, only the essay on Xunzi is included in the HCJSWB in an
abridged version.
2Xie & Zheng (2012), p. 7.
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Wang. Humaneness and righteousness (renyi仁義), on the other hand, are suﬃcient conditions of
good governance on their own because they entails beneﬁt (li).
“It lies in people’s nature that they assemble where there is beneﬁt (li). I am just saying
that beneﬁt alone is not enough to assemble the people (li). I am not saying that whether
people assemble or scatter is independent of beneﬁt (li). But there is a crucial difference:
While both the former sages and the later strategists1 assembled people by means of beneﬁt




In terms of attitude, the sages “loved the people and longed for their peace and safety”愛民欲其安
全也, while the strategists “longed for proﬁt (li)”欲利. In terms of their rule, the sages ensured that
the people had food and shelter and, to ensure the permanence of their having food and shelter, taught
them rites and etiquette to establish a stable order of human relationships. They drew borders, stopped
excess and lethargy, opened up new avenues of proﬁt (li) and prohibited corruption. The state took no
proﬁt (li) from the people except a ﬁxed ten-percent tax. The sages ensured that the people could make
a living and did not have to emigrate even in times of scarcity and war. The strategist rulers, lacking this
kind of love for the people, tried to reap maximum proft from the people. This attitude carried over to
the people, who would similarly only care for their own beneﬁt. Because they could not count on the
loyalty of the people through their exploitative style of rule, they had to resort to force to ensure that
people did not scatter. This lack of genuine loyalty meant that people would plant their ﬁelds and ﬁght
for the state as long as the state could hold up its authority or as long as they deemed it proﬁtable, but
would emigrate as soon as these conditions ceased to hold.
The partial approach of the strategists illuminates beneﬁts (li) and disadvantages (hai害), explains
Wang. But because the approach is agnostic about humaneness and righteousness, it fails to illuminate
them fully. In an essay on Xunzi’s thought, Wang states that one of the eternal characteristics of bad
governance was that it neglects the “harm (hai) for future generations”後世之害 to “attain a one-time
beneﬁt (li)”苟⼀時之利. Good rulers on the other hand will forego one-time beneﬁts to prevent
future harm.2 It plans for the short-term (“plan for proﬁt in the evening in the morning”朝為⼣利)
and therefore operates with an incomplete picture of beneﬁts and disadvantages.
The impartial approach of the sages, on the other hand, illuminates humaneness and righteousness,
and has little to say about beneﬁts and disadvantages. It therefore accounts fully for beneﬁts and disad-
vantages in the long-term. This was actually Mencius’ point for King Hui of Liang: if one’s point of de-
parture is not li but renyi, li will automatically be achieved and hai prevented. It also implies that ends
1“Strategists”術家 is most likely not referring to some particular school of the Warring States, but has a more general
meaning. Wang Jin uses the term to refer to the mainstream style of rule after the Three Ages.
2HCJSWB, 1:28a–30b.
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do not justify the means, expressed in the Mencius as the admonition “not to commit a single unrigh-
teous deed and not so kill a single innocent person for the sake of obtaining power”⾏⼀不義殺⼀不
辜⽽得天下不為也.1 li has to be like the water in which and through which a ﬁsh lives without ever
thinking of it or even being aware of it, says Wang. One must not actively strive to obtain it because “if
one is only humane when there is some immediate beneﬁt (li) involved, then that is fake humaneness
(ren), if one is only righteous when there is some immediate beneﬁt involved, then that is the perversion
of righteousness (yi)”苟利⽽仁焉，是假仁也，苟利⽽義焉，是襲義也which will in the end lead
to one’s downfall.
Chen Shouqi陳壽祺 (1771–1834) explains his ideas on how to restore the unity that li and yi formed
in remote antiquity in an essay addressed at the students of the Aofeng academy in Fujian.2 According
to Chen, the different contradictory statements found in the classics and the books of the Confucian
canon about the relationship of li and yi can be synthesized into a coherent theory, if they are regarded
as historically contingent responses to different intellectual-moral climates. That li and yi were not
apart from each other in antiquity is evident from numerous positive quotes about li in the Book of
Changes, as well as the Shangshu, Zhouli and Chunqiu.
“Not one of the six classics speaks unfavorably of li. li and yi formed a unity in antiquity.
This is why the Book of Changes says ‘beneﬁcial (li) is the harmony of all that is right (yi)’
and ‘by beneﬁting all creatures, (the superior man) is ﬁt to exhibit the harmony of all that
is right (yi)’. We can conclude that only ‘beneﬁting (li) other creatures’ is truly beneﬁcial
(li), and that without beneﬁt (li) there can be no righteousness (yi).”
六經莫不善⾔利。蓋古者利與義合。故易⽂⾔⽈利者義之和也。利物⾜以和義。
惟以利物為@利。無利⾮義矣。
The ﬁrst indications that this changed during the Eastern Han can be found in the Analects which state
that “the gentleman understands righteousness (yi), the mean man (only) understands beneﬁt (li)”君
⼦喻於義⼩⼈喻於利 and can be deduced from the fact that Confucius rarely made any statements
about beneﬁt (li). The situation exacerbated during the Warring States, when people lost all awareness
of righteousness and only cared about beneﬁt. This is reﬂected in Mencius admonishing King Hui of
Liang not to speak of beneﬁt, but only of humaneness and righteousness. Mencius’ argument was that
the ruler’s value orientations inﬂuence the people’s value orientations. People without no sense of hu-
maneness will neglect their duties towards their parents, and people without a sense of righteousness
will neglect their duties towards their ruler.
From the episode with King Hui of Liang one can learn, Chen Shouqi emphasizes, that ren and yi
is always beneﬁcial (li). But this was not how most people pursued beneﬁt then and later. People lost
1Meng & Li (2000), p. 95.
2HCJSWXB/SHENG, 4:25a–31b. For an assessment of the signiﬁcance of the Aofeng academy (Aofeng shuyuan鼇峯書
院) for the revival of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism and statecraft thought, see Li (2015) and Xiao & Lu (2012).
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their intuition about the harm (hai) that can accompany beneﬁt (li). They pursued beneﬁt (li) in a
way that harmed (hai) other people and in the end harmed themselves. This danger is reﬂected in the
warnings by Confucius and Cheng Yi. Confucius warned that “unrestrained pursuit of li leads to much
resentment”放於利⽽⾏多怨. Cheng Yi said that “li is what everyone equally strives for, if one
solely beneﬁts oneself, this will be very harmful, if one is very greedy, one will become beclouded and
irrational, and if one drives it to the extreme, there will be much struggle and resentment”利者眾之所
同欲也。專欲益⼰其害⼤矣。貪之甚則昏蔽⽽忘理義。求之極則爭奪⽽致怨仇. What
Confucius and Cheng Yi called li was the complete opposite of what the classics called li.
Chen Shouqi uses evidence from the classics to elucidate how true beneﬁt (li) comes from being righ-
teous (yi). People who strive for beneﬁt (li) for the sake of beneﬁt make themselves completely depen-
dent on luck. There is no guarantee that they will beneﬁt a lot and fast, and they may just as well lose
everything. Telling people that they will likely not get the beneﬁt they hope for will not keep them from
trying. It is more effective to tell them that their pursuits will bring disaster upon themselves. This way,
they can be made to “give up the pursuit of beneﬁt (li) and pursue righteousness (yi) instead”去利⽽
返之義.
Pursuit of righteousness (yi) is always rewarded in the end.
“When yi struggles against li in the dark, it will become clear in the morning who is Shun
(the good guy) and who is Dao Tuo (the bad guy). When yi is hold up with courage, a
weak person can become a Bo Yi or Shu Qi (paragon of virtue).”1
夫義之與利。爭之也微。則平旦分舜蹠。執之也勇。則懦夫為夷⿑。
Those who engage in learning should therefore learn to distinguish li and yi as early as possible. The
aim should be the discovery of true beneﬁt (li) through full understanding of righteousness (yi), to
learn to enjoy righteousness and grow to fear the risks involved in illegitimate beneﬁt. The ﬁrst to pro-
vide guidance as to how this can be achieved is Confucius, who said that “in antiquity, people engaged
in learning for themselves: nowadays, they engage in learning for others”古之學者為⼰今之學者為
⼈.2 People who do everything “for themselves” do nothing that is not righteous, while people who do
everything “for others” (to see) do nothing that is not beneﬁcial (in the negative sense, that is, beneﬁcial
solely for themselves), explains Chen.
If one observes closely what separates yi from illegitimate li, it comes down to Mencius’ command
“not to do what should not be done, not to desire what should not be desired”無為其所不為，無
欲其所不欲.3 If one follows a sort of categorical imperative in every situation to “only say for which
1Dao Zhi or “bandit Zhi”盗 跖 is a personage of the Spring and Autumn period that appears in the Mencius, Xunzi and
Zhuangzi. Sun (2005), p. 475. Bo Yi伯 夷 and Shu Qi叔 ⿑were antique paragons of virtue, who kept ceding the throne
of the state of Guzhu to each other after their father’s death caught in a dilemma of whether to follow their father’s wish or
custom law. Luo (1990), vol. 1, p. 1261.
2See Legge (1861), p. 207.
3See Meng & Li (2000), p. 423.
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it would be alright if the whole world regarded them as the Way, only act in a way for which it would be
alright if the whole world regarded it as norm of behavior”, then “everything righteous (yi) will at the
same time be beneﬁcial (li)”⾔⽽為天下道。動⽽為天下則。則無義⽽不利焉. This includes to
meet one’s fellow villagers with piety and reverence, and to display respect and trustworthiness towards
the people at the fringes of the empire. The people can be transformed to emulate such model-like be-
havior and social peace will follow. One’s actions will have truly “beneﬁted all creatures” if “those who
are poor do not riot, those who are rich do not live in excess, those with power do not use it to oppress
and nobody brings misfortune about others, there can be beneﬁt (li) without disadvantage (hai)”然⽽
窮不能濫，富不能淫，威不能屈，禍不能加，則有利⽽無害焉. Straight pursuit of beneﬁt, on
the other hand, will almost certainly not only fail to make the world a better (more righteous) place, but
also harm (hai) oneself in the end.
li as standard of validity?
Ren Qiyuan, Wang Jin and Shao Yichen’s writings discussed above approach the li-yi polarity from
a theoretical angle and only touch economic policy on a very general level. On this general level, they
evoke the principle of securing the people’s livelihood and moral wellbeing through proper instruction
in methods of agrarian cultivation and norms of social interaction. The writings by Wang Liu, Wei Yuan
and Shao Yichen use the li-yi polarity to defend the legitimacy of policies that are not conventionally
counted among this repertoire of “righteous” interventions into the economic life of the people. Wang
Liu’s monetary policies and several of the reform projects Wei Yuan was involved in, such as the reform
of the tribute grain transport or the reform of the salt monopoly, represented substantial interventions
into the ﬁnancial and ﬁscal system of the Qing state. Wang and Wei therefore felt the need to defend
themselves against the objection of engaging in short-sighted “talking of beneﬁt (li)” focused on increas-
ing the extractive capacity of the state but neglecting the consequences of policies for the livelihood of
the people. Shao Yichen’s essay argues that the pursuit of achievement and beneﬁt (gongli) such as the
privileges obtained through success in the civil service examinations should be recognized as legitimate
if it promotes a righteous (yi) cause in the end result. Wei Yuan’s arguments, especially his presentation
of li as a standard of validity in his “Eighth essay on Scholarship” provide a link between conventional
interpretations of the li-yi polarity, and the practice of employing li as a standard of validity in late
imperial statecraft writing.
Wang Liu employs the li-yi polarity to legitimize his proposal of introducing paper money as legit-
imate beneﬁt by arguing that it beneﬁts everyone and is therefore “right” (yi).1 Wang Liu authored a
book in 1831 that proposed the introduction of paper money to combat deﬂation of copper money.2
Both the book and a number of accompanying essays are included in the HCJSWXB/SHENG. Wang
1HCJSWXB/SHENG, 60:19a–20b.
2For an outline of Wang’s proposal and an assessment of the arguments voiced in the debate it sparked after Wang Liu
had several hundred copies of his treatise printed and distributed to scholar-oﬃcials over the country, see also Lin (1991). Wei
Yuan and Bao Shichen participated in the debate. Lin (1991), p. 4.
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Liu echoes the rhetoric of Wang Anshi, who insisted in a reconsideration of the nature of the li-yi po-
larity “that the useful and the good were not mutually exclusive binaries” and that the ethical aims and
institutional goals of his reform policies were inseparable.1 Wang Liu’s justiﬁcation of his reform pro-
posals bears a similarity with Wang Anshi’s claims that “gain (li) is to be in harmony with righteousness
(yi); righteousness (yi) surely is to do what is advantageous (li)”利者義之和義固所為利也.2 and
that his own policies were therefore righteous because they enhanced the overall prosperity of the em-
pire.
From Wang Liu’s arguments we see that he still felt the necessity to ward off arguments similar to
those that had confronted Wang Anshi. To legitimize his concern for a topic associated with beneﬁt (li),
Wang Liu clariﬁes how Mencius’ statements about “speaking of proﬁt (li)” and the statement from the
Great Learning that “regarding righteousness as beneﬁt (li)”3 should be read.
Speaking of proﬁt (li) is despicable if it involves exploiting the people in order to enrich
the government. If one speaks about proﬁt (li) without harming the people, but rather




The invocation of the Great Learning makes sense insofar as monetary policies are closely connected
with ﬁscal policies. In the Great Learning, ‘regarding righteousness (yi) as beneﬁt (li)’ is contrasted
with ‘regarding gain (li) as beneﬁt (li)’. According to the Great Learning, the regarding of gain (li,
for the state and/or oneself) as beneﬁt (li) is associated with disproportionate and oppressive taxation
and exaction of labor service from the people. Regarding righteousness (yi) as beneﬁt (li), on the other
hand is associated with light taxation. Wang Liu plans to decrease the tax burden placed upon the peo-
ple with the introduction of paper bills. Requiring taxpayers to pay their taxes in silver means to exploit
the people, who have to bear constantly rising conversion fees, Wang says. With the introduction of pa-
per money, there is “no excuse”無所藉⼜ for raising exorbitant conversion fees, which beneﬁts the
people.
Wei Yuan’s most important statements in connection with li and yi appear in the “First Essay on
Governance” and the “Eighth Essay on Scholarship” in the Essays on Scholarship and Governance4
contains a short paragraph in which Wei Yuan justiﬁes wealth and power as a legitimate goal of gov-
ernment. Not all rulers who manage to achieve wealth and power are adherents of the Kingly Way
1Levine (2008), p. 89.
2Li (2011), 219:2b.
3Legge (1861), pp. 344–345.
4WYQJ, vol. XII, pp. 35–38; 20–21. The “First Essay on Governance” is included in full length in HCJSWXB/SHENG,
8:1a–3b.
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(wangdao王道), Wei Yuan concedes. This does not imply, however, that adherents of the Kingly Way
cannot achieve wealth and power. True adherence to the Kingly Way always leads to wealth and power.
As wealth and power do not occur over night, pursuing the Kingly Way means to enact policies that
promote the economy and strengthen the ﬁscal system and the military. This is the context in which
Wei Yuan presents his own exegesis of the Mencius passage. While numerous passages from the Book
of Changes and the Book of Documents show the sage rulers of antiquity engaging in economic, ﬁscal
and military policies, Mencius’ admonition of King Liang overshadows them all. Misreading the actual
meaning of the passage, the false conclusion conventionally drawn from the episode is that a good ruler
and a good oﬃcial should not concern himself with the details of economic, ﬁscal and military policy
and actually shun questions of practical administration altogether.
“Only because Mencius distinguished between righteousness (yi) and beneﬁt (li), and
between the king and the hegemon, later scholars associated questions of military and pro-
visions (economy and ﬁnance) with the Five Hegemons and regarded it as taboo to even
speak of these topics.”
後儒特因孟⼦義利王伯之辨。遂以兵⾷歸之五伯。諱⽽不⾔。
They squarely missed out on the fact that these matters had been the basis of good government since
antiquity and that the Kingly Way was realized through them, not apart from them, Wei Yuan points
out. Mencius did not distinguish kings from hegemons by way of their policies (ji跡, in the sense of
shiji事跡 or事蹟, deeds or achievements), but by way of judging whether their attitude (xin⼼) in
enacting these policies was impartial (gong) or partial (si).
“King and hegemon differ in their attitude, not in their achievements. While their attitude
is impartial (king) or partial (hegemon), their achievements are fairly similar.”
王伯之分。在其⼼不在其跡也。⼼有公私。跡無胡越。
This assertion bears resemblance with the views of Wang Anshi, Cheng Hao程顥 (1032–1085) and Zhu
Xi, who saw “moral intention rather than the objective content of policies” as the basis of the distinc-
tion between king and hegemon.1
Wei Yuan leaves no doubt that beneﬁt (li) and righteousness (yi), just as the way of the king (wangdao
王道) and the way of the hegemon (badao霸道) are false dichotomies. In fact, the way of the king
can only ﬁnd expression through the vehicle of policies that regulate central government business, that
is, agricultural, military and tax matters. Men are not assessed by their words but by their deeds. Re-
specting the rules of propriety and talking about one’s empathy for fellow human beings everyday is
completely useless if it never translates into action that actually beneﬁts other people, which it cannot if
scholars do not engage in the study of practical affairs.
1HCJSWB, 1:13a–15b; Metzger (1973), p. 67
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“The Kingly Way is very subtle. Its spirit permeates the management of agriculture and
husbandry, labor service, military and taxes. The moment in which those get to rule the
country who make their words agree to the standards of proper character, make their
movements conform to the rules of proper conduct, deliver ﬁne speeches on ‘all things in
the universe being one’, but do not inquire about the diﬃculties of the people, the morale
of civil servants, the management of state ﬁnance and border defense, they are going to run
the state into debt, and will prove unable to pacify the border regions and protect the peo-
ple from misery. If it was all about spending a great deal of time talking about one’s ‘love
for all living things in the world’, but not lifting a ﬁnger to undertake one thing that has
a positive effect on any of those living things, then why should the realm need this useless





Wei Yuan’s rehabilitation of governmental pursuits associated with li does not prevent him from us-
ing the term to accuse others of corruption. Wei Yuan distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate
interests (li), an idea most clearly stated in an essay of his about army provisions, in which he explains
how to understand the demand that administrators should “initiate beneﬁcial things (li) while prevent-
ing abuse” (xing li chu bi興利除弊). To make it unambiguously clear what is meant by li, Wei Yuan
states that the guiding principle of “great imperial policies is that they beneﬁt (li) the state and the peo-
ple, but do not beneﬁt men in between (the state and the people) who make illegal proﬁts”天下⼤政。
利於國利於民者。必不利於中飽之⼈.2 Wei Yuan questions the soundness of his opponents’
arguments by suggesting that they are motivated by vested interests (li). In the preface of a collection
of essays advocating the sea transport of tribute grain Wei Yuan claims that the root of the controversy
about the mode of transportation are not real disadvantages of sea transport, but the “collective vested
interests (li)”積利 of the groups who proﬁt from transport via inland waterways. What requires real
energy and commitment is not the removal of technical barriers, says Wei, but the overcoming of the
combined resistance of all those with personal stakes in the old transport system.3
“It is not the sea which gives men a hard time, but men who make the sea seem diﬃcult. It
is not the transport of tribute grain which gives men a hard time, but men who make the
transport of tribute grain seem diﬃcult. If we look at things from this angle, everything
1HCJSWXB/SHENG, 8:1a–3b.
2HCJSWXB/SHENG, 29:32a–36b.
3He & Wei (1827), 48:60a–62b. More than thirty years later, Hu Linyi胡林翼 (1812–1861) makes a similar point about
the cognitive dissonance of those with personal stakes in the old transport system. The urge to protect their vested interests
has become so ingrained, Hu Linyi argues, that people will oppose any efforts to reform. HCJSWXB/GE, 30:4a–b.
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becomes clear. The diﬃculty is not to overcome of the multifarious perils (related to the
sea, like storms and pirates, which Wei Yuan argues are not as dramatic as they are made to
seem by the opponents of sea transport ), but to overcome people’s vested interests. If we




Mitchell (1970) underlines Wei Yuan’s “insistence on a practical utilitarian standard for knowledge
with the criterion its effect in the socio-political world” in the context of the king-and-hegemon pas-
sage.1 This practical standard was li, which Mitchell renders as “utility” or “proﬁtability”. Wei Yuan
was convinced that li “could determine right and wrong”, an idea that he marketed to other scholars by
presenting it as “the link between Heaven and Man, the unity of which all Confucianists sought”.2 Wei
Yuan expresses this view most clearly in his “Eighth Essay on Governance”.
In the “Eighth Essay on Governance”, Wei Yuan discusses the special status of the Book of Changes
among the Confucian classics.3 According to Wei, the Book of Changes is the classic that goes into much
detail about a topic that receives only sparse treatment in the Shijing, Shujing and the Liji: human char-
acter (xing性), Heavenly mandate (ming命) and that which joins (can參) Heaven and man, beneﬁt
(li). The numerous references to li in the Book of Changes were all instructions about “what do to and
what not to do”當⾏不當⾏which is clearly equivalent with what is beneﬁcial (li) and what is not
beneﬁcial (li)”利不利.
“A common concern of our age is that Heaven and man have been out of touch for a long
time. If we would just use beneﬁt (li, or: utility) as criterion for right and wrong, praise
and blame, pro and con, then Heaven and man would be reconnected.”
世疑天⼈之不合⼀久矣，惟举天下是⾮、臧否、得失⼀決之於利不利，⽽後天
與⼈合。
Wei Yuan employs gongli功利 (utility) as a pejorative term in most of his Essays on Scholarship and
Government. It represents the self-interested pursuit of short-term proﬁt of the post-classical age that
is characterized by the loss of the classical unity of government (zheng政) and Confucian learning (jiao
教), or status (wei位) and virtue (de德). Wei Yuan emphasizes that true utility is compatible with yi,
though: “there is no utility (gongli) without benevolence and righteousness (renyi)”功利不外仁義.
Is this enough to call Wei Yuan’s thought utilitarian? The term utilitarianism commonly refers to an
ethic of end results. But rather than just being practical or concerned about end results, utilitarianism
1Mitchell (1970), p. 42
2Y. C. Wang (unpublished): “Wei Yuan and the Illustrated Gazetteer of the Maritime Countries” referenced in Mitchell
(1970), p. 42.
3WYQJ, vol. XII, pp. 20–21.
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is “that the rightness or wrongness of actions is determined by the goodness or badness of their conse-
quences”. While different strains of utilitarianism differ in their concepts of goodness and badness, “all
utilitarians view effects as the basis for evaluating goodness or appropriateness”. Tillman (1982) relates
“utilitarian” with the Chinese term gongli功利, which “means primary emphasis upon two related
goals: attaining concrete results or consequences” (gong功) and “maximizing the beneﬁts or advantages
[...] that government provides society” (li).1 This description ﬁts Wei Yuan’s statecraft thought.
Wei Yuan is not the ﬁrst be explicit in granting li a prominent place as guiding principle of govern-
ment. The HCJSWB features an essay by Lu Shiyi who similarly declares li a prominent principle in
government.2 Lu Shiyi speaks about li as central principle in the socio-political sphere.
“Everything in All under Heaven comes down to beneﬁt (li). Those who understand ben-
eﬁt (li) well can achieve that everyone in All under Heaven is able to get their due bene-
ﬁt (li). Thereby, they are also able to get their due beneﬁt (li) themselves. All that those
who do not understand beneﬁt (li) well want is to make sure that they themselves beneﬁt




One example where a proper grasp of the principle of li is particularly important are the quality of civil
bureaucracy and the military, says Lu: “if we want excellent soldiers, we have to shrink the size of the
troops and increase their pay; and if we want superior oﬃcials, we have to shrink the size of the bureau-
cracy and increase their pay”欲兵之精不如省兵⽽增糧，欲官之兼不如省官⽽增俸. Proper
remuneration and making sure that everyone is able to get their due beneﬁt (li) ensures that the mem-
bers bureaucracy and commit their energies to their jobs and not to striving for their own beneﬁt (li).
The above considerations also allow Lu Shiyi to use li as a standard of validity in his writings on prac-
tical administration. An example is an essay in which Lu Shiyi lists the six “conveniences” (bian便) of
ﬁsh scale registers (yulin tuce⿂鱗圖冊) for landed property.3 Lu concludes at the end of the essay that
“a man in charge (ren) who does not carry out this policy with its six conveniences has not recognized
its beneﬁt (li)”有此六便⽽⼈不之⾏，未知其利故也.
Shao Yichen邵懿⾠ (1810–1861), ﬁnally, comes closest to an “ethic of end results” in a postface to the
essay collection Yi Song tang儀宋堂 by Su Duyuan蘇惇元 (1801–1857) printed in 1849.4 Shao Yichen
1Tillman (1982), pp. 6–7
2HCJSWB, 11:33a–b
3HCJSWB, 29:28a–29b.
4Yang (1987), p. 223; HCJSWXJ/RAO, 1:21a–22a, HCJSWXB/GE, 4:2a–b. Shao Yichen is associated with the Changzhou
New Text School. He claimed that Liu Xin’s Old Text version of the Book of Rites was a forgery, which proved inﬂuential
on Liao Ping’s廖平 (1852–1932) and Kang Youwei’s doubts about the authority of the classics. Wang (1995)
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argues that motivation through personal advantage (li) is alright if it leads to good results. In the ﬁrst
and longer argument of the postface, Shao rehabilitates state Confucianism and the fact that the teach-
ings of Confucius are studied in standardized versions for standardized examinations, by people moti-
vated by the prospect of gaining the status and material beneﬁts of a state oﬃcial.1 Shao Yichen states
that knowledge about the Three Dynasties and the teachings of the sages would not be as widespread
and internalized among the people if it had not been for Han Wudi to make the Confucian classics the
center of state orthodoxy and for Ming Taizu to make written essays about the four books the center of
standardized recruitment procedures. Shao evokes the classical unity of li and yi.
“Àfter the three dynasties, the way and righteousness (daoyi) and achievement and beneﬁt
(gongli) became separated. But luckily, righteousness (daoyi) was preserved by becoming
attached to utility (gongli). Only because this was determined in commands, and because
of the appeal of title, rank and salary, every woman and child even in the far-ﬂung corners
of the empire knows that Confucius was a sage and Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi were worthies,




The commands Shao Yichen refers to are Han Wudi’s decision to declare the Confucian ﬁve classics and
four books required reading for future administrators and Ming Taizu’s decision to require examination
candidates to compose eight-legged essays. The eight-legged essay prescribed candidates to a rigid for-
mal structure and required them to use quotations from the ﬁve classics and four books and Zhu Xi’s
commentary to express their answer.2
“The two gentlemen motivated the world with the prospect of achievement (gong), and
the way (dao) was transmitted with its help. They lured the world with the prospect of
beneﬁt (li), and righteousness (yi) was conveyed with its help and without much loss.”
⼆君者。以功倡天下⽽道賴以尊。以利誘天下。⽽義賴以着。蓋於此⾮甚失者。
Especially Shao Yichen’s praise for the much criticized eight-legged essay format surprises. Shao seems
intent on driving home his point that sometimes ends, here the popularization of the Confucian teach-
ing, justify means, here motivation by personal advantage and reduction of intellectual pursuits to a
handful of books and an orthodox interpretation.
1In the second and shorter argument, Shao Yichen appeals for more moderation in the controversy between advocates of
Song and Han learning and the recognition of the fact that both strands of learning have their respective strengths.
2Luo (1990), vol. 2, p. 661.
Conclusion
Authors employ the the ming-shi polarity to speak about the fulﬁllment (shi) of oﬃcial duties (ming),
compliance (shi) to regulations (ming), about commands (ming) and their execution (shi), about in-
tended (ming) and actual outcomes (shi) of a policy, and about political claims (ming) and their reality
(shi). The ming-shi polarity imputes an ought-is relationship between nominal responsibilities and ac-
tual performance. The responsibilities (ming) can arise from a title, status, reputation, claim, command
or regulation. Performance (shi) refers to whether responsibilities, duties or expectations are fulﬁlled,
whether claims, commands or regulations are complied with. Because the ming-shi polarity assigns
responsibilities, it implies a moral charge if ming and shi do not correspond to each other, that is, if
obligations are not fulﬁlled. Authors frame problems related to implementation deﬁcits, intransparency
and irresponsibility as discrepancy between ming and shi. Solutions, in turn, are formulated as reestab-
lishing the correspondence of ming and shi.
Authors employ ming and shi to propose two kinds of solutions. The ﬁrst kind is an adaption of ac-
tuality (shi), to responsibilities (ming) by enforcing commands or regulations by means of monitoring
and sanctioning. The second kind of solution is the adaption of responsibilities (ming) to reality (shi).
It means to adapt regulations to reality, that is, men’s capabilities, by modifying commands or regula-
tions so as to render the average oﬃcial capable of complying to them. Illustrative examples of writings
presenting solutions in terms of both mechanisms are the essays by Huang Juezi (adaption of shi to
ming) and Wang Boxin (adaption of ming to shi), respectively, and the writings on taxation by Feng
Guifen (adaption of ming to shi) and Huang Tifang (adaption of shi to ming).
The gong-si polarity is employed to discuss the optimal balance of an oﬃcial’s orientation towards
the “public good” and private interests. It is important to keep in mind that gong and si never func-
tion as a dichotomy in their function as value-free designations of social spheres. As for their function
as designations of interest, that is, public interest or public good and private interest, the tendency to re-
lax moral absolutism in the sixteenth century also removed the absolute dichotomy between gong and
si. This rehabilitated si as a motivation to engage in actions that are conducive to the public interest.
Authors who account for this positively connoted private interest (si), divide si into legitimate and ille-
gitimate private interest. Legitimate private interest, for example, the interest in subsistence of oneself
and one’s family, is not in contradiction with public interest and may even be regarded constituent of or
conducive to the public interest. Illegitimate private interests are interests that, if pursued, result in per-
sonal beneﬁt on the cost of others or the public good. Theft, robbery, usury are examples of pursuit of
illegitimate private interests, but also the embezzlement of public funds and other kinds of corruption
and abuse of power. Authors agree that oﬃcials must not abuse their power to pursue private interests
that harm the public good. Though seemingly clearcut, the division of private interests into legitimate
and illegitimate is subject to redeﬁnition by individual authors.
Authors propose two kinds of solutions to promote oﬃcials’ commitment to the public good (gong)
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and contain the risk that the administration of public affairs is affected by their private interests (si).
The ﬁrst kind are solutions that focus on oﬃcials’ capacities of internal control, that is voluntary or self-
control. Authors suggest that effective internal control means that measures of external control can be
relaxed. Measures include putting emphasis on qualities conducive to public-mindedness in the recruit-
ment process and instructing oﬃcials in qualities conducive to public-mindedness. Also into this group
of measures fall Wang Huizu’s recommendation to subordinates that they should consciously avoid
getting involved in the private business of one’s superior, and Zeng Guofan’s admonition of the em-
peror that his decisions and actions are not automatically or per deﬁnition public-minded but must be
taken with the perspective of the people in mind. The second kind of solutions rely on measures of ex-
ternal control. They involve the creation of more monitoring instances, distinction of negative sanctions
between public-minded (gong) and self-interested (si) offenses, and adequate utilization of positive
sanctions, that is, provision of oﬃcials with an adequate budget to enable them to put the public good
before their private interests in their decisions and actions. Authors also suggest mechanisms of mutual
control and the election of high oﬃcials by low oﬃcials. In the writings collected in the pre-1898 com-
pendia, the idea that certain institutional frameworks can help in transforming private interests into
public interest, so that it is not necessary that all participants in political-administrative processes need
to be perfectly public-minded, becomes prominent
Authors conceptualize beneﬁt (li) and righteousness (yi) as compatible. Similar to private interest
(si), beneﬁt (li) is divided into legitimate and illegitimate beneﬁt. The division between legitimate and
illegitimate beneﬁt seems to depend on intention as much as on end result. Legitimate beneﬁt is the
result of righteousness (yi) and associated with impartiality, fairness or the public good (gong). It is
characterized by a fair distribution among stakeholders, expressed by predicates such as “mutually bene-
ﬁtting”兩利 or “uniformly beneﬁtting”均利. Illegitimate beneﬁt, on the other hand, is beneﬁt that
is achieved on the cost of others or the public. Again, the division of beneﬁt into legitimate and ille-
gitimate is subject to redeﬁnition by individual authors. For example, merchants may be regarded as
pursuing legitimate, or as pursuing illegitimate beneﬁt and likened to robbers and thieves by different
authors.
The conventional position destilled from the Mencius and the Analects is that ruler and his ministers
should not explicitly communicate about policies in terms of their beneﬁt. The fear is that this would
help to spread a mindset that only focuses on shortsighted cost-beneﬁt calculations. People will only be
motivated to engage in action if they see an immediate personal advantage to do so. This has a detrimen-
tal effect on the socio-political order. The classical position also implies that the state should not engage
in economic policy that goes beyond securing peasants basic economic subsistence, such as low taxation
and instruction in methods that enhance agricultural productivity. The statecraft position is that the
state can communicate about policies in terms of their beneﬁt and should engage in any policy as long
as it leads to the increased beneﬁt of the people. They emphasize that the scope of legitimate beneﬁt
comprises more than just low taxation and instruction in agricultural methods. It comprises everything
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that beneﬁts the people. Major reforms of the ﬁscal and monetary system are justiﬁed and compatible
with righteousness as long as they beneﬁt the people not just the state. The focus on end results becomes
even more prominent in the writings collected in the post-1898 compendia discussed in the next chapter.




The polarities in the discourse of the Hundred
Days Reform (1897–1898) and the
New Policy (1901–1903)
The four polarities continued to ﬁgure as prominent analytical terms in the writing of the Hun-
dred Days Reform in 1898 (Wuxu bianfa戊戌變法) and the New Policies (Xin zheng新政) after 1901.
The “Hundred Days Reform” refers to a series of edicts that the young Guangxu emperor promul-
gated between June and September 1898. Under the impression of the reform discourse of the late
1890s, the emperor announced a number of substantial reforms. The reforms included the abolition of
the eight-legged essay and the revaluation of questions on practical statecraft in the civil service examina-
tions, and the promotion of the establishment of a modern school system and specialized academies for
mining and other industries. The edicts also stipulated the establishment of bureaus for the coordina-
tion and promotion of agriculture, mining, industry and railways, the introduction of an annual budget
process, and a improvement of training procedures and modernization of the equipment of the mili-
tary. Furthermore, Guangxu ordered the streamlining of the bureaucracy and its procedures, sinecure
posts were to be abolished and the redundant oﬃcials absorbed into the newly established economic bu-
reaus. Distrust of the empress dowager in several of Guangxu’s newly employed advisers, among them
Kang Youwei, lead Cixi to stage a coup against her nephew. The reforms were aborted, six of Guangxu’s
advisers executed, and the emperor placed under house arrest.1
Two years after the aborted reforms, the seizure of the Beijing by military forces of Germany, France,
1Spence (2008), pp. 278–286.
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Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Austria-Hungary, Russia and the United States in the context of the Boxer
incident in 1900 prompted the court to announce substantial reforms and solicit oﬃcials’ suggestions
for the reform of court regulations, state precedents, civil administration, people’s welfare, education,
civil service examinations, the military and the ﬁnancial administration in 1901. An edict declared that
it was now time to change the methods of government in accordance with the times, and that China
should now start to focus on what had lead the Western nations to wealth and strength. In the same
year, the court began to initiate reforms of the educational system and the military, and in 1903 a central-
ization of the ﬁnancial administration, while the reform of the administrative system was only taken up
after the Russo-Japanese war 1904–1905.1
The polarities are present in writings that advocate reforms to restructure both the bureaucracy itself
and the school and examination systems catering to it. Important demands are the allocation of ade-
quate budgets (positive sanctions), professional training, clear demarcation of oﬃcial responsibilities,
consequent monitoring and sanctioning, abolition of the seniority principle, abolition of sale of oﬃce
and the extension of the duration of terms-of-oﬃce. Writers also employ the polarities in the discussion
of the pros and cons of establishing a parliamentary monarchy. “The West” enters political writing as
the second projection foil of political ideals besides antiquity, and a source of good and bad precedents.
Observers both in- and outside of China viewed the Chinese defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War of
1894/95 as a sign of the failure of decades of self-strengthening in the ﬁelds of industry, military, diplo-
macy etc. Oﬃcial corruption and incompetence was regarded as one of the main reasons of the failure
of many self-strengthening projects, that suffered from a discrepancy between plans on paper (ming)
and their realization (shi). Based on the assumption that Chinese men (ren) cannot be inherently more
corrupt and incompetent than men in the West by nature, some authors of the writings in the post-1897
compendia conclude that there was something wrong with the regulatory framework (fa) in which
these men act. They suggest that the institutions (fa) must be reformed, starting with the civil service.
Aspects previously associated with ren such as adequate remuneration (positive sanctions), a clear de-
marcation of oﬃcial responsibilities, monitoring and sanctioning, as well as professional training and
recruitment (civil service examinations), are now beginning to be associated with fa. Authors suggest
that a clear demarcation of oﬃcial responsibilities is to facilitate monitoring and sanctioning, and ren-
der oﬃcials more accountable to their duties. Adequate remuneration is to lower corruption rates. ren
and fa are also employed in debates about the question of whether the institutions of foreign countries
require a set of skills and abilities which the Chinese bureaucratic workforce is not equipped with and
how to deal with this problem.
Authors employ the ming-shi polarity to emphasize that regardless of whether institutions are re-
formed or not, it must be ensured that they operate effectively. On the national level, a discrepancy
between ming and shi is evoked to lament the control deﬁcit of the central government and the lack
of enforcement of administrative rules. On the level of the individual oﬃcial, the discrepancy of ming
1Chuzo (1980)
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and shi is used to accuse oﬃcials of incompetence, corruption and neglect of oﬃcial duties. Authors
demanding the “observation of the correspondence of ming and shi” call for the conventional set of
measures associated with this request: recruitment of oﬃcials according to aptitude, clear demarcation
of oﬃcial responsibilities so as to hold oﬃcials accountable through sanctions. Adequate remuneration
is also among their demands.
The gong-si polarity gains in prominence as compared to the pre-1898 compendia and is used to
formulate and discuss a number of problem constellations. gong rises to the status of a standard of
validity or central value, the exact substance of which remains to be deﬁned. Authors use the polarity
to cast the capacity of the central government to deﬁne the public interest into doubt. They accuse the
ruling elite to redeﬁne their own private interest as public interest. Authors also employ the polarity
to underline the compatibility of the pursuit of private interests with the public good, in the economic
arena, but also as a general rule in the socio-political ﬁeld. Parliaments are characterized as institutions
which serve the transformation of private interests into the public good.
The post-1897 compendia, without exception, present li and yi as a pair of compatible concepts. Au-
thors characterize li as in harmony with yi under the condition that actions that beneﬁt the individ-
ual do not harm others or even simultaneously beneﬁt the others as well, in short, when beneﬁts are
fairly distributed. There is more emphasis than in the pre-1898 compendia on the idea that it is legiti-
mate that an individual who engages in beneﬁcial acts should be allowed allowed to beneﬁts himself. In
this context, the ﬁve relationships of Confucianism are conceived as based on the principle of mutual
beneﬁt. Self-beneﬁt (zili⾃利) is presented as providing an incentive to engage in beneﬁcial action or as
responding to the instinct for self-preservation.
4.1 ren and fa
There is a tendency in the writings collected in the post-1898 compendia to attribute aspects such as
training and recruitment, monitoring and sanctioning to fa instead of ren. This is a shift on the rhetori-
cal level, as the advocacy of accountability and enforcement of existing regulations does not change. It is
paralleled by a tendency to use fa to not only designate concrete policies or institutions (and their regu-
lations), but also the general institutional framework. Eﬃcacy is still regarded as dependent on the men
in charge (ren), but the institutional framework is prioritized in so far as authors state that the eﬃcacy
of men (ren) cannot unfold without the right institutional framework (fa).
In the writings discussed in the following, Liang Qichao, Mai Menghua, and an anonymous author
writings under pseudonym underline professional training and recruitment, clearly demarcated duties,
monitoring and sanctioning (including adequate remuneration as positive sanction), which they regard
as institutional aspects (fa), as the foundation of good government. Another anonymous author con-
ﬁrms that “relying on regulations (fa)” (ren fa, deciding according to rules of procedure) is (gong),
while “relying on the men in charge” (ren ren, leaving the decision to the men in charge) is impartial or
fair (si). Guo Zongxian’s and Zhang Jian’s essays provide different answers to the question of how to
account for the fact that large-scale reform of the institutional landscape has to cope with a skills gap, as
the personnel trained under the old system does not have the skills and knowledge to operate the new
institutions. While Guo is skeptical as to whether the gap can be bridged and the new institutions be
successful, Zhang proposes the establishment of transitional training and assessment centers that equip
bureaucrats with the required skills and attitudes.
Liang Qichao employs the ren-fa polarity to defend his reform enterprise in his well known essay on
“The bad consequences of ignorance about the foundations of reform”論變法不知本原之害.1 Liang
emphasizes the role of institutions fa in providing the framework in which ren can unfold their poten-
tial. Liang’s reform demands include a reform of training and recruitment of oﬃcials, a reform of the
bureaucracy’s personnel and task structure to render oﬃcial duties clearly demarcated, and consequent
monitoring and sanctioning to enforce these duties. While these aspects are conventionally associated
with ren in the the pre-1898 compendia because they pertain to the individual oﬃcial and his superiors,
Liang regards them as part of the institutional framework (fa). Liang contends that reform is indispens-
able, but that it can only be effective if it proceeds along a logical course. The logical course of reform
is to start with the reform of the fundamental institutions (fa), as they provide the foundation for the
reform of men (ren, both oﬃcials and the population in general). Reform should start with the bu-
reaucratic system, proceed with the educational system, and then tackle the economy and infrastructure
(industry, commerce, ﬁnance, transport and postal system).
Liang insists that if reform proceeds according to a logical course, this will also reduce the prolonged
1HCJSWBWJ/QSZ, 32:10a–11b.
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need for foreign staff. Liang regards it as a fact that most self-strengthening reforms failed because the
Chinese oﬃcials entrusted with the reforms were incompetent and corrupt. However, Western staff are
not inherently brighter and more law abiding (feng fa奉法) than the Chinese.
“When Western staff was employed in the implementation of new policies, the would
project would succeed in most cases. When Chinese staff was employed, it would fail in
most cases. Many would say the reason for this was that Western men are bright while Chi-
nese men are ignorant, and Western men respect the regulations (fa) while Chinese men
tend to pursue their own private interests (si). It is certainly the case that our oﬃcials are
not competent enough to manage these projects. But we cannot blame these men (ren)
alone. Men do not differ that much in terms of intelligence and integrity. If someone says
that Western men are all intelligent while Chinese men are all stupid, that Western men are
all upright while Chinese men are all corrupt, even a little child would judge him wrong.
This is why we cannot blame in on the men (ren) alone if Western oﬃcials are capable






There are structural reasons that lie at the heart of bureaucrats’ incompetency and corruption, Wang
says. Oﬃcials recruited via the civil service examinations cannot be expected to make farsighted plans
for the governance of the country. Oﬃcials who have bought their posts via the system of sale of pub-
lic oﬃce cannot be expected to act with a heightened sense of honor and commitment to public good.
Oﬃcials have to perform a multitude of highly specialized tasks for which they do not receive adequate
training. At the same time, responsibilities are not clearly demarcated, often multiple oﬃcials are in
charge of the same tasks. If oﬃcials are neither professionally trained to fulﬁll their duties nor held ac-
countable if they do not fulﬁll them, they cannot be expected to commit all their energies to their oﬃ-
cial duties. Another problem is that the competition for the scarce job opportunities in the civil service
and the inadequate remuneration corrupts oﬃcials’ morals. Oﬃcials have to be unrealistically virtuous
if they are to work for the public good despite of suffering from material hardship due to their insuﬃ-
cient oﬃcial budget.
Liang attributes all the above structural deﬁciencies to the institutions (fa). His conclusion is that
“all is caused by the institutions (fa). If proper institutions (fa) are established, even the average man
(ren) can become upright and knowledgeable. Improper institutions (fa) have the opposite effect”法
使然也；⽴法善者，中⼈之性可以賢，中⼈之才可以智；不善者反是. But of all reforms, reform of
the “civil service” or “bureaucratic system” (guanzhi官制) has to come ﬁrst. Reform of the guanzhi is
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the precondition for a successful reform of the civil service examination system. Reform of the civil ser-
vice examination system is the precondition of the reform of the educational system, and both in turn
are the precondition for the successful reform of China’s infrastructure, industry, agriculture, ﬁnance,
and commerce.
Mai Menghua similarly regards a reform of the institutional framework (fa) as precondition for en-
suring that the potential of the mass of average oﬃcials (ren) can be properly harnessed. Mai insists
that the bureaucratic task structure must revert from institutions (fa) with “distributed” or “devolved
responsibilities” (fenren分任) to institutions with “dedicated” or “clearly demarcated responsibilities”
(zhuanren專任). Mai argues that the reforms introduced in thirty years of self-strengthening in the
areas of infrastructure, industry, commerce, foreign relations and education have not had the desired
effect because of functional deﬁciencies of the bureaucracy.1 These deﬁciencies are the reason why “the
implementation of the same good policies, which have been implemented to great effect by the people
in the West, became mired in abuse, obstruction, delay, and embezzlement in China, so that these poli-
cies were suspended in the end”且同此善政，西⼈⾏之⽽⼤效，中國⾏之⽽滋弊；壅隔
侵蝕，卒⾄廢輟. Success of the new policies is tied to the existence of mechanisms for ensuring that
the people in charge of their implementation take care of the concrete necessary steps and that nobody
involved embezzles the public funds allocated.
Mai makes a number of speciﬁc suggestions to bring back a bureaucratic system that prepares the
ground for the success of other reforms. He demands the abolition of sine-cure posts, precise demarca-
tion of oﬃcial duties, prolongation of terms-of-oﬃce, and the allocation of suﬃcient oﬃcial budgets
to prevent oﬃcials from exacting illegitimate fees from the people. On the point of clearly demarcated
responsibilities, Mai remarks that the point here is just to restore a prior historical state of the bureau-
cracy. The whole point of establishing a bureaucracy had been to make the government system more ro-
bust. When responsibilities are not clearly demarcated and assigned to individual oﬃcials, this is bound
to lead into chaos sooner or later.
“With institutions (fa) that put one man in charge of a task (zhuanzhi專制), the task
will fail if the wrong man (ren) is put in charge, and it will be accomplished when the
right man (ren) is put in charge. With institutions (fa) with devolved and overlapping re-
sponsibilities (fenren分任), there will be chaos no matter whether the wrong or the right
men (ren) are in charge. With institutions (fa) with clearly demarcated responsibilities
(zhuanzhi專任), achievements as well as as failures can be clearly attributed to the respon-
sible person. With institutions (fa) with overlapping responsibilities, men will contend
with each other to take the credit for achievements, and they will try to shift the blame on
each other for failures. This is why the former kings, when they established their bureau-
1HCJSWXINB/MAI, 3:1a–9b.
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cratic apparatus, created many assistants but no deputies. This was done in order to clearly




Mai argues that responsibilities were once clearly demarcated in the bureaucratic system. This ideal state
changed in the course of history due to modiﬁcations introduced by later emperors. The modiﬁcations
led to “devolved administrative responsibilities”分任, which is not a robust form of government.
Mai argues that the point of the fundamental reforms of the bureaucratic system he proposes is to
strengthen the eﬃcacy of the bureaucracy by turning the mass of “average ren” (zhongren) into valu-
able members of staff. The success of all reforms depends on the condition of the “average men”.
“With the appropriate adaptations, by furthering what beneﬁts, by reforming what can
lead to abuse and harm, and by establishing good fa, average ren can have an upright
character, average ren can have a bright intellect, average ren can have outstanding capa-
bilities. If new policies are introduced under these conditions, they can all be effective. If
new fa are promulgated under these conditions, they can all be enforced.”
若此者增減得宜。利舉弊⾰。⽴法美善。中⼈之性可以賢。中⼈之質可以智。
中⼈之⼒可以才。以⾏新政。何政不舉。以興新法。何法不張。
An anonymous author writing under the pseudonym “a mister from Xianqiao in Lingnan”嶺南
仙橋⽒ similarly argues that institutional arrangements (fa), in particular an adequate administrative
budget, are an important lever for containing oﬃcials’ (ren) corruption. The author presents Western
public budgets as evidence for the fact that Western nations “strive for simplicity of fa”泰西⽴法尚
簡.1 What the author calls simple is that a suﬃcient budget automatically engenders an attitude con-
ducive to voluntary compliance and cooperation on the part of the oﬃcials.
“The Western nations strive for simplicity in their institutions (fa). In their personnel pol-
itics, when calculating the budget, they ensure that an oﬃcial’s (ren) expenses do not ex-
ceed his income so that he does not get into ﬁnancial diﬃculties. If oﬃcials have suﬃcient
ﬁnancial means after deduction of their expenses, the practices of extortion and embezzle-
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Another anonymous author advocates the abolition of the seniority principle.1 The anonymous au-
thor points out that the seniority principle did not exist during the Han dynasty. It was only introduced
in the Northern Wei dynasty and consolidated during the subsequent Tang dynasty. The seniority prin-
ciple was not abolished later although “everyone agreed that it was a detrimental policy”夫資格之為
弊政⼈莫不知 because a powerful idea was cited in favor of it. “Was not the reason cited in favor of
keeping the seniority principle always that letting men (ren) decide easily leads to partiality (si), while
letting regulations (fa) decide decide leads to impartiality (gong)”豈不以任⼈則易涉於私。任法則
動合於公耶.
The anonymous author does not disagree with the tenet of “letting regulations (fa) decide”, that is,
following established procedures and standards. But at the same time, the author argues, this cannot
mean to stick with regulations (fa) that are detrimental for the bureaucracy’s eﬃcacy. The detrimental
effect of the seniority principle is that people with below-average qualiﬁcations are guaranteed positions
and automatic promotions, regardless of their qualities and performance. At the same time, committed
and talented candidates are demoted for minor infringements of rules, which drains their enthusiasm
and renders them unable to put their talents to use.
Guo Zongxian郭宗憲 (?–?) employs the categories of ren and fa to discuss the introduction of
Western political, legal and economic institutions (fa) in China, namely parliaments, private enterprises,
elections, a national army and a 20% tax rate.2 Guo argues that institutions (fa) must not only be good,
but adapted to the men (ren) who are supposed to operate them. Guo differentiates between these fa,
institutions deﬁned by statutes specifying duties, and non-fa (wu fa無法), Guo’s term for rights or
freedoms. Guo thinks that Western nations have achieved an optimal balance between fa and non-fa,
that is, between where to regulate and where not to regulate ren through fa.
“In the West, they employ fa and non-fa simultaneously, and in both respects, they out-
perform China. When looking at it in terms of freedoms and equality, they abandon
taboos, abolish harsh legislation and increase transparency (lit.: reduce chances of inten-
tional misinformation). Everyone can act according to his own will and utter his own opin-
ion. There is no great difference between high and low. The ruler is not valued excessively
highly. The people are not valued excessively lowly. They are connected like one entity.
This is how the West excels in not not restricting/regulating (wu fa). When looking at it
in terms of the clear speciﬁcation of statutes for the civil service, industry and commerce,
everyone is aware of his professional duties and performs them without constant surveil-
lance. Everything is regulated down to the last detail, everyone proceeds accordingly, there
are no exceptions. People do not mind when the orders change at short notice. This is how
the West excels in restricting/regulating (fa).”
1HCJJWXB/YJS, 10:7a.
2HCJSWBWJ/QSZ, 2:23a–27b.






This seemingly makes the Western nations a good model for China in terms of balancing fa and non-
fa. Recreating the same balance in China is not a matter of simple transfer, however. The reason is that
changes on the institutional level (fa) can only be effective if the personnel level (ren) is prepared to
accommodate them. If not, it is unwise to change institutions (fa), as this will lead to chaos: “factional
struggles will continue and the nation will dissolve over it”黨論紛歧⾄於亡國⽽後已. Wang Anshi’s
problem was not that his new institutions (fa) were not good, or his intention bad, but they could not
work because men’s (ren) “mores and attitudes at the time”其時之⾵俗⼈⼼ could not adapt to
them. The intellectual, moral and physical strength of the Chinese people is at a low point, so that they
cannot play their part in the reform effort. To conclude from the historical lesson of Wang Anshi’s case
that the government should refrain from reform in general is “not rational”不達於理, however. But
instead of attempting to bring about democracy, parliament, stock companies, elections and a national
army from one day to the next “which is how a few people think it can be achieved”有⼀⼆⼈焉謂能
旦暮為之, Guo advocates incremental change.
Guo cites a contemporary saying that “wealth and power cannot be created, they can only be brought
about by creating favorable conditions, giving the right impetus, fostering the roots and watching over
its growth, so that effect sets in before one was expecting it”富強不可為也，特可以致之者；何
相其宜，動其機，培其本根，衛其成⾧，使其效不期⽽⾃⾄. Guo makes no concrete sug-
gestions as to how to prepare the grounds for the successful establishment of the institutions. He seems
to imply that the root of men’s insuﬃciency is that Confucius’ teachings are not understood, and that
the ignorance of the logic of reciprocity and mutual beneﬁt is especially problematic. According to Guo,
an understanding of the logic of mutual or conjoint beneﬁt (gong li共利) is the basis for successful
self-rule (zizhi⾃治), which in turn allows for freedom (ziyou⾃由) and sovereignty (zizhu⾃主).
In 1901, Zhang Jian張謇 (1852–1926) answers the chicken-and-egg question of whether ren or fa
comes ﬁrst in the logic of good governance by introducing a functional differentiation between institu-
tions.1 Zhang differentiates between places (a physical reference to institutions) where ren make new
fa, and places where fa help to make men into “ren who bring order”.
“In places that establish fa, ren who bring order produce fa which bring order. In places
that execute fa, fa which create order produce ren who bring order.”
⽴法之地。以治⼈⽣治法。⾏法之地。以治法⽣治⼈。
1張謇:變法平議 in邵編·卷⼀百⼆通論部三.
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Zhang argues that the concern that there “is no qualiﬁed personnel (rencai) is not a valid argument
against the new institutions, as the extant institutions suffer from the very same “lack of talent”. Zhang’s
answer is the establishment of a special transitional institution, the keliguan課吏館 for the time in be-
tween the abolition of the civil service examinations and the establishment of a new national school
system. Keliguan were educational institutions providing successful candidates of the metropolitan ex-
aminations waiting to be posted to an oﬃce (houbu guanyuan候補官員) with intensive training in
practical administrative affairs. They were also meant to further screen and assess the prospective oﬃ-
cials. They were supervised by the governor-general of the respective province. Zhang’s essay dates prior
to 1902, when keliguan were established nationwide with the proclamation of the Qing court’s “New
Policies”.1
In Zhang’s eyes, professional knowledge is key to a competent bureaucratic workforce. In order to
produce a suﬃciently large talent pool, it is necessary to educate everyone in a specialized disciplinary
curriculum. Zhang’s answer to the questions as to how to deal with the fact that men (ren) lack qualiﬁ-
cations they need to properly implement new institutions (fa) is to establish an institutions for profes-
sional training and assessment of oﬃcials. The keliguan is an interim institution that provides oﬃcials
(ren) with professional knowledge because “government business cannot be put on hold to wait for
the right men (ren)”必不可停政⽽待⼈也 during the transitional period before a new educational
system has been put in place.
1Xiao (2006)
4.2 ming and shi
The basic function of the ming-shi polarity does not undergo signiﬁcant change in the writings col-
lected in the post-1897 compendia as compared to the pre-1898 compendia. Its two principal functions
are pointing out implementation deﬁcits, and subverting opposing arguments (ming) by implying that
they lack a grounding in reality (shi). Recapitulating the projects of the self-strengthening period, au-
thors observe that no matter whether it is extant or newly established institutions, the measures that
ensure the congruence of ming and shi, that is, compliance of oﬃcials to the institutional regulations,
and thereby institutonal eﬃcacy are the same: recruitment according to aptitude, clearly assigned re-
sponsibilities, monitoring and sanctioning to hold oﬃcials accountable for their responsibilities, as well
as adequate remuneration (positive sanctions).
The essay of a anonymous author on “Observing the correspondence of name (ming) and perfor-
mance (shi)”綜覈名實說 deals with the different kinds of ming that an individual can have in the
socio-political sphere – reputation, oﬃcial title and academic title.1 The anonymous author starts with
a theoretical statement on the relationship of ming and shi. A name (ming) is always false (xu虛) if
reality (shi) does not correspond to it.
“A name (ming) is something that refers to an actuality (shi). A name (ming) without a
actuality (shi) is a false name (name). A gentleman should not value it.”
名者實之賓。若有其名。⽽無其實。則為虛名。君⼦勿貴也。
The anonymous author substantiates this theoretical instruction with a number of speciﬁc examples,
proceeding from the virtues of loyalty and piety to oﬃcial titles and ending with scholarly designations.
While it is desirable for anyone to receive the designation, or, in this case more aptly, reputation,
of being loyal or ﬁlial, one should not solely strive for the reputation (ming), but strive for the real-
ity (shi), that is, strive to really act loyal or ﬁlial. Anyone who comes with a reputation for being loyal
or ﬁlial but acts to the contrary will earn a reputation for “false loyalty” (weizhong僞忠) or “false
piety” (weixiao僞孝). In the end, no one can enjoy a reputation (ming) for something that he actu-
ally (shi) is not. At the same time, a person can deceive people who do not care to check (zonghe綜覈)
whether his reputation (ming) corresponds to reality (shi). Reality check are necessary to avoid being
deceived. When appointing oﬃcials, the sage kings and their virtuous ministers, the author reassures, al-
ways double-checked whether the reputation of a person matched his behavior in order to avoid wrong
choices. For administration, this means to check whether the high oﬃcials are all engaging in the imple-
mentation of the ruler’s policies “with real commitment”實⼒ and do not just engage in “empty talk”
空⾔, pretending they are implementing the policies while remaining inactive. It also means to check
1citetaliashe1902, 7:4a.
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whether the lower oﬃcials carry out the orders they receive “with real commitment”實⼒ and do not
just regard them as “dead letter”具⽂.
Next, the author comes to speak of oﬃcial titles. Key to improving bureaucratic discipline (lizhi吏
治) is to ensure that the title (ming) of an oﬃcial matches his actual performance (shi). A district mag-
istrate, literally “the one who is in charge of the district” (zhixian知縣), should indeed be informed
about and in charge of all affairs in the district. The examination supervisor, who literally “presides over
the examination” (zhukao主考) should only be concerned with tasks related to the examination pa-
pers, and nothing else. The provincial education commissioner, literally the one “in charge of the edu-
cational administration” (tidu xuezheng提督學政), should supervise education and be involved in re-
lated administrative activities. However, as the provincial education commissioners are usually recruited
from among the members of the Hanlin academy, the anonymous author notes, they are often inexperi-
enced in administration and leave administrative business to their secretaries and scribes. This leads to a
situation in which “according to the title (ming), the oﬃce is in charge of administration, but the man
who occupies it is not in charge in reality (shi)”官有政之名。⼈無政之實.
Finally, the author speaks of informal honoriﬁc titles for outstanding scholars, and the title ru儒,
and observes that they are all not easy to live up to in practice (shi) due to all the implications the titles
(ming) have in terms of the bearer’s personal virtue and scholarly achievements. He concludes that it is
important to always be aware of what a title implies. It is a common hope of men that bearers of titles
lives up to the requirements and that the emperor ensures that they do.
The ﬁrst writing of Chen Ciliang’s陳次亮 (Chen Chi陳熾, 1855–1899) Yongshu is an essay entitled
“Name (ming) and reality (shi)”名實. The essay is included in the chapter Lizhi吏治 (Bureaucratic
discipline) of the HCJSWBWJ/QSZ.1 Chen published the Yongshu庸書 (Book of the Correct Meth-
ods2) in 1896. The HCJSWBWJ/QSZ includes the complete Yongshu, but the writings are distributed
across different chapters of the compendium.
Chen writes that in the more than 280 years since the foundation of the Qing dynasty, regulations
(fa) have been modiﬁed and reﬁned, their coverage has been extended, the related documents accumu-
lated and grown more complex in the process. The strategies of oﬃcials and functionaries to abuse the
rules to their personal advantage have become more sophisticated at the same pace. The extant institu-
tional framework is not bad, but it suffers from oﬃcial corruption and incompetence. Criminals are not
persecuted because they pretend to hold up the law and the public good, while, in reality, they evade
and bend the rules. There are mediocre and incompetent people who constantly underperform and
achieve nothing but who are able to preserve their salary and status in the long run.
After China’s forced opening to Western overseas trade (haijin dakai海禁⼤開), there is an urgent
need for many institutions and regulations to change and adapt. Two common reactions to the need for
1HCJSWBWJ/QSZ, 1:7a–b
2Translation suggested in Lackner (2008), p. 191.
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change are a conservatism that rejects all change, and a reformism that rejects all extant institutions and
wants to exchange them for foreign solutions, Chen argues. Both is not an option, Chen says. The con-
servatives’ ignorance and inaction is dangerous. The reformists fail to pay close attention to the situation
of the Chinese people (Zhongguo zhi renqing中國之⼈情) with their plans, and at the same time do
not grasp the good points about the extant institutional framework which they want to discard.
“How to respond to this situation? Simply by checking the correspondence of responsibil-
ities (ming, what ought be observed) and performance (shi, what is observed, or, rather,
not observed). We should check whether regulations and institutions (fa) that should be
adhered to are carefully adhered to by observing whether the effect (xiao) of adhering to
the institutions (fa) occurs. Then we do not need to doubt and abolish them. We should
check whether regulations and institutions (fa) that should be reformed are vigorously re-
formed by observing whether efforts (gong) to reform the institutions (fa) are made. Then
we do not need to expect regrets later.”
然則何以待之。亦惟綜覈名實⽽已矣。法之宜守者。慎守之實。課以守法之效。
⽏庸⾒異⽽遷也。法之當變者。⼒變之實。責以變法之功。⽏俟後時⽽悔也。
Contributive to achieving the effectiveness of existing institutions and reforms are a moderation of the
tone of the debates and a steady reform course. Qualiﬁed men (men) have to be put in charge and as-
signed clearly demarcated responsibilities (專其責任). This way, they can be held accountable just like
the Zhou princes according to the Book of Documents, who “presented oral reports, which was veriﬁed
by comparing it to their achievements. They received chariots and robes according to their merits.”敷
奏以⾔。明試以功。⾞服以庸。
In the preface to Chen Ciliang’s Yongshu, Song Yuren highlights Chen’s decision to open the book
with a text on ming and shi. The book covers various aspects of government in past and present, in
China and foreign countries, says Song, but its common thread and recurring theme is the correspon-
dence of ming and shi.
The hundred chapters emphasize the necessity of the correspondence of responsibility
(ming) and performance (shi). The ﬁrst chapter is therefore entitled ‘ming and shi’. The
monitoring and sanctioning of the bureaucracy, the governance of the people, the pro-
motion of learning, the management of resources, the moderation of the laws, the orga-
nization of the army and the defense of the borders are connected to the causes of the rise
and fall of states in present and past. The name (ming) or reality (shi) of rules and the re-
sulting in order or chaos of paragraphs are discussed in detail. Much attention is given to
transformation of mores and fundamental principles of good governance.”




Song argues that China’s domestic problems and its weakness towards foreign powers are closely inter-
linked. The primary problem of China’s domestic policies, according to Song, is that they are not im-
plemented: “they certainly exist in name (ming) but not in reality (shi)”今固有其名也⽽未始有
其實也. The solutions consists in improving the accountability of the bureaucracy. Personnel politics
must “observe the correspondence between responsibilities (ming) and performance (shi)”審名實 by
holding oﬃcials responsible for their claims.
ming and shi already ﬁgured prominently in Song Yuren’s own reform writing before he wrote the
preface to the Yongshu.1 In the Shiwulun時務論 (“On current affairs”), Song writes about a number
of points which past and present experience has shown to be the most “important techniques of wealth
and power”富強之要術. Even more fundamental than these techniques, however, are the “fundamen-
tal principles of order”治本, Song points out. If one only excavates these foundations from accounts of
the rule of the ancient kings, one will end up with something very lofty and removed from the present
time. And as “anyone who wants to talk about the lessons of the past has to check their validity in the
present”善⾔古者必有騐於今, quoting Wei Yuan, it is advisable to corroborate the wisdom exca-
vated from the past with “what is already implemented to great effect in enemy territory”敵國已⾏
之效. Song thus presents four “fundamental principles of order” and seeks to corroborate them with
recent historical evidence.
Song devotes most space to the third principle, which he calls “observing the correspondence of nom-
inal responsibilities (ming) and actual performance (shi)”核名實. Song regards the “discrepancy be-
tween nominal responsibilities (ming) and actual performance (shi)”名實不相副 as the reason why
many important affairs are left in disarray although there is no shortage of oﬃcials. This discrepancy in-
cludes both cases in which one oﬃcial is assigned too many responsibilities, as well as cases of oﬃcials
who have no actual responsibilities at all. Both is detrimental to the eﬃcacy of the bureaucracy. The of-
ﬁcial who has to administer to many disparate affairs at once is so caught up in paperwork and meeting
formal requirements that he has no time to properly think things through. Oﬃcials with no speciﬁc du-
ties are usually badly paid, so that they spend their time teaming up and engaging in corrupt practices.
Confucius emphasized the importance of “correcting the names (ming)”正名 for good government.
According to Confucius “the role is determined after the name (ming) is correct”先正其名其分乃定.
Applied to the sphere of bureaucracy, this means that in a world of correct names, the assignments of an
oﬃcial post are fully determined by its title. The most important point to observe in government is the
constant revision of the oﬃcial titles (ming) in the written administrative framework, the Huidian會
1HCXAWB/YU, 2:19b–47b. Song is the author of one of the three prefaces of the HCXAWB/YU. The other two pref-
aces are by Zhang Zhidong and the editor Yu Baoxuan himself.
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典 (Collected oﬃcial statuts) in the case of the Qing dynasty. The ancient model for this kind of compi-
lation is the Zhouli周禮 (Rites of Zhou). The Rites of Zhou speciﬁed the tasks (shi事) of each oﬃce
in a few sentences and with a plausible name (ming). This way, “anyone in the realm could understand
how names (ming) are expected to correspond to reality (shi)”循名責實天下可得⽽理, and was
informed about the responsibilities of each individual oﬃcial. The only reason why Confucius himself
did not compile such a book during his service in the state of Lu was that he was only a rites specialist
back then.
The ﬁrst step in “correcting the names” today, then, is to publish a companion edition to the Col-
lected Statutes that contains clear speciﬁcations of each oﬃcials’ duties. A further condition to ensure
that nominal responsibility (ming) and actual performance (shi) correspond to each other is that the of-
ﬁcial salary should match the responsibilities of an oﬃcial and be suﬃcient to conduct oﬃcial business
and feed the family. In the process of reforming oﬃcial salaries to conform to this condition, customary
fees have to be regularized. The regularized quotas for customary fees should be made public, so that
people can ﬁle complaints if they are charged too much. Sinecure posts should be abolished, especially if
they encourage men to engage in corrupt and nepotist practices. The oﬃcials-in-waiting thus freed can
be trained in technical subjects so that they can work as government experts in these ﬁelds if they are not
appointed to regular posts. Sale of oﬃce should be abolished because it promotes corruption in oﬃce.
In conclusion, Song Yuren lists the advantages of the central idea of adjusting titles (ming) and re-
sponsibilities (shi) through the reform of the bureaucratic structure. Upright oﬃcials can fully commit
to performing their tasks. Less upright oﬃcials will not dare to pursue their private interests at public
cost (營私以廢公). With clearly demarcated responsibilities it becomes possible to evaluate people
more objectively and to recognize particularly able oﬃcials. With appropriate budgets that correspond
to the nature of oﬃcial responsibilities, oﬃcials need to fear that they run out of money to entertain
their own households, so that the people stay free from the burden of excessive surcharges.　　
Wang Tao王韜 (1828–1897) attacks opponents of reform and uses the ming-shi polarity to critically
interrogate the validity of their arguments in his essays on “Reform”變法.1 Wang Tao counters the ide-
ological argument of the reform opponents of any reform that “China uses its own models (fa) to order
the realm and she bases them on the way (dao) of her sages”我⽤我法以治天下，⾃有聖⼈之道
在 by stating that even Confucius would not stick to anachronistic solutions if he was reborn in the con-
temporary world. The other arguments cited by opponents of reform apart from this ideological argu-
ment are equally out of touch with reality, Wang says. In the whitewashed version of reality they present
in their petitions, “the Western nations can never hope to attain the great multitude of China’s talented
men, the vastness of China’s territory, the power of China’s army, the wealth of China’s resources and
the perfection of its institutions”中國⼈才之眾也，⼟地之廣也，甲兵之強也，財⼒之富也，法
度之美也，⾮西國之所能望其項背也.
1HCXAWB/YU, 1:5b–7a.
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While this may all be true, it is everything but a valid argument against reform, Wang argues. China
has great potential but leaves it untapped. China does not nurture its talents so that they can be put
to good use in the government. “The court maintains the claim (ming) that it fosters talents, but the
reality (shi) of talents being fostered is not given”是朝廷有養⼠之名⽽無養⼠之實也. The
examinations system recruits ignorant people into the civil service. China does not train its armies so
that they can protect the country. “The land and naval forces only exist in the registers in name (ming)
but not in reality (shi)”今之陸營⽔師其著於籍者有名⽽無實. China has resources but does
not utilize and multiply them to increase the government budget. China has good institutions but no
proper mechanisms to ensure that the public good is respected and regulations (fa) are adhered to and
that their signiﬁcance rise above dead letter (juwen具⽂). Its overly complex legislations invite abuse.
Functionaries’ bending and breaking of the law goes unchecked because nobody can be bothered to deal
with the complicated legal requirements. “The throne maintains the claim (ming) that regulations (fa)
are being adhered to, but the reality (shi) of regulations being complied to is not given”是朝廷有⾏法
之名⽽無奉法之實也.
It follows that there is an acute need for reform, Wang concludes. Civil service recruitment methods
have to change. Schools need to recruit teachers who can act as both intellectual and moral role models.
The army needs to introduce modern training methods, and the naval forces need modern ships and
weaponry. Regulations need to be simpliﬁed and made public.
An anonymous author cites the idea of “observing the correspondence of nominal responsibilities
(ming) and actual performance (shi)”循其名責其實 as the quintessence of his argument to abol-
ish redundant low oﬃcial posts created to accommodate members of the growing group of oﬃcials-
in-waiting (houbu候補).1 The prosperity of a state and its people does not increase proportional to
the absolute number of oﬃcials. It is rather dependent on whether the number of oﬃcials matches the
amount of administrative tasks to be performed, and whether the tasks are appropriately distributed
among the oﬃcials. Superﬂuous oﬃcials in the capital are simply a waste of public resources because
“having them is as good as not having them”雖設如不設. Superﬂuous oﬃcials in the provinces are
worse because they try to improve their meagre salary by illegal means and harass the local population so
that “one is actually better off not having them than having them”雖不設或愈於設.
The ming-shi polarity plays a key function in the ﬁrst two of six suggestions which Zhou Hengqi
周恒祺 (1824–1894) proposes to “rectify bureaucratic discipline”整飭吏治.2 Zhou’s ﬁrst suggestion
is to strengthen the enforcement of imperial orders in the provinces. His second suggestions is to “ob-
serve the correspondence of nominal qualities (ming) and actual performance (shi)”核名實 in the
recruitment of candidates. Oﬃcials recommending candidates should be required to highlight one or
1HCJJWXB/YJS, 7:6a–b
2HCJSWSANB/CHEN, 22:1b.
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two special qualities or competences of their protégé in their recommendation letters such as exemplary
conduct, military aptitude or love for the people. After one or two years in oﬃce, the candidates can
be evaluated with respect to their qualities. If “actual performance (shi) and nominal quality (ming)
correspond”實與名副 they can be promoted. If not, their patrons can be held responsible.
Cai Zhenfan蔡鎮藩 (jinshi 1892) memorializes the court pleading for an “inspection the current
state of the bureaucracy and a clear speciﬁcation of oﬃcial responsibilities in order to establish the new
policy”審官定職以成新政.1 Cai criticizes that the policy of the past thirty years has been characterized
by make-shift solutions. Many new task forces established in the context of self-strengthening have not
been staffed by regular oﬃcials, there was no clear assignments of tasks to oﬃcials, and therefore also a
way of evaluating the performance of the staff. Most recently, the court started to “scrutinize the corre-
spondence of nominal duties (ming) and actual performance (shi)”綜核名實, abolishing superﬂuous
posts and agencies and drawing up statutes, which shows that the mismatch between oﬃcials and ad-
ministrative responsibilities has now full imperial attention. The most important task pending now is
a reorganization of the bureaucracy, Cai says. The oﬃces have to be reorganized in a way that responsi-
bilities are clearly demarcated and associated with speciﬁc oﬃcials. This is to ensure that oﬃcials can be
properly evaluated and held accountable for fulﬁlling their responsibilities.
“Without a reorganization of the bureaucracy, it is not possible to specify oﬃcial respon-
sibilities. Without a clear speciﬁcation of oﬃcial responsibilities, it is not possible to estab-
lish a proper way of evaluating oﬃcials. Without a proper system of evaluation, it is not
possible to hold oﬃcials accountable for doing their job. Without oﬃcials performing
their job, it is not possible to achieve wealth and power.”
⾮修官制。不能定職守。⾮明職守。不能⽴考成。⾮嚴考成。不能責功效。⾮
收功效。不能致富強。
Cai presents eighteen concrete suggestions for how to reorganize individual institutions of the imperial
bureaucracy. In several of them, Cai employs the ming-shi polarity.
Cai uses ming-shi to criticize the excessive powers and responsibilities of the Grand Council, an in-
formal policy making body that had originally been put in charge of military affairs by the Yongzheng
emperor in the context of his campaigns in the Northwest. For Cai, the Grand Council is the example
par excellence of “China’s greatest problem, namely the discrepancy between nominal responsibility
(ming) and actual performance (shi)”中國之⼤弊⽈無名實. With the many changes and reforms ini-
tiated in recent times, the breadth of tasks of the Grand Council has grown tremendously, the decisions
require more time than busy members of the Grand Council, usually concurrent members of other
high government agencies, have to spare. Cai advocates to split the powers and responsibilities concen-
trated in the Grand Council and distribute them among the Grand Secretariat, the Hanlin Academy
1HCXAWB/YU, 12:20b–30a.
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and the Grand Council. This would more or less restore the setup established when the Qing dynasty
was founded, which Cai regards as optimal, when the tasks that are now the sole responsibility of the
Grand Council were performed by three institutions all staffed with secretaries.
Cai uses ming-shi to point out the dysfunctionality of the board of public works. According to Cai,
“never before were the nominal responsibilities (ming) of the board’s oﬃcials so removed from their ac-
tual performance (shi)”冬曹事官。未有名不符實如今⽇者. Cai makes a number of speciﬁc sugges-
tions on how to reorganize the board’s staff and their responsibilities. In the case of the Grand Council,
the discrepancy between ming and shi consists in the members of the Grand Council amassing to many
powers in their hands without any formal backing, says Cai. In the case of the board of public works,
the discrepancy between ming and shi is characterized by overlapping responsibilities and that leads to
an inability to perform at all. Numerous oﬃcials share very similar responsibilities of oversight so that
none of them feels personally responsible, leading to an immense waste of funds in badly monitored
public construction projects.
4.3 gong and si
The importance of the gong-si polarity increases in the post-1897 compendia as compared to the pre-
1898 compendia. gong-si is employed to state a number of interesting points in political-administrative
discourse. In the writings of Huang Zongxi and Liang Qichao, gong and si are used to cast the capacity
of the central government to deﬁne the public interest (gong) into doubt. Huang and Liang subvert
the ideological premise that the ruling class has a special capacity for supreme impartiality or public-
mindedness (gong) that enables them to free themselves from the inﬂuence of their own personal pref-
erences and interests (si) and decide everything in the interest of the public good (gong). In reality,
Huang and Liang argue, the ruling class acts selﬁsh and simply redeﬁnes their own personal interests
(si) as representing the public good (gong). Xue Fucheng, Wang Kangnian, Mai Menghua, Xu Xiang-
shu and the writer duo Ho Kai and Hu Liyuan examine the nature of the relationship of gong and si
to conclude that some institutional arrangements realized in companies and states such as joint stock
companies with an elected board of directors and parliaments with elected representatives are able to
convert the sum of personal interests (si) of their stakeholders into public good (gong).
Huang Zongxi’s essay “On the ruler”原君, a polemic against imperial rule in post-classical times,
opens the chapter on Minzheng民政 (lit. “people government”) in the HCJSWXB/MAI.1 Huang
Zongxi completed the Ming yi daifang lu from which the essay is drawn in 1662. The book was sub-
sequently banned under the Qianlong emperor, which did not prevent it from being reprinted and
circulating privately.2 The Minzheng chapter discusses the place of the people in government and the
state’s role in the national economy, discussing different forms of government and the people’s partici-
pation in government and economy. In the essay, Huang Zongxi rejects the idea that the post-classical
emperors were blessed with the ability of perfect “public-mindedness” (gong) which legitimized their
autocratic powers and enabled them to rule the empire to the maximized beneﬁt of all. He accuses the
rulers of subsequent dynasties of redeﬁning their own private interest (si) as the public interest (gong).
The ideal of perfect impartiality or public-mindedness (gong) places high demands on the ruler, that
the rulers of imperial times were not able or willing to fulﬁll, Huang says. Perfect public-mindedness
requires a readiness for altruism. The legendary sage rulers were men who worked harder than every-
one else and enjoyed less of the fruits of their labor than anyone else. In the mists of time, Huang says,
each man was interested in his own personal advantage (si). Nobody engaged in affairs that would have
been of common (gong) beneﬁt. Also, nobody engaged in affairs that would have prevented common
(gong) harm. This went on until the mists lifted and some men came who neglected their own personal
(si) beneﬁt (li) and worked for the general beneﬁt of all. They also neglected their own personal (si)
harm (hai) and worked to rid the world of general causes of harm. These men made greater efforts than
1HCJSWXINB/MAI, 18A:1a–b
2Zhou (1996), p. 385.
266
4.3. GONG AND SI 267
anyone else without being able to personally enjoy the beneﬁts of their work. It is not something that
men are naturally ready to do, including the men of antiquity. The people in antiquity were just as fond
of leisure and averse to effort as people today. This is evidenced by the fact that many ancient rulers, in-
cluding those who became legendary heroes, initially refused to become ruler (Yu) or retired from the
post of ruler early (Yao and Shun).
Later rulers are not known for a similar reluctance because they did not take the ideal of perfect
public-mindedness serious. Their actions were diametrically opposed to the ideal example set by the
sage rulers. They were only posthumously redeﬁned in a cosmological-moral language as examples of
perfect virtue by the rulers or “petty scholars”⼩儒. With his contrasting of ancient and later rulers,
Huang Zongxi creates a subversive account of imperial history. Realizing that by virtue of their posi-
tion they wielded “the power over beneﬁt (li) and harm (hai)”天下利害之權, later rulers found it
appropriate to reap all beneﬁt for themselves and burden the rest of the world with the harm. They told
the rest of the world not to act selﬁsh (si) and work for their own beneﬁt, while they redeﬁned their
own personal interest (si) as equivalent with the public good (gong). They regarded the world as their
private property from which they strove to reap as much proﬁt as possible and then pass it on to their
descendants. Instead of regarding themselves as guests of the rest of the world, and committing their
energies to work for the beneﬁt of the world, they regarded themselves as hosts of the rest of the world,
and worked only for their own beneﬁt, says Huang. The rulers were the actual source of harm and dis-
cord in the world. Before they conquered the imperial throne, they killed people and destroyed families
and naturally called it “establishing an empire for their descendants”為⼦孫創業. After they had con-
quered the imperial throne, they killed people and destroyed families to increase their own pleasure and
comfort and called it “natural beneﬁts of a blooming empire”產業之花息 as a matter of course. The
people ruled by the ancient sage rulers called them “father-like” and “heaven-like”如⽗如天 on their
own accounts. These became “empty names”空名 only used by rulers themselves to designate them-
selves, while the people called the rulers “tyrants”獨夫. Those who still feel a natural duty to serve this
kind of rulers are mindless “petty scholars”⼩儒, says Huang.
Liang Qichao regards the autocratic rule of the post-Qin emperors as rooted in fundamental self-
ishness (si), while he presents the benevolent rule of the pre-Qin sage emperors as rooted in public-
mindedness (gong).1 Coming from a self-interested standpoint, the post-Qin rulers were ﬁrst and
foremost focused on “preventing abuse” (fangbi防弊), that is, preventing actions that could poten-
tially lead to a loss of power and maintaining the status quo. A ruling style that focuses on “preventing
abuse” manifests in depriving people of their autonomy (zizhu⾃主) and is rooted in selﬁshness (si).
The pre-Qin rulers focus was on “getting things accomplished” (wu zhishi), that is, actively taking care
of the people, and was rooted in the pre-Qin rulers public-mindedness (gong). Liang’s account of the
post-classical empire as focused on “preventing abuse” and fundamentally self-interested is typical of a
1HCJSWSANB/CHEN, 21:3b–5b; HCJSWXINB/MAI, 1C:1a–2a; HCJSWBWJ/QSZ, 25:1a–2a.
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popular tendency among the late Qing reformers “to dismiss China’s entire post-Qin history as a kind
of wrong turn, a two-thousand-year detour”. Zarrow (2000) points out that this going beyond the con-
ventional rejection of tyrannical Qin-rule meant an attack of dynastic kingship itself and also of ‘impe-
rial Confucianism as it had developed over the centuries.”1
Liang Qichao’s equating monarchy with selﬁshness (si) and democracy with public-mindedness
(gong) did not mean that Liang Qichao regarded gong and si as a dichotomy in general. The selﬁsh-
ness (si) Liang Qichao refers to in this essay is the selﬁshness (si) of the rulers, not the self-interest (si) of
common people that is constitutive of the public interest (gong).
“In equating the monarchy with selﬁshness, Liang was not saying that selﬁshness was en-
tirely wrong but rather that private interests had no place in the public realm. As well
as signifying selﬁshness, si referred to the entire realm of the self and the private, a realm
Liang also wanted to strengthen. Liang criticized a strand of traditional Confucian thought
that emphasized the moral value of self-control or ‘self-suppression’ (keji), and he noted
that selﬁshness was, after all, natural. He thus urged that a balance be struck between gong
and si.”2
Liang Qichao describes the general attitudes of “getting things accomplished” and “preventing abuse”
with the following words.
“The former (pre-Qin) kings were public-minded (gong) about the realm and therefore
committed to getting things accomplished. Later (post-Qin) rulers were self-interested (si)
towards the realm and therefore committed to preventing abuse. Although being com-
mitted to getting things accomplished does not preclude that minor defects or abuses can
arise, the beneﬁt (li) achieved is great enough to make up for it. If the government is ob-
sessed with preventing abuse, a hundred defects or abuses will arise before one defect or
abuses has been prevented, like a leaking roof that leaks more the more one tries to repair
it, or a threadbare quilt that gets worse the more one tries to mend it. When being commit-
ted to getting things accomplished, there will be order when the right men (ren) can be
put in charge, and chaos if the wrong men (ren) are put in charge. When obsessed with
preventing abuse, abuses will become more frequent when the wrong men (ren) are put






1Zarrow (2012), p. 65.
2Zarrow (2012), p. 65.
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Liang describes the historical consequences of the focus on “preventing abuse” at length and in de-
tail and contrasts it with the ancient arrangements under the sage rulers just to show how, in the end,
each dynasty’s “preventing of abuse” proved self-defeating. Liang starts with the Qin dynasty, when
prohibitions and censorship became so complex as to render common people and oﬃcials apathetic,
while bandits could not be brought under control. Liang continues with another ten examples of self-
defeating measures introduced in imperial times that removed the empire farther and farther from the
ideal institutional setup of the sage rulers. In the ﬁrst example, Liang points out that some time after
the Wei dynasty, ministries were assigned multiple leading oﬃcials “out of fear” that if an agency was
headed by one oﬃcial this oﬃcial would become too powerful. This broke with the ancient model of
concentrating and clearly demarcating responsibilities in order to render evaluation easy. None of the
leading oﬃcials had real power, just as none of them had real responsibility, so that administrative tasks
were not performed properly.
Liang ends up identifying nearly each weak point in the imperial bureaucracy as a departure from the
institutional setup of the sage rulers introduced to “prevent abuse”. According to Liang, these depar-
tures not only lead to the slow deconstruction of the heritage of the sage rulers, but also prevent the in-
troduction of institutional innovations. This means to take everyone’s powers and give them to one per-
son, which is the deﬁnition of selﬁshness (si). It stands in contradiction to a theory in the West which
states that every man has a certain kind of powers called zizhu zhi quan⾃主之權 (“individual rights”
or “right to self-determination”). These zizhu zhi quan imply that everyone has to accomplish certain
tasks, and is then entitled to enjoy certain beneﬁts. This theory is perfectly public-minded (gong), says
Liang.
The obsession with “preventing abuse” is the result of selﬁshness (zisi⾃私), emphasizes Liang. It
justiﬁes conferring all power to the ruler (zhirenzhe治⼈者) and leave the governed (shouzhizhe受治
者) without any power. Conferring all power to one person can never be rational, Liang argues. If the
entitlement to enjoy beneﬁts is conditional on the accomplishment of tasks, then one could argue that
a ruler who accomplishes all tasks in the world should also be entitled to enjoy all beneﬁts in the world.
But no ruler is so omnipotent as to manage everything. The sage rulers knew this and therefore high-
lighted the importance of reciprocity (jieju zhi dao絜矩之道) and public-mindedness (gong). They
also pointed out that “the greatest problem is not that there is not enough, but to that it is unequally
distributed”不患寡⽽患不均. Liang connects these orientations with a theory of appropriately
distributed powers. Just like the world consists of the accumulation of people, a state consists of the
accumulation of power. The power in a state can be in one of three states: perfect balance of power, im-
perfect balance of power and complete imbalance of power. In a state of perfect balance of power, every
person in the state exercises his established powers (guyou zhi quan固有之權). In a state of imperfect
balance of power, some people have powers, while some people are stripped of their powers. In a state
of complete imbalance of power, it is unclear who has the power. This last state results when one man
seizes the powers of many but ﬁnds that the related tasks are so great and complex that he cannot accom-
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plish them all. The powers will then devolve and be lost because it is hard to restore the original balance.
“Preventing abuse” starts with a struggle for power (zheng quan爭權) but runs the risk of resulting in
a complete absence of powers because it makes it necessary to cede powers (rang quan讓權). The em-
peror cedes the power to discuss the course of politics to his ministers. After the results of the ministers’
debates have been approved, the power to execute the decisions is ceded to the provincial high oﬃcials,
who cede it to their assistant oﬃcials, who cede it to the magistrates, who cede to their functionaries.
This long, partly formal, partly informal chain of delegation of power does not result in effective admin-
istration, argues Liang. In the end, “extreme self-interest”私之極 leads to a state of absence of a clear
command structure where nothing gets accomplished.
In the context of an exposition of his ideas on commercial policies, Xue Fucheng薛福成 (1838–1894)
formulates a connection between public good (gong) and self interest (si) that clearly seems inﬂuenced
by Adam Smith’s economic insights about rational self-interest.1 Xue advocates to enable and encourage
more participation of private business men in commercial steamship transport in order to generate the
momentum necessary to quickly break the foreign dominance of the sector. Self-interest (si) motivates
people to plan ahead and provides them with the activation energy to undertake upfront efforts.
“It is a natural principle that endeavors are most diﬃcult in the beginning. It lies in the hu-
man condition that men are most committed when pursuing their private interests (si).”
夫事之難于謀始者。理也。⽽⼈之篤于私計者。情也。
Xue evokes the image of a busy market street with merchants advertising discounts and clients readily
spending their money as illustration of how the actions of individuals driven by self-interest result in
something that can be called the public good.
“As all these men desire to satisfy their private interests (si), they do not inﬂict losses to the
public (gong) budget, but eventually greatly beneﬁt (li) the public (gong) budget.”
惟⼈⼈欲濟其私。則無損公家之帑項。⽽終為公家之⼤利。
While Xue Fucheng reconciles gong and si in the economic context, Wang Kangnian汪康年 (1860–
1911) reconciles the polarity on a more general level. Wang discusses the relationship of gong and si by
breaking them down to the concepts of “for the good of others” (wei ren為⼈) and “for one’s own
good” (wei ji為⼰).2 gong and si are persistent terms in people’s speech and writing, and as persistent
is the outlook that regards si as extreme egoism, says Wang. While gong is generally regarded as an incli-
nation to act “for the good of others, too”兼為⼈, si is conceived as the inclination to act “exclusively
for the good of oneself”專為⼰.
1HCJSWSANB/CHEN, 29:5b–6a.
2HCJSWSANB/CHEN, 19:32b–33a.
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“Men have always been used to speaking about public-mindedness (gong) and self-interest
(si). Something is public-minded (gong) if it is done for others as well. Something is self-
interested (si) if it is done exclusively for oneself. It leads states to division, alienation and
imminent downfall. This is why we currently have the theory that one should do every-
thing exclusively for others. Those who propagate it try to move people with talk of realiz-
ing humaneness (ren) and choosing righteousness (yi) and warn people that you reap what
you sow. But still, they do not succeed in moving people. Just like men do not have two






It is a mistake, however, to construct a dichotomy between “for others” and “for oneself” by deﬁning si
as extreme egoism (“exclusively for the good of oneself”) and creating the ideal of extreme altruism as its
counterpart. Because egoist attitudes have detrimental consequences for state and society, people were
instructed to practice selﬂess altruism, in order to prevent them from becoming egoists. This strategy
proved useless in the long run, but it is also unnecessary in the ﬁrst place because the dichotomy of al-
truism and egoism is an unreasonable reduction of reality. People do not have to be turned into selﬂess
altruists in order to make them act “for the good of others, too”.
Wang Kangnian presents a number of examples to argue that people need simply be made to follow
their common sense in order to be turned into individuals who act to the beneﬁt of others. In their
essence the examples all either follow the straightforward insight that people in the same boat should
row together, that an economic strategy should be sustainable in the long term, or the logic of secular
retributive justice (yinguo baoying因果報應), that teaches people that a man reaps as he sows (shishou
xunhuan施受循環). If people who live in the same building do not care about the room of one of the
inhabitants collapsing, says Wang, they will soon have their own room collapsing, too. If a ﬁre breaks
out in the south of a neighborhood and the people from the north of the neighborhood do not rush to
their aid in extinguishing the ﬁre, their homes will soon be burning, too. If bandits invade the south of
a city and the residents in the north do not rush to their defense, the bandits will soon be looting their
homes, too. If a volcano breaks out in the East of a country, the people in the West will be affected by
the earth quakes induced.
If one person in the village accumulates the property of all others at a low price, he will soon have no-
body to socialize with because there are no rich households left. If someone establishes a shop in town,
and then strategically drives all other shops into ruin, then the town will quickly have no big shops left,
which will adversely affect the economic health of the place and thereby drive his own shop into ruin,
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too. An oﬃcial who uses his power to bully people in his home town will invite later oﬃcials to imi-
tate his behavior which will aﬄict his own descendants. Similarly, if someone bullies other people, than
nobody will mind if his children get bullied. If someone does not to rush to the help of others in an
emergency, then nobody will mind if others refuse to rush to hep if his children are caught in an emer-
gency. On the other hand, a public-minded rich man who founds a local school raises the general level
of education and ensures that his children and grandchildren will also receive a good education. Some-
times, people also achieve something to the beneﬁt of others while they were just thinking of their own
advantage. For example, somebody may catch a robber in order not to be robbed will be praised for his
service to the general public while he was just thinking he was saving himself some trouble.
The common denominator of all the behaviors reported in the examples of people getting adversely
affected through their egoistic pursuit of their own good is that “they all distanced themselves from the
others without recognizing that they themselves and the others were inseparably interconnected”是皆
離⼰於⼈⽽不知⼈⼰之相連屬也. The people should heed the words of the sages who regarded the
world (tianxia天下) as one family, and the state as one person. The behavior in the above cited exam-
ples seems as irrational as if a left hand would rejoice in being unharmed after the right hand got injured,
or a person whose brother got beaten up rejoices that it was not him being hurt. With the awareness of
the multifarious interconnectedness of people in the world and with this idea of solidarity among the
parts of a body and among the members of a family in mind, people can proceed to feel regional and
national solidarity. If people are made to overcome from the inclination of just acting “for their own
good”, they are deﬁnitely able to “think about the affairs of the world with a mind that has become
public-minded”固能公其⼼以思天下之事.
Mai Menghua regards the compatibility of the pursuit of self-interest (si) and the public good (gong),
and the commitment that people display when they are pursuing their own personal interest as the basis
of the success of associations (hui會).1 The synergies that people develop when they join to form associa-
tions are the basis of a nation’s strength. The people’s self-rule (zizhi⾃治) is the foundation of national
strength. The precondition of full-ﬂedged self-rule is a level of education that the Chinese people has
not yet attained. But the Chinese can start right away to practice self-rule on a small scale by forming
associations in the areas of commerce, industry and science. Here, the people’s natural inclination to
pursue their own personal beneﬁt comes in handy, and it also comes in handy that associations act as
a powerful means to turn the pursuit of private ends into public good, and, in the end, as a means to
increase China’s national wealth and power.
It is right that the people should be granted more powers. However, parliaments are not the way to
realize this in China at the present moment. The majority of the Chinese people are uneducated and
undisciplined, they cannot meaningfully participate in an institution such as a parliament. Still, “restor-
ing the people’s powers”復民權 is necessary in order to strengthen China. The people should be in
1HCJSWXINB/MAI, 18A:11a–15a
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charge of all affairs that they are capable to manage because they are similar to their day to day activities.
The crucial point is to give people a stake in the affairs they are managing so that they manage them with
the same enthusiasm as they would manage their own family business. This principle is realized in the
West, which is the reason for the Western nations’ wealth and power. People join together in associa-
tions of all types to jointly manage affairs. The strength of the West in different areas lies in its associa-
tions in these areas. The reason why there are Western missionaries missionizing and geographers survey-
ing in all corners of the world, and why Western merchants can cause so much trouble China and India
is that they are backed by powerful associations in their home countries. Mai points out a few examples.
The sciences progress through associations which channel intellectual efforts. Technology progresses
through associations which can acquire devices and instruments that single engineers could not afford.
Trade progresses through associations which can assemble capital for ventures that a single merchant
could never fund. Mai highlights how this differs from the conventional idea of having a few outstand-
ing heroic leaders do great work: associations can achieve things that a few heroic leaders cannot achieve
on their whole lifetime.
“The desire of men in the West to satisfy the particular interests (si) of their state and the
private (si) their family is just as strong as it is in China. But how they proceed to realize
this desire is different from us. To satisfy the particular interests (si) of the state, it is neces-
sary to make its affairs a public (gong) affair of the people. To satisfy the private interests
of the family, it is necessary to make its affairs a public (gong) affair of the masses. There is




Xu Xiangshu advocates the establishment of parliaments in the context of a constitutional monarchy
in an essay entitled “Which are the beneﬁts and disadvantages of parliaments?”議院利害若何論.1
Xu brieﬂy describes the evolution of popular assemblies in the West and sketches suggestions on how to
transfer the idea into the institutional landscape of the Chinese state.
Xu states that there are monarchies, democracies and constitutional monarchies in the West. In
monarchies, the monarch wields all power and the parliaments cannot suggest anything on their own
initiative. The disadvantage are dictatorial and arbitrary decisions. Russia and Germany are examples of
monarchies. In democracies, all powers are in the hands of the members of parliament. The disadvan-
tage is the lack of a monarch. US-America and France are examples of democracies. Great Britain is a
constitutional monarchy. If the monarch approves of something and the people (parliament) objects
it, the monarch cannot enforce it dictatorially. IF the people (parliament) approves of something and
1 HCJSWSANB/CHEN, 18:8a–9a.
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the monarch objects, the people (parliament) cannot enforce it dictatorially. This is the perfect model in
which the motives of the monarch can be known by the people and the people’s wishes can be known
by the monarch.
China has manifold problems: absence of a means to concentrate ﬁnancial resources at the center,
absence of a means to change detrimental policies, absence of a means to reform penal law, absence of
a means to lift people out of poverty, absence of a means to assert China’s authority internationally, ab-
sence of a means to make sure good candidates can be recruited for the civil service, absence of a means
to ensure that bad civil servants are demoted. These problems are not attributable to the lack of ability
and virtue of the emperor and his ministers. These problems all result in the lack of such a mechanism
for exchange of information between the ruler and the people. Therefore, China must establish parlia-
ments if it does not want to perish. The parliament can develop plans for the development of mining,
agriculture and industry, in order to tap unused potentials in these areas. The need for parliamentary ap-
proval of the budget for military and construction projects will make ﬁscal management more effective
and reduce the need for levying problematic commercial taxes. With a parliament established, abuses
such as the arbitrary use of torture by magistrates and excesses in the levying of the commercial tax can
be reported and steps can be taken to prevent them. The establishment of a parliament will also likely
propel the reform of the judicial system with legal professionals and due process. Parliament can effect
a renegotiation of the unequal treaties and will prevent that future treaties can ever be of such unequal
nature again. This will remove the disadvantages of Chinese merchants compared with merchants from
Western nations. The members of parliament can contribute to the prevention of corruption in the up-
per ranks of the military, and loss of discipline in the lower ranks by exposing and investigating related
cases. Parliament should debate and select the candidates for the highest positions in the civil service,
that is the grand secretaries, the high oﬃcials of the six boards, the Zongli Yamen and the marine, the
governors-general, governors, provincial and regional military commanders and diplomatic envoys. This
will ensure that able candidates can be promoted and incompetent can be released of their duties.
In the last part of the essay, Xu indicates various groups who are likely to oppose the establishment
of parliaments out of ignorance or because of fear for infringement of their vested interests. The above
cited beneﬁts should be enough reason to favor the establishment of parliaments. However, even in
reform-friendly Meiji Japan, the establishment of an elected parliament was met with the most resis-
tance of all reform measures. In China, were opposition to reform is greater and conservative sentiment
demands that everything follow established precedents, opposition will be even greater. The high of-
ﬁcials in the central government will oppose parliaments because the focus on competence instead of
seniority in the appointment of high oﬃcials jeopardizes their vested interests. The high oﬃcials in the
provinces and the lower oﬃcials will oppose parliaments because the disciplinary and budgetary control
emanating from parliament jeopardizes their vested interests. Oﬃcials at the district level will oppose
parliaments out of fear of new things.
The common people will oppose parliaments citing the argument that they are not compatible with
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the customs and manners of the Chinese people (minfeng shisu民⾵⼠俗). In the West, most people
are able to make decisions based on the bigger picture. In China, people only care about themselves and
their immediate family, and not about others and the state. With parliaments in place, these selﬁsh senti-
ments will take control of the bureaucracy and of public affairs. There are no “perfect institutions (fa)”
無弊之法, therefore China needs “perfect men (ren)”無弊之⼈ to take care of government. Xiang
employs the gong-si polarity to defend idea of the institution of parliaments against this argument. He
argues that it does not matter of the mass whether the people is focused on their personal interest and
because parliaments are a mechanism for distilling the public interest (gong) from private interests (si).
“The Western nations established parliaments to combine the petty private interests (si)
of many into one greater public good (gong). If the people want something, it must be
because it is beneﬁts (li) them personally. If one man wants it, it is private interest (si). If
all men want it, it is the public good (gong). If the people detest something, it must be
because it harms (hai) them. If one man detests it, it is private interest (si). If all men detest
it, it is the public good (gong). Sometimes opinions do not harmonize (at once) and dif-
ferent men represent different positions. In this case, controversial debate is possible, that
prevents that distorted views do not triumph over straightforward ones and wrong does





The Remarks after reading the Exhortation to Study勸學篇書後 (1900) by Ho Kai何啟 (1859–1914)
and Hu Liyuan胡禮垣 (1847–1916) are a polemic refutation of Zhang Zhidong’s Exhortation to Study
勸學篇 (1898). In the treatise, Ho and Hu declare the difference between their 1895 treatise Discussion
of new policies新政論議 and Zhang’s essay, that discusses the same themes, to consist of “a difference
in terms of gong and particularity si”夫異同之分仍以公私⽽別. Their deﬁnition of gong and si
as characteristics of speech and writing touches both upon public good and private interest as well as on
the related ideas of a impartial and universal perspective and a partial and particulate perspective. In the
prologue of the Remarks after reading the Exhortation to Study, the authors expound:
“There are gong and si statements in the world. What are gong statements? They are
statements uttered by one man, which all men in the world can agree to. What are si state-
ments? They are statements uttered by one man, which no men in the world can agree to.
It is alright and possible to translate gong statements into action, and when they are trans-
lated into action, they result in beneﬁt (li). It is not alright or impossible to translate si
statements into action, and when they are translated into action, they result in harm (hai).
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gong statements must be most balanced in their reasoning, based in human feeling, they
must be smooth to implement and their observations must be perfectly impartial. The






gong statements are universally acceptable principles, while si statements are unacceptable particulate
opinions.
In the their refutation of Zhang’s chapter on the Three Bonds (Ming gang pian明綱篇), the authors
present the Three Bonds, that serve contemporary conservatives as rhetorical foundation for rejecting
the civil rights and equality of women, as an ill-conceived reinterpretation of the ﬁve relationships that
lacks any basis in the classics. According to the authors, the three bonds are an artiﬁcial distortion of the
natural Five Relationships. Demanding unconditional obedience of the minister towards the ruler, the
son towards the father and the wife towards the husband makes no sense. If the ruler is a good ruler, the
minister will naturally follow what the ruler says, as wood the son and wife if the father is a good father
and the husband is a good husband. If the opposite is the case, then they would be ill-advised to obey.
The dissemination of the idea of the three bonds is the cause of moral degeneration, not a remedy
against it. The three bonds do not only demand unconditional obedience, they also allow a ruler to kill
his minister without punishment, a father to kill his son without punishment, and a husband to kill his
wife without punishment. The climate of brutality this creates is the reason why China has many cases
ministers killing their rulers, sons killing their fathers and wifes killing their husbands.
The Five Relationships are a natural hierarchy. Because they are based on natural conditions, and they
are impartial (gong). The Three Bonds are based on differences in power. Because they are determined
by people, they are partial (si). If a rationale is impartial (gong), it is stable. If it is partial (si), it is insta-
ble. An unstable rationale is based on the current balance of power (shi勢), which inevitably changes
with the time. A ruler, a father and a husband may be able to bully their minister, son and wife as long
as they can cling to their power. But as soon as the minister, the son or the wife get the power, they can
bully their ruler, father or husband.
In the refutation of Zhang’s chapter on “Being aware of differences”知類篇, impartial (gong) and
partial (si) acquire the meaning of a universalist and particularist attitude. The authors write that Zhang
Zhidong’s demand to “know one’s kind” or “race” (zhilei知類) contradicts the quintessence of the in-
sights of Fuxi, King Wen of Zhou, the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, that are evidenced in the tongren
同⼈ hexagram Book of Changes and its commentary layers. The authors explain the essence of the hex-
agram as an appeal to “overcome the particulate (si) and concentrate on the universal (gong)”去私⽽
4.3. GONG AND SI 277
⾔公.
“The commentaries of the hexagram indicate that regarding other men as different arises
from a particulate attitude (si). If I have a particulate attitude and there is a man I do not
know, I will not regard him as my equal. If another man has a particulate attitude and
he does not know me, he will not regard me as his equal. A superior man (junzi君⼦),
though, will overcome the particulate (si) and concentrate on the universal (gong).”
⾔⼈之所以不同者私故⽿。吾有私⽽⼈不我知。則⼈不我同。⼈有私⽽我不⼈
知。則我不⼈同。唯君⼦去私⽽⾔公。則天下之志可得⽽通也。
The message of the hexagram is that all categorizations of peoples and persons are just a means “to sepa-
rate the universal (gong) from the particular (si)”為分別公私⽽⾔.
“The expression ‘to categorize peoples and distinguish things’ is just meant to create a basis
for telling the universal from the particular. It means to see the commonalities in the differ-
ence. Loyalty has many expressions, but the underlying attitude is always the same. Filial
piety has many expressions, but the underlying attitude is always the same.”
其⾔以類族辨物者。為分別公私⽽⾔。謂審不同以致其同⽿。忠之事容有不同。
⽽其志則⼀也。孝之事容有不同。⽽其志亦⼀也。
Already the title of Zhang’s chapter, “Being aware of differences”, is inadequate, write Ho and Hu, as
well as the use of “absurd interpretations”謬解 by Cheng Yi and Zhuxi. They criticize Zhang for “going
after that which is different from a particularist standpoint (si), instead of going after that which is alike
from a universalist standpoint (gong) and regarding everyone as a fellow human”不求其公之同。⽽
⼀視同⼈。但求其私之異⽽嚴分畛域. Zhang Zhidong ignores “universal principles accepted
all over the world”天下之公⾔ and gives ample room to the “particularist opinions (si) of ordinary
men”常⼈之私, which is inappropriate in an exhortation to learning written for scholars. If he had
understood the classics Zhang would be teaching what Confucius had taught, namely that there are no
differences among men. This is the message needed in today’s world where people’s ﬁght against other
because they consider themselves as belonging to different nations or races.
In the chapter on “Legitimate power”正權篇, Zhang Zhidong argues against civil rights, saying
that they remove theauthority that is necessary to maintain the order and function of human society.
Any busy market needs a supervisor, and even a gang of bandits needs a leader. If all men were free or
self-determined (zizhu⾃主), every family and every region would concentrate only on the particular in-
terests (si) of its members. Scholars would idle their days away, peasants would refuse to pay taxes, mer-
chants would try to maximize their proﬁts by any means, craftsmen would demand exorbitant wages,
and the poor and unemployed would engage in looting and robbing. Sons would stop to obey their fa-
thers, students would stop refuse to obey their teachers, wives would stop to obey their husbands, the
socially inferior would stop to subordinate themselves to the socially superior. All this would lead to
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a world in which the “law of the jungle” (ruorou qianshi弱⾁強⾷) rules and eventually lead to the
extinction of humankind.
The authors refute Zhang Zhidong’s arguments one by one. They argue that there is no place in the
world in which the social-Darwinistic conditions of the kind Zhang describes prevail. Equal rights
(pingquan平權) are not the antithesis of acceptance of authority but the precondition for accepting
the authority of someone on the grounds that he “excels the others”差勝羣眾, the authors argue. The
inclination of a family or a village to put the private interests (si) of its members ﬁrst, is the foundation
for the functioning of parliamentary assemblies. Parliaments transform the particular interests (si) of
the family to those the region, then to those of a whole nation, and ﬁnally those of all human kind. In
the process, the personal interests do not completely dissolve into thin air and they are not regarded as
generally taboo. The universal brotherhood of men may be a distant goal, but for now, it is better to let
families, regions and nations focus on the private interests of their members (si). And each man should
in principle be free to pursue his personal interest (si). But because each man has different private in-
terests, it follows that each man will likely not be able to completely fulﬁll his own private interest. The
goal should therefore be to combine the personal interests of everyone into a collective private interest
in a way that everybody can fulﬁll that part of his private interests that does not conﬂict with the private
interests of others. This collective private interest should not be called “private interest” (si) anymore,
but should be called “public good” (gong) instead.
“It is accordingly also best to let each man be concerned about his private interest (si). But
every man can see that the private interests of all are not completely compatible, but also
that his own private interest will not be completely ignored. If the private interests are
combined in this way, everyone gets his private interest, and the world is in order. If ev-





The private interest of merchants may be to maximize their proﬁts and the private interest of craftsmen
may be to demand high wages. But the claim that that scholars’ private interest consists of idling their
days away, that the peasants’ private interest is evade taxes and that the poors’ private interest is looting
other people’s property is deceptive. If all of these groups can fulﬁll his legitimate private interests, they
will not infringe upon other people’s private interests to enforce it, and nobody will infringe upon their
private interest in order to enforce his own private interest. There are cases of mutual beneﬁt where hav-
ing private interests are better than having none. For example, when merchants bring goods from other
places in their own private interest to maximize their proﬁt, the private interests of other people are also
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fulﬁlled in the process because customers can purchase goods and new business opportunities may be
created.
Following up on the explanations in the refutation of the Ming gang pian, Ho and Hu argue that
blind obedience in terms of the three bonds is not a precondition for social order but rather for its per-
version. It rests on the incorrect assumption that power and authority must emanate from those with
higher social status. In reality, power and authority must emanate from those who accord with “feeling
and reason” (qingli情理). If this person happen to be one’s father, one should follow him. If it hap-
pens to be one’s son, then one should follow him. The same rules for teacher and student, husband and
wife, people of superior and inferior status, and the strong and weak. If someone, on the other hand,
is at odds with “feeling and reason”, then one should not follow this person even if it is one’s father,
teacher, husband, ruler or any person in a higher position than oneself at all: “the reason for obedience
or disobedience and the impetus to follow or not should result from considerations of feeling and rea-
son only, but certainly not social status”順逆之故向背之機。惟情理是視焉⽿。奚能以尊卑貴賤
為哉.
4.4 li and yi
It is especially the compendia of the New Policy period that contain texts concerned with the rela-
tionship between li and yi. Without exception, the writings insist that the conception of li and yi as
dichotomy is a delusion and results from a misreading of the text of the Mencius at best. Authors take
it for granted that there is righteous beneﬁt that reconciles righteousness (yi), that is necessary as con-
dition for long-term beneﬁt, and beneﬁt (li), that is necessary as an incentive for action. It is deﬁned as
not doing harm to others or even beneﬁting them. The authors are ever more explicit that the individual
engaging in beneﬁcial action must be allowed to beneﬁt himself. The Five Relationships are presented
as an example of such collective or mutual beneﬁt. In the context of the discussion of Huxley’s critique
of Social Darwinism, Yan Fu states that there is “enlightened self-preservation” that is based on mutual
beneﬁt and therefore represents the balance of righteousness and beneﬁt.
An essay by an anonymous author from the HCJSWSIB/HE repeats the point that positing a di-
chotomy between beneﬁt (li) and righteousness (yi) is a misreading of Mencius and Dong Zhongshu.
An author in the HCJSWTB/SHAO similarly insists that the construction of the taboo is a misread-
ing of Mencius, and that beneﬁt (li) is indispensable in providing incentives for actions and efforts. All
other essays discussed set out to deﬁne the distinctions between legitimate beneﬁt (li), that is congruent
with righteousness (yi), and illegitimate proﬁt (li), that is at odds with righteousness (yi). Two authors
in the HCJSWTB/SHAO operate with “beneﬁt within the bounds of righteousness” (yi zhong zhi
li) and “beneﬁt outside the bounds of righteousness” (yi wai zhi li). The ﬁrst author deﬁnes yi zhong
zhi li as publicly shared beneﬁt and yi wai zhi li as privately monopolized beneﬁt. The second author
declares rightful enjoyment of remunerations for one’s labor as yi zhong zhi li. Yan Fu posits that the
principle of mutual beneﬁt, that is also distinctive of “enlightened self-preservation”, is a crucial charac-
teristic of righteous beneﬁt. Chen Ciliang, ﬁnally, argues that beneﬁt that is impartially distributed and
conducive to the public good is in accordance with righteousness, and that the establishment of mining
enterprises is accordingly a righteous endeavor.
The author of an essay entitled “Wealth and moral education are combined in the countries of the
West”西國富教合為⼀事說 states that the view that scholars should only speak of benevolence (ren
仁) and righteousness (yi) and not speak of proﬁt (li) has no basis in the classics.1 The Book of Changes
contains numerous passages about beneﬁt (li), in particular the text of the ﬁrst hexagram (qian) that
Confucius emphasized as especially important. The Great Learning goes into great detail about ways
of generating revenue (shengcai zhi dao⽣財之道). The statements in the Mencius about enriching
poor farmers by teaching them ploughing methods and lowering taxes, and about regulating people’s
eating and spending habits to create an ample surplus show that Mencius was concerned about beneﬁt
(li), too. His remarks directed at King Liang have to be understood in their historical context, as expe-
1HCJSWSIB/HE, 47:2a–b
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dient exhortations. They should not be regarded as universally valid models for action (dian典). Dong
Zhongshu’s statement that one should “be just rather than plan for beneﬁts (li) and strive to under-
stand moral principles rather than being concerned with merits”正其誼不謀其利明其道不計
其功was similarly distorted by later scholars. What Dong Zhongshu had meant to say was just that
one should fulﬁll one’s duties and not be exclusively occupied with making proﬁts. Later scholars were
lead to the erroneous belief that they should ban the word beneﬁt (li) from their speech and writing
and solely concentrate on benevolence and righteousness (yi). They concentrated on regarding righ-
teousness (yi) as beneﬁt (li) and on seeing proﬁt as detrimental to benevolence and righteousness, and
blocked out that perfect proﬁt implies benevolence and righteousness.
The HCJSWTB/SHAO contains three short pieces specially dedicated to discussing the false di-
chotomy of li and yi. All three stress the compatibility of li and yi. The ﬁrst of the three short pieces,
entitled “Discussion of public beneﬁt”公利說, conﬁrms the ambiguity of the term li that has at once
a neutral or positive and a negative connotation: “The great necessity on earth is called beneﬁt (li). The
great harm on earth is also called beneﬁt (li)”天下之⼤要⽈利；天下之⼤害亦⽈利.1 The essay
further states that the treatment of li as taboo originated the account of Mencius’ reprimanding King
Liang for “speaking of proﬁt (li)”⽈利. That this passage was misinterpreted and rose to the status of
a model for action lead later statesmen to avoid engaging in the active maximization of public beneﬁt.
The statesmen of antiquity had never avoided the term li for good reason: nothing works if there is no
incentive. li has to function as incentive after which the realization of benevolence and righteousness
can follow. This is true for all areas of administration, for education and even for the Five Relationships,
the mutual obligations between father and son, ruler and minister, elder and younger brother, husband
and wife and between friends, that all internally rest on the principle of mutual beneﬁt.
“Everything necessarily arises from beneﬁt (li). Virtue, benevolence and righteousness (yi)
follow from its and are enabled by it. Military, agriculture, rites and music cannot function
without beneﬁt (li) as incentive. Instruction and rectiﬁcation of customs cannot succeed
if there is no beneﬁt (li) as incentive. [...] All Five Relationships rely on beneﬁt (li) for
internal cohesion and external support.”
且必先興乎利。⽽後道德仁義。可得⽽施是。故兵農禮樂。⾮利不⾏。教訓正
俗。⾮利不成。[...]五倫之內。無⼀不恃乎利。以隱為固結。顯為維持。
The anonymous essay “On proﬁt”說利 states that there are two kinds of proﬁt, one kind that is
“within the bounds of righteousness (yi)” (yi zhong zhi li義中之利) and one that is outside its bounds
(yi wai zhi li義外之利).2
1HCJSWTB/SHAO, 107:14a–b
2HCJSWTB/SHAO, 106:2a–b
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“Scholars have denounced the pursuit of beneﬁt (li) since Zhu Xi said that one should
‘follow righteousness and not pursue for beneﬁt (li)’1. Why should pursuing beneﬁt (li)
actually be denounced? There is beneﬁt (li) outside the bounds of righteousness (yi), and
beneﬁt (li) inside the bounds of righteousness (li). When is beneﬁt (li) inside the bounds
of righteousness (yi)? When the beneﬁt (li) is shared with the general public (gong, here:
other people, everyone) and therefore accords with righteousness (yi). When is beneﬁt (li)
outside the bounds of righteousness (yi)? When the beneﬁt (li) is monopolized by oneself




The anonymous author of the “Differentiation of righteousness and beneﬁt”義利辨 similarly iden-
tiﬁes a close connection between li-yi and gong-si. The author explains the concept of yi zhong zhi li
義中之利 as rightful enjoyment of what one is entitled to, the collected taxes in the case of the ruler, the
harvested crops in the case of the peasant, the remuneration that the oﬃcial, the scholar and the crafts-
man receive for their work, and the multiplication of capital in the case of the merchant.2 This contrasts
with the essays brieﬂy mentioned in chapter 3.3.2, that had ranked scholars and peasants, craftsmen and
merchants, and robbers and thieves according to the descending righteousness of their beneﬁts. The
Book of Changes’s “harmony of all that is right” is achieved when every of the above groups is able to
successfully strive for his legitimate beneﬁt. “Ignoring righteousness (yi) in the pursuit of beneﬁt (li)”
舍義取利, on the other hand, means to pursue beneﬁt without regard for the social obligations repre-
sented by the Five Relationships. The prime example is the oﬃcial who serves the ruler while “ignoring
righteousness (yi) in the pursuit of beneﬁt (li)” and therefore engages in corruption.
Yan Fu employs li and yi in a comment to his paraphrase of a passage from Thomas Huxley’s Evolu-
tion and Ethics, the Tianyanlun天演論. In the passage, Huxley formulates one of the central tenets of
his book, that the natural tendency of the survival of the ﬁttest must be infused with human morality
that replaces primordial egoism in order to arrive at a humane society.3 State and society must counter
nature and reward non-egoistic individual behavior in such a way that the ﬁttest is not the one who
proﬁts most on the cost of others, but the one who does not harm others in the pursuit of survival. Yan
Fu introduces the concept of “enlightened self-preservation” (kaiming ziying) which men should be
made to pursue and which combines righteousness (yi) and utility (li).
Huxley criticizes social Darwinist theories of society and government for their neglect of the evils of
unfettered struggle for survival among individuals and peoples. It is not naturally good if mechanisms
1Zhu & Li (1473), p. 1978.
2HCJSWTB/SHAO, 107:13a–14a.
3HCXAWB/YU, 71:25b–26b.
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such as the survival of the ﬁttest that Darwin proved at work in nature also operate in society. Human
governance must intervene to counter the effects of evolution. Whether the egoist or the enlightened
individual is ﬁttest depends on whether human governance is able to counter nature or not. If nature
rules, the ﬁttest is the one who can proﬁt most at the cost of others (yi wu guang ji役物廣已). If hu-
man governance rules, the ﬁttest is the one who coexists peacefully with other and understands to in-
hibit his private interests for the love of others (chu si cun ai黜私存愛) and mutually assist each other
(xiang yang xiang sheng相養相⽣).
Yan Fu notes in this context that the concept of self-preservation (ziying⾃營) changes with the
times. Regarding self-preservation as a taboo is based on a dichotomous view that views utility (gongli
功利) and righteousness (daoyi道義) as necessarily incompatible and that one ﬁnds in the ancient
authors both of China and of the West. After it became evident that the instinct for self-preservation
was a vitally important evolutionary principle for biological organisms, the idea of “enlightened self-
preservation” gained recognition in the West. Enlightened self-preservation means not to strive for
achievement and beneﬁt with the wrong intentions and by the wrong means. Enlightened self-preservation
achieves beneﬁt (li) without turning its back to righteousness (yi), it regards “beneﬁt (li) on both
sides”兩利為利 as beneﬁt but not “one-sided beneﬁt (li)”獨利必不利.
In an essay on the mining industry, Chen Ciliang refutes the arguments of critics of the exploration
of of new mines.1 Chen Chi argues that mining opens new sources of proﬁt (li) which can improve
the livelihood of the people and the budget of the state. There are literati who attack the plans on the
grounds that “one should beware of speaking about proﬁt (li)”. These people close their eyes to the fact
that the people’s very existence depends on whether material proﬁt can be generated or not, Chen says,
and ignore that the presence of spirits and the sages of the past cannot save them from starving. Oppo-
nents of oﬃcial mining enterprises furthermore claim that competition for proﬁt (li) leads to strife and
ultimately to chaos, while righteousness (yi) agnostic of proﬁt achieves makes the world peaceful”劑天
下之平. This argument is invalid, Chen argues.
“It is not so that we can do without beneﬁt (li) when there is righteousness (yi), rather,
righteousness helps to distinguish whether a beneﬁt is conducive to the public good (gong)
or just to private interest (si). If the beneﬁt is privatized (si) by one person, we are witness
of the impertinence of a petty man. If the beneﬁt is impartially enjoyed (gong) among ev-
eryone, we are witness of the moderation of a superior man. This criterion should decide
over reward and punishment and it is intimately related to the life or death of the people.




284 CHAPTER 4. POLARITIES DURING HUNDRED DAYS AND NEW POLICIES
民⽣死之關。⽽⼈禽之界也。
Those who are busiest telling the world not to speak of proﬁt, Chen claims, are the most proﬁt-obsessed
of all. The true sages spoke constantly about distributing proﬁt impartially (gong) among the people in
the world, and they certainly did not avoid speaking of proﬁt (li).
Conclusion
The writings included in the post-1897 compendia extend the scope of fa to include aspects previously
associated with ren, most importantly monitoring and sanctioning. The writings redeﬁne fa to refer to
more general mechanisms and characteristics of the institutional framework, not just particular institu-
tions and regulations. This builds on the conviction in many of the writings in the pre-1898 compendia
that, everything being equal (especially the quality of the men in charge), some regulations are better
than others in effectively achieving state goals and in preventing corruption and abuse.
The ming-shi polarity remains most stable in terms of patterns of use of the four polarities. The writ-
ings in the post-1897 compendia primarily employ the polarity to point out implementation deﬁcits and
to dismiss claims conﬂicting with their own views as being out of touch with reality. Authors emphasize
that both existing institutions and institutions newly established in the context of self-strengthening
programs can only be effective if certain conditions are met. The conditions that authors propose to en-
sure congruence of ming and shi, that is, compliance of men to regulations and institutional eﬃcacy,
do not substantially differ from those proposed in the pre-1898 compendia. They include recruitment
according to aptitude, a clear task structure with clearly assigned responsibilities as well as consistent
monitoring and sanctioning to hold oﬃcials accountable, and adequate remuneration (positive sanc-
tions).
gong and si are conceptualized as compatible but in tension. There are legitimate private interests
that are compatible with, conducive to or even constitutive of the public interest (gong). But there
are also private interests (si), associated with corruption and autocracy, that harm the public interest
(gong). This tension necessitates a search for mechanisms and ways of understanding and establishing
public interest. The traditional way of deﬁning and working to achieve the public good (deﬁnition of
the public interest by public-minded individuals specially qualiﬁed by birth or examination success) is
cast into doubt and new ways to establish the public good are explored (companies with elected boards
in the economic ﬁeld, associations in the scientiﬁc and social ﬁelds, parliaments in the political ﬁeld).
Several authors redeﬁne gong to mean public consensus.
li and yi are regarded as mutually dependent goals of action in the writings of the post-1897 compen-
dia. The prospect of beneﬁt (li) is necessary as an incentive to engage in action. Righteousness (yi) is
necessary to ensure social harmony and long-term beneﬁt. Beneﬁt that is compatible with righteousness
cannot be one-sided beneﬁt on the cost of others or the public but must instead fall under the deﬁni-
tion of mutual beneﬁt or fairly distributed beneﬁt. Both the Five Relationships as well as Huxley’s “en-




This dissertation has traced the use of four polarities in Qing dynasty statecraft discourse. Through ob-
serving how these polarities are used across discourses, administrative areas and ideological convictions
to structure arguments, the aim was to arrive at some conclusion as to what patterns authors share in
their usage of the terms, and what concerns manifest through this usage. ren-fa, ming-shi, gong-si
and li-yi are polarities in so far as the relationship of the terms which constitute them is characterized
by an existential tension. They appear to be opposites at times, but at other times prove to be correla-
tives which render each other intelligible. The authors of the writings collected in the statecraft com-
pendia use the polarities to designate two indispensable and interdependent aspects of a problem or its
solution that can be in tension with each other, but that can (or even have to) be reconciled if the state is
to be well and eﬃciently governed.
On an abstract level, authors suggest that ren and fa, gong and si, ming and shi, and li and yi
must be balanced or brought into congruence. On a concrete level, we observe a concern for eﬃcacy
that nurtures a concern for organizational control, that is meant to ensure that members of the bureau-
cracy work to reach state goals. Authors’ proposals do not just touch upon the administrative regula-
tions associated with a particular institution under discussion, but also aspects of internal organization,
including education, recruitment, appointment, task structure, monitoring and sanctioning. This disser-
tation calls ren and fa the building blocks of eﬃcacy because they represent two basic elements of bu-
reaucracy and government. fa are the formalized rules, that is, regulations, methods or models, accord-
ing to which institutions are operated. ren are the men in charge of operating the institutions according
to the rules, bureaucratic personnel in most cases. ming-shi and gong-si are referred to as the condi-
tions of eﬃcacy because they are used to formulate important conditions of effective government. For
example, ming-shi can point to the correspondence of formal responsibilities with actual performance
of the bureaucratic personnel, and gong-si to the balance or congruence of the private interests of the
bureaucratic personnel and the “public interest” of all. Authors propose to establish both conditions,
the correspondence of ming and shi and the balance of gong and si, by means of proper recruitment
and more consistent monitoring and sanctioning, associated with ren, and by means of more adequate
regulations (fa). li and yi, ﬁnally, are called the goals of eﬃcacy because they are employed to discuss
the goals of government.
In general, authors regard both men (ren) and regulations or models (fa) as indispensable. Even
negative statements about regulations (fa) such as “it is men (ren) who order the state not regulations
(fa)” or “no regulation (fa) is immune against abuse” do usually not signify that the author regards
regulations as dispensable. Negative statements ﬁrst and foremost intend to underline that adequate reg-
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ulations have no agency on their own but must be enforced to be effective. A further important point
made by authors emphasizing that “it is men (ren) who order the state not regulations (fa)”, that good
government must “rely on men (ren) not regulations (fa)” or “put men in charge not regulations” is
the need for ﬂexible adaption of regulations to local circumstances. In the pre-1898 compendia, fa refers
to regulations pertaining to the administration of clearly circumscribed tasks and institutions such as
public granaries and the salt monopoly. Many authors argue that regulations play a decisive role for
the eﬃcacy of institutions, and that regulations should provide constraints that render abuse, be it by
oﬃcials or private persons, diﬃcult and unattractive. fa furthermore refers to the administrative laws
sanctioning deviant behavior of the bureaucratic personnel. ren are the “men in charge’, that is, oﬃ-
cials, sub-oﬃcial functionaries, members of the local elite, and occasionally also other players such as
merchants or smugglers. Authors emphasize that the eﬃcacy of institutions ultimately depends on the
agency of the men (ren) who operate, implement and comply with regulations (fa). Superiors (ren)
have to recruit, educate, monitor and sanction their subordinates (ren) in order to ensure that they
are unlikely to commit abuses. In the writings of the post-1898 compendia, fa increasingly refers to the
institutional framework or “law” in its entirety, including mechanisms of recruitment, appointment,
monitoring and sanctioning, that authors earlier tended to associate with ren.
Authors employ ming and shi to point to the discrepancy between formal arrangements or claims
(ming) and reality (shi). shi refers to the actual performance of oﬃcials and other men in charge or
the actual results of a policy. The ming-shi polarity formulates a relationship between what “ought
to be” and what “is” or between “saying” and “doing”. ming refers to formal arrangements such as
regulations, commands, claims, oﬃcial titles and task structures, and the responsibilities arising from
these formal arrangements or intended policy outcomes. shi refers to the compliance with regulations
and commands, the fulﬁllment of responsibilities and the actual outcomes of a policy. By claiming dis-
crepancies between what ought to be and what is, or between “saying and doing”, authors are making a
moral indictment against men who do not live up to their own responsibilities or claims. Authors frame
their solutions as a reestablishment of the correspondence of ming and shi that either results from an
adaption of ming to shi, or from an adaption of shi to ming. The adaption of shi to ming refers to
the enforcement of formal arrangements by means of monitoring and sanctioning. The adaption of
ming to shi means that the formal arrangements, that is oﬃcial duties and/or regulations are adapted
to the capabilities of the average man in charge (zhongren). The use of the ming-shi polarity remains
relatively constant when comparing the writings collected in the pre-1898 and post-1898 compendia. Im-
plementation deﬁcits resulting from corruption, irresponsibility or inappropriate legislation remain a
much discussed issue in the late 19th century and beyond.
With the gong-si polarity, authors discuss the relationship of public good and private interest. In
particular, they discuss how orientation towards the public good (gong) and towards private interests
(si) can be properly balanced in the minds of oﬃcials and other men in charge. Authors do not deny
the possibility of legitimate private interests (si) that harmonize with the public interest (gong). They
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differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate private interests. When depicting gong and si as a
dichotomy, authors often implicitly refer to illegitimate private interests (si) that negatively affect the
public interest (gong) when pursued. Some authors claim that making public-mindedness (gong) a
criterion in the recruitment of oﬃcials and constant education in public-mindedness can improve the
integrity of the bureaucracy. Some authors also argue that regulations (fa) can help in minimizing op-
portunities for pursuing private interests (si). Already Gu Yanwu writes about the theoretical possibility
of integrating oﬃcials’ private interests (si) “into the system” so that they could contribute to the public
good (gong). The view that mechanisms exist in politics and economy that can accumulate and trans-
form private interests into the greater public good, and thereby separate legitimate from illegitimate
private interests becomes more popular in the course of the nineteenth century. According to this view,
public interest is the sum of other private interests that the individual must not infringe upon in his pur-
suit of his own private interest. Authors in general associate compliance with regulations (fa) with an
orientation towards the public good (gong), while disregard of regulations is associated with selﬁshness
(si). In this context, the view is uttered that the ability to identify the public interest and to act impar-
tially (gong) may not result from restricting decision-making powers to a small elite of men (ren) but
rather from proper institutional mechanisms (fa).
Being used to reason in terms of the beneﬁt (li) of administrative measures, statecraft authors empha-
size the compatibility of beneﬁt (li) and righteousness (yi) because they feel the need to defend their
proposals against conventional arguments that economic and ﬁscal policies are “talk about beneﬁt (li)”
that is detrimental to public morale and harmful in the end. According to the conventional stance, any
policy that is publicly called “beneﬁcial” or rather “proﬁtable” (li) propagates a dangerous mindset
of narrow-minded proﬁt thinking and selﬁshness among oﬃcialdom and common people. Authors
underline the harmonious relationship of beneﬁt (li) and righteousness (yi) in the highly ambiguous
textual layers of the Book of Changes to counter the depiction of li and yi as conﬂicting pursuits in
other classics, most notably the Mencius and the Analects. The authors of the writings included in the
pre-1898 compendia tend to restrict their concrete examples of policies that are compatible with righ-
teousness (yi) to measures that promote the economic subsistence of the farming population, such as a
low land tax and instruction in farming methods that increase agricultural productivity (but not explic-
itly state revenue). In the later compendia, the predicate “righteous” (yi) is extended to economic and
ﬁscal policies that authors present as beneﬁcial for the general public in the end result.
The opening lines of Wei Yuan’s preface to the HCJSWB underline the interdependent nature of a
number of fundamental polarities. Yu Yingshi (2013) notes the general tendency in the social, economic,
and ethical thought of Qing Confucianism to relax moral absolutism and to redeﬁne mutually exclu-
sive polarities in relative terms. Qing thinkers were aware that moral absolutism is often connected to
the problematic of power of interpretation (Interpretationshoheit). Dai Zhen declared repeatedly that
“his redeﬁnition of ‘principle versus desire’ was prompted by the simple fact that, more often than not,
those in power condemned the basic needs of the common people as ‘human desires’ and summarily
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rejected their demands for fulﬁllment in the name of ‘heavenly principles”.1 Similarly, as discussed in
chapter 4.3, Huang Zongxi criticized the autocracy of postclassical emperors on the grounds that they
“violated the terms of service originally expected of a universal king. Instead of advancing the interests
of the people, they abused the enormous power vested in them by identifying their supreme private
interests with the common good of the empire”.2
The vocabulary of the “language of eﬃcacy” consists of rhetorical devices. Authors used this vocab-
ulary at times to gain a certain moral authority in order to support their own agenda, or even moral
superiority over people with a rivaling agenda. For example, oﬃcials could make negative claims (ming)
about the proposals of their political opponents and deny them an actual (shi) positive effect in order to
advance their own agenda. Members of the local community could use their leverage on public opinion
to antagonize against oﬃcial policy, questioning its public (gong) beneﬁt and reproaching the oﬃcial
side with selﬁsh (si) intentions to build up public pressure and advance their own interests. Contem-
poraries were, however, not unaware of the rhetorical nature of their language, and of the fact that au-
thority of interpretation is never absolute and that opponents could take recourse to the same rhetorical
devices to combat their own speech acts. Examples of the consciousness of the rhetorical use of the po-
larities Sun Jiagan’s defense against ming-shi rhetoric, Sun Hao’s objections against ren-fa rhetoric,
Zeng Guofan’s, Huang Zongxi’s and many others’ cautioning against gong-si labels, and most writings
underlining the compatibility of li and yi discussed in this dissertation.
The observations presented in this dissertation illustrate Guy’s (2010) assessment referred to in the in-
troduction that idioms that constituted “part of the common ground” of political-economic discourse
“were available to articulate members of the discourse community to draw on in ways that contested
the very assumptions they were conventionally resumed to convey”.3 Authors appropriate and redeﬁne
both the concepts that constitute the polarities and idioms in which the polarities ﬁgure. An example
is the redeﬁnition of “it is men (ren) who order the state not regulations (fa)” from a general princi-
ple into an undesired dysfunctional force that has to be counteracted. Authors such as Gao Chengling
and Sun Jiagan argue that regulations (fa) should be the basis of administration and government, not
arbitrary decisions of the men in charge (ren). Another example is the redeﬁnition of fa to include
aspects previously not attributed to fa but to ren, most notably mechanisms of monitoring and sanc-
tioning. These means of organizational control are also invoked with the ming-shi polarity the use of
which remains relatively constant. Yet another example is the redeﬁnition of the mechanisms to iden-
tify and realize the public good (gong). Authors such as Huang Zongxi and Liang Qichao question the
court’s capacity of deﬁning the public good (gong), and redeﬁne the public good (gong) as popular
consensus. A broad range of ﬁscal and economic policies is redeﬁned as righteous (yi) on the account
1Yu (2013), p. 123.
2Ibd. Yu’s examples illustrating the new reading are “common good” and “self-interest”, “righteousness” and “proﬁtable-
ness”, “frugality” and “luxury”, and “heavenly principles” and “human desire”. This dissertation has examined the case of the
ﬁrst two.
3Guy (2010), p. 357.
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that they beneﬁt (li) the people in the long run. Authors present the strategy to motivate oﬃcials with
the prospect of personal beneﬁts (li) such as status and privileges as legitimate on the condition that it
serves a righteous end (yi) such as spreading awareness of Confucian teachings. All these redeﬁnitions
amount to “drawing new meanings out of old linguistic ﬁgures”.1 The ﬂexibility that the four polari-
ties discussed in this dissertation exhibit in Qing dynasty statecraft discourse explains their continued
presence in Republican and PRC discourse.2
Polarities are a useful way to approach a body of thought that is as non-monolithic as the “West-
ern thought” of the same period. The examination of the four polarities discussed in this dissertation
raises awareness for other polarities in the thought of late imperial China worth examining, for exam-
ple, morality of social results and personal virtue, Legalism and Confucianism, “rites” (li禮) and law
(fa), orientation towards present and past, “East” and “West”.3 Research into the concept of li and its
relation with fa was beyond the scope of this dissertation but is facilitated by recent and forthcoming
studies about the history of the Board of Rites in the Qing dynasty.4 There are actually many similar-
ities in the writings of the statecraft compendia in how li and fa are discussed, for example, that both
are viewed as regulating and sanctioning external behavior, not internal attitudes which cannot be effec-
tively regulated and sanctioned, and that both must be adapted to the capacities of the “average man”.
1Rowe (2002), pp. 289–290.
2See Jenco (2010) about ren and fa in Republican political discourse; Zhang & Deng (2008) about ming-shi and “rec-
tiﬁcation of names” in Mao Zedong’s thought; the more recent recourse to renzhi⼈治 and fazhi法治 in PRC political
discourse, for example in the writings of Hu Jintao’s adviser Yu Keping, see Yu (2008), amongst others; for an analysis of the
role played by the categories in China’s modern history by Hongkong and Taiwan-based scholars, see Chen (2005) and Ren
(2013); for Xi Jinping’s use of li-yi in international relations, see Xinhuawang (2014).
3Compare Polachek (1992), p. 7, on the existence of alternatives to the “celestialist” tribute-system ideology of Sino-
foreign relations such as the international Machiavellianism of the Warring States period and the expansionist cosmopoli-
tanism of the early Tang empire. Polachek argues that the question of why one ideology or “brand of tradition” prevailed
at the expense of others cannot tautologically be answered on grounds of ideology alone. Similarly, Polachek challenges the
view that ignores the possibility of a practical bureaucratic interest in power and posits that reform and opening was only
made possible by the advent of a Western-inﬂuenced utopianism. Polachek’s stance, then, is that such a pragmatic stance very
much existed early on and that the question posed should rather be why it did not prevail. Polachek furthermore contends
especially for the period until 1850, the year of the outbreak of the Taiping rebellion, the answer has to be sought in central
policymaking, as “local history” or domestic distractions explanations do not hold for this comparatively quiescent period.
See also Dunstan (2006), p. 248, in the context of grain export bans about the role played by “cultural stereotypes”: “It is
not, let me repeat, that moralistic hostility to big business per se was a substantive policy of mid-Qing administration, but
that the broader, inherited political culture provided anti-merchant attitudes to be drawn upon when needed.”
4See Keliher (2016) and Büchsel (forthcoming).

Appendix
Translation of the preface of the HCJSWB (1826)
Practical affairs1 are necessarily based on the heart-mind. If we create a myriad imprints with one seal,
they all come out perfectly identical. If the seal is inscribed in ordinary script, can one use it to print
ornate script with it? If the seal is inscribed in ornate script, can one print ordinary seal script with it?
Although a scale without measuring marks is useless, the actual weight of an object is what produces the
measured weight on the scale, not the other way round. Anyone who wants to properly speak about the
mind has to verify it by observing practical affairs.
Standards necessarily depend on human agency. A cart with ﬁve-inch hubs can transport its load a
thousand miles, but without a driver, it will not even move an inch. However, even the famous crafts-
men Lu Ban and Wang Er with their sharp eyes and great imagination were not capable of building a
fully functioning carriage behind closed doors. Anyone who wants to properly speak about human
agency has to take standards into consideration.
The present necessarily depends on the past. The sixty-year-cycle devised by the Great Nao can be
used for thousands of years without alteration. But last year’s calendar cannot be used for this year, the
inventions of out great-great-grandfathers and out great-grandfathers are not as convenient to use as the
ones of our grandfathers and fathers. The more recent the times, the more similar the circumstances.
The sages adapt their attitudes and statesmanship to the times and circumstances. Anyone who wants to
talk about the lessons of the past has to check their validity in the present.
Things in the outside world (wu物) necessarily depend on the observation of oneself (wo我). But if
two things rub against each other, something more reﬁned results. If two minds confront each other’s
opinions, doubts arise. If these doubts are critically debated, a simple and viable solution results. The
‘Book of Songs’ says: ‘Wisely arranged are the great plans; Sages devised them. What other men have in
their minds, I can measure by reﬂection’.2 It further says: ‘everywhere I seek information and advice’,
‘everywhere I seek information and counsel’.3 This is how the people of antiquity relied on their own
mind by not daring to rely upon their own mind alone. They were eager to inquire what others had in
their minds, and thus broaden their own minds in an incremental process of repeated discussion and
continued exchange of ideas. Anyone who wants to speak about oneself has to seek exchange with oth-
ers in the external world.





That which permeates everywhere is called spirits. That which takes speciﬁc form is called affairs.
Those who establish and adapt1 are called kings and lords. Those who receive and spread are called high
oﬃcials at the court and all over the country. Those who make the plans for implementation, dedicate
their talents, perform all sorts of specialised tasks, tirelessly, and bring it to the whole realm are called sec-
retaries, clerks, peasants, craftsmen, merchants and soldiers. Men standing on top of other men is called
government2. The replacement of one rule by the next forms the present and past. What goes through
decline and blossom, decay and renewal is called the Way and the Vessel.
When lords, high oﬃcials and commoners search for the causes of the ups and downs of the Way
and Vessel in order to bring order to themselves and the external world and in order to know what path
to take and how to make sense of indeterminacy and change, this is called learning. Learning enables
the teacher, the oﬃcial, the scholar and the common man to investigate all matters concerning mind,
person, family, country and realm, and to know how to correct, how to cultivate, how to order, govern
and bring peace (pacify).
Rewards and punishments will stir fondness and aversion, education and nourishment will inspire
happiness and joy, military action and penal law will provoke anger and lamentation.3 If one is percep-
tive both when it comes to the constant frame of reference and the ﬂuctuating details, and receptive to
the subtle and profound, then the need for institutional continuity will integrate nicely with the need
for institutional innovation, and the results from consultations and debates will be easy to implement
and put into practice. It will become apparent how to trace the most profuse and complex intricacies
back to the principled nature of things which determines their dynamics.
In antiquity, the left scribe4 recorded all the entangled events, while the right scribe recorded all the
profuse words. Events cannot be altered once they have happened, the merits and drawbacks of words
are clear once they have been uttered, the path taken is ﬁxed, all indeterminants are fully known. The
former kings used these records for consultation, to keep themselves informed about the people’s situa-
tion, to aggregate collective worries, to examine signs and to study ultimate reasons. They did not think
that the study of things that had not yet taken shape was obscure, they did not regard the broad investi-
gation of the basic principles of human affairs as inessential, they were not perplexed by the antinomy
of light and dark (contradictions on the surface?), they did not regard overlapping rules and measures as
exact duplicates of one another.
For this reason, I collected the words of famous oﬃcials, eminent scholars, brilliant literati and out-
1The yin因 could mean here either that established institutions are followed, or that they are adapted to the changing
times, therefore, adapt was chosen as translation, which in a way strikes the best balance between both meanings.
2The term zhi治 can not only mean government or rule, but also what government and rule intended to establish and
maintain, i.e. order
3To account for the parallelism of the phrases in this sentence, all objects are rendered as the mental states or emotional
expressions of the people (like and dislike, happiness and joy, angriness and lamentation). The ﬁrst phrase could also be trans-
lated as “using rewards and punishments to inﬂuence what the people like and dislike”, but while the second phrases could
still be forced into a similar schema, it is impossible to ﬁnd a corresponding parallel translation for the third phrase (it would
make no sense to recommend a ruler to use troops and penal law to inﬂuence what the people are angry and lament about).
4The antique shi史were in a sense proto-court historians, so shi could also be rendered as historiographer.
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standing commoners, all of them signiﬁcant works, into one hundred-twenty volumes, divided into
eight overarching sections and sixty-three chapters. Six of the chapters are about learning, ﬁve about
government, eight about state servants, twelve about households, nine about rites, twelve of them about
military, three about punishments, nine about public works. This compilation was introduced by Wei
Moshen [Yuan], proofread by Cao Sheng, and completed in the sixth year of the reign of Daoguang


























Translation of the editorial principles of the HCJSWB (1826)
Selection criteria.
1The yuan元 here replaces the taboo character xuan⽞ (which became taboo because it appeared in the Kangxi em-
peror’s birth name, Aisin Gioro Hiowan Yei (Xuanye)愛新覺羅⽞燁).
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Every book has its purpose and the Way is realized in its practical application. If the in-
tention is active implementation, why prefer a winding trail over a broad thoroughfare?
Practical statecraft is the overarching theme of this collection of writings, a section entitled
‘Learning’ (xueshu學術) provides the guiding principles. Writings that are too lofty in
their subtleness or too shallow and commonplace have not been included into this section.
No affairs are more relevant for us than contemporary affairs and no categorization of af-
fairs is more complete than that of the Six Boards. But the imperial court is the source of
government, the ruler and his ministers oversee all governmental functions. Therefore a
section entitled ‘Essence of Government’ (zhiti治體) precedes the sections on govern-
ment (shuzheng庶政, i.e. lizheng吏政, huzheng⼾政, lizheng禮政, xingzheng刑政,
gongzheng⼯政). Writings about ancient scenarios that are impracticable under present
conditions and writings so general that their practical relevance remains vague have not
been included into this section.
The Qing statutes (Huidian會典) are based on the institutions of the Ming, like the Rites
of Zhou (Zhou guan周官) reﬂected the institutions of the Xia and Shang. But the cir-
cumstances change over time, if abuses become too serious, they have to be counteracted.
Writings on measures that were effective in previous dynasties but are of little use today
have not been included.
Astronomy is a highly specialized ﬁeld of which dedicated experts are in charge. The an-
cient musical systems are a controversial subject. Both are not priority tasks, it is not easy
for people to reach expertise in them, and therefore there is no need to go into detail about
them.
Narrative accounts are a genre just as important as policy discussion, but manifold events
recorded in biographies are diﬃcult to classify. We could only include commemorative ac-
counts on defense against the Southern Barbarians and naval defense in the present work.
Commemorative accounts on other topics, even the excellent works among them, have not
been included.













Everything that brings a beneﬁt also comes with a downside. Sometimes an opposing
view complements the original suggestion, sometimes it is just a question of perspective
and both opponents are actually on the way to the same destination, and it does no harm
that they set out on slightly different tracks.1. Therefore, [if we look at the various discus-
sions of contemporary affairs with] questions such as whether it is diﬃcult or effortless
to operate the baojia-system, whether military colonies can work out or not, whether
mines should be closed down or opened, lawsuits about proper performance of burial
sacriﬁces, controversies between advocates of different styles of taxation, controversies be-
tween North and South concerning the ﬂow of the Yellow River, debates about whether
to leave management of the salt monopoly to the merchants or convert it into an ordi-
nary tax, whether the grain insurance levy2, should go into the provincial treasury or the
local oﬃcial’s treasury, the question of varying geographical conditions in the capital and
provinces, the discussions about whether tribute grain should be transported by inland
waterways or by sea, about whether the dikes constructed along the rivers Sang and Zhang
should be removed, about whether the sluices built into the rivers Wu and Song should
be removed, the massive opposition warning of the serious faults of the Jing Canal that
has been regarded as great beneﬁt through the ages, or the heavy critique of the downsides
of the liquor ban that has been practiced since antiquity. In all these debates, one person
will advocate what the next person rejects and the other way around, and it will be diﬃ-
cult to tell which perspective is too radical or unrealistic. The best thing we can do is to
accumulate different ideas in order to increase beneﬁts, combine two alternatives and take
the happy medium. If one wants to ﬁnd the optimal solution, one has to consider a broad
array of options.
Intricacy or simplicity of style are no absolute criteria for the quality of a writing, only
whether the statements made in it are truthful. Why should one prefer plain color over
bright color by principle when even the Sages did not shun unconventional means in their
strategies and teaching?
One should not reject a text for the person of its author, practical texts should not be
ranked according the status of the writer. Even writing that at ﬁrst sight seems like parochial
talk and street gossip can sometimes be like fresh water that runs deep (provide fresh and
deep insights), while in an impressive multi-volume anthology there can sometimes be a
1This is again a paraphrase of the beginning of the ﬁfth verse of the Xici shang in the Yijing.
2This refers to an additional levy intended to make up for loss during grain transport.
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few writings that are like the faint sound of foot steps in an empty valley (a few highly rele-
vant pieces amidst volumes over volumes of irrelevant writings).
Therefore, we have browsed everything of which copies are extant, neglecting not a single
record, and we have not only checked the personal collected writings of individual authors,
but also their other books and alternative versions of their works, so as to ensure broad cov-
erage. In order to avoid being constrained by our own limited perspective, we also called












The choice of major sections inﬂuences the choice of chapters. If matters are complex, prin-
ciples had better be profound and methods rigorous. The need for separation into topics
should not prevent from the drawing of parallels across thematic boundaries for the sake
of fuller comprehension.
Tribute grain, grain storage and all other matters concerning public revenue are the respon-
sibility of the Board of Revenue, but for issues concerning the river transport of grain, the
section on the Board of Public Works should also be consulted. Public spending on water
conservancy projects is a matter managed by the Board of Public Works, but the related
topic of famine relief in the countryside also intersects with the Board of Revenue. As ‘it
is people who establish order in the state, not laws by themselves’, many issues related to
grain storage and the baojia-system are strongly related to topics dealt with in the section
on the Board of Appointments.1 Only someone who knows how to order his own family
is able to order the country, while the successful implementation of clan rules and family
1 The quotation that ‘it is people who establish order, not the laws [by themselves]’ is from the Xunzi. Xun (1978), p. 40.
See chapter 2.1 of this dissertation for a discussion of the statement. It is signiﬁcant that Wei Yuan quotes Xunzi in connec-
tion with granaries and the baojia-system. Problems in these areas of policy arose not exactly because there were no rules and
regulations, but because people, not least oﬃcials, did not abide by them, as they conﬂicted with their vested interests and
were not effectively enforced.
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rules in turn depends on proper self-cultivation, therefore all related policies have been ar-
ranged under the Ministry of Rites. The imperial lectures1 broadly discuss national politics,
and their purpose is to instruct and to initiate a return to the root of government. Cus-
toms rectify shortcomings in human interaction, and their purpose is to warn of improper
behavior, resulting in a uniﬁed understanding of proper custom. Sometimes an issue that
was the responsibility of the Board of Rites becomes the responsibility of the Board of
Punishments, for example in case when the rules of proper behavior are violated, when
even garments can become an aspect that a court passes judgment on. And then there are
peasants in arms and military colonists and cadastral registration is an aspect of the bao-
jia-system. These are all examples of texts on the same topic that have been arranged into
different sections.
On the other hand, individual chapters can discuss a whole range of different topics. The
chapters on famine relief cover locusts and epidemics, the chapters on agricultural policies
cover silkworm cultivation and lifestock breeding, the chapter on schools cover the civil ser-
vice examination, the chapter on horse husbandry includes writings on the postal service,
the chapters on monetary policies starts with writings on mining, the chapters on geogra-
phy also touch upon the topic of fortiﬁcations. The Lower Yellow River (下河?) is inti-
mately connected to the irrigation systems of the Huai and Yangtse delta, to ﬁle writings
about it under river defence would be confusing. The Hu and Sang River are associated
with river construction work in the capital area, so that it would be sloppy not to discrimi-
nate writings about them from writings on irrigation. These are all examples of writings on
different topics that have been arranged into a single chapter.
And ﬁnally mind the fact that the order of succession of the writings may be ﬁxed, but this
should not prevent the reader to read two articles in parallel and let them mutually illu-
minate each other. With so much information on matters and methods assembled in one
place, it is up to you, the esteemed reader, to choose among them, every pick of reading
















The names of all authors, their places of origin and oﬃcial titles are summarized in the
beginning of this compendium. Lu Yao’s preface to the Qiewenzhai wenchao is dated to
the fortieth year of the Qianlong reign (1775). Although Liu Dakui and Dai Zhen were Lu
Yao’s contemporaries, his Qiewenzhai wenchao included several of their essays on customs
and current institutions. Words that are relevant for their times do not have to published
only after the deaths of their authors.
The texts recorded are all based on woodblock editions1. When Su Shi was in Hainan no-
body knew whether he was still alive or whether he had passed away. Even contemporaries
of Bai Juyi’s works were not sure whether his poems were modern or ancient. We have al-
ways taken those parts from books in circulation that are relevant for statecraft. Of those
authors whose identity can be determined with some certainty, we indicate their names
together with the titles of the texts.2
Writings are meant to solve the big problems of the time, but according to convention,
they have to contain extreme praise (庶⽂資乎救時，復例絕夫標榜?). When discussing
matters, one should strive for simplicity and clarity, but oﬃcial documents are mostly
lengthy and redundant, which often leads to obscurity. Suggestions should be practical
and realistic, but subjective views often lead to suboptimal choices. Had we not discarded
those redundancies, this would have lead to writings lacking consistent literary style, which
do not carry far. Had we not discarded extreme laudatory statements, this would have lead
to the ruining of great works just because they contain some minor faults. We have not,
however, acted as Han Feizi and taken Xunzi in order to construct a more perfect version






1This is probably to emphasize that the sources were not unreliable handwritten copies, which is not entirely true. There
are a few authors in the list of authors of the HCJSWB for whose writings it is indicated that they were obtained in the form
of handwritten copies (dezhi chuanchao得之傳抄).






Amelung, Iwo. 2000. Der Gelbe Fluß in Shandong (1851-1911): Überschwemmungskatastrophen und
ihre Bewältigung im China der späten Qing-Zeit. Vol. 7. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.
Ban, Gu班固, & Yan, Shigu顏師古. n.d.. Qian Han shu 前漢書. Wuyingdian武英殿. Digitized
edition in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫 (hunteq.com/
ancientc/ancientkm).
Beijingshi qianbi xuehui mishuchu,北京市錢幣學會秘書處 (ed). 1991. Zhongguo yingbi biaozhun
tulu 中國硬幣標準圖錄. Beijing: Beijing chubanshe北京出版社.
Bernhardt, Kathryn, & Huang, Philip C. C. (eds). 1994. Civil Law in Qing and Republican China.
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Bourgon, Jerome. 2002. Uncivil Dialogue: Law and Custom did not Merge into Civil Law under the
Qing. Late Imperial China, 23(1), 50–90.
Brindley, Erica. 2013. The Polarization of the Concepts “Si” (Private Interest) and “Gong” (Public Inter-
est) in Early Chinese Thought. Asia Major, 26(2), 1–31.
Büchsel, Ulrike. forthcoming. Conceptualizing State Ritual between Dynasty and Nation: The Reform
of the Qing Ritual System, 1906-1911. Ph.D. thesis, Universität Heidelberg.
Cabrera, Miguel A., Fagan, Anna, & McMahon, Marie. 2001. On Language, Culture, and Social Ac-
tion. History and Theory, 40(4), 82–100.
Chen, Jingpan陳景磐. 1979. Zhongguo jindai jiaoyushi 中國近代教育史. Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu
chubanshe⼈民教育出版社.
Chen, Lianying陳連營. 2000. Guanyu Qing zhongqi de lizhi fubai wenti關於清中期的吏治腐敗問
題. Qingshi luncong 清史論叢, 15, 90–107.
Chen, Ruoshui陳弱⽔ (ed). 2005. Gonggong yishi yu Zhongguo wenhua 公共意識與中國⽂化.
Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi聯經出版事業公司.
Chen, Zhongyi陳忠倚 (ed). 1897. Huangchao jingshiwen sanbian 皇朝經世⽂三編. Reprint. Jindai
Zhongguo shiliao congkan近代中國史料叢刊. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe⽂海出版社, 1979.
Chen, Zilong陳⼦⿓ (ed). 1638. Huang Ming jingshi wenbian 皇明經世⽂編. Pinglutang平露堂.
Cheng, Anne. 1997. Nationalism, Citizenship, and the Old Text/New Text Controversy in Late Nine-
teenth Century China. Pages 61–81 of: Fogel, Joshua A., & Zarrow, Peter Gue (eds), Imagining the
People: Chinese Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship. ME Sharpe.
Cheng, Zhongying. 1991. New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-Confucian Philosophy: Contempo-
rary Allegory and the Search for Postmodern Faith. Albany: SUNY Press.
301
302 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cheng, Zhongying成中英. 1974. Zhongguo zhexue yu Zhongguo wenhua 中國哲學與中國⽂化.
Taipei: Sanmin shuju三民書局.
Chu, Fangqing儲⽅慶. 1876. Dun’an wenji 遯菴⽂集.
Ch’ü, T’ung-Tsu. 1962. Local Government in China Under the Ch’ing. Harvard East Asian Studies, vol.
9. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Chuzo, Ichiko. 1980. Political and institutional reform, 1901–11. Pages 375–315 of: Fairbank, John K., &
Twitchett, Denis C. (eds), The Cambridge History of China, vol. 11. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Creel, Herrlee Glessner. 1970. What is Taoism?: and other studies in Chinese cultural history. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Ding, Wenjiang丁⽂江 and Zhao Fengtian趙豐⽥. 1983. Liang Rengong xiansheng nianpu changbian
梁任公先⽣年譜長編. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe上海⼈民出版社.
Dou, Jingkui竇經魁, & Geng, Yin耿愔 (eds). 1936. Yangwuxian zhi 陽武縣志. Digitized edition
in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫 (hunteq.com/ancientc/
ancientkm).
Dunstan, Helen. 1996. Conﬂicting counsels to confuse the age: A documentary study of political econ-
omy in Qing China, 1644-1840. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
Dunstan, Helen. 2006. State or merchant?: political economy and political process in 1740s China. Vol.
273. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies.
Elman, Benjamin. 1990. Classicism, Politics, and Kinship – The Ch’ang-Chou School of New Text Con-
fucianism in Late Imperial China. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press.
Elman, Benjamin A. 1988. The Relevance of Sung Learning in the Late Ch’ing: Wei Yuan and the
Huang-ch’ao ching-shih wen-pien. Late Imperial China, 9(2), 56–85.
Fan, Benfu樊本富. 2016. Qingmo keju zhidu de gaige zijiu清末科舉制度的改⾰⾃救. Beijing
kaoshi bao 北京考試報, 1138. Online Publication https://www.shikede.net/bjksb.shikede.net/html/
ksb/.../62166.html.
Feng, Tianyu馮天瑜 and Huang Changyi⿈⾧義. 2002. Wan Qing jingshi shixue 晚清經世實學.
Shanghai: Shanghai kexueyuan chubanshe上海科學院出版社.
Franke, Wolfgang. 1960. The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System.
Vol. 10. Cambirdge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center.
Gan, Han⽢韓. 1902. Huangchao jingshiwen xinbian xuji 皇朝經世⽂新編續集. Jindai Zhongguo
shiliao congkan近代中國史料叢刊. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe⽂海出版社, 1972.
Ge, Shijun葛⼠濬 (ed). 1896. Huangchao jingshiwen xubian 皇朝經世⽂續編. Shanghai: Baoshan
shuju寶⼭書局.
Goldin, Paul. 2001. Han Fei’s Doctrine of Self-Interest. Asian Philosophy, 11(3), 151–159.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 303
Goldin, Paul R. 2011. Persistent Misconceptions about Chinese ‘Legalism’. Journal of Chinese Philoso-
phy, 38(1), 88–104.
Gong, Laiguo龔來國. 2004. Qing ‘jingshi wenbian’ yanjiu – yi biancuanxue wei zhongxin 清“經世⽂
編”研究——以編篡學為中⼼. Ph.D. thesis, Fudan Daxue復旦⼤學.
Gong, Rufu龔汝富, & Liu, Jianghua劉江華. 2011. Cong Huang Liuhong ‘Fuhui quanshu’ kan
Qingdai zhouxian lizhi de jingyan zhishi從⿈六鴻《福惠全書》看清代州縣吏治的經驗智慧.
Jiangxi caijing daxue xuebao 江西財經⼤學學報.
Graham, Angus Charles. 1978. Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science. Hongkong: Hongkong Chinese
University Press.
Graham, Angus Charles. 1989. Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China.
Chicago: Open Court.
Grampp, William Dyer. 1965. Economic liberalism. New York: Random House.
Green Apple Data Center,青蘋果數據中⼼. 2010. Shenbao 申報, 1872–1949. Shenbao digital edition
(www.huawenku.cn/html/huawenkuguihua/ruxuanbaokan-20120306856.html).
Gu, Yanwu顧炎武. 1983. Gu Tinglin shiwenji 顧亭林詩⽂集. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju中華書局.
Gu, Yanwu顧炎武. 1994. Rizhilu jishi 日知錄集釋. Changsha: Yuele shushe岳麓書社.
Guan, Xiaohong關曉紅. 2010. Wan Qing zhisheng ‘gongfei’ yu lizhi zhengdun晚清直省 “公費”與
吏治整頓. Lishi yanjiu 歷史研究, 65–80.
Guan, Zhong管仲, & Zhu, Changchun朱⾧春. 1619. Guanzi que 管⼦榷. Zhang Weiqu張維樞.
Guo, Yisheng郭毅⽣, & Shi, Shi史式. 1995. Taiping tianguo da cidian 太平天國⼤辭典. Beijing:
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe中國社會科學出版社.
Guy, R Kent. 2010. Ideology and Organization in the Qing Empire. Journal of Early Modern History,
14(4), 355–377.
Halsey, Stephen R. 2013. Money, Power, and the State: The Origins of the Military-Fiscal State in Mod-
ern China. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 56(3), 392–432.
Han, Chenghua韓承樺. 2011. Pingjie liang’an xuejie jin shinian youguan ‘Jingshi wenbian’ de yanjiu
gaikuang評介兩岸學界近⼗年有關《經世⽂編》的研究概況. Shiyuan 史原, 205–238.
Han, Fei韓⾮, & Chen, Qitian陳啟天. 1992. Zengding Han Feizi jiaoshi 增訂韓非⼦校釋. Tapei:
Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan臺灣商務印書館.
Han, Fei韓⾮, & Wang, Xianshen王先愼. 1896. Han Feizi jijie 韓非⼦集解. Guangxu keben光緒⼆
⼗⼆年刻本. Digitized edition in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂
資料庫 (hunteq.com/ancientc/ancientkm).
304 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Han, Yu韓愈, & Wei, Zhongju魏仲舉. 1200. Xinkan wubaijia zhuyin bian Changli Xiansheng wenji
新刊五百家注音辨昌黎先⽣⽂集. Wei Zhongju jiadian魏仲舉家塾刻本. Digitized edition
in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫 (hunteq.com/ancientc/
ancientkm).
Hart, Herbert L. A. 1961. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
He, Changling賀⾧齡, & Wei, Yuan魏源 (eds). 1827. Huangchao jingshiwenbian 皇朝經世⽂遍.
Reprint. Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan近代中國史料叢刊. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe⽂海出
版社, 1974.
He, Changling賀⾧齡, & Wei, Yuan魏源 (eds). 1887. Huangchao jingshiwenbian 皇朝經世⽂遍.
Shanghai: Guangbai songzhai廣百宋齋.
He, Liangdong何良楝 (ed). 1902. Huangchao jingshi wenbian 皇朝經世⽂編. Reprint. Jindai
Zhongguo shiliao congkan近代中國史料叢刊. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe⽂海出版社, 1979.
He, Yan何晏. n.d.. Lunyu 論語. Gu yishu congshu Riben Zhengping ben古逸叢書⽇本景正平
本. Digitized edition in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫
(hunteq.com/ancientc/ancientkm).
Ho, Ping-ti. 1954. The salt merchants of Yang-chou: a study of commercial capitalism in eighteenth-
century China. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 17(1/2), 130–168.
Huang, Huixian⿈惠賢 (ed). 1997. Ershiwu shi renming da cidian ⼆⼗五史⼈名⼤辭典.
Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe中州古籍出版社.
Huang, Kewu⿈克武. 1985. ‘Huangchao jingshi wenbian’ xueshu zhiti bufen sixiang zhi fenxi《皇朝
經世⽂編》學術、治體部分思想之分析. M.Phil. thesis, National Taiwan Normal University台
北師范⼤學.
Huang, Kewu⿈克武. 2000. Cong zhuiqiu zhengdao dao rentong guozu – Mingmo zhi Qingmo
Zhongguo gongsi guannian de chongzheng從追求正道到認同國族——明末⾄清末中國公私
觀念的重整. Zhishi fenzi luncong 知識分⼦論叢, 1(5), 1.
Huang, Philip CC. 1996. Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing. Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press.
Huang, Philip CC. 2009. Chinese Civil Justice, Past and Present. Lanham, Maryﬁeld: Rowman &
Littleﬁeld.
Huang, Zongxi⿈宗羲. 2005. Huang Zongxi quanji 黄宗羲全集. Zhejiang guji chubanshe浙江古籍
出版社.
Huang, Zongxi⿈宗羲. n.d.. Mingyi daifanglu 明夷待訪錄. Haishanxian guan海⼭仙館. Digitized
edition in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫 (hunteq.com/
ancientc/ancientkm).
Hucker, Charles O. 1985. A Dictionary of Oﬃcial Titles in Imperial China. Stanford, California: Stan-
ford University Press.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 305
Janku, Andrea. 2003. Nur leere Reden: politischer Diskurs und die Shanghaier Presse im China des
späten 19. Jahrhunderts. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.
Janku, Andrea. 2004. Preparing the Ground for Revolutionary Discourse: From the Statecraft Antholo-
gies to the Periodical Press in Nineteenth-Century China. T’oung Pao, 90(1), 65–121.
Jenco, Leigh K. 2010. ‘Rule by Man’ and ‘Rule by Law’ in Early Republican China: Contributions to a
Theoretical Debate. The Journal of Asian Studies, 69(1), 181–203.
Johnston, Ian. 2010. The Mozi: A Complete Translation. New York: Columbia University Press.
Keliher, Macabe. 2016. Administrative Law and the Making of the First Da Qing Huidian. Late Impe-
rial China, 37(1), 55–107.
Kiser, Edgar, & Tong, Xiaoxi. 1992. Determinants of the Amount and Type of Corruption in State
Fiscal Bureaucracies: An Analysis of Late Imperial China. Comparative Political Studies, 25(3), 300–
331.
Kuhn, Philip A. 1995. Ideas behind China’s Modern State. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 55(2),
295–337.
Kuo, Ting-yee. 1983. Self-Strengthening: the Pursuit of Western Technology. Pages 491–542 of: Fair-
bank, John K., & Twitchett, Denis C. (eds), The Cambridge History of China, vol. 10. Cambridge
University Press.
Lackner, Michael. 2008. “Ex Oriente Scientia?” Reconsidering the Ideology of a Chinese Origin of
Western Knowledge. Asia Major, 21(1), 183–200.
Legge, James. 1861. The Four Books: Confucian Analects, The Great learning, and The Doctrine of the
Mean. London: Trübner & Company.
Legge, James. 1876. The She King or Book of Ancient Poetry Translated into English Verse, with Essays
and Notes. London: Trübner & Company.
Legge, James. 1899. The Yi King or Book of Changes. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Leonard, Jane Kate. 1984. Wei Yuan and China’s rediscovery of the maritime world. Cambrdige, Mas-
sachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center.
Levine, Ari Daniel. 2008. Divided by a Common Language: Factional Conﬂict in Late Northern Song
China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Li, Ciming李慈銘. 1965. Yuemantang riji 越縵堂日記. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju中華書局.
Li, Ciyun李慈紜. 2015. Aofeng shuyuan yu Qingchu Fujian lixue de fuxing 鼇峰書院與清初福建理
學的復興. M.Phil. thesis, Qinghua Daxue清華⼤學.
Li, Huaiyin. 2010. Cultural Transition and Village Discourse in Twentieth-Century China. Pages 113–132
of: Ascher, W., & Heffron, J. (eds), Cultural Change and Persistence: New Perspectives on Develop-
ment. Palgrave Macmillan.
306 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Li, Tao李燾. 2011. Xu zizhi tongjian changbian 續資治通鑑長編. Lexington: Reprints from the
collection of the University of Michigan.
Liang, Qichao梁啓超. 1992. Liang Qichao wenxuan 梁啓超⽂選. Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo
dianshi chubanshe中國廣播電視出版社.
Lin, Guohui林國輝. 1994. Cong ‘Huangchao jingshi wenbian’ ‘xueshu’ ji ‘zhiti’ bufen kan wan Qing
‘jingshi sixiang’ de neihan 從《皇朝經世⽂編》「學術」及「治體」部分看晚清「經世思想」
的內涵. M.Phil. thesis, Hongkong Chinese University⾹港中⽂⼤學.
Lin, Man-houng. 1991. Two Social Theories Revealed: Statecraft Controversies Over China’s Monetary
Crisis, 1808-1854. Late Imperial China, 12(2), 1–35.
Liu, Changshan劉常⼭. 2005. Tao Zhu yu Lianghuai yanwu de gaige陶澍與兩淮鹽務的改⾰.
Fengjia renwen shehui xuebao 逢甲⼈⽂社會學報, 11, 223–251.
Liu, Cuirong劉翠溶. 1980. Qingdai cangchudu wending gongneng zhi jiantao清代倉儲度穩定功能
之檢討. Jingji lunwen 經濟論⽂, 8(1), 1–33.
Liu, Dapeng劉⼤鵬. 1990. Tuixiangzhai riji 退想齋日記. Shanxi renmin chubanshe⼭西⼈民出版
社.
Liu, Guangjing劉廣京. 1984. Wei Yuan zhi zhexue yu jingshi sixiang魏源之哲學與經世思想. In:
Jindai Zhongguo jingshi sixiang yantaohui wenji 近代中國經世思想研討會⽂集. Institute of
Modern History, Academia Sinica中研院近代史研究所.
Liu, James TC. 1959. Some classiﬁcations of bureaucrats in Chinese historiography. Pages 165–81 of:
Confucianism in action. Stanford University Press.
Liu, Kuang-ching. 2000. Wei Yuan and the West. Pages 206–212 of: De Bary, Wm Theodore, &
Lufrano, Richard (eds), Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume 2: From 1600 Through the Twenti-
eth Century, vol. 2. New York: Columbia University Press.
Liu, Kuang-ching劉廣京, & Chow, Kai-wing周啟榮. 1986. Huangchao jingshi wenbian guanyu
‘jingshi zhi xue’ de lilun皇朝經世⽂編關於「經世之學」的理論. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan
jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊, 15(1), 33–99.
Liu, Zehua劉澤華. 2003. Chunqiu zhanguo de li gon mie si guannian yu shehui de zhenghe春秋戰
國的⽴公滅私觀念與社會的整合. Pages 337–373 of: Xi’erzhai wengao 洗耳齋⽂稿. Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju中華書局.
Lu, Shanji⿅善繼. 2002. Lu Zhongjie gong ji 鹿忠節公集. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe上海
古籍出版社.
Luo, Zhengjun羅正鈞, & Zhu, Yue朱悅. 1983. Zuo Zongtang nianpu 左宗棠年譜. Changsha:
Hunansheng xinhua shudian湖南省新華書店.
Luo, Zhufeng羅⽵⾵. 1990. Hanyu da xidian 漢語⼤詞典. Shanghai: Hanyu da cidian chubanshe漢
語⼤詞典出版社.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 307
Mai, Zhonghua⿆仲華 (ed). 1898. Huangchao jingshiwen xinbian 皇朝經世⽂新編. Reprint. Jindai
Zhongguo shiliao congkan近代中國史料叢刊. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe⽂海出版社，1979.
Makeham, John. 1994. Name and actuality in early Chinese thought. New York: SUNY Press.
Makeham, John. 2003. Transmitters and creators: Chinese commentators and commentaries on the
Analects. Vol. 228. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center.
Mann, Susan. 1987. Local merchants and the Chinese bureaucracy, 1750-1950. Stanford University Press.
Mann Jones, Susan, & Kuhn, Philip A. 1983. Dynastic Decline and the Roots of Rebellion. Pages 107–
162 of: The Cambridge History of China, vol. 10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marsh, Robert M. 1961. The mandarins. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.
Meng, Ke孟軻, & Li, Xueqin李學勤. 2000. Mengzi zhushu 孟⼦註疏. Shisan jing zhushu⼗三經
注疏. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe北京⼤學出版社.
Metzger, Thomas A. 1972. The organizational capabilities of the Ch’ing State in the ﬁeld of commerce:
The Liang-huai salt monopoly, 1740-1840. Pages 9–46 of: Willmott, William E. Willmott (ed), Eco-
nomic Organization in Chinese Society. Stanford University Press.
Metzger, Thomas A. 1973. The Internal Organization of Ch’ing Bureaucracy: Legal, Normative, and
Communication Aspects. Vol. 7. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Mitchell, Peter MacVicar. 1970. Wei Yüan (1794-1857) and the Early Modernization Movement in China
and Japan. Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University.
Mo, Di墨翟, & Sun, Yirang孫詒讓. 1907. Mozi xiangu 墨⼦閒詁. Handwritten manuscript抄
本. Digitized edition in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫
(hunteq.com/ancientc/ancientkm).
Motono, Eiichi. 2000. Conﬂict and Cooperation in Sino-British Business 1860-1911: The Impact of the
Pro-British Chinese Commercial Network in Shanghai. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Myers, Ramon Hawley. 1980. The Chinese economy: Past and present. Belmont, California:
Wadsworth.
National Palace Museum,故宮博物館. n.d.. Database of Ch’ing Palace Memorials and Archives of
the Grand Council 清代宮中檔奏摺及軍機處檔摺件. http://npmhost.npm.gov.tw/ttscgi/
ttswebnpm.
Ng, On Cho, & Wang, Q Edward. 2005. Mirroring the Past: the Writing and Use of History in Imperial
China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Nivison, David S. 1966. The Life and Thought of Chang Hsüeh-ch’eng, 1738-1801. Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press.
Oﬃcial compilation,官修. n.d.. Shizong xian huangdi shilu 世宗憲皇帝實錄. Diaolong Zhong-Ri
guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫 (hunteq.com/ancientc/ancientkm). digitized
handwritten manuscript of the Imperial Secretariat Qing清内府鈔本.
308 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ouyang, Kang. 2013. Confucianism: Qing Dynasty. Page 539 of: Cua, Antonio S. (ed), Encyclopedia of
Chinese philosophy. Routledge.
Ouyang, Xiu歐陽修, & Xu, Wudang徐無黨. n.d.. Xin Wudaishi 新五代史. Wuyingdian武英殿.
Ouyang, Xiu歐陽修, Song, Qi宋祁, & Dong, Heng董衝. n.d.. Xin Tangshu 新唐書. Wuyingdian
武英殿.
Pang, Pu龐朴. 1997. Zhongguo ruxue 中國儒學. Vol. 2. Shanghai: Dongfang chuban zhongxin東⽅
出版中⼼.
Pi, Mingxiu⽪明庥 (ed). 1987. Zhongwai lishi renwu cidian 中外歷史⼈物詞典. Changsha: Hunan
renmin chubanshe湖南⼈民出版社.
Pocock, John Greville Agard. 1971. Politics, language, and time: Essays on political thought and history.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pocock, John Greville Agard. 2009. Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Polachek, James M. 1992. The Inner Opium War. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia
Center.
Qiu ziqiang zhai zhuren,求⾃疆齋主⼈ (ed). 1901. Huangchao jingji wenbian 皇朝經濟⽂編.
Shanghai: Shenji shuzhuang慎記書庄.
Qiushizhai zhuren,求是齋主⼈ (ed). 1902. Huangchao jingshi wenbian wuji 皇朝經世⽂編五集.
Reprint. Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan近代中國史料叢刊. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe⽂海出
版社, 1979.
Rao, Yucheng饒⽟成 (ed). 1882. Huangchao jingshi wenbian xuji 皇朝經世⽂編續集. Jiangyou
cuiyun shanfang江右翠筠⼭房.
Ren, Junfeng任軍鋒. 2013. Zhonguo dangdai zhengzhi zhong de ‘gong’ yu ‘si’中國當代政治中的
「公」與「私」. ⼆⼗⼀世紀雙月刊, 135(2), 75–86.
Rickett, W Allyn. 2001. Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China, A
Study and Translation. Boston: Cheng & Tsui.
Rowe, William T. 2002. Saving the world: Chen Hongmou and elite consciousness in Eighteenth-
Century China. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Schell, Orville, & Delury, John. 2013. Wealth and Power: China’s long march to the twenty-ﬁrst cen-
tury. New York: Random House.
Schwartz, Benjamin I. 1959. On some Polarities in Confucian Thought. Pages 50–62 of: Nivison,
David S., & Wright, Arthur F. (eds), Confucianism in Action. Stanford, California: Stanford Uni-
versity Press.
Shao, Zhiteng邵之棠 (ed). 1901. Huangchao jingshiwen tongbian 皇朝經世⽂統編. Jindai Zhongguo
shiliao congkan近代中國史料叢刊. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe⽂海出版社, 1979.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 309
Shen, Dao慎到. 2001. Shenzi: Wei de慎⼦：威德. Pages 27–36 of: Gao, Liushui⾼流⽔, & Lin,
Xuansen林桓森 (eds), Shenzi, Yin Wenzi, Gongsun Longzi 慎⼦、尹⽂⼦、公孫龍⼦. Wunan
tushu chuban gufen youxian gongsi五南圖書出版股份有限公司.
Shen, Han-Yin Chen. 1967. Tseng Kuo-fan in Peking, 1840-1852: His Ideas on Statecraft and Reform.
The Journal of Asian Studies, 27(1), 61–80.
Sheng, Kang盛康. 1897. Huangchao jingshiwen xubian 皇朝經世⽂續編. Shanghai: Wujin Shengshi
sibulou武進盛⽒思補樓.
Smith, Richard J. 2015. The Qing Dynasty and Traditional Chinese Culture. Lanham, Maryﬁeld: Row-
man & Littleﬁeld.
Sokoloff, Laurence David. 1980. The Ch’ing Salt Monopoly: a Reappraisal. M.Phil. thesis, University of
British Columbia.
Song, Yao宋瑶. 2012. Guanyu ‘Huangchao jingshi wenbian’ biancuan yanjiu 關於《皇朝經世⽂編》
編篡研究. M.Phil. thesis, Qufu shifan daxue曲⾩師範⼤學.
Spence, Jonathan D. 2008. Chinas Weg in die Moderne. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung.
Sun, Baoxuan孫寶瑄. n.d.. Wangshanlu riji 忘⼭廬日記. Handwritten manuscript抄本. Digitized
edition in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫 (hunteq.com/
ancientc/ancientkm).
Sun, Xun孫遜. 2005. Jin Ping Mei jianshang cidian ⾦瓶梅鑒賞辭典. Shanghai: Hanyu da cidian
chubanshe漢語⼤詞典出版社.
Tang, Zhen唐甄. 1984. Qianshu 潛書注. Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe四川⼈民出版社.
Tillman, Hoyt Cleveland. 1982. Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch’en Liang’s Challenge to Chu Hsi. Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center.
Tillman, Hoyt Cleveland. 2004. Selected Confucian Networks and Values in Society and the Economy.
Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.
Twitchett, Dennis C. 1964. Review of Shishi sanyō: chūgoku ko nōsho ko saishiki no shin shiryō by
Moriya Mitsuo. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 27(3), 646–647.
Vanheste, Jeroen. 2007. Introduction. Pages 1–19 of: Vanheste, Jeroen (ed), Guardians of the Humanist
Legacy: The Classicism of T.S. Eliot’s Criterion. Leiden: Brill.
Vogel, Hans Ulrich. forthcoming. The Salt Industry. Section 37 of Science and Civilisation in China. Ed.
Joseph Needham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wan, Li萬⾥. 2006. Huxiang wenhua da cidian 湖湘⽂化⼤辭典. Vol. 1. Changsha: Hunan renmin
chubanshe湖南⼈民出版社.
Wang, Biao王飈. 2008. Jindai wenxueshi 近代⽂學史. Lecture series on the Chaoxing mingshi
jiangtan超星名師講壇, http://video.chaoxing.com/serie_400000072.shtml.
310 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Wang, Chong jun王崇峻. 2006. Cong Li Fu de bachu kan Yongzheng Di de zhengzhi mudi從李紱的
罷黜看雍正帝的政治⽬的. Xingda lishi xuebao 興⼤歷史學報, 17, 431–456.
Wang, Fansen王汎森. 1995. Shao Yichen (1810–1861) yu Qingmo sixiang de jiliehua邵懿⾠ (1810–1861)
與清末思想的激烈化. Dalu zazhi ⼤陸雜誌第, 90(3), 1–8.
Wang, Fansen王汎森. 2003. Zhongguo jindai sixiang yu xueshu xipu 中國近代思想與學術的系譜.
Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi聯經出版事業公司.
Wang, Fuzhi王夫之. n.d.. Du Tongjian lun 讀通鑑論. Chuanshan yishuben船⼭遺書本. Digitized
edition in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫 (hunteq.com/
ancientc/ancientkm).
Wang, Guowei王國維. 1983. Guantang jilin 觀堂集林. Shanghai: Shanghai shudian上海書店.
Wang, Xiangfeng王向峰 (ed). 1987. Wenyi meixue cidian ⽂藝美學辭典. Shenyang: Liaoning daxue
chubanshe遼寧⼤學出版社.
Wang, Xianqian王先謙 (ed). 1884. Donghualu 東華錄. Changsha: Wangshi keben王⽒刻本.
Digitized edition in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫
(hunteq.com/ancientc/ancientkm).
Wang, Yeh-chien. 1973. Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750–1911. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Har-
vard University Press.
Wei, Qi魏耆. 1976. Shaoyangfu Weijun shilüe邵阳魏府君事略. In: 魏源集. Beijing: Zhonghua
shuju中華書局.
Wei, Yuan魏源. 2004. Wei Yuan Quanji 魏源全集. Changsha: Yuelu chubanshe岳麓書社.
Will, Pierre-Étienne. 2003. L’apprentissage du métier de fonctionnaire à la ﬁn de la période impériale.
Pages 7–47 of: Despeux, Catherine, & Nguyen, Christine (eds), Éducation et instruction en Chine,
vol. 2. Paris and London: Édition Peeters.
Will, Pierre-Étienne. 2012. Checking Abuses of Power under the Ming Dynasty. Pages 128–30 of:
Delmas-Marty, Mireille, & Will, Pierre-Étienne (eds), China, Democracy, and Law. Leiden: Brill.
Will, Pierre-Etienne, & Wong, R Bin. 1991. Nourish the People: The State Civilian Granary System in
China, 1650–1850. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies.
Will, Pierre-Étienne魏丕信, & Li, Bozhong李伯重. 1999. Wan Qing shiqi de guanzhenshu yu Zhong-
guo xingzheng wenhua明清时期的官箴书与中国⾏政⽂化. Qingshi yanjiu 清史研究, 1,
3–20.
Wu, Mei’an吳枚庵 (ed). 1851. Guochao wenzheng 國朝⽂徵. Wujiang Shen shi shimeitang吳江沈
⽒世美堂.
Xiao, Mansheng肖滿省, & Lu, Cuiwan盧翠琬. 2012. Aofeng shuyuan jingshi zhiyong sixiang ji qi
xiandai yiyi鰲峰書院經世致⽤思想及其現代意義. Minjiang xueyuan xuebao 閩江學院學報,
33(3), 23–27.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 311
Xiao, Zongzhi肖宗志. 2006. Wan Qing de keliguan晚清的課吏館. Qingshi yanjiu 清史研究, 1, 3–8.
Xie, Chenghao謝成豪, & Zheng, Ruxiu鄭如秀. 2012. Qing Ru Wang Jin ‘Zhun Meng’ tanxi清儒汪
縉《準孟》探析. Ying Hua xuebao 應華學報, 10, 129–165.
Xinhuawang,新華網. 2014. Xi Jinping: zai guoji guanxi zhong jianxing zhengque li-yi guan 習近
平：在國際關系中踐⾏正確義利觀. http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0704/c1001-
25240344.html, 2014/07/04.
Xun, Kuang荀況. 1978. Xunzi jijie 荀⼦集解. Taipei: Shijie shuju世界書局.
Yan, Yuan顏元. 1987. Yan Yuan ji 顏元集. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju中華書局.
Yan, Zhitui顔之推撰, & Zhao, Ximing趙曦明. 1928. Yanshi jiaxun 顏⽒家訓. Weinan Yanshi Xiaoyi
jiadian keben渭南嚴⽒孝義家塾刻本. Digitized edition in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen
ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫 (hunteq.com/ancientc/ancientkm).
Yang, Changji楊昌濟. 1978. Dahuazhai riji 達化齋日記. Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe湖南
⼈民出版社.
Yang, Dijie楊玓潔. 2013a. Wan Qing keju gaizhi yu jingshi sixiang de bianqian: yi ‘zuixin jingshi wen-
bian’ (1903) wei zhongxin 晚淸科舉改制與經世思想的變遷：以 ‘最新經世⽂編’（1903）為中
⼼. M.Phil. thesis, National Taiwan Normal University台北師範⼤學.
Yang, Jikai楊際開. 2005. Ping Zhang Shou’an: ‘Yi li dai li – Ling Tingkan yu Qing zhongye Ruxue
sixiang zhi zhuanbian’評張壽安：《以禮代理 ￿￿凌廷堪與清中葉儒學思想之轉變》. Ershiyi
shiji (online edition) ⼆⼗⼀世紀（網絡版）, 34(1).
Yang, Liren楊⽴⼈. 1990. Jingshiwen xubian yanjiu經世⽂續編研究. Jindaishi yanjiu 近代史研究,
68–86.
Yang, Shengxin楊繩信 (ed). 1987. Zhongguo banke zonglu 中國版刻綜錄. Xi’an: Shanxi renmin
chubanshe陝西⼈民出版社.
Yang, Soon-ja. 2013b. Shen Dao’s Theory of fa and His Inﬂuence on Han Fei. Pages 47–63 of: Goldin,
Paul R. (ed), Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei. Dordrecht: Springer.
Yijinshi zhuren,宜今室主⼈ (ed). 1901. Huangchao jingjiwen xinbian 皇朝經濟⽂新編. Shanghai:
Yijinshi宜今室.
Yin, Wei殷偉. 2006. Zai hua weiqi de gushi 再話圍棋的故事. Taipei: Knowledge House Press知書
房出版集團.
Yu, Baoxuan于寳軒 (ed). 1903. Huangchao xu’ai wenbian 皇朝蓄艾⽂編. Shanghai: Guanshuju官
書局.
Yu, Keping俞可平. 2008. Zhongguo zhili bianqian 30 nian (1978–2008)中國治理變遷 30年 (1978–
2008). Jilin dacue shehui kexue xuebao 吉林⼤學社會科學學報, 3(6).
Yu, Yingshi. 2013. Confucianism: Qing Dynasty. Pages 115–125 of: Cua, Antonio S (ed), Encyclopedia of
Chinese philosophy. New York and London: Routledge.
312 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Yu, Yu Yingshi余英時. 1987. Zhongguo jinshi zongjiao lunli yu shangren jingshen 中國近世宗教倫
理與商⼈精神. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi聯經出版事業公司.
Yu, Yu Yingshi余英時. 1997. Xiandai ruxuelun 現代儒學論. Shanghai renmin chubanshe上海⼈民
出版社.
Zarrow, Peter. 2012. After empire: the conceptual transformation of the Chinese state, 1885-1924. Stan-
ford, California: Stanford University Press.
Zelin, Madeleine. 1992. The Magistrate’s Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-century
Ch’ing China. Oakland, California: University of California Press.
Zelin, Madeleine. 2002. The Yong-cheng Reign. Pages 183–229 of: The Cambridge History of China,
vol. 9. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zeng, Guofan曾國藩. 1987. Zeng Guofan riji 曾國藩日記. Changsha: Yuelu chubanshe岳麓出版
社.
Zeng, Guofan曾國藩. 1989. Zeng Guofan jiashu 曾國藩家書. Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe
湖南⼈民出版社.
Zhang, Haiyan張海燕, & Deng, Lihua鄧麗華. 2008. Lun Mao Zedong de zheng ming sixiang論⽑
澤東的正名思想. Xueshu luntan 學術論壇, 31(3), 1–4.
Zhang, Pengfei張鵬⾶. 1851. Huangchao jingshi wenbian bu 皇朝經世⽂編補. Ankang: Lailutang來
⿅堂.
Zhang, Qing章清. 2013. Wan Qing Zhongguo Xixue shuji de liutong - lüelun ‘Wanguo gongfa’ ji
‘gongfa’ de ‘zhishi fuzhi’晚清中國西學書籍的流通——略論《萬國公法》及 “公法”的 “知識
複製”. Shihua wenshi luncong 中華⽂史論叢, 3, 213–263.
Zhang, Shou’an張壽安. 1994. Yi li dai li: Ling Tinkan yu Qing zhongye ruxue sixiang zhi zhuanbian
以禮代理: 淩廷堪與清中葉儒學思想之轉變. Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia
Sinica中央硏究院近代史硏究所.
Zhang, Zhidong張之洞. 1935. Shumu dawen 書目答問. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan商務印書
館.
Zhao, Erxun趙爾巽. 1977. Qingshi gao 清史稿. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju中華書局.
Zhao, Rebekah X. 2003. The Changzhou Jinwen Xuepai. In: Yao, Xinzhong (ed), The Encyclopedia of
Confucianism: 2-volume Set. New York and London: Routledge.
Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan,中國第⼀歷史檔案館 (ed). 2008. Qingting qianyi ‘Jiaobinlu
kangyi’ dang’an huibian 清廷簽議「校邠廬抗議」檔案彙編. Vol. 1–25. Beijing: Xianzhuang
shuju線裝書局.
Zhongguo gaodeng jiaoyu wenxian baozhang xitong guanli zhongxin,中國⾼等教育⽂獻保障系
統管理中⼼. 2010. CALIS 中國⾼等教育⽂獻保障系統. Online meta catalogue of mainland
Chinese university library holdings (rbsc.calis.edu.cn).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 313
Zhou, Gucheng周⾕城. 1996. Zhongguo xueshu mingzhu tiyao 中國學術名著提要. Shanghai:
Fudan daxue chubanshe復旦⼤學出版社.
Zhou, Jian周健. 2007. Qingji Zhili chaiyao yanjiu 清季直隸差徭研究. M.Phil. thesis, Nankai Daxue
南開⼤學.
Zhou, Jian周健. 2012. Lougui yu Qing Jia Dao zhi ji de difang caizheng - yi Jiaqing ershiwu nian
qingcha lougui shijian wei xiansuo陋規與清嘉道之際的地⽅財政 ￿以嘉慶⼆⼗五年清查
陋規事件為線索. Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History Academia Sinica 近代史研究所集
刊, 115–122.
Zhou, Jiming周積明, & Guo, Ying郭瑩. 2003. Zhendang yu chongtu: Zhongguo zaoqi xiandaihua
jincheng zhong de sichao he shehui 震蕩與沖突: 中國早期現代化進程中的思潮和社會.
Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan商務印書館.
Zhou, Xueguang周雪光. 2014. Cong ‘Huang Zongxi dinglü’ dao diguo de luoji: Zhongguo guojia
zhili luoji de lishi xiansuo從 “⿈宗羲定律”到帝國的邏輯:中國國家治理邏輯的歷史線索.
Kaifang shidai 開放時代, 4, 108–132.
Zhou, Zhenhuan周振鶴. 2005. Wan Qing yingye shumu 晚清營業書目. Shanghai: Shanghai
shudian chunbanshe上海書店出版社.
Zhu, Xi朱熹. 1983. Siku zhangju: Mengzi jizhu四書章句·孟⼦集注. Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.
Zhu, Xi朱熹. n.d.. Hui’an xiansheng Zhu Wengong wenji 晦庵先⽣朱⽂公⽂集. Shanghai hanfen-
lou Ming kanben上海涵芬樓藏明刊本. Digitized edition in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen
ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫 (hunteq.com/ancientc/ancientkm).
Zhu, Xi朱熹, & Li, Guangdi李光地. 1713. Zhuzi quanshu 朱⼦全書. Wu Yingdian kanben武英殿
刻本. Digitized edition in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫
(hunteq.com/ancientc/ancientkm).
Zhu, Xi朱熹, & Li, Jingde黎靖德. 1473. Zhuzi yulei 朱⼦語類. Chen Wei kanben陳煒刻本.
Digitized edition in Diaolong Zhong-Ri guji quanwen ziliaoku雕⿓中⽇古籍全⽂資料庫
(hunteq.com/ancientc/ancientkm).
Zhuang, Hanxin庄漢新, & Guo, Juyuan郭居園 (eds). 1991. Zhongguo gujin mingren da cidian 中國
古今名⼈⼤辭典. Beijing: Jingguan jiaoyu chubanshe警官教育出版社.
Zuo, Zongtang左宗棠. 1987. Zuo Zongtang quanji: zougao 左宗棠全集: 奏稿. Vol. 4. Changsha:
Yuelu chubanshe岳麓書社.
